Autobiographical memory specificity and cognitive style across the bipolar disorder spectrum by Gooding, Patricia et al.
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
  
and Cognitive Style Across the 
 
Bipolar Disorder Spectrum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Medical & Human Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
2011 
 
 
 
 
Robert Christopher Dempsey 
 
School of Psychological Sciences 
 
 
 2 
 Contents  
   
Abstract  9 
  
Declaration & Copyright Statement 10 
  
Acknowledgements 11 
  
Section 1 Introduction & Literature Reviews 
1.1 The Epidemiology & Phenomenology of Bipolar Disorder 
    
1.1.1 Introduction 12 
1.1.2 Symptoms of Bipolar Disorder 13 
1.1.3 The Diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder 17 
1.1.3.1 DSM-IV Criteria for Bipolar Disorder 17 
1.1.3.2 The Reliability & Stability of Bipolar Diagnoses 20 
1.1.4 Treatment for Bipolar Disorder 20 
1.1.4.1 Physiological Therapies 20 
1.1.4.2 Psychological Therapies 23 
1.1.5 Illness Courses & Outcomes for Bipolar Disorder 31 
   
1.2 Psychological Theoretical Models of Bipolar Disorder 
   
1.2.1 Behavioural Activation, Inhibition & Dysregulation 33 
1.2.2 The Depression Avoidance Hypothesis 36 
1.2.3 Response Styles Theory 38 
1.2.4 The Beckian Cognitive Models 40 
1.2.5 Appraisals of Internal States 44 
1.2.6 Interacting Cognitive Subsystems 48 
1.2.7 Summary 51 
   
1.3  The Specificity of Autobiographical Memory in the Affective 
Disorders: Psychological Mechanisms, Theory, and Potential 
Applications to Bipolar Disorder 
 
   
1.3.0 Abstract 55 
1.3.1 The Autobiographical Memory System 55 
1.3.2 Autobiographical Memory Recall 56 
1.3.3 Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory Specificity 57 
1.3.4 Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Overgeneral 
Autobiographical Memory 
59 
1.3.5 The Impact of Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory Recall 
upon Functioning and Illness Outcomes 
69 
1.3.6 Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory in Bipolar Disorder 73 
1.3.7 Conclusions 79 
   
1.4 The Current Thesis: Theory, Research Aims & Hypotheses  
   
1.4.1 Autobiographical Memory Recall in Bipolar Disorder 81 
1.4.2 Research Aims & Hypotheses 83 
1.4.3 Overview of Studies 89 
1.4.4 The Alternative Format & Publications 91 
   
1.5 The Current Thesis: Methodology  
   
1.5.1 Methodological Approaches 92 
   
 3 
Section 2 Cognitive Styles & the Vulnerability to Hypomania   
  
2.1 Study One: Positive and Negative Cognitive Style Correlates of the 
Vulnerability to Hypomania 
 
   
2.1.1 Abstract 98 
2.1.2 Introduction 98 
2.1.3 Method 101 
2.1.4 Results 105 
2.1.5 Discussion 118 
2.1.6 Conclusions 122 
   
2.2 Study Two: The prospective associations between positive and 
negative cognitive styles and the severity of bipolar mood 
symptoms at six months in an analogue sample 
 
   
2.2.1 Abstract 124 
2.2.2 Introduction 124 
2.2.3 Method 127 
2.2.4 Results 129 
2.2.5 Discussion 135 
2.2.6 Conclusions 138 
   
Section 3 Autobiographical Memory & Problem Solving  
3.1 Study Three: The Development of the University Means-End Problem 
Solving Task as a Measure of Problem Solving 
Capabilities in British Undergraduate Students 
 
   
3.1.1 Abstract 140 
3.1.2 Introduction 140 
3.1.3 Method 143 
3.1.4 Results 147 
3.1.5 Discussion 153 
3.1.6 Conclusions 156 
   
3.2 Study Four: The differential associations between defeat and 
entrapment with psychosocial problem-solving. Further 
validation of the University Means-End Problem Solving 
Task  
 
3.2.1 Abstract 158 
3.2.2 Introduction 158 
3.2.3 Method 161 
3.2.4 Results 164 
3.2.5 Discussion 173 
3.2.6 Conclusions 176 
  
3.3 Study Five: Investigating the Cognitive Vulnerability to Hypomania: 
autobiographical memory specificity, positive and negative 
rumination, and problem-solving  
 
   
3.3.1 Abstract 178 
3.3.2 Introduction 178 
3.3.3 Method 182 
3.3.4 Results 187 
 4 
   
3.3.5 Discussion 194 
3.3.6 Conclusions 197 
   
Section 4 
The Specificity of Autobiographical Memory Recall 
& the Planning and Pursuit of Goals 
 
4.1 Study Six:   A Preliminary Investigation into the Relationships 
between Dysfunctional Goal Striving and Goal-related 
Memory Recall Processes in the Vulnerability to 
Hypomania 
 
4.1.1 Abstract 199 
4.1.2 Introduction 199 
4.1.3 Method 204 
4.1.4 Results 209 
4.1.5 Discussion 214 
4.1.6 Conclusions 216 
   
Section 5 
The Specificity of Autobiographical Memory Recall 
Across the Bipolar Disorder Spectrum 
 
5.0 Abstract 218 
  
5.1 Introduction: Autobiographical Memory Specificity across the      
Bipolar Disorder Spectrum 
 
5.1.1 General Introduction 219 
5.1.2 The Present Research 222 
  
5.2 Study Seven: The Specificity of Autobiographical Memory Recall in 
Hypomania 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 223 
5.2.2 Method 225 
5.2.3 Results 229 
5.2.4 Discussion 234 
5.2.5 Conclusions 237 
   
5.3 Study Eight:  The Specificity of Autobiographical Memory Recall in    
Remitted Bipolar Individuals & Matched Controls 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 238 
5.3.2 Method 239 
5.3.3 Results 242 
5.3.4 Discussion 249 
5.3.5 Conclusions 253 
  
5.4 General Discussion for Studies Seven & Eight  
5.4.1 General Discussion 254 
5.4.2 Conclusions 258 
  
Section 6  General Discussion  
6.1 Research Aim 1 259 
6.2 Research Aim 2 260 
6.3 Research Aim 3 262 
6.4 Research Aim 4 263 
   
 5 
   
6.5 Research Aim 5 264 
6.6 Discussion of Results Across Studies 264 
6.7 Methodological Considerations 267 
6.7.1 Assessing the Specificity of Autobiographical Memory 267 
6.8 Strengths & Limitations of the Current Thesis 269 
6.9 Directions for Future Research 274 
6.10 Clinical Implications 276 
6.11 Conclusions 278 
   
References 
 
280 
    
Appendix I Behavioural Inhibition & Activation Scale 299 
 II Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 300 
 III Defeat Scale 302 
 IV Entrapment Scale 303 
 V Event-rating Scale 304 
 VI Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire 305 
 VII Hypomanic Personality Scale 307 
 VIII The Internal States Scale 309 
 IX Interpretations of Depression Questionnaire 310 
 X Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  312 
 XI The Problem Solving Scale 313 
 XII Responses to Positive Affect scale 314 
 XIII Ruminative Responses Scale 315 
 XIV Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test 316 
 XV Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Test 316 
 XVI The University Means-End Problem Solving Task 317 
 XVII The WASSUP Scale 320 
 XVIII Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) Instructions 321 
 XIX Coding Manual for the AMT 322 
 XX The UMEPS Scoring Manual 323 
 
 
Final Word Count = 96, 403 words 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
List of Tables 
 
Table Title Page 
   
1.2.1 The major psychological theoretical frameworks for Bipolar Disorder 54 
1.3.1 Autobiographical memory studies conducted in bipolar samples  78 
2.1.1 Means and standard deviations for scores on the questionnaire measures. 105 
2.1.2 Correlation matrix for symptom, self-appraisal and cognitive measures 107 
2.1.3   Regression of the associations between cognitive styles and hypomania 109 
2.1.4 Regression of the association between cognitive styles and depression 110 
2.1.5 Item loadings on the Principal Components Analysis  111 
2.1.6 Correlations between symptom measures and PCA components 116 
2.1.7 Regressions of the associations between the cognitive style components 
with hypomania vulnerability and depressive symptoms 
117 
2.2.1 Means and standard deviations for the Time 2 measures 130 
2.2.2 Correlations between Time 1 measures and Time 2 symptom measures. 131 
2.2.3 Regressions for associations between Time 1 and Time 2 measures 133 
2.2.4 Regressions for associations between the Time 1 & Time 2 measures 134 
3.1.1 Mean scores on the self-report measures and the UMEPS task 148 
3.1.2 Realism ratings for the UMEPS task items 149 
3.1.3 Correlations between UMEPS measures, resourcefulness and depression 150 
3.1.4 Regression of depression from the number of solutions on the UMEPS 152 
3.1.5 Logistic regression of depressed group membership from the UMEPS task 153 
3.2.1 Mean scores on the self-report measures and the UMEPS task measures 164 
3.2.2 Inter-rater reliability statistics for the UMEPS problem-solving task 165 
3.2.3 Effort and realism ratings for items on the UMEPS problem-solving task  166 
3.2.4 Factor loadings for items from the Defeat and Entrapment scales 168 
3.2.5 Correlations between the self-report measures and the UMEPS task 170 
3.3.1 Demographic characteristics for whole sample, high and low risk groups  182 
3.3.2 Example responses on the SCEPT autobiographical memory task  186 
3.3.3 Inter-rater reliability statistics for the autobiographical memory measure 
(SCEPT) and problem solving task (UMEPS) 
188 
3.3.4 Means and between-group differences for the mood symptoms measures 189 
3.3.5 Means and between-group differences in positive and negative rumination 190 
3.3.6 Autobiographical memory specificity across the high and low risk groups 191 
3.3.7 Scores on the UMEPS problem-solving task across groups 192 
 7 
 List of Tables (continued)  
3.3.8 Logistic regression for the prediction of group membership for risk groups 194 
4.1.1 Example responses on the SCEPT-WL and SCEFT tasks 208 
4.1.2 Mean scores on the symptom, vulnerability and goal measures 209 
4.1.3 Mean scores on the goal-related memory and correlations between the 
goal-striving questionnaire measures with hypomania vulnerability, past 
goal-related memory recall and future event imagination. 
211 
4.1.4 Regression analysis for hypomania vulnerability according to goal-
striving, reward sensitivity, and goal-related memory  
213 
5.2.1 Cue words used in the Autobiographical Memory Test 227 
5.2.2 Demographic characteristics for the high, moderate and low risk groups   230 
5.2.3 Autobiographical memory specificity across HPS groups 231 
5.2.4 Response latencies across the low, moderate and high HPS groups 233 
5.3.1 Demographic characteristics of the bipolar and control groups 243 
5.3.2 Results of the  MANOVA for mean scores on the mood and symptom 
questionnaire measures across groups 
245 
5.3.3 Autobiographical memory specificity across the remitted bipolar and  
control groups 
246 
5.3.4 Response latencies across the bipolar and non-bipolar control groups 249 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure Title Page 
1.2.1 The Schematic Propositional Analogical and Associative Representation 
Systems framework (Power & Dalgleish, 1997) 
45 
1.2.2 Interacting Cognitive Subsystems framework (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991) 49 
1.3.1 The autobiographical memory system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) 56 
1.3.2 The CaRFAX model of autobiographical memory (Williams 2006) 65 
3.2.1 Scree plot of the eigenvalues from the factor analysis 167 
3.3.2 Mediation of depression and irrelevant solution means by entrapment 172 
3.2.3 Mediation of depression and solution effectiveness by defeat 173 
5.2.1 The interaction of memory specificity and HPS group 232 
5.3.1 The interaction of memory specificity and valence for the bipolar group 247 
5.3.2 The interaction of memory specificity and valence for the control group 248 
 8 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AMT Autobiographical Memory Test 
BAS  Behavioural Activation System 
BIS  Behavioural Inhibition System 
CaRFAX  The Capture and Rumination, Functional Avoidance, and Executive 
Processes and Control Model of Autobiographical Memory 
CBT  Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
CES-D  Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 
DYS Dysregulation of BAS 
ECT Electro-Convulsive Therapy 
ESK Event-Specific Knowledge 
HIQ  Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire 
HPS  Hypomanic Personality Scale 
ICS  Interacting Cognitive Subsystems 
IDQ  Interpretations of Depression Questionnaire 
IPSRT  Interpersonal and Social Rhythm Therapy 
ISS  Internal States Scale 
MEPS  Means-End Problem Solving task 
PANAS  Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
PSS  Problem Solving Scale 
RCT Randomised Controlled Trial 
RPA  Responses to Positive Affect Scale 
RRS  Ruminative Responses Scale 
RSQ  Response Styles Questionnaire 
SCEFT Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Test 
SCEPT Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test 
SPAARS  Schematic Propositional Analogical and Associative  
  Representation Systems framework 
UMEPS  University Means-End Problem Solving Task 
WASSUP  The Willingly Approached Set of Statistically Unlikely Pursuits Scale 
 
 9 
The University of Manchester 
 
Robert Christopher Dempsey  
PhD in Psychology 
2011 
 
Autobiographical Memory and Cognitive Style across the Bipolar Disorder Spectrum 
 
Abstract 
Bipolar disorder is characterised by intense fluctuations in mood, including the experience 
of severe episodes of depression, mania and hypomania. The experience of bipolar disorder 
can also be associated with biases in various cognitive processes, including rumination in 
response to positive and negative mood states and tendencies to make dysfunctional self-
appraisals. Preliminary research has also suggested that bipolar disorder may be associated 
with deficits in the recall of specifically detailed autobiographical memories. 
 The lack of specificity in the recall of autobiographical memories, known as the 
“overgeneral” recall bias, refers to tendencies to generate generalised memory 
representations as the memory recall process is terminated prior to the activation of 
specifically detailed memories. This overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories can 
also contribute to ruminative thought patterns, impair the generation of effective solutions 
to problems, and is associated with poor illness outcomes. The overgeneral bias has been 
extensively researched within major depressive disorder and suicidality, but has been 
comparatively under-researched in bipolar disorder and in vulnerable individuals. 
A series of eight studies were designed to: (i) investigate the cross-sectional 
associations across measures of positive and negative rumination and self-appraisal with 
the vulnerability to hypomania, and investigate the associations of these cognitive styles 
with prospective mood symptoms in an at-risk sample; (ii) investigate the cognitive 
vulnerability to hypomania in relation to rumination, problem-solving and autobiographical 
memory specificity; (iii) conduct a preliminary investigation into the associations between 
goal-related memory processes and extreme goal-pursuit in relation to hypomania 
vulnerability; (iv) investigate whether the vulnerability to hypomania and future bipolar 
disorders is associated with similar patterns of overgeneral memory recall on a 
standardised cue memory task; and (v) investigate the patterns of autobiographical memory 
specificity within a remitted bipolar sample.  
The heightened vulnerability to future bipolar disorders was associated with 
tendencies to engage in both positive and negative forms of ruminative thought processes, 
and with poorer psychosocial problem-solving, however, this relationship with problem-
solving was not independent of current mood symptoms. The results of two studies 
indicated that the heightened vulnerability to hypomania was associated with an 
overgeneral memory bias across two different assessments of memory specificity, in direct 
contrast to previous research. Individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder also reported 
more extreme overgenerality during memory recall than a sample of age and gender-
matched healthy controls, but were able to recall some specifically detailed negative 
memories in short response latencies compared to non-bipolar control participants.  
The research presented within this thesis supports the notion of a continuum of 
increasing overgenerality in the bipolar disorder spectrum, inclusive of at-risk individuals 
to people formally diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Although bipolar disorder appears to 
be associated with a trait-based overgeneral memory bias, bipolar individuals appear to 
have ready access to some specific negative memories even during remission from 
symptoms. The clinical implications of this research, methodological considerations in the 
assessment of memory specificity, and directions for further investigations into the nature 
of autobiographical memory recall in bipolar spectrum disorders are discussed. 
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Section 1.1 
 
Literature Review: 
The Epidemiology & Phenomenology of Bipolar Disorder 
This section will provide a review of the literature detailing the epidemiology of bipolar 
disorder, and will review the current diagnostic criteria, the symptoms, treatments, and the 
illness outcomes associated with bipolar disorder. 
 
1.1.1 Introduction 
Bipolar Disorder is a pervasive mental health condition which is characterised by dynamic 
swings in mood and self esteem and is highly associated with a variety of co-morbid 
mental and physiological health problems (Simon et al., 2004; McIntyre et al., 2006). 
Individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder typically experience fluctuations between 
periods of relatively normal functioning and stable mood states, in addition to relapses into 
manic, hypomanic, depressive and mixed state episodes of illness. Rates of relapse can be 
high, with as many as 50% of bipolar patients found to relapse within 2 years of first 
remission from symptoms, and up to 73% of patients relapse within 5 years, despite 
continued treatment by medication (Gitlin, Swendsen, Heller & Hammen, 1995). Bipolar 
disorder is estimated to have a lifetime prevalence of approximately 1-1.5% in the general 
population (Bebbington & Ramana, 1995), although some estimates have suggested 
prevalence rates as high as 5% in the community when accounting for softer forms of 
bipolar disorder (Lewisohn, Klein & Seeley, 1995). 
Bipolar Disorder is highly heritable amongst family members (Bertelsen, Harvald 
& Hauge, 1977; McGuffin et al., 2003), leading to the suspicion that some form of genetic 
vulnerability exists for bipolar affective illnesses. However no specific gene has been 
identified as being solely responsible for conferring a genetic vulnerability to bipolar 
disorder (Craddock & Sklar, 2009), although a number of potential candidate genes have 
been identified (Craddock & Jones, 1999). 
Bipolar disorder is associated with significant levels of disability particularly 
during acute episodes of the illness (Huxley & Baldessarini, 2007) and is one of the 
leading global causes of disability (Murray & Lopez, 1996). Whilst bipolar disorder can 
present a significant burden to the patient and their significant others, there is also a 
considerable economic cost associated with bipolar disorder. It has been estimated that 
bipolar disorder may cost the UK economy up to £4.9 billion per annum (based upon 2007 
prices) (Fajutrao, Locklear, Priaulx & Heyes, 2009), through costs to the healthcare system  
and the reliance on government benefits (Das Gupta & Guest, 2002). 
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Age of Onset 
Bipolar Disorder can be diagnosed at any age and is frequently misdiagnosed (Perlis, 
2005). Bipolar patients are often misdiagnosed with schizophrenia and major depressive 
disorder (Baca-Garcia et al., 2007b), which complicates the task of ascertaining the true 
age of onset of bipolar affective illnesses. The average age of first onset of bipolar 
symptoms is generally considered to be in the twenties, with various studies and literature 
reviews suggesting average ages of onset of approximately 26-28 years of age (Goodwin & 
Jamison, 1990; Lam, Wright & Sham, 2005; Baldessarini et al., 2010), although the first 
appearance of bipolar symptoms can occur prior to this age. Indeed, a recent web-based 
survey of 1024 bipolar patients reported a mean age of onset of symptoms of 18.5 years, 
but a mean age at first diagnosis of bipolar disorder of 32.9 years (Depp et al., 2009). 
A large scale epidemiological study has also reported that 28% of bipolar patients 
reported a very early onset of bipolar disorder prior to the age of 13 years, with an 
additional 38% reporting a first onset of bipolar disorder of between 13 and 18 years of age 
(Perlis et al., 2004). Early ages of onset are associated with more severe courses of bipolar 
affective illness, greater co-morbid health problems and with poorer illness outcomes 
(Perlis et al., 2004). Earlier onset of bipolar disorder has been associated with more severe 
psychotic symptoms (Bellivier, Golmard, Henry, Leboyer & Schürhoff, 2001), greater 
substance abuse (Cate Carter, Mundo, Parikh & Kennedy, 2003), poorer responses to 
lithium medication (Schürhoff et al., 2000), more frequent recurrences of bipolar episodes, 
shorter inter-episode periods of normal functioning (Perlis et al., 2004), and with greater 
risks of attempted suicide (Cate Carter et al., 2003; Perlis et al., 2004). Bipolar disorders 
with later ages of onset, later than 40 years of age, are associated with less severe illness 
courses than early onset bipolar disorder. Interestingly, earlier ages of onset have also been 
associated with a greater prevalence of bipolar disorder amongst family members than later 
onset, suggesting that earlier and late onset bipolar disorder may represent different 
subtypes of bipolar affective illness (Schürhoff et al., 2000). 
 
1.1.2 Symptoms of Bipolar Disorder 
 
Depression 
A major depressive episode, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association‟s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4
th
 Edition) (DSM-IV: APA, 
2000), is a period of at least two weeks where there has been a predominantly depressed 
mood and/or a loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities (APA, 2000). For a 
diagnosis of a depressive episode to be made at least four of the following additional 
symptoms must be observed, including: changes in appetite, weight, sleep or psychomotor 
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activity; loss of energy; feelings of guilt or worthlessness; difficulties in thinking, 
concentrating, or making decisions; and/or recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation. 
These symptoms must have been newly present or have worsened during the depressive 
mood state, and persisted for most of the day, nearly everyday, for at least two weeks 
(APA, 2000). A depressive episode should be accompanied by significant feelings of stress 
and impairments to social, occupational and any other important areas of functioning. As 
with the other mood episodes featured in the DSM, the diagnosis of a major depressive 
episode must not include symptoms which meet the criteria for a mixed episode. Similarly, 
the depressed episode must not be due to a substance, in the form of medication or illicit 
substances, or due to a general medical condition. Finally, the depressive symptoms should 
not be better accounted for by the recent experience of bereavement. 
 
Mania 
A manic episode is a distinct period of time consisting of an abnormal, persistently 
elevated, expansive or irritable mood, which lasts for a minimum period of one week 
(APA, 2000). However, the criterion of a week-long duration may be ignored if immediate 
hospitalisation of a manic patient is required. The abnormal mood episode must also be 
accompanied by at least three additional symptoms for a diagnosis of a manic episode to be 
made. These symptoms include: increased self-esteem or grandiosity, being more talkative 
or pressurised in speech, increased goal directed activity or psychomotor agitation, the 
experience of a flight of ideas or racing thoughts, distractibility, a reduced need for sleep, 
and excessive involvement in activities of a highly risky, yet pleasurable nature, such as 
unrestrained spending, increased sexual behaviour or promiscuity, reckless driving and the 
use of recreational drugs (APA, 2000). 
The disturbance of mood during mania should be sufficiently severe to cause 
impairments in occupational functioning, social activities and relationships. In cases where 
there is a threat of harm to the self or others, hospitalisation of the patient may be 
necessary. For the diagnosis of a manic episode to be made the previously specified 
symptoms should not meet the criteria for a mixed episode and should not be explained by 
the presence of a general medical condition, or be due to antidepressant medication, 
electroconvulsive therapy, or substance abuse. 
 
Mixed Episode 
A mixed episode refers to a period of time where the individual experiences rapidly 
alternating moods, including irritability, euphoria and sadness, accompanied by the 
symptoms of both a manic and a major depressive episode (APA, 2000). The criteria for 
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both a manic episode and a major depressive episode must have been met for nearly every 
day for at least a period of one week. The mood disturbance associated with a mixed 
episode should also cause impairments in occupational functioning, social activities and 
relationships, and may require hospitalisation if there is a fear of harm to the self or others 
or if the disturbance is associated with psychotic features. The symptoms of a mixed 
episode should not be caused by a general medical condition or by the physiological effects 
of a substance, whether medication or a recreational drug. 
 
Hypomania 
A hypomanic episode is distinguished from a manic episode by the experience of an 
abnormal and persistently elevated, expansive or irritable mood for a period of at least four 
days which is different from the individual‟s normal mood profile (APA, 2000). The 
individual must have experienced at least three symptoms of a manic episode as previously 
described (e.g., inflated self-esteem, increased goal-directed activity). A hypomanic 
episode must represent a change in the individual‟s usual functioning and mood which is 
not characteristic when non-symptomatic, which is noticeable by other individuals, 
including friends and relatives (APA, 2000). In contrast to a manic episode, hypomania 
should not represent a severe impairment to social or occupational functioning, should not 
require hospitalisation, and should not be associated with psychotic symptoms (e.g., 
hallucinations, delusions). 
The DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for hypomania are somewhat controversial, with 
criticism particularly centred on the four day diagnostic criterion for the duration of a 
hypomanic episode. Recent epidemiological research has suggested that up to 30% of 
hypomanic episodes may last less than four days, often with durations of between 2-3 days, 
although up to 30% of hypomanic episodes can have durations greater than four weeks 
(Benazzi & Akiskal, 2006). There has been a growing call for a review of the duration 
criteria for hypomania, especially as hypomanic episodes with minimum durations of 2-3 
days are able to distinguish between outpatients with unipolar depression and bipolar II 
disorder (Benazzi, 2001). It has been suggested that the four day criterion for hypomania 
could potentially misdiagnose up to one third of bipolar II patients with major depressive 
disorder (Benazzi & Akiskal, 2006), with potentially serious implications upon the 
treatment and clinical outcomes for those patients receiving such misdiagnoses. 
 
Comorbidity in Bipolar Disorder 
Bipolar Disorder is highly comorbid with a range of psychiatric conditions and general 
medical conditions, with estimates that around 60-65% of bipolar patients have some form 
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of comorbid diagnosis (Cassano, Pini, Saettoni, Rucci & Del'Osso, 1998; McElroy et al., 
2001). Bipolar disorder is highly comorbid with a range of anxiety disorders (McElroy et 
al., 2001; Perlis et al., 2004; Simon et al., 2004), sleep disorders (Harvey, Schmidt, Scarnà, 
Semler & Goodwin, 2005), psychoses (Keck et al., 2003), substance abuse disorders 
(Regier et al., 1990; McElroy et al., 2001; Kilbourne et al., 2004), and a range of general 
medical health conditions (Kilbourne et al., 2004; McIntyre et al., 2006). As many as 50% 
of bipolar outpatients have comorbid axis I anxiety disorders (McElroy et al., 2001; Simon 
et al., 2004). In relation to psychosis, a community based study reported that as many as 
68% of bipolar patients reported histories of psychotic symptoms, with high prevalences of 
delusions of reference (62% of patients), grandiosity (61%) and persecution (51%), as well 
as auditory (37%) and visual hallucinations (32%) reported during previous mood episodes 
(Keck et al., 2003). 
In relation to sleep disturbance, manic episodes are often associated with a 
decreased need for sleep (Loudon, Blackburn & Ashworth, 1977; Serretti & Olgiati, 2005). 
Many manic individuals are able to function without sleep for up to several days whilst 
still feeling full of energy (APA, 2000). In contrast, depressive episodes can be associated 
with insomnia (Winokur, Clayton & Reich, 1969) and difficulties in falling asleep (Casper 
et al., 1985), whilst over-sleeping (hypersomnia) is less common in depressive episodes 
than insomnia (Casper et al., 1985). Sleep disturbances appear to be diminished outside of 
bipolar mood episodes (Harvey et al., 2005; Jones, Hare & Evershed, 2005b), yet many 
euthymic bipolar individuals still report poor qualities of sleep (Harvey et al, 2005; 
Harvey, 2008). Many psychological therapies now incorporate techniques which 
encourage the stabilisation of daily activities and the maintenance of regular sleeping 
patterns (Frank et al., 1997; Frank et al., 2005; Jones & Burrell-Hodgson, 2008). 
In comparison with the general population, high rates of substance abuse have been 
associated with bipolar disorder (Regier et al., 1990), including high lifetime rates of 
alcohol, tobacco, cocaine, and cannabis abuse (Agrawal, Nurnberger Jr & Lynskey, 2011). 
Higher rates of substance abuse are found in younger age groups and in males more than 
females (Cassidy, Ahearn & Carroll, 2001). Interestingly, both bipolar and non-bipolar 
individuals with diagnosed substance abuse disorders appear to endorse similar reasons for 
engaging in substance abuse behaviours (Bizzarri et al., 2007), these include the alleviation 
of psychopathological symptoms, maintenance of positive mood states, attempts to 
increase energy, alleviating boredom, and for aiding relaxation (Bizzarri et al., 2007). 
Bipolar disorder is also highly comorbid with a number of general medical 
conditions. A recent large scale epidemiological study observed that bipolar disorder was 
associated with high prevalences of conditions such as migraines, chronic fatigue 
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syndrome, asthma, Crohn‟s disease and hypertension, with the existence of additional 
comorbid chronic medical disorders associated with more severe courses of bipolar 
disorder (McIntyre et al., 2006). Similarly, high prevalences of comorbid cardiovascular 
complaints as well as endocrinological conditions, such as diabetes and pancreatitis, are 
highly associated with bipolar disorder (Kilbourne et al., 2004). The diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder can be associated with significant medical comorbidities which may reduce the 
individual‟s physiological well-being. 
 
1.1.3 The Diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder 
1.1.3.1 The DSM-IV Criteria for Bipolar Affective Disorders 
The current UK diagnostic criteria for bipolar disorder are based upon the specifications 
outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition 
produced by the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV: APA, 1994). The DSM-IV 
currently specifies a number of subtypes of bipolar affective illness, including: Bipolar I 
Disorder, Bipolar II Disorder, Cyclothymia, and Bipolar Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified. Descriptions of each of these diagnostic subtypes are presented below. 
 
Bipolar I Disorder 
Bipolar I Disorder is associated with the experience of both manic and depressive mood 
states, and is distinguishable from the other bipolar subtypes by the occurrence of at least 
one manic or mixed episode, which is usually accompanied by the experience of one or 
more major depressive episodes. Diagnoses of Bipolar I Disorder are often made on the 
evidence that the patient has experienced a manic episode, which are unique to Bipolar I 
Disorder. A range of epidemiological studies and literature reviews suggest lifetime 
prevalences of Bipolar I Disorder of 0.4-1.6% in community samples (Kessler, Rubinow, 
Holmes, Abelson & Zhao, 1997), to as high as 3.3% (Grant et al., 2005). 
 
Bipolar II Disorder 
The clinical course of Bipolar II Disorder is characterised by the experience of at least one 
major depressive episode accompanied by the experience of at least one hypomanic 
episode (APA, 1994). A diagnosis of Bipolar II Disorder is also based upon the absence of 
manic and mixed episodes. The lifetime prevalence of Bipolar II Disorder in community 
studies has ranged from estimates of 0.5% to 1.4% in adults (Bebbington & Ramana, 1995; 
Merikangas et al., 2007), and approximately 1% in adolescents (Lewisohn et al., 1995).  
Research has suggested that Bipolar II Disorder is often associated with the 
experience of a depressive episode at first contact with a healthcare professional, and is 
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often diagnosed at a later age than Bipolar I Disorder (Baldessarini et al., 2010). 
Difficulties in identifying previous hypomanic episodes could explain the suggested later 
age of onset of Bipolar II disorders, as the diagnostic criteria for hypomania specifies that 
it is a change in behaviour which is not significantly impairing (APA, 2000), which may be 
difficult to detect by a clinician. Because Bipolar II Disorder is differentiated from a 
diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder by the experience of past hypomania, patients are 
often misdiagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. Indeed, high prevalences of 
individuals satisfying the DSM criteria for Bipolar II Disorder have been found in samples 
of depressed outpatients (Benazzi, 1999). 
 
Cyclothymia 
Cyclothymic Disorder, as defined by the DSM-IV-TR, “is a chronic, fluctuating mood 
disturbance involving numerous periods of hypomanic symptoms and numerous periods of 
depressive symptoms” (APA, 2000, p.398). For a diagnosis of cyclothymia to be made 
these fluctuations in symptoms must have been present for the past two years, within 
which the patient must not have been without the symptoms for more than two months at 
any time. Estimates of the lifetime prevalence of cyclothymic forms of bipolar affective 
illnesses range from 0.4% to 1% in community samples (APA, 2000; Regeer et al., 2004). 
 
Bipolar Disorder Not Otherwise Specified 
Bipolar Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (NOS) incorporates any remaining disorders 
with bipolar features that do not meet the diagnostic criteria for any of the previously 
specified disorders. A diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder NOS may feature more rapid cycling 
forms of bipolar disorder, the experience of recurrent hypomania without depression, or 
forms of bipolar disorder where it is unclear whether the disorder is caused by an 
underlying general medication condition or induced by a substance (APA, 2000).  
 
Course Specifiers 
In addition to the main diagnostic categories associated with bipolar disorder, a course 
specifier may be applied to a diagnosis. These specifiers include rapid cycling, seasonal 
patterns and longitudinal course specifiers, the latter of which provides further clarification 
regarding the illness course of Bipolar I and Bipolar II Disorders according to the patterns 
of symptom recurrence and periods of recovery from symptoms (e.g., with or without full 
inter-episode recovery, APA 2000).  
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The Bipolar Disorder Spectrum 
There is a growing consensus that bipolar spectrum disorders are located on a continuum 
of increasing severity and impairment (Akiskal & Mallya, 1987; Merikangas et al., 2011), 
inclusive of clinically diagnosed bipolar disorders to less impairing and severe bipolar-like 
phenomena which may be experienced by healthy non-bipolar individuals. The continuum 
conceptualisation of bipolar disorders suggests that the entire population is located at some 
point on the bipolar spectrum, as opposed to the conceptualisation of bipolar disorder as 
being a discrete disorder which is substantially distinct from normal functioning. It has also 
been suggested that bipolar disorder may form a continuum with depressive and 
schizophrenic disorders given the high degree of similarity in the symptomatic experiences 
shared across these disorders (Möller, 2003; Benazzi, 2007). 
At present, there are four main clinically recognised forms of bipolar disorder, as 
previously discussed in this section, although a number of softer forms of bipolar disorder 
have been proposed and identified which share a number of symptomatic features with the 
more severe bipolar disorders, albeit to a less extreme and impairing degree. These include 
cyclothymia, “minor bipolar disorder” pertaining to the experience of mild depressive 
episodes and hypomania (Angst et al., 2003), pure hypomania without the experience of 
depressive episodes (Angst et al., 2003; Seal, Mansell & Mannion, 2008), and hyperthymic 
or hypomanic personality temperaments relating to the habitual and lifelong experience of 
hypomania-like states and euthymia without the experience of discrete hypomanic episodes 
(Akiskal & Akiskal, 1992; Seal et al., 2008). The continuum conceptualisation also 
suggests that it is clinically important to target those individuals with vulnerabilities to 
bipolar disorder, as well as those individuals early in the course of bipolar disorder (Jones 
& Burrell-Hodgson, 2008), to prevent the development and ongoing experience of 
clinically severe and impairing bipolar symptoms.  
The conceptualisation of the bipolar spectrum has also led to attempts to research 
potential risk factors for future bipolar disorder in healthy individuals. However, there are 
difficulties associated with the identification of those individuals at-risk for bipolar 
disorder, particularly as the risk phenotypes may vary significantly between individuals in 
respect to the possible combinations of genetic, behavioural, physiological and 
environmental factors which confer risk (Depue et al., 1981). There is also a substantial 
ethical concern with potentially wrongly identifying healthy individuals to be at-risk, or 
even diagnosed with bipolar disorder, raising the chance of observing false positives when 
investigating the risk for bipolar disorders. The investigations into the role of cognitive 
processes in relation to the vulnerability to bipolar disorder presented in this thesis may 
assist in reducing these false positives by better understanding the psychological 
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mechanisms associated with an elevated risk for bipolar disorder, which may assist in 
discriminating between those individuals at a low and high-risk for bipolar disorder. 
(Please note that a full review of the bipolar spectrum concept is beyond the scope of the 
current thesis, for reviews of the spectrum and challenges associated with investigating the 
continuum please see Depue et al., 1981, and Benazzi, 2007) 
 
1.1.3.2 The Reliability & Stability of Bipolar Diagnoses 
The recurrent nature of bipolar disorder presents a considerable challenge in the effective 
diagnosis and treatment of the condition. There are a number of factors which further 
complicate the diagnosis of bipolar disorder in addition to mood lability, including 
problems in identifying past illness episodes, the highly co-morbid nature of bipolar 
affective illnesses with other disorders, as well as interference from long-term substance 
abuse and medication regimes (Kessing, 2005). Due to the fluctuating nature of bipolar 
mood symptoms, assessments made at different time points may observe qualitatively 
different presentations of bipolar disorder, hindering an accurate diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder (Chen, Swann & Johnson, 1998). A recent large scale review of hospital records 
indicated that as few as 23% of patients received a consistent diagnosis of bipolar disorder 
across a minimum of 75% of medical evaluations (Baca-Garcia et al., 2007a, 2007b). 
Across a number of studies, approximately 30% of patients diagnosed as bipolar at initial 
assessment changed diagnosis at follow-up (Chen et al., 1998; Kessing, 2005). Frequent 
changes in diagnoses have also been noted between bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and 
psychotic disorders for some patients (Chen et al., 1998; Kessing, 2005; Baca-Garcia et al., 
2007b). 
 
1.1.4 Treatment for Bipolar Disorder 
1.1.4.1 Physiological Therapies 
Although a detailed discussion and critique of the therapeutic interventions used to treat 
bipolar disorder is beyond the scope of the current thesis, the following section will 
provide an overview of the main treatments available for bipolar disorder. This will be 
limited to an overview of the medications prescribed for bipolar disorder, with a more 
detailed overview presented for the psychological therapies for bipolar disorder.  
 
Medication 
Patients with bipolar disorder are typically treated with medication, with lithium carbonate 
most frequently prescribed to alleviate the severity of bipolar symptoms and to stabilise 
mood (Geddes, Burgess, Hawton, Jamison & Goodwin, 2004). There is a significant body 
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of research which advocates the efficacy of lithium therapy for bipolar disorder, with the 
maintenance of lithium medication being associated with improved symptom severity, 
particularly for mania, with weaker evidence for reductions in depressive symptoms and 
depressive relapses (Geddes et al., 2004). Consistent lithium prophylaxis (maintenance 
therapy) has also been associated with reductions in the number of attempted suicides 
(Tondo et al., 1998), as well as with a reduced frequency and duration of future 
hospitalisations (Maj, Pirozzi, Magliano & Bartoli, 1998).  
However, lithium remains a somewhat controversial medication. There is some 
uncertainty regarding lithium‟s precise mechanism of action, with lithium found to effect a 
variety of neurotransmitter systems (Lenox & Hahn, 2000). There is also concern over the 
onset of action from lithium administration until therapeutic effects are observed, with at 
least 10 days required before improvements in symptoms are noted (Rivas-Vazquez, 
Johnson, Rey, Blais & Rivas-Vazquez, 2002). Many bipolar patients also fail to 
demonstrate adequate improvements in symptom severity following initial lithium therapy 
(Kleindienst & Greil, 2003), or demonstrate a late non-response, the occurrence of 
affective episodes despite years of remission and full compliance with lithium prophylactic 
therapy (Maj, Pirozzi & Magliano, 1996). There is also a low ratio between a therapeutic 
dose and a harmful toxic dose due to the natural toxicity of lithium carbonate (Bowden, 
2000), and as a consequence patients require regular blood monitoring to prevent side 
effects (Nemeroff, 2000; Rivas-Vazquez et al., 2002). There is also the potential for 
accidental or attempted overdose using lithium, particularly in suicidal individuals 
(Montagnon, Saïd & Lepine, 2002), although lithium has been associated with lower rates 
of suicide in comparison to other mood stabilisers (Goodwin et al., 2003). Lithium has also 
been associated with a range of health complaints, including weight gain (Garland, Remick 
& Zis, 1998), hypothyroidism (Kleiner, Altshuler, Hendrick & Hershman, 1999), and other 
kidney-related complaints, such thirst and urination (Gitlin, 1999). Lithium has also been 
associated with a number of cognitive side-effects, with negative effects noted upon 
memory, speed of information processing and reaction times (Honig, Arts, Ponds & 
Riedel, 1999). However, the short-term discontinuation of lithium has been associated with 
improvements in memory (Kocsis et al., 1993). For some patients, lithium can assist in 
maintaining long periods of remission, yet many patients experiencing more severe forms 
of bipolar disorder experience poor outcomes from lithium therapy (Maj et al., 1998). 
High rates of relapse and hospitalisation are noted in bipolar patients receiving 
lithium therapy, particularly in those patients who immediately cease taking their 
medication (Scott & Pope, 2002). Successful withdrawal from lithium may require weeks 
of dosage adjustment (Baldessarini et al., 1996). It is perhaps unsurprising that more 
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patients are prescribed a combination of medications, including mood stabilisers, 
anticonvulsants, antipsychotics and/or antidepressants, alongside medications for co-
morbid disorders and general medical conditions (Rivas-Vazquez et al., 2002). 
Many bipolar patients also receive antidepressant medication to assist in alleviating 
depressive symptoms. In those patients who do not demonstrate adequate reductions in 
symptom severity following antidepressant medication, the alternative offered is typically 
a different antidepressant or an increased dosage of the current medication (Hirschfield et 
al 2002). However, a recent review highlighted that the increase of antidepressant 
medication in the short term is associated with moderate improvements in symptoms, but 
also frequent switches into manic episodes (Post et al., 2003a). The same review also 
suggested that the discontinuation of antidepressant medication should be avoided in those 
bipolar patients who do respond to antidepressants, as discontinuation appears to be 
associated with an increased risk of depressive relapse (Post et al., 2003a). There is 
generally mixed evidence for the efficacy of adjunctive antidepressant treatment with 
bipolar patients, with one trial reporting no additional benefit of adjunctive antidepressant 
medication compared to mood stabilisers administered with a placebo (Sachs et al., 2007). 
Anti-psychotic medications, such as clozapine and chlorpromazine, are increasingly 
prescribed to bipolar patients, irrespective of whether the patient is currently psychotic. 
Atypical anti-psychotics, the most recent generation of anti-psychotic medications, have 
been observed to have mood regulatory properties, and are typically used as medication for 
mania and psychotic-mania (Keck, McElroy & Strakowski, 1998). Antipsychotics are also 
more likely to be prescribed to younger patients, and to patients with comorbid substance 
abuse disorders or comorbid post-traumatic stress disorder (Sajatovic, Valenstein, Blow, 
Ganoczy & Ignacio, 2006). 
Although medication may assist in alleviating the most severe symptoms associated 
with bipolar disorder, there are a number of limitations. Individuals with bipolar disorder 
may find it difficult to take their prescribed medication at the required time, or may be 
disinclined to take their medication on a regular basis, particularly if the medication is 
associated with adverse side effects (Perlick, Rosenheck, Kacyznski & Kozma, 2004). A 
review suggested that between 23% to 68% of bipolar patients do not fully adhere to 
medication (Perlick et al., 2004). In recognition of this, there has been an increased focus 
in recent years upon improving treatment adherence in bipolar patients through the use of 
adjunctive psychotherapy and psychoeducation (Sajatovic, Davies & Hrouda, 2004). Both 
of these techniques emphasise the necessity of taking prescribed medication on a regular 
basis, and inform the patient of the potential consequences of not taking their medication. 
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1.1.4.2 Psychological Therapies 
Psychological therapies for bipolar disorder have only recently been developed and 
subjected to empirical study, with the current published research literature somewhat in its 
infancy. However, preliminary research suggests that some form of psychological therapy 
can assist in improving illness outcomes for individuals with bipolar disorder. 
 
Psychoeducation 
Psychoeducation is a key component of many psychological therapies for bipolar disorder, 
the primary aim of which is to improve the patient‟s and their family member‟s 
understanding of their condition, including the causes, consequences, and treatments 
(Smith, Jones & Simpson, 2010). Psychoeducation also aims to destigmatise the condition 
in question and improve relationships between patients and family members. 
Psychoeducation can be delivered by itself or as part of another intervention, in one-to-one 
sessions with a therapist or in a group, and is frequently incorporated in the early phases of 
cognitive-behavioural and family-focused therapies. A number of psychoeducational 
approaches have been used, with interventions focusing upon improving medication 
adherence, improving the early recognition of early signs (prodromes) of bipolar episodes, 
and in maintaining periods of normal functioning outside acute illness episodes. 
An early trial by Perry and colleagues (1999) trained recently relapsed bipolar 
patients to identify the prodromes associated with the onset of a manic or depressive 
episode. Although Perry and colleagues did not take an explicitly psychoeducational 
approach, significant improvements in the time to the first manic relapse and reductions in 
the frequency of manic relapses in the 18 months post-therapy were observed (Perry, 
Tarrier, Morriss, McCarthy & Limb, 1999). However, no between-group differences were 
noted between patients who received the training intervention and those on the waiting list 
in terms of the number of depressive relapses and the time taken to the first depressive 
relapse at follow-up. Perry and colleagues‟ (1999) study suggested that this may reflect the 
fact that bipolar patients often report difficulties in recognising depressive prodromes 
which may be less distinct than manic prodromes, and less distinguishable from 
subsyndromal depressive symptoms (Perry et al., 1999; Lam, Wong & Sham, 2001). 
More positive outcomes have since been reported in a large scale randomised 
controlled trial (RCT) of a group psychoeducation intervention for bipolar outpatients 
(Colom et al., 2003). Bipolar patients attending psychoeducation reported fewer relapses 
and longer survival rates to their next mood episode over a two year follow-up compared 
to a control group of patients who attended regular non-structured group meetings (Colom 
et al., 2003). Psychoeducation was also associated with fewer and shorter durations of 
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hospitalisations and with improved medication adherence at two year follow-up. A five 
year follow-up observed that the psychoeducation group continued to report longer times 
to relapse, fewer recurrences of episodes, reductions in the time spent hospitalised, and less 
time spent acutely ill over the five years (Colom et al., 2009b). The comprehensive 
psychoeducation delivered by Colom and colleagues would appear to be successful in 
preventing subsequent recurrences of bipolar episodes over the long term. Interestingly, 
Colom et al (2009b) observed that psychoeducation appeared to be much more effective at 
preventing manic relapses at a five year follow-up than at two years, and suggested that 
psychoeducation should be treated more as disease management training rather than a 
means for passing on information to patients regarding their mental health condition. 
A subgroup analysis of patients diagnosed with bipolar II disorder from Colom and 
colleagues‟ studies (2003, 2009b) observed that psychoeducation was associated with 
fewer total episodes, fewer hypomanic and depressive episodes than the control group at a 
five year follow-up (Colom et al., 2009a). Although this analysis should be treated with 
caution as it was not conducted on a psychoeducational programme tailored specifically for 
bipolar II disorder, Colom and colleagues (2009a) suggest that psychoeducation may assist 
in improving outcomes for bipolar II patients. This is despite Colom‟s (2003, 2009b) 
previous studies indicating greater preventative effects of psychoeducation for manic 
relapses, where mania is a feature of bipolar I disorder, not bipolar II. 
Whilst psychoeducation appears to assist in improving the outcomes for bipolar 
patients, this approach is not without its limitations. Psychoeducation would appear to be 
unsuitable for use in currently episodic patients, who may lack the prerequisite motivation 
and insight when acutely ill to fully benefit from a program of psychoeducation. It has 
been suggested that psychoeducation may function best as a preventative therapy in 
euthymic patients rather than as a means of improving outcomes for currently ill patients 
(Vieta, 2005; Miklowitz, 2008). Psychoeducation also appears to be a favourable for use 
with both bipolar patients and their relatives. Following psychoeducational interventions 
for patients and their relatives, improvements have been noted in knowledge of bipolar 
disorder and improved familial relationships, as well as reductions in relatives‟ expressed 
emotion and symptom-related burden, at a one year follow-up (Bernhard et al., 2006). 
 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
An early pilot study of a twenty week depression-focused CBT intervention reported 
significant decreases in depressive symptoms across groups of eleven bipolar and eleven 
unipolar patients at post-treatment (Zaretsky, Segal & Gemar, 1999). Zaretsky and 
colleagues (1999) suggested that bipolar patients may require more intensive CBT than the 
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relatively standardised treatment offered in their study. However, despite the small scale 
nature of the study significant reductions in depressive symptoms were noted, providing 
one of the early indications of the promise of CBT for bipolar disorder. 
A pilot study of a relapse-prevention approach to CBT for bipolar disorder also 
reported encouraging results (Lam et al., 2000). Patients were randomly assigned to either 
a six month course of CBT or to ongoing treatment-as-usual. At a 12 month follow-up, 
patients in the treatment-as-usual group had experienced more bipolar episodes and more 
hospitalisations than the CBT group, with the majority of the CBT group not experiencing 
relapses post-therapy (Lam et al., 2000). The CBT group also reported reduced symptom 
severity, improved functioning, medication adherence, and coping with manic prodromes 
compared to the control group. Interestingly, no significant difference between the groups 
was reported for coping with depressive prodromes at the post-treatment time point, 
supporting previous observations that bipolar patients appear to have particular difficulties 
in identifying the early symptoms of depression (Lam & Wong, 1997; Perry et al., 1999). 
Despite such positive findings, there are some potential confounds in Lam and colleagues‟ 
(2000) study, particularly in the absence of a control to account for the increased contact 
with a healthcare professional during the CBT intervention. In a larger scale replication of 
this pilot study, bipolar patients receiving CBT reported significantly fewer bipolar 
episodes, fewer fluctuations in manic symptoms, fewer days in acute bipolar episodes and 
fewer hospitalisations at a twelve month follow-up than those receiving treatment as usual 
(Lam et al., 2003). Again, patients in the CBT group reported improved coping with manic 
but not depressive prodromes, at both six and twelve months follow-up (Lam et al., 2003). 
Scott and colleagues (2006) conducted the first multi-site RCT of CBT for acutely 
ill patients and patients with severe bipolar disorder. A total of 253 patients were 
randomised to receive a six month CBT intervention or ongoing treatment as usual, and 
were followed up over a twelve months. More than half of the patients experienced a 
recurrence of a bipolar episode during the follow-up period, with no differences in relapse 
rates between the CBT and control groups, although more depressive than manic relapses 
were noted overall (Scott et al., 2006). The absence of a standardised treatment-as-usual 
provision across sites may not have accounted for discrepancies between sites in terms of 
the available healthcare. In addition, forty percent of Scott and colleagues‟ (2006) patients 
failed to complete the full programme of CBT (see Lam, 2006, for a detailed critique). In 
light of this, and the high rates of relapse noted in both the treatment and control groups, 
Scott and colleagues suggested that CBT may not be suitable for use with patients with 
complex and severe presentations of bipolar disorder (Scott et al., 2006). The authors also 
suggested that CBT may be more effective when used with bipolar patients with less 
 26 
complex presentations and with patients who have been recently diagnosed, as these 
patients may be more able to commit to a programme of CBT (Scott et al., 2006). 
Following the failure of Scott and colleagues‟ (2006) trial, Jones and Burrell-
Hodgson (2008) reported a case series of a CBT intervention delivered to seven patients 
with recent first diagnoses of bipolar disorder. Based upon a previously established CBT 
approach (Lam, Jones, Hayward & Bright, 1999), participants completed a short 
psychoeducation phase, training in prodrome detection, coping skills for managing mood 
fluctuations, and training in maintaining regular sleep and activity patterns. Participants 
received six months of CBT and were followed up for six months, and completed self-
report measures of mood, symptoms, coping styles and dysfunctional attitudes, and wore 
actigraphic watches as an objective measure of sleep and circadian rhythm regularity. 
Improvements in symptom severity, reductions in hopelessness, and more stable behaviour 
patterns were noted by the end of therapy, but no significant reduction in dysfunctional 
attitudes was observed (Jones & Burrell-Hodgson, 2008). Improvements were also noted in 
prodrome detection and the use of adaptive coping skills when encountering the early signs 
of mania, but such improvements were less prominent for depression (Jones & Burrell-
Hodgson, 2008). Although the study was small scale, the CBT programme offered by 
Jones and Burrell-Hodgson (2008) appeared to be effective for use with patients with 
recent bipolar diagnoses. The application of CBT and symptom management training in 
the early phases of bipolar disorder may assist in softening the impact of subsequent 
chronic episodes, and may improve long term patient outcomes. A large scale replication 
of Jones and Burrell-Hodgson‟s (2008) study is required to determine the efficacy of 
targeting CBT earlier in the illness course of bipolar disorder. 
Whilst CBT has provided some encouraging findings for the reductions of manic 
symptoms, there has been mixed success in alleviating bipolar depressive symptoms. A 
trial conducted by Scott and colleagues, randomised 42 bipolar patients to a waiting list 
control group or a CBT group, the latter receiving a six month intervention of 
psychoeducation, prodrome identification, relapse prevention training, and training in 
cognitive and behavioural techniques for symptom management (Scott, Garland & 
Moorhead, 2001). CBT was associated with greater improvements in functioning and 
greater reductions in depressive than manic symptoms compared to the control group, with 
fewer relapses and hospitalisations also noted in the CBT group in the eighteen months 
post-therapy compared to the eighteen months pre-treatment. However, an RCT comparing 
CBT, incorporating emotive techniques such as imagery, versus ongoing treatment-as-
usual (TAU) failed to demonstrate between-group differences in medication adherence, 
time to relapse, or the number of days experiencing affective symptoms following a six 
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month CBT intervention (Ball et al., 2006). Whilst there was a trend for the CBT group to 
have shorter times to depressive relapses than TAU group at post-treatment, this trend 
disappeared once baseline depressive symptoms were accounted for (Ball et al., 2006). 
Clinician made assessments of changes in symptom indicated that the CBT group had 
greater improvements in depressive symptoms and overall bipolar symptoms, with a trend 
noted for manic symptoms, from the 18 months pre-treatment to 12 months post-treatment. 
Whilst the level of dysfunctional attitudes and depressive symptoms in the CBT group 
improved at post-treatment, this difference compared to the TAU group did not remain at 
follow-up. Although Ball and colleagues‟ (2006) study demonstrated some changes in 
symptom severities following CBT, many of the between-group comparisons failed to 
reach significance, limited by the study‟s low statistical power. 
However, a more recent trial reported that bipolar patients who received a 
combination of psychoeducation and CBT reported 50% fewer days depressed in the year 
following therapy, in comparison to a control group who received psychoeducation alone 
(Zaretsky, Lancee, Miller, Harris & Parikh, 2008). Whilst no group differences in rates of 
hospitalisation, medication adherence, or psychosocial functioning were noted over the one 
year follow-up period, participants in the control group received greater increases in 
antidepressant medication (Zaretsky et al., 2008). The combination of a comprehensive 
psychoeducation programme and CBT reduced the need for additional antidepressant 
medication, suggesting that adjunctive CBT and psychoeducation may provide patients 
with the ability to more effectively self-manage their depressive symptoms without 
requiring additional psychopharmacological interventions. 
The combination of CBT with medication monitoring has also shown promise 
when used with patients with dual diagnoses of bipolar and substance abuse disorders 
(Schmitz et al., 2002). Although Schmitz and colleagues failed to detect any changes in 
substance abuse behaviours following the intervention, improvements were noted in mood 
symptoms and medication adherence in the CBT group. Similar improvements in 
medication adherence and reductions in bipolar symptom severity were also observed in a 
small scale trial of CBT used with bipolar patients who experienced relapses whilst 
receiving lithium prophylaxis (Fava, Bartolucci, Rafanelli & Mangelli, 2001). CBT has 
also shown promise when delivered in a group format, with improvements in psychosocial 
functioning and symptom severity noted in a group of predominantly euthymic bipolar 
patients (Patelis-Siotis et al., 2001). However, larger scale studies exploring the efficacy of 
group CBT for bipolar disorder are required. Future studies should also incorporate 
suitable control comparison groups to allow for meaningful comparisons to be made 
between outcomes for CBT interventions and treatment-as-usual (Jones, 2004).  
 28 
Preliminary studies have also explored how mindfulness-based CBT (MBCT), 
which incorporates traditional CBT techniques with mindfulness-awareness meditation 
strategies which aim to discourage ruminative thought processes, are associated with 
symptom alleviation in bipolar disorder. A pilot study of an eight week MBCT intervention 
noted reductions in depressive symptom severities in both bipolar and unipolar patients, 
with significant reductions in anxiety severities being noted at post-treatment for the 
bipolar patients receiving MBCT (Williams et al., 2008). A similar study of MBCT for 
bipolar patients currently between episodes reported reductions in depressive symptoms 
and suicidal ideation, with smaller reductions in manic symptoms and anxiety also noted 
following 8 weeks of MBCT (Miklowitz et al., 2009). 
In sum, CBT for bipolar disorder appears to possess promise and is highly 
acceptable for the majority of patients (Scott et al., 2001). Research has suggested that 
CBT can be associated with improvements in mood symptoms, psychosocial functioning 
and medication adherence. There are also benefits to the healthcare system, with a cost-
effectiveness study indicating that the use of CBT with bipolar patients may offset costs on 
other healthcare services (Lam, McCrone, Wright & Kerr, 2005c). However, there are a 
number of limitations which may restrict the efficacy of CBT for bipolar disorder. In 
particular, CBT may be limited for use with currently euthymic patients or with those who 
have recently been diagnosed. Acutely ill patients may be unable or unwilling to commit to 
CBT, or may require more intensive CBT to deal with challenges associated with current 
symptoms. In addition, bipolar patients with a “sense of hyper-positive self”, the belief that 
attributes associated with hypomanic symptoms represent the normal healthy self, respond 
poorly to CBT, such beliefs may require specifically targeted therapeutic approaches in 
order to be resolved (Lam et al., 2005a). The failure of Scott and colleagues‟ (2006) trial 
would suggest that acutely ill patients require more intensive interventions than those 
currently reported in the literature, particularly to deal with complex presentations, 
comorbid syndromes and current mood difficulties. Alternatively, ongoing support may be 
required with acutely ill patients over a long-term period. 
 
Interpersonal & Social Rhythm Therapy (IPSRT) 
Interpersonal and social rhythm therapy combines therapeutic techniques which aim to 
improve interpersonal functioning and symptom management, with techniques which aim 
to improve the regularity of social rhythms and activities. IPSRT is composed of 
psychoeducation, social rhythm therapy which promotes regular daily activities and the 
modulation of stimulation through activity scheduling, and interpersonal therapy, which 
focuses upon the associations between mood symptoms and relationships (Frank, 2005; 
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Swartz, Frank, Frankel, Novick & Houck, 2009). Although few studies have investigated 
the efficacy of IPSRT for bipolar disorder.  
Frank and colleagues (1997) compared two groups of patients with bipolar I 
disorder who received either an IPSRT invention or ongoing clinical management of 
symptoms and medication adherence. Whilst the groups were comparable in the severity of 
their current symptoms at the end of the interventions, the IPSRT group‟s social rhythms 
had stabilised to a greater degree than those patients who received ongoing clinical 
management (Frank et al., 1997). A second study (Frank et al., 2005) randomised acutely 
ill bipolar I patients into receiving one of four combinations of IPSRT and clinical 
maintenance during the acute illness phase and for a two year follow-up period (i.e. acute 
IPSRT-maintence IPSRT, acute CM-maintence IPSRT, etc.). Whilst no differences were 
found between the groups for the time taken for the stablisation of affective symptoms, or 
for the proportion of patients who achieved full remission, those patients who had received 
IPSRT in the acute phase of illness had longer survival times until their next episode as 
well as increased social rhythm regularity. The ability to increase the stability and 
regularity of social rhythms during the acute phase was also associated with the reduced 
probability of symptom recurrence during the two year follow-up, suggesting that IPSRT 
has promise in stabilising social rhythms in bipolar individuals who have enrolled in the 
treatment whilst currently experiencing an acute episode of illness (Frank et al, 2005). 
A recent pilot study has indicated that IPSRT may be efficacious in treating 
depression in patients with bipolar II disorder (Swartz et al., 2009). Although the study was 
limited by its low statistical power, small sample size and lack of a control comparison 
group, 41% of patients experienced reductions in depression severities by the twelfth 
session of IPSRT, with 53% reporting reductions in depression severities and 29% of 
patients achieving full remission of symptoms by the twentieth IPSRT session (Swartz et 
al., 2009). Frank and colleagues (1997, 2005) have suggested that IPSRT may be of 
particular benefit when used with recently acute patients who may have a particular 
appetite for making considerable lifestyle and social rhythm changes. 
 
Family Therapy 
Miklowitz and colleagues (2000) reported one of the first RCTs of family focused therapy 
for bipolar disorder. Patients who had recently experienced mood episodes were 
randomised into receiving ongoing clinical management or family focused therapy, the 
latter consisting of sessions of psychoeducation, interpersonal communication training and 
problem-solving training with their relatives. Those patients who received family therapy 
had fewer relapses in the year post-therapy, improvements in depressive symptoms, and 
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longer times to relapse compared to patients receiving ongoing clinical management 
(Miklowitz et al., 2000). The family-focused intervention was also associated with 
improvements in patients whose family members expressed high levels of emotion. High 
expressed emotion amongst family members is indicative of emotionally over-involved, 
hostile and overly critical family environments, which is associated with poorer illness 
outcomes in patients whose families are high in expressed emotion (Honig, Hofman, 
Hilwig, Noorthoorn & Ponds, 1995). Promising data for the effectiveness of family 
therapies for bipolar disorder were also reported in a trial in which currently manic bipolar 
patients were randomised to receive either family focused psychoeducational therapy or 
individual treatment (Rea et al., 2003). Over a two year follow-up, patients who had 
received family-focused therapy were less likely to be hospitalised and had experienced 
fewer relapses than those who had received individual treatment, which included 
psychoeducation, symptom management and problem solving training (Rea et al., 2003). 
 
Summary of therapies for Bipolar Disorder 
Although the research literature exploring the efficacy of psychological interventions for 
bipolar disorder is still relatively new, there is promise in the use of psychotherapeutic 
interventions with bipolar individuals. Whilst it would appear that there exist many 
disparate psychological therapeutic approaches for bipolar disorder, there is a considerable 
amount of overlap in the content of these interventions. Most therapeutic approaches 
incorporate psychoeducation, with focuses in later stages upon relapse prevention, training 
in prodrome identification, effective problem-solving, improving interpersonal 
relationships, with the importance of maintaining regular daily activities, social rhythms 
and regular sleep routines also stressed to the patient. 
Due to the infancy of the research literature investigating the effectiveness of 
psychological interventions for bipolar disorder, it is not currently possible to specify 
whether one intervention is more effective than another in improving illness outcomes for 
patients (Zaretsky, 2003; Beynon, Soares-Weiser, Woolacott, Duffy & Geddes, 2008). 
Although more studies are being conducted and published, Jones (2004) has previously 
highlighted that many therapeutic trials for bipolar disorder have been statistically 
underpowered, due to poor experimental designs, and have often lacked a clear theoretical 
basis. There is a growing consensus that the efficacy of psychotherapy for bipolar disorder 
is largely dependent on the patient‟s current state, with more intensive forms of CBT, 
including focuses on reducing and managing current symptoms, thought to be necessary 
for use with currently unwell patients and with patients with severe forms of the bipolar 
disorder than the therapies currently available (Rizvi & Zaretsky, 2007). 
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1.1.5 Illness Courses & Outcomes for Bipolar Disorder 
Relapse 
Bipolar Disorder is notably associated with high rates of relapse, with recurrences of 
affective symptoms being considerably more impairing in comparison to symptom 
recurrences in unipolar depression (Goldberg, Harrow & Grossman, 1995). As many as 
one third of bipolar patients experience relapses despite continued adherence to mood 
stabiliser medication (Solomon, Keitner, Miller, Shea & Keller, 1995). However, a 
prospective study observed higher rates of relapse in lithium-medicated bipolar patients, 
with 50% of patients found to relapse within two years of their first remission from 
symptoms, whilst 73% of patients relapsed within five years (Gitlin et al., 1995). In 
comparison, some studies have observed that adherence to medication, including lithium 
and other mood stabilisers, is associated with lower rates of relapse and improved illness 
outcomes (Maj et al., 1998). Many psychological therapies for bipolar disorder have been 
associated with reduced rates of relapse and improved illness outcomes, following the 
results of randomised controlled trials of interpersonal and social-rhythm therapy, CBT, 
and psychoeducation (Frank et al., 2005; Lam, Hayward, Watkins, Wright & Sham, 2005b; 
Colom et al., 2009b). It has been estimated that around 90% of patients may experience 
full syndromal recovery from bipolar disorder, where they no longer satisfy the DSM 
criteria for bipolar mood episodes (Huxley & Baldessarini, 2007). 
 
Management of Bipolar Disorder 
A growing number of individuals with bipolar disorder choose to self-manage their 
condition. Although, many psychological therapies for bipolar disorder are collaborative in 
nature and allow for the patient to take an active role in their treatment (Scott, 2001). 
Individuals with bipolar disorder often try a wide range of methods when attempting to 
self-manage their condition. An interview study reported that bipolar individuals identified 
that accepting their diagnosis, gaining adequate sleep, managing stress, being prescribed 
suitable medication, and being mindful of their illness during day-to-day activities and of 
potential triggers and early warning signs were strategies that assisted in their management 
of bipolar disorder (Russell & Browne, 2005). A recent web-based survey reported that 
bipolar individuals rated that avoiding dangerous activities (e.g., drinking too much 
alcohol), taking medication as directed, and acting as an advocate for other bipolar 
individuals as being the three most helpful activities in successfully managing their 
condition (Depp et al., 2009). These studies suggest that the effective self-management of 
bipolar disorder is dependent on the individual determining which are the most effective 
strategies for managing their own condition (Russell & Browne, 2005; Depp et al., 2009). 
 32 
Positive Experiences in Bipolar Disorder  
Research has traditionally focused upon the psychopathological nature of bipolar mood 
disorders without necessarily considering the positive experiences and potential benefits 
that an individual with bipolar disorder may experience. Common experiences of many 
bipolar individuals include feelings of increased creativity, energy, inspiration, goal-focus 
and concentration (Galvez, Thommi & Ghaemi, 2011), particularly during the experience 
of hypomanic mood states (Murray & Johnson, 2010). Indeed, hypomanic episodes have 
been associated with elevated scores on assessments of global functioning in patients with 
bipolar II disorder (Benazzi, 2004). In comparison to other mental health conditions, 
individuals with bipolar disorder often have high levels of educational attainment, 
including achieving university degrees and postgraduate qualifications, and can maintain 
employment, albeit during periods of euthymia (Depp et al., 2009). 
 
Mortality & Suicide 
Although the symptoms of bipolar disorder can be managed through medication regimes, 
psychological therapies and self-management strategies, bipolar disorder can still be highly 
associated with high levels of suicidal ideation and with the engagement in non-lethal and 
lethal suicide behaviours. Indeed, studies comparing the lifetime rate of attempted suicide 
have indicated that bipolar disorder is associated with higher suicide risk compared to 
other mental illnesses, including major depression (Chen & Dilsaver, 1996; Lam et al., 
1999; Newman, 2005). Estimates of the lifetime prevalence of suicide attempts in bipolar 
disorder have been as high as 50% (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990), whilst more conservative 
estimates have placed the risk of attempted suicide at 15% (Simpson & Jamison, 1999). 
A variety of risk-factors for suicide in bipolar patients have been highlighted, with 
feelings of hopelessness and histories of previous suicide attempts appearing to be 
significant predictors of suicide in bipolar disorder (Hawton, Sutton, Haw, Sinclair & 
Harriss, 2005). Meta-analyses have also suggested that non-lethal suicide behaviours, such 
as self-harm, can be predicted by family histories of suicide, an early onset of symptoms, 
the severity of depressive symptoms, rapid-cycling disorders, experiences of mixed 
affective episodes, the presence of comorbid anxiety disorders, and alcohol and drug abuse 
(Tondo et al., 1998; Dalton, Cate-Carter, Mundo, Parikh & Kennedy, 2003; Simon et al., 
2004; Hawton et al., 2005). From a therapeutic perspective, reductions in suicidal 
behaviour and ideation have been noted in bipolar patients receiving lithium medication 
(Tondo et al., 1998), and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (Miklowitz et al., 2009). 
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Section 1.2 
Literature Review: 
Psychological Theoretical Models of Bipolar Disorder 
This section will present an overview of the major psychological theoretical frameworks of 
Bipolar Disorder, with communalities between and limitations across these theories 
discussed. 
 
1.2.1 Behavioural Activation, Inhibition & Dysregulation 
The behavioural activation and inhibition systems are two motivational systems which 
have been developed from a neuropsychological perspective (Gray, 1987, 1990). The 
behavioural activation system (BAS) is sensitive to signals of reward, and is associated 
with positive affectivity, approach and engagement behaviours. The behavioural inhibition 
system (BIS) is responsive to aversive stimuli, signals of threat and non-reward, and is 
associated with negative affect and with inhibitions in behavioural responses to stimuli, 
such as avoidance behaviours. The dysregulation of the behavioural activation system is 
considered to play an important role in bipolar disorder, across both manic and depressive 
states (Depue & Iacono, 1989). Over-activation of the BAS is implicated in manic 
symptomatology, whilst BAS under-activation and elevated BIS activity is associated with 
depression (Urošević, Abramson, Harmon-Jones & Alloy, 2008). 
 Studies have used the BIS/BAS questionnaires to explore the self-reported 
sensitivity of these motivational systems in bipolar patients and in at-risk individuals 
(Carver & White, 1994). BAS activity is captured by three subscales assessing drive, the 
engagement in fun seeking behaviours and reward responsivity, with a single subscale 
measuring behavioural inhibition (BIS). A number of analogue studies have observed that 
the behavioural risk for hypomania is associated with increased BAS sensitivity (Johnson 
& Carver, 2006; Jones, Shams & Liversidge, 2007; Jones & Day, 2008; Applegate, El-
Deredy & Bentall, 2009), although some studies have failed to observe significant 
correlations between hypomania risk and reward responsivity (Fulford, Johnson & Carver, 
2008; Carver & Johnson, 2009). Some studies have reported either negative or no 
significant correlations between hypomania-risk and BIS (Meyer, Beevers, Johnson & 
Simmons, 2007; Applegate et al., 2009), supporting the hypothesis that it is the BAS 
system which is implicated in bipolar disorder and the risk for hypomania.  
Mansell and colleagues (2008) noted that all three BAS measures, not BIS, 
correlated with a history of hypomanic symptoms in an analogue sample, but this 
association was not significant when accounting for the presence of dysfunctional self-
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appraisals (Mansell, Rigby, Tai & Lowe, 2008). Elevated BAS sensitivity has also been 
associated with elevated manic symptoms amongst at-risk individuals for bipolar disorder 
(Meyer, Johnson & Carver, 1999). The associations between BAS sensitivity and current 
manic symptoms were also observed in a bipolar sample, where BIS scores were 
negatively associated with mania (Van der Gucht, Morriss, Lancaster, Kinderman & 
Bentall, 2009). BAS sensitivity has also predicted the intensification of manic symptoms 
over 24 months in individuals diagnosed with bipolar I disorder (Meyer, Johnson & 
Winters, 2001). Lower BAS and higher BIS levels have been reported by patients with 
major depressive disorder, with lower BAS sensitivities associated with greater severities 
of depressive symptoms and with poorer illness outcomes at 8 months (Kasch, Rottenberg, 
Arnow & Gotlib, 2002). In students prone to mood disorders, high BIS has been associated 
with more severe depression symptoms (Meyer et al., 1999; Meyer et al., 2007), with 
lifetime histories of depressive symptoms (Carver & Johnson, 2009), and proneness to 
future depression (Alloy et al., 2006). 
Holzwarth & Meyer (2006) extended the BIS/BAS scales to incorporate a self-
report measure of BAS dysregulation, and noted a trend for elevated scores on the BAS 
Dysregulation scale in a group of bipolar-prone individuals compared to controls. 
Interestingly, whilst an analogue study reported that none of the BAS or BIS scales 
predicted mood symptoms at a 3 month follow-up, scores on the BAS Dysregulation 
measure did predict the severity of prospective depressive symptoms (Dodd, Mansell, 
Sadhnani, Morrison & Tai, 2010).  
As the heightened sensitivity of the BAS system is considered to predispose 
individuals to bipolar disorder, Alloy and colleagues (2006) screened students into high 
and moderate groups according to scores on the BAS scales and then explored the 
prevalence of lifetime bipolar spectrum disorders between these groups. Participants in the 
high BAS group were significantly more likely to have had a lifetime bipolar spectrum 
illness than the moderate BAS group. The high BAS group also scored higher on measures 
of impulsivity and proneness to future hypomanic symptoms, supporting the hypothesis 
that over-sensitivity of the BAS system is a risk factor for clinically significant levels of 
bipolar disorders (Alloy et al., 2006).  
In sum, evidence suggests that the dysregulation of the behavioural activation 
system is associated with fluctuations of mood in bipolar disorder, and in conferring the 
vulnerability to mood disorders in at-risk individuals. Whilst the theory refers to 
behavioural inhibition and activation systems, research suggests that it is the sensitivity or 
dysregulation of the BAS which is implicated in bipolar disorder (Alloy et al., 2006). 
Elevated BAS sensitivity has been associated with the severity of manic symptoms, with 
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the vulnerability to bipolar disorder in at-risk individuals, whilst lower BAS activation 
have been implicated in lowered affective states and depression.  
There is also some evidence to suggest that the BAS system influences cognitive 
processes, with elevated BAS sensitivity associated with higher expectancies of positive 
events occurring and with a greater reported frequency of previously experienced positive 
events (Beevers & Meyer, 2002). Interestingly, BIS was not associated with the recall of 
negative events or with the anticipation of future negative events. Beevers and Meyer 
(2002) also noted that a lack of positive experiences and expectancies about the future 
mediated the relationship between low BAS sensitivity and depressive symptoms. 
Although Beevers and Meyer only assessed the past experience of positive events on a 
simple questionnaire scale, their findings could suggest that the level of BAS activation 
determines the availability of past events during recall, which influences the relationship 
between BAS activation and affective symptoms.  
Alloy and colleagues (2009) identified a number of cognitive styles relevant to the 
nature of the behavioural activation system. These cognitive styles included dimensions 
relating to performance evaluation, autonomy and self-criticism, and were observed to 
differentiate individuals with bipolar disorder and demographically matched control 
participants. These BAS-relevant cognitive processes were also predictive of the likelihood 
of the onset of bipolar affective episodes over a 3 year follow-up period (Alloy et al., 
2009). Bipolar individuals with higher autonomy scores were less likely to develop major 
depressive episodes than those with lower autonomy scores, whilst higher scores on 
measures of autonomy and self-criticism predicted the onset of hypomanic and manic 
episodes when controlling for current and past bipolar symptoms (Alloy et al., 2009). One 
explanation for the association between BAS and its effects upon cognitive processes is 
that increased BAS activity may activate positive self-schemas. Increases in goal-directed 
behaviours and elevated expectancies for the future following BAS activation may be 
mediated by a positive self-worth schema, which when activated directs behaviour and 
cognitive processes into maintaining positive mood states. The Schematic Propositional 
Analogical and Associative Representation Systems (SPAARS) model, discussed later in 
this chapter, provides a potential pathway for this, where physiological and behavioural 
activation may be appraised in a positive manner which activates positive self-schematic 
models leading to approach behaviours and the maintenance of positive moods. 
Whilst the BAS account provides an explanation for the occurrence of manic and 
depressive symptoms, it is currently unclear how other symptomatic traits of bipolar 
disorder, such as psychosis, result from BAS activity and/or dysregulation. The BAS 
literature is also reliant upon the self-reported sensitivity of the BAS and BIS systems 
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according to scores on a widely used questionnaire measure, which may be subject to 
biases in introspective reporting compared to objective measures. Although, a small 
literature has suggested that there exist specific neurobiological pathways relating to BAS 
and approach motivation (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1997). 
 
1.2.2 The Depression Avoidance Hypothesis 
Abraham‟s (1911) hypothesis that the development of manic and hypomanic states serves 
as a defence mechanism against depressive cognitions has been revived in a theory now 
commonly referred to as “Depression Avoidance”. In a cognitive reformulation of the 
manic defence hypothesis, Neale (1988) proposed that a combination of unstable self-
esteem and the setting of unachievable or unrealistic goals contribute to a predisposition to 
bipolar disorder in vulnerable individuals. Threats to the individual‟s labile self-esteem, 
such as the recall of memories for negative life events, lead to the endorsement of 
grandiose thoughts and appraisals about the self in the attempt to reduce the impact of 
negative cognitions, to keep unpleasant thoughts out of consciousness (Neale, 1988). 
Indeed, high prevalences of grandiose delusions have been noted in bipolar disorder (Keck 
et al., 2003), particularly in currently manic patients (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990). Ascents 
in mood, potentially leading to manic states, result from the endorsement of these negative 
appraisals and grandiose thoughts about the self, with mania serving a somewhat 
dysfunctional protective function from undesirable and unpleasant cognitions. 
Empirical support for the depression avoidance theory has been provided by studies 
exploring self-esteem lability, cognitive style and attributional style in bipolar disorder, 
where similar cognitive processes appear to underlie mania and bipolar depression. 
Discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem have been reported by 
Winters & Neale (1985), with higher self-reported (explicit) self-esteem noted in remitted 
bipolar individuals compared to remitted unipolar patients. However, on an implicit 
attributional style measure, the Pragmatic Inference Task (PIT), bipolar individuals made 
more internal attributions for failure scenarios, mirroring performances by remitted 
unipolar patients (Winters & Neale, 1985). Interestingly, the bipolar participants also 
scored higher on measures of social desirability and self-deception, suggesting that the 
bipolar patients were masking their underlying low self-esteem. Winters and Neale (1985) 
suggested that these findings may reflect a low self-worth schema in bipolar patients, 
which is concealed by the external appearance of elevated self-esteem.  
While a seven day diary study noted comparable mean levels of self-esteem in 
healthy controls and remitted bipolar patients, bipolar participants reported more elevated 
and fluctuating self esteem compared to a group of remitted unipolar patients (Knowles et 
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al., 2007). Remitted bipolar patients also reported more extreme fluctuations in both 
positive and negative affect, but demonstrated a negative attributional style on the PIT in a 
similar manner as the unipolar patients, making more internal attributions for negative than 
positive events (Knowles et al., 2007). Again, a discrepancy between explicit high self-
esteem and a pattern of negative attitudes towards the self on an implicit measure was 
reported in bipolar individuals, supporting the theory that bipolar disorder is associated 
with an underlying negative self-schema, which may be concealed by transient levels of 
elevated self-esteem. Scott and Pope (2003) also reported elevated levels of both positive 
and negative self-esteem in hypomanic bipolar patients in comparison to depressed-
bipolar, remitted-bipolar, and remitted-unipolar patients. Greater variability of self-esteem 
in currently manic, depressed and euthymic bipolar patients compared to non-bipolar 
controls has also been reported by Van der Gucht and colleagues (2009), in a replication of 
the diary procedure used by Knowles et al. (2007). Increased lability of self-esteem and the 
use of abnormal affect regulatory strategies have also been reported in children of bipolar 
parents, a vulnerable population for bipolar illnesses (Jones et al., 2006b).  
A later study comparing currently-manic, currently-depressed bipolar individuals 
with healthy controls, reported that manic participants attributed more positive events to 
internal factors and more negative events to external factors on an explicit self-report 
measure (the Attributional Style Questionnaire), but performed in the opposite direction on 
the implicit PIT, making more depressive and pessimistic attributions (Lyon, Startup & 
Bentall, 1999). Manic participants also attributed more positive than negative words as true 
of themselves, but recalled more negative words during a memory recall task, and 
demonstrated slowed colour naming for negative words on the Stroop Task (Lyon et al., 
1999). Slower colour naming on the Stroop task has also been noted in individuals at a 
behavioural risk for mania, with hypomanic personality traits associated with the slower 
naming of depressive-related compared to euphoria-related words (Bentall & Thompson, 
1990; French, Richards & Scholfield, 1996). This interference for depression-related 
stimuli on the Stroop task may reflect a selective attention bias means of coping with 
depressive tendencies in hypomanic personality (French et al., 1996). However, some 
studies have failed to observe differences in colour naming latencies for positive and 
negative stimuli on the Stroop task between bipolar and unipolar patients (Kerr, Scott & 
Phillips, 2005), and between bipolar patients and non-bipolar controls (Lex, Meyer, 
Marquart & Thau, 2008). There has also been mixed support for the presence of negative 
attributional styles in bipolar disorder. Van der Gucht and colleagues (2009) failed to find 
differences in negative attributional styles when using the PIT with manic, depressed and 
remitted bipolar individuals, and healthy controls. 
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A key strength of the depression avoidance hypothesis is that it provides an 
explanation for why mania can be preceded by depressed states in bipolar individuals, as 
well as for the presence of underlying dysphoria in manic and euthymic states (Bentall, Tai 
& Knowles, 2006). The depression avoidance hypothesis also provides a reasonable 
explanation for the sensitivity towards self-negative information by bipolar individuals and 
at-risk individuals, despite these individuals appearing to be in positive moods and 
hypo/manic states. Depression avoidance is somewhat complimentary with other 
psychological approaches, particularly the response styles literature, where research has 
suggested that hypomania and mania may be associated with dysfunctional attempts to 
cope with depressed mood states and cognitions (Thomas & Bentall, 2002) (see “Response 
Styles Theory” section 1.2.3 below). As such, the depression avoidance hypothesis is seen 
to comprise two propositions: that mania vulnerability is associated with depressogenic 
psychological processes, and that mania arises from dysfunctional attempts to avoid 
negative emotions and cognitions (Thomas, Knowles, Tai & Bentall, 2007). Mania may 
also act as a mask or a pleasant distraction away from current depressive feelings, although 
bipolar individuals may require ever more extreme forms of distraction to avoid 
experiencing more intense depressive feelings. Hence the observation that mania is often 
associated with gambling activities and risky behaviours (Thomas et al., 2007). 
 
1.2.3 Response Styles Theory 
Nolen-Hoeksema first proposed that gender differences in the prevalence of depression 
could be explained by differences in how males and females respond to the experience of 
negative emotions and depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). These response 
styles included rumination, a repetitive passive focus on the causes and consequence of 
one‟s current emotional state and circumstances, and distraction, where attention is focused 
away from current depressive symptoms onto more pleasant or neutral thoughts about the 
self in order to avoid unpleasant emotional states (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) suggested that the observable gender differences in the 
prevalence of unipolar depression related to a tendency for women to ruminate whilst men 
tend to reduce their negative mood state through distraction. Research conducted in 
dysphoric individuals has observed that inducing ruminative cognitive styles is associated 
with exacerbations in depressive mood states, whilst reductions in depression were 
associated with distracting attention away from thinking about the self and current mood 
states (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). 
Treynor and colleagues (2003) provided a refinement to the Response Styles 
Theory, where different subtypes of negative ruminative cognitive styles emerged in a 
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factor analysis of the Ruminative Responses Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), a 
self-report measure of rumination originally derived from Nolen-Hoeksema‟s Response 
Style Questionnaire. These subtypes included: brooding, a maladaptive focus upon the 
discrepancy between one‟s current self and unachieved goals; reflection, a more adaptive 
focus upon improving one‟s current depressed state through cognitive problem-solving; 
and depression-focused rumination, a ruminative focus on current depressive symptoms 
(Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Tendencies to engage in brooding have 
since been associated with exacerbations in negative moods and depressed states across 
non-clinical samples (Treynor et al., 2003; Burwell & Shirk, 2007) and samples of 
clinically depressed patients (Bagby & Parker, 2001; Lo, Ho & Hollon, 2008). Suicidal 
individuals also appear to readily engage in brooding than reflective responses to negative 
experiences (Crane, Barnhofer & Williams, 2007a), whilst brooding has been associated 
with suicidal ideation (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007). 
A small number of studies have explored the role of negative forms of ruminative 
cognitive styles in bipolar disorder, and in individuals who are considered to be at an 
elevated behavioural risk for hypomania. Hypomanic personality traits, a known 
vulnerability factor for bipolar disorder (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Kwapil et al., 2000), 
have been associated with elevated rumination, as well as distraction, and the engagement 
in dangerous activities in response to negative mood states (Thomas & Bentall, 2002). 
Knowles and colleagues (2005) reported that hypomanic personality traits were more 
strongly associated with rumination and engaging in risky activities than engaging in 
distraction and problem-solving in response to depressed mood states (Knowles, Tai, 
Christensen & Bentall, 2005).  
In individuals with diagnoses of bipolar disorder, higher self-reported rumination 
scores have been observed in remitted patients compared to currently depressed and manic 
individuals (Thomas et al., 2007). Currently manic patients also reported greater use of 
risk-taking and active-coping in response to depression compared to remitted and 
depressed patients (Thomas et al., 2007). However, Van der Gucht and colleagues (2009) 
reported higher self-reported rumination in a group of currently depressed bipolar patients 
in comparison to currently manic and euthymic patients. Both studies reported more 
extreme self-reported rumination in remitted bipolar patients compared to control groups 
of healthy, non-bipolar individuals. Ruminative cognitive styles may form part of the 
cognitive vulnerability to relapse in bipolar disorder, particularly as rumination appears to 
be prevalent during remission from symptoms. 
There has also been a recent focus upon the potential role of positive forms of 
rumination and their potential relationship with mania and the vulnerability to bipolar 
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disorder. It has been suggested that individuals may engage in positive forms of rumination 
in order to maintain or bolster positive emotional states (Feldman, Joormann & Johnson, 
2008). To assess positive forms of rumination Feldman and colleagues devised the 
Responses to Positive Affect scale (RPA) as a counterpart to the Ruminative Responses 
Scale (Feldman et al., 2008). The RPA has a three factor structure capturing three distinct 
responses to positive emotional states, including: emotion-focused positive rumination, the 
focus upon amplifying positive moods; self-focused rumination upon the self and the 
pursuit of goals; and dampening, encompassing attempts to reduce the intensity of positive 
emotional states (Feldman et al., 2008).  
The RPA has so far demonstrated good reliability as a measure of positive 
rumination, and has demonstrated good convergent validity with the expected associations 
being observed with depressive and manic symptoms, negative rumination, mania 
vulnerability, and in samples of bipolar and unipolar patients (Feldman et al., 2008; 
Johnson, McKenzie & McMurrich, 2008a; Johnson & Jones, 2009). Hypomanic 
personality traits have been positively associated with tendencies to engage in emotion-
focused and self-focused positive rumination, and to a lesser extent dampening responses 
to positive affect, in undergraduate samples (Carver & Johnson, 2009). In the same study, 
only dampening was associated with lifetime histories of depressive symptoms (Carver & 
Johnson, 2009). Elevated tendencies to dampen positive affect in individuals with 
hypomanic personalities have been reported elsewhere, and have been suggested to reflect 
a need to regulate heightened positive emotions and restrict over-responding to positive 
affect (Johnson & Jones, 2009). In terms of clinical studies, individuals with bipolar 
disorder and major depressive disorder have been observed to report elevated ruminative 
tendencies in response to negative mood states, but only the engagement in positive 
rumination has been associated with bipolar disorder (Johnson et al., 2008a). 
There is growing convergence in the research literature regarding the role of 
response styles in the bipolar disorder spectrum, with positive forms of rumination 
seeming to be important in the vulnerability to hypomania in at-risk individuals. However, 
it is currently unclear how positive and negative forms of rumination interact over longer 
periods of time in terms of the development and changes in affective symptoms. There has 
also been a lack of research exploring how the different subtypes of negative rumination as 
suggested by Treynor and colleagues‟ (2003) factor analysis are associated with affective 
symptoms and mood disorders. 
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1.2.4 The Beckian Cognitive Models 
Dysfunctional attitudes form a key component of Beck‟s cognitive models for depression 
and for mania, and are thought to underlie the cognitive vulnerability to mood disorders. 
Beck‟s depression model proposes that dysfunctional self-schemas are formed following 
childhood experiences, with depression associated with a negative cognition triad of the 
self, the world and the future (Beck, 1976). These schematic models revolve around 
personal themes such as the desire to be successful or a need for approval, and become 
activated during later life following stressful experiences and life events relating to the 
schema‟s thematic content. Schemas serve to direct thinking styles, including negative 
automatic thoughts, and behaviour patterns, leading to the onset of depressed mood states 
(Beck, 1976). Currently held dysfunctional attitudes reflect the thematic content of these 
schematic models, with attitudes relating to needs for perfectionism, dependency and 
approval from others being associated with the vulnerability to mood disorders. It has been 
argued that these self-schemas may act in a bidirectional manner in bipolar disorder, where 
a schema‟s thematic content (e.g., a need to be successful) may change polarity depending 
on the individual‟s current mood state and the experience of recent life events (e.g., from 
“I‟m very/extremely successful” to “I‟m a failure”) (Newman, Leahy, Beck, Reilly-
Harrington & Gyulai, 2002). Beck‟s model suggested that mania is the opposite of 
depression, and features a positive cognitive triad of the self, world and future (Newman et 
al., 2002). However, it was unclear from this model whether dysfunctional attitudes 
underlying bipolar disorder were similar to those underlying unipolar depression.  
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) was developed as a self-report measure 
of negative attitudes and maladaptive beliefs relating to the negative cognitive triad 
described in Beck‟s cognitive model of depression (Weissman & Beck, 1978). A number 
of studies have explored the similarity of dysfunctional attitudes in bipolar disorder and 
unipolar depression to determine whether the same cognitive vulnerability is shared across 
the disorders. Higher DAS scores have been observed in euthymic bipolar patients 
compared to non-bipolar control participants, with higher scores noted on the 
Perfectionism and Need for Approval subscales (Scott, Stanton, Garland & Ferrier, 2000). 
Whilst Scott and Pope (2003) found no differences in dysfunctional attitudes between 
unipolar and bipolar patients, currently hypomanic bipolar patients reported higher levels 
of dysfunctional beliefs than euthymic bipolar patients, but lower levels than depressed 
bipolar patients. This pattern was reversed for self-reported self-esteem, with the remitted 
bipolar patients reporting the highest self-esteem, depressed bipolar patients the lowest, 
and hypomanic patients reporting levels between the two groups. Goldberg and colleagues 
(2008) observed that remitted bipolar patients reported less extreme scores on the DAS 
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than unipolar depressed patients, but more extreme scores than healthy controls (Goldberg, 
Gerstein, Wenze, Welker & Beck, 2008). However, a recent study reported similar levels 
of dysfunctional attitudes across bipolar and unipolar patients (Jones, Twiss & Anderson, 
2009). Two studies conducted in analogue samples have failed to observe associations 
between hypomanic personality traits and dysfunctional attitudes (Jones et al., 2007; Jones 
& Day, 2008), whilst a separate study noted a small positive correlation between 
hypomanic personality and the DAS (Jones, Mansell & Waller, 2006a). However, Jones 
and Day (2008) did note positive correlations between positive and negative forms of self-
appraisals with dysfunctional attitudes. 
As the original subscales of the DAS were based upon data collected in unipolar 
patients, Lam et al (2004) assessed the factor structure of the 24-item DAS scale in a 
bipolar sample. Three factors representing “Goal-attainment”, “Dependency”, and 
“Achievement” were identified, but Lam and colleagues failed to observe differences in 
DAS scores between bipolar and unipolar patients. However, when patients who were 
likely to be in a depressive episode were excluded from the analyses, the bipolar patients 
scored significantly higher on the Goal-attainment subscale than the unipolar patients. This 
goal-attainment component reflected attitudes regarding striving to attain positive 
emotional states, control over emotions, possessing the ability to excel at any task, and 
being able to solve problems without requiring much effort (Lam, Wright & Smith, 2004). 
Higher scores on the subscales of the DAS-24 have been reported in euthymic bipolar 
patients, particularly for the dependency and achievement subscales, compared to non-
bipolar controls (Lomax, Barnard & Lam, 2009). 
At least one study has failed to observe significant differences in DAS scores 
between bipolar and control participants (Lex et al., 2008). However, the lack of between-
group differences in that study may be due to the remitted bipolar patients being largely 
free of residual depressive symptoms (Lex et al., 2008). That said, an earlier study reported 
more extreme DAS scores in remitted bipolar patients compared to non-bipolar controls, 
and observed that a majority of the bipolar participants had elevated levels of residual 
depressive symptoms despite being rated by clinicians as euthymic (Scott et al., 2000). 
Jones and colleagues (2005) also noted higher DAS scores in remitted unipolar patients 
compared to bipolar and control participants, but this difference was non-significant once 
current depressive symptoms were accounted for (Jones et al., 2005a). During remission, 
activation of underlying self-schemas and beliefs through exacerbations in depressive 
moods may be required in order for dysfunctional attitudes to become more readily 
accessible. Although some studies suggest that similar levels of dysfunctional attitudes are 
prevalent in bipolar disorder and unipolar depression, implying that the cognitive 
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vulnerability to future relapses may share similar markers in relation to dysfunctional 
attitudes about the self. However, one study indicated that the induction of either a 
negative or positive mood state was associated with little change in DAS scores in remitted 
bipolar patients, suggesting that dysfunctional attitudes may be more stable and trait-like in 
bipolar disorder (Wright, Lam & Newsom-Davis, 2005). 
The presence of dysfunctional attitudes is often assessed as a measure of the 
vulnerability to relapse and consequently forms a target for many cognitive behavioural 
therapies for bipolar disorder. Although an early trial of CBT for bipolar depression failed 
to observe improvements in dysfunctional attitudes at the end of therapy (Zaretsky, Segal 
& Gemar, 1999), a recent study reported improvements following six months of CBT (Ball 
et al., 2006). However, this improvement was not maintained at a later 18 month follow-
up. Dysfunctional attitudes relating to a sense of a “Hyper-Positive Self” in bipolar 
individuals have been associated with poorer responses to CBT (Lam, Wright & Sham, 
2005). Goal-attainment scores on the DAS were also observed to make significant 
contributions to the severity of scores on the “Sense of Hyper-Positive Self” measure 
devised by Lam and colleagues (2005), supporting the notion that overly positive beliefs 
about the self are associated with cognitions relating to extreme goal-attainment. 
The dysfunctional attitudes literature is limited by the use of different versions of 
the DAS across different population of patients. Whilst Lam et al.‟s (2004) factor analysis 
identified specific forms of dysfunctional attitudes associated with bipolar disorder; many 
studies conducted in bipolar samples have not used their refinement of the DAS scale (e.g., 
Lex et al., 2008). The use of the DAS scale also assumes that participants have the 
prerequisite insight into their own beliefs and that participants are being truthful when 
completing the scale (Mansell & Scott, 2006). A recent study using a sentence completion 
task as an indirect measure of dysfunctional attitudes observed that currently manic, 
depressed and remitted bipolar patients produced significantly more positive responses on 
the completion task than healthy controls (Thomas, Bentall, Knowles & Tai, 2009). The 
authors suggested that the high frequency of positive responses may reflect an underlying 
negative self-schema, and may reflect depression avoidance. However, this study did not 
use an established dysfunctional attitudes measure to assess how responses on the sentence 
completion task represent dysfunctional attitudes. Further research is required to determine 
whether endorsement of dysfunctional attitudes can be successfully captured by indirect 
tasks such as the sentence completion procedure. 
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1.2.5 The Appraisal of Internal States 
The instability hypothesis proposed by Goodwin and Jamieson (1990) proposed that a 
vulnerability to disruptions in circadian rhythm activity is fundamental to the development 
and experience of bipolar disorder. Circadian rhythms are patterns of physiological 
processes which occur over 24-hour periods and are maintained by physical (e.g., day-
night cycles) and psychological (e.g., social and behavioural) zeitgebers, external cues 
which synchronise the internal clock of the individual in relation to the environment 
(Jones, 2001). Both disturbances in sleep and activity levels are a prominent feature of 
bipolar disorder (Harvey et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2005b), and are symptomatic of bipolar 
depression and mania (APA, 2000), and have also been noted in at-risk groups including 
individuals with hypomanic personality traits (Meyer & Maier, 2006; Ankers & Jones, 
2009), and in children of bipolar parents (Jones et al., 2006b). 
Jones (2001) proposed a new model of bipolar disorder which combined the 
instability hypothesis for circadian rhythms with Healy and Williams‟ (1989) proposition 
that changes in circadian rhythms are subjected to cognitive distortions, with such changes 
being attributed to personal rather than situational factors. In addition, Jones incorporated a 
multi-level structure of emotion based upon the Schematic Propositional Analogical and 
Associative Representation Systems model (SPAARS; Power & Dalgleish, 1997) to allow 
for more complex interactions between cognitive and emotional processes, and to better 
account for the presence of mixed states in bipolar disorder (Jones, 2001). Beck‟s cognitive 
models of mania and depression have previously struggled to account for mixed states and 
more complex cognitive-emotional interactions, despite the potential for complex patterns 
of emotion to occur in bipolar individuals (Jones, 2001; 2006). The SPAARS model 
describes two routes to the production of emotion from cognition, an associative route and 
a route involving the schematic appraisal of propositional cognitions.  
In the SPAARS model (see Figure 1.2.1), external stimuli are initially processed 
through an analogical system which processes information from across a number of 
sensory-specific systems, including systems specific to olfactory, auditory, visual, tactile, 
and proprioceptive information. The analogical system processes information from across 
these sensory modalities into an implicit representation, which does not require a linguistic 
representation for meaning. The propositional level is the intermediate level of semantic 
representation in the SPAARS model and incorporates abstract language-based models, 
which are explicit and discrete in nature. The schematic model level is the highest level of 
representation which integrates information from the other processing systems into a more 
complex level of knowledge beyond simple propositional concepts (Power & Dalgleish, 
1997). Schemas can be changeable and flexible depending on the content of the 
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information entering the system. The associative level allows for the experience of emotion 
without the influence of the schemas contained in the higher-order schematic model level. 
Associations are produced between frequently occurring events and their schematic 
interpretations and subsequent emotional states, meaning that in future schematic 
interpretation is no longer required. The SPAARS framework allows for two levels of 
emotion generation, at the associative and schematic model levels, and provides a 
mechanism for the production of multiple and conflicting emotions. The propositional 
level cannot directly elicit emotional states, but cognitions in the propositional level are 
mediated by appraisals from the schematic models. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2.1 The Schematic Propositional Analogical and Associative Representation 
Systems framework  
 
In relation to mania, Jones (2001) suggests that the experience of life events exert 
effects on the analogical system, resulting in disruptions to circadian rhythms which lead to 
physiological and cognitive changes indicating increased energy and alertness. These 
changes are subjected to an internal attribution bias leading to positive propositional 
cognitions, specifically of positive self-appraisals relating to the changes in the analogical 
system (e.g., “I am full of energy and ready to take on the world”, Jones, 2001). The 
propositional appraisals are integrated at the schematic model level with information from 
other levels to produce positively biased self-schemas, which influence future behaviour 
patterns. A schema describing the self in an overly-positive manner facilitates the 
experience of more intense positive emotional states and behaviours which further 
exacerbate such feelings. Jones (2001) implicates disturbances in circadian rhythms and 
the production of internal schematic appraisals and attributions in the exacerbation of 
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mood states and in directing behaviour patterns, such as increased drive, sleep loss, and 
risk-taking, which cause further circadian rhythm disruption in a feedback loop. Indeed, 
social rhythm disrupting life events have been associated with the onset of manic, but not 
depressive episodes in bipolar patients, providing partial support for Jones‟ model of mania 
(Malkoff-Schwartz et al., 1998).  
Similar processes are thought to underlie depression in bipolar disorder. Jones 
(2001) suggested that the severity of the circadian rhythm disturbance noted by the 
analogical system may play a significant role in determining whether mania or depression 
result from the appraisal process. An event which prompts analogical indications of fatigue 
and reduced physical and cognitive activity is appraised at the propositional level in a self-
negative manner (e.g., “it is because of my personal faults that I feel this tired”). At the 
schematic model level, a combination of the analogical input of tiredness with a self-
negative schema, which could describe the self as defective and that the future outlook is 
hopeless, is associated with avoidance and withdrawal behaviours leading to exacerbations 
in negative mood states. Following repeated pairings of the analogical sensations of fatigue 
with negative appraisals and withdrawal behaviours, the associative route to depression 
becomes reinforced and more prominently activated. Jones (2001) suggested that 
depression via the associative route of emotion becomes increasingly experienced as 
“coming out of the blue”, contributing to feelings of helplessness. 
To capture the internal attributions as implicated in his model, Jones and colleagues 
devised a self-report measure of positive self-dispositional appraisals known as the 
Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire (HIQ: Jones, Mansell & Waller, 2006). The HIQ 
asks participants to provide ratings for a number of hypomania-relevant experiences in 
relation to an overly-positive appraisal, or a normalising appraisal. In the original 
development and validation of the HIQ, Jones and colleagues (2006) noted that scores on 
the hypomanic appraisals measure of the HIQ, and, to a lesser extent, dysfunctional 
attitudes, independently predicted scores on the hypomanic personality scale in an at-risk 
sample. This association between positive self-appraisals and a higher risk for mania has 
since been replicated in a number of analogue studies (Jones & Day, 2008; Ankers & 
Jones, 2009; Johnson & Jones, 2009). The HIQ was later administered to a sample of 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder and a non-bipolar control group, with 
significantly higher scores on the HIQ observed in the bipolar group (Jones et al., 2006a). 
In addition, a logistic regression determined that scores on the hypomanic appraisal scale 
were the primary predictor of group membership between the bipolar and control groups, 
with scores on a measure of manic symptomatology making a small contribution to the 
regression equation (Jones et al., 2006a). Interestingly, the bipolar group reported lower 
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positive mood states than the control group but still produced more hypomanic 
interpretations. Jones and Day (2008) later developed a negative self-appraisal measure 
similar to the HIQ, termed the “Interpretations of Depression Questionnaire” (IDQ). Whilst 
scores on the IDQ were not predictive of hypomanic personality scores in an analogue 
population, scores on the HIQ hypomanic self-appraisal scale, greater behavioural 
activation and lower behavioural inhibition made significant contributions to the variance 
in hypomanic personality trait scores (Jones & Day, 2008). Negative self-appraisals on the 
IDQ were observed to be modestly positively correlated with hypomanic personality traits. 
A study exploring sleep quality and circadian rhythm stability noted that the 
endorsement of hypomanic self-appraisals and the greater variability of bedtimes 
distinguished group membership between individuals at a high and a low-risk for 
hypomania, supporting Jones‟ model (Ankers & Jones, 2009). The high-risk group in this 
study also reported more variable sleep quality and sleep patterns than low-risk 
individuals, but few between-group differences in circadian rhythm stability and variability 
were noted. The study by Ankers and Jones (2009) provides preliminary support for the 
notion that a combination of circadian rhythm disruption and appraisal styles contribute to 
the vulnerability to bipolar disorder, although further research is required to replicate these 
findings in clinical samples. 
In sum, Jones‟s (2001) reformulation of the SPAARS model implicated the 
appraisal of internal state in the development of bipolar symptomatology, where changes in 
physiological processes and the schematic appraisal of these changes facilitate emotional 
states and regulatory behaviours. Support for the model has been provided by Ankers and 
Jones‟ (2009) study of circadian rhythm regularity in a high bipolar risk sample, and the 
previously discussed studies which have associated the overly positive appraisal of 
hypomania in the behavioural risk for mania and risk for bipolar disorder (Jones et al., 
2006a; Jones & Day, 2008; Johnson & Jones, 2009). 
 In relation to therapeutic applications of Jones‟ (2001) model for bipolar disorder, 
Jones and Burrell-Hodgson (2008) reported a pilot study of a CBT approach delivered to 
patients with recent first diagnoses of bipolar disorder. By targeting CBT early in the 
course of bipolar affective illness, prior to the development of associative links where later 
mood episodes may become more easily triggered by environmental stimuli, Jones and 
Burrell-Hodgson‟s study demonstrated improvements in their patients‟ use of adaptive 
coping skills, prodrome detection, feelings of hopelessness as well as improvements in 
bipolar symptoms. Improvements in circadian rhythms regularity and activity levels have 
also been noted from a number of CBT trials, including those delivered by Jones and 
Burrell-Hodgson (2008) and the Interpersonal and Social Rhythm Therapy (IPSRT) 
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studies, where improvements in affective symptoms and longer times to relapse were also 
noted following CBT (Frank et al., 1997; Frank et al., 2005). 
 
1.2.6 Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) 
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991), like SPAARS, is a multi-
level theoretical framework which allows for complex interactions to arise between 
cognitive and affective processes. Barnard and Teasdale (1991) have used ICS to describe 
a framework for unipolar depression, particularly for dysfunctional cognitive-affective 
relationships, and described an ICS-based approach for cognitive therapy. ICS proposes 
that the human cognitive system is organised into nine separate yet interacting subsystems, 
each of which is specialised for processing specific forms of information (see Figure 1.2.2, 
below).  
At the centre of the ICS framework are two bidirectional subsystems which process 
different types of meaning: the propositional and implicational codes. Both of these 
subsystems are considered to be important in the processing of emotion. The propositional 
subsystem processes small semantic units known as propositions which describe easily 
understandable forms of meaning. These propositions are expressible in single sentences 
and can take the form of simple true-false statements. The implicational subsystem 
processes higher order but more implicit forms of semantic representation, with 
implicational representations of meaning taking the form of schematic models of 
experiences. These schematic models are produced from the combination of information 
which has been abstracted from across the various subsystems and the memory stores 
located at each subsystem, as well as the currently stored propositional information. The 
schematic models are considered to be holistic representations of the information in the 
ICS framework, which are also generic, abstract and personal in nature and represent 
recurring themes and patterns drawn from experience. The implicational level of meaning 
is considered to be important in emotion production, as this is where propositional meaning 
is integrated with input from the sensory subsystems. The implicational system is the only 
level of representation which can directly produce emotion, with the potential modification 
of emotional processing thought to require modification of the schematic models located in 
this higher order level of meaning (Teasdale, 1999). In contrast to the SPAARS model 
(Power & Dalgleish, 1997) ICS does not incorporate a direct associative route to the 
production of emotion. Rather emotion in ICS is seen to be mediated by a process of 
appraisal from the higher-order schematic models (Jones, 2001). 
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Fig 1.2.2 The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems framework  
(ICS: Barnard & Teasdale, 1991) 
 
 
The propositional and implicational subsystems become interlocked during 
depressed mood states, with negative propositions about the self being continually 
generated leading to the regeneration of negative schematic models in the implicational 
subsystem (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991). This interlocking is maintained as processing is 
focused upon the propositional level of meaning, with the current propositions reinforced 
and maintained by feedback from the sensory subsystems, e.g., self-negative propositions 
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associated with a propositional mode of processing, mania is considered to be associated 
with a focus upon the content of the implicational code, particularly the schematic models. 
As opposed to the implicational schematic models undergoing low rates of change during 
depressed states, in mania, high rates of implicational code change as well as the excessive 
attention paid to the generic meaning of the implicational system contribute to a more 
unregulated interaction between the implicational and propositional codes. In contrast to 
the processing of self-negative schematic models in depression, self-schemas during manic 
states are considered to be more positive and/or mixed in affective polarity (Power, 2005). 
The polarity of the schematic models is considered to vary over time during mixed bipolar 
episodes, contributing to the appearance of mixed emotional states (Barnard, 2004). 
 In sum, ICS proposes that depressive states are associated with propositional, 
analytical and ruminative forms of processing, where thinking patterns are focused upon 
the analysis of discrepancies in propositional statements about the self. Meanwhile manic 
states are associated with more implicational forms of processing, where thinking patterns 
are focused more on generic forms of meaning and less attention is placed upon the 
analysis of the relationships between propositional information. Lomax and colleagues 
(2009), using a simple question and answer task to assess propositional and implicational 
forms of processing, found that bipolar participants were more likely to answer questions 
relating to implicational forms of meaning, suggesting that the currently euthymic patients 
were focusing more on the abstract implicational-level self-schemas.  
 Lomax and colleagues (2009) have provided some early support for the notion that 
more implicational forms of processing are associated with bipolar disorder, particularly in 
positive mood states. Further research is still required to explore the forms of processing 
that are associated with depressed, manic, euthymic, and mixed affective states, to assess 
whether the processing modes associated implicated within the ICS framework are present 
in bipolar disorder. However, as ICS was originally devised as a theoretical framework and 
not as a specific theory of cognitive-emotional processes, it is unclear whether ICS can 
ever be fully falsified through empirical testing (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991). ICS does 
provide a reasonable explanation for the differences in cognitive processing between manic 
and depressive states, and has been applied in the explanation of the overgeneral 
autobiographical memory phenomenon (e.g., Delduca, Jones & Barnard, 2009). 
 There has also been an attempt to apply the principles of ICS to cognitive therapy, 
where emphasis is placed upon addressing implicational level cognitions and schematic 
models, as well as physiological arousal, through meditation and mindfulness (Clarke, 
1999; Teasdale, 1999). Attempts to create alternative modes of processing, aside from 
dysfunctional propositional processing, are a key component of Mindfulness Based 
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Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) which has provided some encouraging results for bipolar 
disorder. A small-scale trial of MBCT conducted in patients in remission from bipolar and 
unipolar disorders reported reductions in depressive symptoms for across groups, with 
greater improvements in levels of anxiety noted in the bipolar group (Williams et al., 
2008). A subsequent trial noted reduced suicidal ideation and depressive symptoms 
severity in a group of euthymic bipolar individuals following an 8 week MBCT 
intervention, with smaller reductions in the severity of manic symptoms and anxiety also 
noted (Miklowitz et al., 2009). These early trials would suggest that targeting MBCT 
during periods of remission between episodes is effective in reducing the focus upon 
propositional forms of processing associated with the cognitive vulnerability to depression. 
 
1.2.7 Summary 
Six prominent theoretical models for bipolar disorder have been presented in this chapter 
(see Table 1.2.1 for a summary). These theories implicate various cognitive processes in 
the exacerbation of symptoms in bipolar affective disorder, as well as in conferring a 
vulnerability to mood disorders in at-risk individuals.  
The BAS theory suggests that the under and over-activation of the behavioural 
approach system is associated with manic and depressive states respectively (Meyer et al., 
1999; Van der Gucht et al., 2009), with a dysregulated BAS thought to underpin the 
vulnerability to bipolar disorder (Urošević et al., 2008). A range of cross-sectional and 
prospective studies have been conducted using the BIS/BAS questionnaires (e.g., Meyer et 
al., 2001; Alloy et al., 2006), in samples of individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder 
(e.g., Meyer et al., 2001), major depressive disorder (e.g., Kasch et al., 2002), and in 
analogue student samples (e.g., Dodd et al., 2010). However, there has been a tendency for 
research to focus solely on the nature of the BIS/BAS systems and not on the associations 
with other cognitive processes (e.g., Beevers & Meyer, 2002). 
The Depression Avoidance account posits that mania is the result of a dysfunctional 
attempt to avoid depressive mood states and cognitions (Neale, 1988; Bentall et al., 2006; 
Thomas et al., 2007), and shares some common ground with Response Styles Theory 
where the engagement in distraction responses to negative moods has been associated with 
increased hypomania vulnerability (Thomas & Bentall 2002; Thomas et al., 2007). The 
Depression Avoidance literature suggests that bipolar disorder is associated with an 
underlying negative self-schema reflecting low-self worth which is masked by outward 
appearances of elevated self-esteem (Winters & Neale, 1985), with bipolar patients and at-
risk individuals found to have particular sensitivities towards self-negative information 
(Bentall & Thompson, 1990; French et al., 1996; Lyon et al., 1999). The Depression 
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Avoidance theory has also been supported by studies demonstrating that individuals 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and at-risk individuals can possess both low and 
fluctuating self-esteem (Jones et al., 2006b; Knowles et al., 2007; Van der Gucht et al., 
2009). However, the Depression Avoidance theory is limited by low empirical support and 
it is unclear as to how these negative self-schemas are associated with mood lability, in 
particular how the sensitivity to self-negative information contributes to subsequent mood 
swings. Although, there has been an attempt to research the underlying source of the 
depression avoidance hypothesis through the use of both implicit and explicit measures of 
self-esteem (e.g., Winters & Neale, 1985; Knowles et al., 2007).  
The Response Styles Theory suggests that the manner in which individuals 
cognitively respond to affective states determines the future course of mood states (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), with ruminative and brooding 
responses to negative mood states associated with increased depressive states (Treynor et 
al., 2003). A developing literature has indicated that responding to positive mood states in 
a positively focused ruminative manner may be associated with ascents in mood and with 
the vulnerability to bipolar disorder (Feldman et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008a). The 
Response Styles literature has a very established evidence base from research conducted in 
unipolar depression, as well as in subclinical depression (dysphoria). However, the nature 
of ruminative thought processes and response styles in bipolar disorder is less well 
understood, particularly how negative and positive forms of rumination relate to other 
cognitive processes and contribute to mood lability. The rumination research in bipolar 
disorder has been largely cross-sectional (e.g., Van der Gucht et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 
2007), with generally few studies conducted across patient and student samples. 
The Beckian Cognitive models suggest that both bipolar and unipolar disorders are 
associated with underlying negative self-schemas and maladaptive attitudes about the self 
(Jones et al., 2009), with mixed evidence as to whether the same types of beliefs underlie 
bipolar disorder and unipolar depression (Jones et al., 2005a; Lex et al., 2008). The Beck 
models assume that latent self-schemas underlie bipolar disorder, which can be positive or 
negative in valence. Research in this area is primarily based upon the use of the DAS scale 
to measure the prevalence of dysfunctional attitudes, which may be problematic due to 
concerns over whether individuals, particularly in patient samples, have the necessarily 
awareness of their own attitudes and are truthfully reporting the extent to which they 
endorse these attitudes (Mansell & Scott, 2006). Cognitive therapies based upon Beck‟s 
work suggest that modifying underlying dysfunctional schemas and attitudes about the self 
is associated with improved illness outcomes in bipolar samples (e.g., Lam et al., 2003).  
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Schematic models are prominent features of the two multi-level models of emotion 
presented in this chapter. Jones‟ (2001) adaptation of the SPAARS model (Power & 
Dalgleish, 1997) implicates the schematic appraisal of internal physiological states in the 
exacerbation of bipolar symptoms. The ICS framework similarly implicates physiological 
input in triggering schematic appraisals leading to one of two forms of processing styles to 
arise. ICS proposes that propositional forms of thought dominate depression, where 
attention is focused upon the analysis of self-discrepancies similar to ruminative modes of 
thought. During mania, processing is focused upon more abstract and generic levels of 
meaning relating to implicational schematic models of the self, leading to less 
propositional thought and higher rates of change in the generation of schemas. 
Both Jones‟ (2001) model and the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems framework 
(Barnard & Teasdale, 1991) have received low levels of empirical support. The presence of 
overly-positive appraisals has been established in samples of patients with bipolar disorder 
and at-risk individuals, with such appraisals considered to contribute to symptom 
exacerbation (Jones et al., 2006a). A measure of negative appraisals has been developed to 
assess how self-negative cognitions may contribute to the downward regulation of mood 
states (Jones & Day, 2008); however this measure has only been used in a student sample. 
Ankers and Jones (2009) reported that the endorsement of positive self-appraisals and 
greater sleep variability distinguish group membership between low and high risk 
individuals for bipolar disorder. Additional research is required to further explore the 
associations between these self-appraisals and their association with mood, behaviour and 
sleep patterns in at-risk individuals and patients with bipolar disorders. The Interacting 
Cognitive Subsystems framework has received a small amount of evidential support 
(Lomax et al., 2009). However, a major issue is whether ICS as a theory is truly falsifiable 
through empirical testing (Barnard and Teasdale, 1991, p.3, state that “the ICS model is 
not, in itself, an exact theory that can be proved true or false”). Whilst the ICS account 
may assist in generating hypotheses relating to potential cognitive-emotional interactions 
in the affective disorders (e.g., Delduca et al., 2009), there is the concern that ICS as a 
theory is not testable and may only unnecessarily complicate the understanding of 
cognition and emotion without a falsifiable research base.  
In sum, the psychological processes underlying bipolar disorder remain poorly 
understood. The theories presented in this review have received differing degrees of 
empirical support. This lack of scientific understanding about the basic psychology of 
bipolar disorder is concerning. Improving the understanding of the (potentially) 
dysfunctional nature of these processes would assist in the development of effectively 
targeted, evidence-based psychotherapeutic interventions. 
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Table 1.2.1 Summary table of the major psychological theoretical frameworks for Bipolar Disorder
 Central tenet of theory Strengths & Limitations 
Behavioural Activation 
A behavioural activation system, sensitive to signals of 
reward, becomes dysregulated in at-risk and bipolar 
individuals. Low BAS activity associated with 
depression, higher BAS activity associated with 
hypo/mania. 
Explains the vulnerability to bipolar disorder from 
a diathesis-stress perspective (e.g., interaction 
between BAS sensitivity and life events). Evidence 
is largely based upon self-reported BAS sensitivity.  
Depression Avoidance 
Mania is the result of a dysfunctional attempt to avoid 
depression and depressive cognitions about the self. A 
negative self-schema is considered to underlie mania. 
Supporting evidence for theory available from a 
variety of studies. Theory somewhat controversial 
due to suggestions that mania is a “defence 
mechanism”. 
Response Styles Theory 
Differences in responses to clinical mood states 
determine the future exacerbations of moods. 
Theory is compatible with other cognitive theories. 
Few studies have been conducted in bipolar 
spectrum samples. 
Beck Cognitive Models 
Maladaptive beliefs about the self underlie the cognitive 
vulnerability to depression and mania. Dysfunctional 
attitudes regarding goal-achievement, dependency and 
autonomy have been implicated in Bipolar Disorder. 
Evidence is reliant upon the DAS scale, which 
assumes the transparent and truthful reporting of 
attitudes. Research has used different versions of 
the DAS scale across a number of bipolar samples. 
Appraisals of Internal State 
(SPAARS & Jones, 2001) 
The schematic appraisal of changes in internal state in a 
self-negative or self-positive manner contributes to 
attempts to regulate moods and behaviour patterns, 
leading to manic or depressive states. 
Accounts for more complex cognitive-emotional 
interactions, and integrates physiological and 
cognitive processes in describing the vulnerability 
to bipolar disorder. Low empirical support. 
Interacting Cognitive 
Subsystems (ICS) 
Different forms of processing underlie manic and 
depressive states, with implicational and schematic 
processing during mania, and more propositional and 
ruminative processing during depression. 
Provides an account for the complex cognitive-
affective interactions noted in bipolar disorder. ICS 
is considered to be more a conceptual framework 
rather than a falsifiable theory. 
5
4
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Section 1.3 
 
The Specificity of Autobiographical Memory in the Affective 
Disorders: Psychological Mechanisms, Theory, and Potential 
Applications to Bipolar Disorder 
1.3.0 Abstract 
A lack of specificity in the recall of autobiographical memories is considered to be a 
marker of the cognitive vulnerability to affective disorders. Whilst this overgeneral 
memory phenomenon has most frequently been studied in major depressive disorder, few 
studies have explored the role of autobiographical memory recall in bipolar affective 
disorders, despite research indicating that similar latent cognitive vulnerabilities may be 
shared by the two conditions. The present review will provide an updated discussion of the 
autobiographical memory research literature relating to the mood disorders, including a 
review of the mechanisms implicated in overgenerality, with a focus upon how these 
mechanisms may function in bipolar disorder. 
 
1.3.1 The Autobiographical Memory System 
Autobiographical memories are recollections of personally experienced events which are 
hierarchically structured within the human memory system. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 
(2000) proposed a self-memory model where autobiographical memory is structured 
according to three levels of representation, reflecting lifetime periods, general events and 
event-specific knowledge (ESK) which form an autobiographical knowledge base (see 
Figure 1.3.1). The representations within the self-memory system are differentiated 
according to the specificity of detail in their descriptions of events. Lifetime periods refer 
to broad periods of time which capture general temporal and thematic knowledge of a 
distinct time period (e.g., “When I was studying at university”). General events are more 
specific and heterogeneous descriptions which can incorporate both single and repeating 
events, and can also encompass series of events linked by common themes (e.g., “When I 
went on holiday to…”). Event-specific knowledge is the most specifically detailed and 
vivid memory representation which includes detailed accounts of events incorporating 
sensory information unique to that event. The ability to recall event-specific knowledge 
contributes to the identification of specific events stored in the memory system (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and also assists in the identification of memories for real versus 
imagined events (Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988; Conway, Collins, Gathercole & 
Anderson, 1996).  
 56 
Figure 1.3.1. The autobiographical memory system as outlined by Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce (2000). 
 
 
1.3.2 Autobiographical Memory Recall 
Memory recall within Conway and Pleydell-Pearce‟s (2000) system can occur 
generatively, a top-down staged search with retrieval directed from general to specific 
memory representations, or directly, an automatic bottom-up recall process where event-
specific knowledge is activated following a cue.  
A series of studies have observed that individuals with mood disorder diagnoses, 
and individuals with histories of suicidal behaviours and other mental health conditions, 
have particular difficulties in accessing and recalling the specific autobiographical memory 
representations (Williams et al., 2007), in a phenomenon known as “overgeneral memory” 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams, 1996). One explanation for this overgeneral 
memory bias is that individuals diagnosed with mental health conditions have 
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dysfunctional recall strategies for autobiographical memories, where the memory recall 
process fails to progress past general levels of representation within the memory system. 
This “truncated search” (Williams et al., 2007) is considered to arise from generative 
processing, where, following a memory cue, processing in the autobiographical memory 
system generates more elaborative representations until a specific representation is 
activated and recalled. However, this search is stopped at a higher generic level than the 
specific representations, resulting in the recall of generally detailed descriptions of 
autobiographical memories. The current section will review the evidence base for the 
overgeneral memory phenomenon in the affective disorders, and will consider the different 
psychological mechanisms and contrasting theories which have been proposed to explain 
this overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories. 
 
1.3.3 Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
The recall of autobiographical memories in an overgeneral level of detail was first 
demonstrated by Williams and Broadbent (1986). When tasked with recalling specific 
memories for positive and negative cue words, individuals with recent suicide attempts 
were slower to recall memories for positive than negative cues, and also recalled more 
general memories for positive cues compared to controls (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). 
This finding was replicated by Williams and Dritschel (1988), who noted that recovered 
individuals with lifetime histories of attempted suicide were more specific in the recall of 
positive memories compared to recent suicide attempters, suggesting that the inability to 
recall specific positive memories confers a risk of suicide in vulnerable individuals. 
 Whilst these studies had established the prevalence of overgeneral memory in 
suicidal patients, a later study using the cued memory paradigm developed by Williams 
and Broadbent (1986) (the “Autobiographical Memory Test”, the “AMT”) observed that 
patients with major depressive disorder were slower to recall memories for positive than 
negative cues, and recalled more general memories for positive cues (Williams & Scott, 
1988). A number of studies have since observed that individuals diagnosed with major 
depressive disorder recall positive and negative memories in general levels of detail 
(Goddard, Dritschel & Burton, 1996, 2001; Barnhofer, de Jong-Meyer, Kleinpaß & 
Nikesch, 2002; Burnside, Startup, Byatt, Rollinson & Hill, 2004; Kuyken, Howell & 
Dalgleish, 2006; Raes et al., 2006b; Vrielnyck, Deplus & Philipot, 2007). A number of 
studies have also suggested that there exists a bias in the overgeneral recall of emotionally 
positive memories in depressed patients (Moore, Watts & Williams, 1988; Brittlebank, 
Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Puffet, Jehin-Marchot, Timsit-Berthier & Timsit, 1991; 
Nandrino, Pezard, Posté, Réveillère & Beaune, 2002), and in adolescents in remission from 
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depression (Park et al., 2002). In contrast, Mackinger and colleagues (2000) reported a 
reduced recall specificity for negative memories in women with histories of major 
depression (Mackinger, Pachinger, Leibetseder & Fartacek, 2000). At least one study has 
failed to observe an overgeneral memory recall bias in depressed patients (Kaney, Bowen-
Jones & Bentall, 1999). 
 A study by Leibetseder and colleagues (2006) sought to address concerns regarding 
the comorbid nature of suicidality and depression in a study comparing memory specificity 
in depressed patients with and without histories of suicide attempts, patients with histories 
of suicidal behaviour without diagnosed affective disorders, and a control group of healthy 
adults. Patients with recent suicide attempts without a diagnosis of an affective disorder 
demonstrated similarly reduced memory specificity as the depressed patients, with and 
without prior suicidal attempts (Leibetseder, Rohrer, Mackinger & Fartacek, 2006). 
Leibetseder‟s findings suggest that a reduced specificity of memory is a shared 
vulnerability factor between suicidality and major depression, and may interact with an 
additional leading to increased suicidality, such as feelings of hopelessness (Leibetseder et 
al., 2006). However, one study noted that depressed adolescents who reported high levels 
of depression and hopelessness were specific in their recall of negative autobiographical 
memories (Swales, Williams & Wood, 2001). Although the this study did not find an 
association between overgenerality and hopelessness, the recall of specific negative 
autobiographical memories relating to traumatic experiences appeared to exacerbate 
hopelessness in clinically depressed adolescents, many of whom reported past suicidality 
and self-harm behaviours. 
Overgeneral memory recall does not appear to be a feature of all mood disorders, 
with no evidence of an overgeneral memory bias in individuals with seasonal affective 
disorder (Dalgeish, Spinks, Yiend & Kuyken, 2001). Seasonal affective disorder is 
characterised by biological etiological factors, namely seasonal changes in light cycles, and 
may be less influenced by the psychological vulnerability factors associated with non-
seasonal forms of major depressive disorder. Preliminary research has suggested that 
bipolar disorders are associated with reduced memory specificities (Mansell & Lam, 
2004). However, overgenerality does not appear to be a feature of all anxiety disorders 
(Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz & Merckelbach, 2001; Williams et al., 2007), except for 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Sutherland & Bryant, 2008) and trauma-related conditions 
(See section 1.3.4).  
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1.3.4 The Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Overgeneral 
Autobiographical Memory 
 
The Affect Regulation & Early Trauma Hypothesis 
The affect regulation hypothesis suggests that overgeneral memory specificity develops 
following the experience of negative childhood life events, from which individuals learn to 
avoid remembering events in specific detail to prevent the re-experience of negative 
emotions associated with these memories (Williams, 1996). The avoidance of re-
experiencing these negative emotions reinforces the overgeneral recall of negative 
memories. 
 Experimental studies have investigated the affect regulation hypothesis in samples 
of individuals with histories of trauma, where the experience of past traumatic life events is 
anticipated to be associated with reduced memory specificity, particularly for negative 
memories. Overgeneral memory specificities are prevalent in maltreated children 
(Valentino, Toth & Cicchetti, 2009), and in adolescents with histories of emotional, 
physical and sexual abuse (de Decker, Hermans, Raes & Eelen, 2003). Overgeneral 
memory specificities have also been observed in adults with histories of childhood sexual 
abuse (Kuyken & Brewin, 1995; Burnside et al., 2004), histories of physical abuse 
(Dalgleish et al., 2003), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Sutherland & Bryant, 
2008), in war veterans with PTSD (McNally, Litz, Prassas, Shin & Weathers, 1994; 
McNally, Lasko, Macklin & Pitman, 1995), and in patients with acute stress disorder 
(Harvey, Bryant & Dang, 1998).  
The number of specific autobiographical memories recalled by adults with major 
depressive disorder has also been negatively associated with histories of trauma, with more 
overgeneral memories recalled in individuals with histories of physical abuse (Hermans et 
al., 2004). A separate study observed that an earlier age of onset of childhood sexual abuse 
is associated with greater severities of overgeneral memory in patients with recurrent 
suicidal behaviours (Crane & Duggan, 2009). It would appear that the severity and the 
earlier onset of trauma may influence the severity of overgeneral memory. Greater 
severities of overgeneral memory have also been associated with longer durations of 
childhood abuse and earlier ages of onset of abuse in adults with post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Burnside et al., 2004). The association between histories of trauma and 
overgeneral memory has also been observed in student samples, where individuals 
identified with low specificities of autobiographical memory also report histories of 
emotional abuse (Raes, Hermans, Williams & Eelen, 2005b), although a subsequent 
student study failed to replicate this association (Stokes, Dritschel & Bekerian, 2008).  
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Although a number of studies have cited support for the affect regulation 
hypothesis, as previously discussed, a somewhat recent review has suggested that the 
evidence base is more actually mixed as many studies have failed to observe associations 
between histories of trauma with overgenerality in autobiographical memory (Moore & 
Zoellner, 2007). For example, Wessel and colleagues (2001) observed that a diagnosis of 
major depressive disorder, rather than a history of trauma, predicted the severity of 
overgeneral autobiographical memory in a sample of depressed and anxious patients, 
however the participants only reported mild to moderate scores on a self-report measure of 
trauma (Wessel et al., 2001).  
In the opposite direction of the affect regulation hypothesis, one study has observed 
that higher levels of childhood traumatisation are predictive of more specific recall of 
negative memories in a sample of depressed outpatients (Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach & 
Boon-Vermeeren, 2002), whilst a separate study has reported more severe overgeneral 
memory in depressed adolescents without histories of trauma than depressed adolescents 
with trauma (Kuyken et al., 2006). The association between histories of trauma and 
overgeneral autobiographical memory has also failed to emerge in adults with bipolar 
disorder (Mowlds et al., 2010). The mixed evidence base for the experience of traumatic 
events in childhood being a causal factor of the overgeneral recall of memories in later life 
may suggest that the experience of significant childhood traumas is just one of many 
mechanisms implicated in a lack of specificity in autobiographical memory. 
In relation to this, Hauer and colleagues (2008) have provided evidence to suggest 
that the overgeneral bias may be dependent on whether memories are recalled generatively 
or directly in individuals with histories of trauma. Hauer and colleagues (2008) presented a 
sample of adults with histories of childhood sexual abuse with two AMT tasks in order to 
promote generative and direct memory recall. A standardised AMT task, using emotionally 
valenced cue words (e.g., “happy”, was presented to elicit the generative retrieval of 
memories via the top-down process of identifying a specific memory in Event-Specific 
Knowledge (ESK) from the activation of memory representations for lifetime periods to 
more general events (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). A second AMT task presented 
participants with more concrete and highly imageable cue words (e.g., “funeral”) than the 
standardised AMT in order to prime the immediate activation of the sensory-perceptual 
information located in the specific memory representations (ESK), therefore bypassing 
generative memory searches (Hauer, Wessel, Geraerts, Merckelbach & Dalgleish, 2008). 
Both AMT procedures still required participants to recall a specific memory for each cue 
within a sixty second time limit, the only difference between AMT tasks was in the 
imageability of the cue words. Whilst participants with histories of childhood sexual abuse 
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produced more overgeneral memories than non-abused controls during generative recall, 
during direct recall no group differences were found (Hauer et al., 2008). In addition, the 
association between childhood sexual abuse and overgeneral memory on the standardised 
AMT task was found to be independent of past and current depression. Hauer and 
colleagues‟ (2008) study supports the argument that individuals with past histories of 
trauma regulate their affective states through aborting generative memory recall processes 
at the intermediate general stages of the memory system. The direct route to memory recall 
may be outside of conscious executive control, meaning that individuals are unable to abort 
retrieval, resulting in the automatic specific recall of unpleasant and traumatic memories, 
as suggested by Peeters and colleagues‟ (2002) study. 
 
The Rumination Hypothesis 
Convergent evidence has implicated the engagement in negative forms of rumination in 
reducing the specificity of autobiographical memory recall (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Watkins, Teasdale & Williams, 2000; Park, Goodyer & Teasdale, 
2004). The rumination hypothesis suggests that the overgeneral recall of memories results 
from the individual‟s engagement in persistent ruminative and analytical verbal thought 
processes which prevent the elaborative recall of specific representations of 
autobiographical memories (Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2007). In relation to this, 
Williams (1996) introduced the concept of “mnemonic interlock”, and suggested that a 
network of general memory representations becomes established following repeated 
failures to access the specific memory representations. This network of general 
representations becomes elaborated through repeated retrieval attempts, and is maintained 
by ruminative thought processes and also encourages further rumination. Future attempts 
to activate specific memory representations fail due to the abundance of intermediate 
memory descriptions.  
Empirical support for the rumination hypothesis has been provided by a series of 
studies, with the induction of non-ruminative thought processes associated with reductions 
in overgeneral memory compared to the induction of rumination in dysphoric participants 
(Watkins et al., 2000). Watkins and Teasdale (2001) further investigated whether the 
analytical or self-focused components of rumination are associated with overgeneral recall 
biases. In their study, depressed patients were allocated to receive one of four experimental 
manipulations to induce either a high or low self-focused thinking style, which was either 
high or low in analytical thought, with memory specificity tested pre and post-
manipulation. The degree of self-focused thought processes was found to influence the 
severity of the participant‟s current despondent mood state but not their specificity of 
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memory recall, whilst the inverse relationship was observed for the degree of analytical 
thought process. The severity of overgenerality of memory during recall, but not the 
severity of despondent mood, was associated with the degree of analytical thought, with 
analytical thought processes associated with elevations in overgeneral memory recall 
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). The authors suggested that the overgeneral memory bias in 
depression may be associated with a dysfunctional attempt to understand past and/or 
current problems, providing a possible explanation for the presence of overgeneral memory 
in patients outside of depressive episodes. Interestingly, the induction of an experiential 
self-focus in depressed patients has also been reported to reduce overgeneral memory 
specificity compared to analytical self-focus (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). 
 Subsequent studies have observed that rumination is associated with both 
exacerbations in depressed mood and increases in overgeneral memory recall particularly 
for emotionally negative memories (Park et al., 2004). The induction of abstract, 
analytical, and ruminative modes of thought in patients in recovery from depression is also 
associated with significant reductions in the recall of specific autobiographical memories 
(Crane, Barnhofer, Visser, Nightingale & Williams, 2007). The induction of rumination in 
currently dysphoric students also contributes to the generation of negatively biased 
memories (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998). Rumination in currently depressed patients has also 
been associated with poorer problem solving skills in addition to reduced autobiographical 
memory specificities, with low memory specificity found to mediate the relationship 
between rumination and problem solving capabilities (Raes et al., 2005a). Raes and 
colleagues (2006d) have presented further data to suggest that a bidirectional relationship 
may exist between memory specificity and rumination, where the overgeneral recall of 
memories may also influence ruminative thought processes. In a sample of students with 
high and low trait levels of rumination, the experimental induction of an overgeneral 
memory recall style led to high trait ruminators producing more rumination relevant 
sentences on a sentence scrambling task (Raes, Hermans, Williams, Geypen & Eelen, 
2006d). The memory retrieval manipulation had no effect upon performance on the 
sentence scrambling task in individuals with low trait levels of rumination. 
 Finally, the experimental induction of a non-ruminative cognitive style in an 
analogue student sample led to reductions in the recall of overgeneral memories on a 
sentence completion autobiographical memory measure, in comparison to students who 
were induced into an abstract and ruminative-like thinking style (Raes, Watkins, Williams 
& Hermans, 2008b). The overgeneral recall of memories on this sentence completion task 
has also been associated with increased depressed mood and rumination within a non-
clinical student sample (Raes, Hermans, Williams & Eelen, 2007).  
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 Whilst studies have investigated the association between negative forms of 
rumination and reduced autobiographical memory specificity, Sutherland and Bryant 
(2007) compared the effect of positive and negative rumination upon memory specificity. 
Induced negative rumination led to the recall of more overgeneral memories in dysphoric 
individuals compared to distraction and positive rumination, negative rumination was not 
associated with the recall of overgeneral memories in non-depressed individuals 
(Sutherland & Bryant, 2007). 
 In sum, research has implicated negative ruminative thought processes in the 
overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories, with support from studies which induce 
ruminative thinking styles (e.g., Watkins et al., 2000) and studies which measure self-
reported trait rumination (e.g., Raes et al., 2005a), across both clinically depressed (e.g., 
Crane et al., 2007) and non-clinical student samples (e.g., Raes et al., 2008b). Whilst the 
induction of positive rumination has been associated with increases in positive mood states 
in both depressed and non-depressed students, only increases in overgeneral memory recall 
were associated with negative rumination inductions (Sutherland & Bryant, 2007). The 
induction procedure used by Sutherland and Bryant (2007) may not have sufficiently 
induced positive ruminative thought processes to produce effects on memory specificity, 
only increases in mood. Future studies could consider using a recently developed self-
report measure of positive rumination, the “Responses to Positive Affect” scale (Feldman 
et al., 2008), to more accurately assess the engagement in positive self-thought processes. 
 
Executive Processes 
The recall of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system is thought to be 
moderated by supervisory central executive processes (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Reductions in the capacities of central executive processes are considered to be implicated 
in the overgeneral memory bias, through interference with the more effortful generative 
recall of memories, meaning that event-specific representations in the memory system fail 
to be activated (Williams, 2006). A number of studies have reported associations between 
a reduced specificity of autobiographical memory with reduced working memory capacity 
and reduced executive processes (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Neshat-Doost, Dalgleish & 
Golden, 2008; Ros, Latorre & Serrano, 2010). 
Dalgleish and colleagues (2007) reported a series of studies that demonstrated that 
a reduced specificity of autobiographical memory was associated with poor performances 
across a number of measures of executive processes, including verbal fluency tasks, which 
remained independent of the effect of current depressive mood states. Current depressed 
mood states were also associated with reduced executive processes across samples of 
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healthy controls, participants with subclinical levels of depressive symptoms, and in 
participants with clinically diagnosed eating disorders (Dalgleish et al., 2007). 
 One suggestion is that the association between reduced executive processes and 
overgeneral memory may be the result of a failure to inhibit distracting or irrelevant 
information which interferes with the generative memory recall process (Dalgleish et al., 
2007; Williams et al., 2007). Indeed, the severity of overgeneral autobiographical memory 
has been associated with lower scores on a self-report measure of inhibitory control in non-
clinically depressed children (Raes, Verstraeten, Bijttebier, Vasey & Dalgleish, 2010). The 
relationship between depressed mood and overgeneral memory was also partially mediated 
by reduced inhibitory control in the same study. In sum, the reduction of executive 
processing capacities is considered to interfere with the generative recall of specific 
autobiographical memories, possibility due to the inability to inhibit distracting 
information during recall (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2007), meaning that there are insufficient 
processing capacities for specific memory representations to be activated. 
 
The Non-Trauma Affect Regulation Hypothesis 
Individuals may learn to avoid recalling autobiographical memories in specific detail as a 
means of regulating their emotional state, but not as a result of traumatic experiences 
(Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams & Eelen, 2005; Raes, Hermans, Williams & Eelen, 
2006c; Hermans et al., 2007). The overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories may be 
adaptive in the short term, in terms of regulating mood and in avoiding negative mood 
states (Hermans et al., 2005), and may become reinforced as the individual continues to 
avoid negative emotional states, developing into an enduring tendency to be overgeneral in 
memory recall. Indeed, the overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories has been 
associated with avoidant coping styles in non-depressed students, including social 
avoidance and thought suppression strategies (Hermans et al., 2005).  
 The overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories also appears to be a means of 
coping with future unpleasant events, with students with low memory specificities 
reporting less distress following the experience of an unexpected negative event compared 
to high-specific students (Raes, Hermans, de Decker, Eelen & Williams, 2003; Hermans et 
al., 2007). A second study by replicated this finding and observed that both high and low-
specific students did not differ in their emotional reactions to a positive event (Raes et al., 
2006c), suggesting that habitual overgenerality may serve a protective function from 
negative events and cognitions at least in the short term. 
Interestingly, Raes and colleagues (2006c) have suggested that there exists a 
dichotomy between individuals who are low-specific in that they recall fewer specific 
 65 
memories, and individuals who are low-specific in that they recall more general memories. 
In their second study, participants induced to retrieve more overgeneral memories 
experienced more distress and intrusive thoughts following a negative laboratory event, in 
comparison to participants who received a specific memory recall induction (Raes et al., 
2006c). Raes and colleagues (2006c) suggested that the avoidance of recalling specific 
memories through the recall of more general memories is associated with affect regulation 
as the individual avoids priming emotions associated with event-specific memory 
representations. Whilst avoiding the recall of specific memories (i.e., recalling fewer 
specific memories) for unpleasant events may be beneficial in that the emotions associated 
with event-specific information are not primed, the overgeneral recall of memories appears 
to be associated with greater distress following a negative experience. Overgenerality as an 
affect regulatory strategy may only assist in priming ruminative propositional thoughts 
about the self through the activation of the general memory networks as suggested by 
William‟s (1996) mnemonic interlock concept, meaning that individuals are more likely to 
interpret recent experiences in a self-negative manner. 
 
The CaRFAX Model of Autobiographical Memory Recall 
Williams (2006) proposed the CaRFAX model of autobiographical memory in recognition 
of the established associations between overgeneral memory recall with negative 
rumination and reduced executive processing capacities, as well as the affect regulatory 
strategy of recalling unpleasant memories in overgeneral levels of detail. CaRFAX 
integrates capture and ruminative thought processes, functional avoidance (the affect 
regulatory hypotheses), and executive capacity and control processes into one framework 
(see Figure 1.3.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3.2 The CaRFAX model of autobiographical memory (Williams 2006) 
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Capture and rumination refers the processes involved in the identification and recall 
of memories, including the conceptual overlap between a presented memory cue to the 
current concerns of the individual (Williams, 2006). This conceptual overlap is considered 
to trigger ruminative thought processes and is also thought to activate higher-order mental 
representations, including dysfunctional attitudes and self-schemas (Williams, 2006). Two 
studies conducted in samples of depressed patients and patients with borderline personality 
disorder observed a reduced specificity of autobiographical memory recall in response to 
cue words that matched underlying schemas and attitudes (Spinhoven, Bockting, Kremers, 
Schene & Williams, 2007). Greater conceptual overlap between memory cues and self-
conceptual information, relating to perceptions of past, current and future selves, has also 
been associated with reduced memory specificity in depressed individuals but not in never-
depressed controls (Crane, Barnhofer & Williams, 2007). The association between 
overgeneral memory and schema activation as suggested by these studies suggests that the 
activation of self-schemas may be related to the activation of the over-elaborated general 
memory representations which develop through mnemonic interlock (Williams, 1996). 
Greater degrees of conceptual overlap between cue words and schematic content may lead 
to the activation of the propositional information contained within the general memory 
representations, leading to rumination and the truncation of memory recall prior to the 
event-specific knowledge representations in autobiographical memory. 
Functional avoidance, an “affective gating mechanism” (Williams, 2006, p. 563), 
refers to attempts to avoid the remembrance of unpleasant memories through the abortion 
of the memory recall process prior to the activation of the specific memory representations. 
Williams (2006) emphasised the motivational need of the individual to avoid recalling 
memories in specific detail, and suggested that reduced executive processing capacities 
may reduce the ability of the individual to keep unpleasant memories out of consciousness.  
Executive processes are considered to be implicated in the generative recall of 
autobiographical memories, with the reduction of executive processing capacities thought 
to assist in the truncation of the memory recall process at the generic intermediate 
representations within the self-memory system. Whilst research has demonstrated that the 
association between reduced memory specificity and executive processing capacities are 
independent of depressed mood states (Dalgleish et al., 2007), the experience of depression 
and the engagement in ruminative thought processes are also considered to reduce 
executive processes through the propositional analytic thought (Watkins & Brown, 2002; 
Philippot & Brutoux, 2008). 
Despite the efforts of Williams to produce a more cohesive model of 
autobiographical memory, research has continued to focus upon the individual 
 67 
contributions of the CaRFAX processes to memory specificity, rather than investigating 
the associations between these processes and their combined influence upon memory 
recall. In addition, the CaRFAX model is primarily based upon studies conducted within 
clinically depressed and dysphoric analogue samples. It is unclear how these processes are 
associated with overgeneral memory in other conditions. The functional avoidance strand 
of CaRFAX, in particular, has received less empirical support compared to the effects of 
negative rumination and reduced executive processing capacity upon memory specificity.  
 
 
Summary 
In sum, research has suggested that there are a number of different mechanisms through 
which overgenerality in the recall of autobiographical memories may arise. These include 
the engagement in rumination (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998), and reductions in executive 
processing capacities (Dalgleish et al., 2007). Whilst overgeneral memory recall may arise 
in the attempt to regulate mood states (Hermans et al., 2007), and to avoid recalling past 
traumatic experiences (Hermans et al., 2004). Although numerous studies have 
demonstrated the presence of overgeneral memory recall in depressed samples, 
overgenerality does not appear to be a simple function of depressed mood (Mackinger et 
al., 2000), more a function of these maladaptive cognitive processes. In addition, research 
conducted with patients diagnosed with Seasonal Affective Disorder, an organic form of 
depression which is not associated with overgenerality, has implied that overgeneral 
autobiographical memory is largely a cognitive phenomenon (Dalgleish et al., 2001).  
A number of studies have demonstrated that both naturally occurring and 
experimentally induced negative ruminative thought processes are associated with reduced 
memory specificities (e.g., Watkins et al., 2000; Raes et al., 2008b). However, these 
studies have been limited to clinically depressed or non-clinical dysphoric samples, and 
only one study has investigated how positive forms of rumination may be associated with 
memory specificity (Sutherland & Bryant, 2007). The memory specificity and rumination 
literature has been well supported by studies which have used established self-report 
measures of rumination (e.g., the Ruminative Responses Scale: Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) as well as experimental studies investigating the induction of ruminative 
thinking styles in comparison to distraction and concrete-forms of thinking processes (e.g., 
Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). 
 A range of studies have been conducted in relation to the affect regulation 
hypothesis, including studies conducted in clinical and non-clinical samples, and across 
various mental health conditions. There are two somewhat different components to the 
affect regulation hypothesis, relating to the overgeneral recall of autobiographical 
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memories as a means to avoid recalling memories of past traumas, and overgenerality as a 
more general means for regulating emotions. Whilst some studies have associated the 
experience of trauma with overgenerality in autobiographical memory, conditions such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are notably associated with intrusive memories and 
vivid flashbacks of past traumas (APA, 2000). Peeters and colleagues (2002) also noted 
that the experience of more severe childhood traumas was associated with the recall of 
specific negative memories in adult patients with diagnosed with depression (Peeters et al., 
2002). One explanation for the increased specificity of memory recall in trauma, suicidality 
and depression, is that memory recall is primarily of the direct form, not generative recall 
where the memory recall process may be aborted prior to the activation of specific memory 
representations (Hauer et al., 2008). The repeated rehearsal of past traumas may assist in 
the development and maintenance of direct associative links between cues and specific 
memory representations, leading to the more automatic re-experiencing of unpleasant 
events and their associated emotional states. However, there is some concern regarding the 
assessment of traumatic experiences through the use of self-report questionnaires of trauma 
(Raes et al., 2005b). Future studies could use structured clinical interviews to more 
accurately assess the qualitative nature of traumatic experiences in non-clinical samples. 
However, the extent to which traumatic experiences lead to more specific memory recall 
due to the rehearsal of these experiences is unclear simply due to a lack of research. Whilst 
the non-trauma based affect regulation hypothesis has been supported by experimental 
studies, these studies have been conducted within student samples (Raes et al., 2003; Raes 
et al., 2006c). It remains unclear as to how clinically depressed individuals regulate their 
emotional states through memory recall, and whether overgenerality in depressed patients 
protects the individual from experiencing negative emotional states associated with 
negative experiences.  
In sum, whilst research has implicated the experience of early traumas, the 
engagement in ruminative and abstract-verbal modes of thought, and reductions in 
executive processing capacity with reduced memory specificity, these processes are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (e.g., the CaRFAX model). Although there appear to be a 
number of different pathways to reduced memory specificity, there remains a general lack 
of understanding and research investigating the interactions between these processes and 
their subsequent effects upon memory specificity.  
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1.3.5 The Impact of Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory Recall upon 
Functioning and Illness Outcomes 
The overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories can have a significant impact upon 
illness outcomes in patient populations. A number of studies support the notion that 
overgeneral memory may act as a marker of the vulnerability to relapse and may also be 
predictive of the future course of depression (Sumner, Griffith & Mineka, 2010).  
For example, the overgeneral recall of positive autobiographical memories has been 
reported to be predictive of poorer responses to antidepressant medication at both three and 
seven month follow-ups in depressed patients (Brittlebank et al., 1993). Similar studies in 
depressed patient samples have suggested that the specific recall of negative but not 
positive autobiographical memories are associated with reduced depression severities at 
three month (Peeters et al., 2002) and seven month follow-ups (Raes et al., 2006a). The 
overgeneral recall of positive and negative memories in depressed patients has also been 
associated with a higher probability of still meeting criteria for being clinically depressed 
at a 4 week follow-up (Hermans et al., 2008). Interestingly, Raes and colleagues (2006a) 
observed that the association between reduced memory specificity and increased 
depression severity at a seven month follow-up in depressed patients was rendered non-
significant once rumination was incorporated as a mediator. Rumination may not be 
directly associated with poorer illness outcomes in depressed patients, but may assist in 
preventing the specific recall of memories which in turn is associated with poorer illness 
outcomes. However, one study reported that depression severities at a six month follow-up 
was predicted by the intrusion and avoidance of stressful memories in depressed patients 
rather than by overgenerality (Brewin, Reynolds & Tata, 1999).  
In patients with recurrent forms of depression, overgeneral autobiographical 
memory specificity appears to remain stable despite continued treatment by antidepressant 
medication, suggesting that overgeneral memory may be a function of the number of 
previous depressive episodes experienced (Nandrino et al., 2002). Interestingly, the 
severity of overgeneral memory also appears to be predictive of outcomes following 
electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) in depressed patients, with overgeneral patients reporting 
greater increases in depression severities following ECT than specific patients (Raes et al., 
2008a). These studies would appear to support the notion that physiological treatments do 
not address the underlying cognitive processes implicated in overgeneral memory. 
  
Modification of Overgenerality in Autobiographical Memory Recall 
There is some evidence to suggest that cognitive-behavioural therapies can assist in 
improving autobiographical memory specificity. McBride and colleagues (2007) reported 
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improvements in the recall specificity of extended memories, memories for events lasting 
more than one day, in a group of depressed patients who had received a 16 week course of 
CBT compared to depressed patients receiving pharmacotherapy. However, improvements 
in the recall of specific memories, and reductions in the quantity of overgeneral memories 
recalled were noted in both groups at the end of therapy (McBride, Segal, Kennedy & 
Gemar, 2007). One study has failed to observe significant changes in memory specificity 
following group cognitive therapy in euthymic patients with histories of recurrent 
depression (Spinhoven et al., 2006). Whilst CBT appears to have had an effect upon 
improving the recall specificity for extended memories (McBride et al., 2007), more 
focused CBT interventions may be required to address the dysfunctional autobiographical 
memory recall. 
Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) has also been demonstrated to 
reduce overgeneral memory in patients with major depressive disorder (Williams, 
Teasdale, Segal & Soulsby, 2000). MBCT incorporates exercises to train patients to focus 
more on momentary experiences rather than engaging in ruminative thinking or thought 
processes that take attention away from their present situation (Ma & Teasdale, 2004). In a 
sample of individuals who had recovered from major depressive disorder, participants who 
were assigned to an eight week MBCT intervention had significant reductions in 
overgeneral memory compared to those who received ongoing treatment as usual 
(Williams et al., 2000). Promoting mindful thought processes may assist in improving the 
specificity of overgeneral memory recall via improving cognitive flexibility and executive 
processing capacity (Williams et al., 2000). Research in a non-depressed sample reported 
that individuals who completed an MBCT intervention had improved memory specificities 
and improved their performance on measures of cognitive flexibility and the inhibition of 
automatic responses to stimuli (Heeren, Van Broeck & Philippot, 2009). 
Memory Specificity Training (MeST), a psychological intervention focused upon 
improving the specificity of autobiographical memory recall, has also provided support for 
the notion that overgeneral memory is modifiable (Raes, Williams & Hermans, 2009). 
MeST is a one-to-one psychotherapy delivered over the course of four weeks in one hour 
sessions with a clinical psychologist. MeST incorporates psychoeducation regarding 
memory functioning and its impairments in relation to depression, in addition to activities 
that aim to promote specific memory recall, for example through focusing the client upon 
the retrieval of sensory and peripheral details of memories (for a thorough description of 
the MeST procedure, please see Raes et al., 2009). 
A recent pilot study reported improvements in memory specificity in a sample of 
ten patients with major depressive disorder following a four week MeST intervention, with 
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these improvements being independent of changes in depressive symptoms (Raes et al., 
2009). Improvements in problem solving, feelings of hopelessness, and ruminative 
thinking patterns were also observed at post-treatment. The authors also noted that some 
participants reported improved awareness of the detail in their environment (Raes et al., 
2009), which may indicate that improved memory recall through MeST training may be 
associated with improvements in mindfulness.  
Whilst two studies have reported improvements in memory specificity in depressed 
patients receiving CBT (Williams et al., 2000; McBride et al., 2007), the application of 
Memory Specificity Training (MEST) reported improvements in overgeneral memory 
which were independent of current mood states (Raes et al., 2009). The lack of a 
significant change in memory specificity following group cognitive therapy in Spinhoven 
and colleagues‟ study (2006) may be due to the group CBT format and the absence of 
techniques focused upon improving memory specificity. Although these are only 
preliminary studies, there is some encouraging evidence to suggest that the application of 
CBT may assist in improving the recall specificity of autobiographical memories. 
There is limited evidence to suggest that pharmacological therapies can assist in 
alleviating overgeneral memory (McBride et al., 2007). Whilst pharmacological treatments 
may assist in stabilising mood patterns, only cognitive-behavioural techniques appear to 
assist in modifying underlying information processes implicated in reduced memory 
specificity, and the cognitive restructuring of dysfunctional cognitions and self-schemas.  
 
Overgeneral Memory & Problem Solving 
In addition to impacting upon illness outcomes, the overgeneral recall of autobiographical 
memories has also been associated with deficits in psychosocial problem-solving 
capabilities (Goddard et al., 1996; Raes et al., 2005a; Williams et al., 2006). The problem 
solving hypothesis suggests that the overgeneral retrieval of autobiographical memories 
prevents the access and subsequent application of previously successful problem-solving 
strategies stored in the memory system to current problems (Williams, 1996).  
The ability to successfully resolve problematic situations encountered in the 
environment has been suggested to be a fundamental component of maintaining positive 
well-being (Bell & D'Zurilla, 2009). Indeed, poor problem solving skills, in terms of the 
generation of less effective solutions, are associated with increased depressive symptom 
severities in patients with major depressive disorder (Marx, Williams & Claridge, 1992; 
Garland, Harrington, House & Scott, 2000). In extreme cases, deficits in problem-solving 
and in the specific recall of autobiographical memories have been reported in individuals 
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with histories of attempted suicide (Evans, Williams, O'Loughlin & Howells, 1992; Sidley, 
Whitaker, Calam & Wells, 1997; Arie, Apter, Orbach, Yefet & Zalzman, 2008). 
 In a non-clinical student sample, Williams and colleagues (2006) reported that the 
induction of a specific memory recall style was associated with the production of more 
effective solutions to problems on the Means-End Problem Solving task (MEPS: Williams 
et al., 2006). The MEPS is a problem-solving task which requires participants to generate 
solutions to a range of hypothetical problematic situations, with problem-solving 
performance usually assessed by the number of solution steps participants generate in 
relation to these scenarios (Platt & Spivak, 1975). A second study conducted by the same 
researchers observed that the induction of a specific memory recall strategy, through the 
presentation of highly imageable cue words, was associated with the production of more 
effective solutions and a greater number of relevant solution means on the MEPS 
(Williams et al., 2006). It would appear that the generation of effective solutions on the 
problem solving task is modifiable through the increased availability of autobiographical 
memories for retrieval. 
 Within clinical samples, the overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories by 
patients with major depressive disorder has been associated with poorer performances on 
measures of problem solving, with depressed patients found to generate fewer effective 
solution steps and less effective solutions to problems (Goddard et al., 1996; Raes et al., 
2005a). The association between deficits in social problem solving and reduced memory 
specificity has also emerged in samples of dysphoric students (Goddard, Dritschel & 
Burton, 1997). 
 
Summary 
In sum, the overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories appears to present a 
considerable impact upon an individual‟s well-being. The tendency to recall 
autobiographical memories in overgeneral levels of detail has been associated with 
prospective increases in depressive symptoms (Raes et al., 2006a; Sumner et al., 2010), 
with lower likelihoods of recovering from depressive episodes (Hermans et al., 2008), and 
is predictive of poorer responses to treatment by medication and by electro-convulsive 
therapy (Brittlebank et al., 1993; Raes et al., 2008a). A lack of specificity in the recall of 
autobiographical memory has also been associated with impairments in the effective 
resolution of psychosocial problems (Goddard et al., 1997; Williams et al., 2006). The 
association between reduced memory specificity and impaired problem solving capabilities 
suggests that overgeneral individuals are unable to recall previously successful problem 
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solving strategies which they are then unable to apply to their current and future problems, 
potentially leading to future exacerbations of depressed states. 
 Whilst there is some encouraging evidence to suggest that psychotherapy may be 
effective in reducing the severity of overgeneral autobiographical memory, these studies 
are largely small-scale and preliminary in nature. The development of Memory Specificity 
Training (MeST) shows promise (Raes et al., 2009), although further evaluation is required 
in relation to the effectiveness of MeST for prospective illness outcomes. However, the 
majority of studies investigating the effect of psychotherapy upon overgenerality have 
been conducted within depressed patient samples, so it is unclear how such therapies may 
assist in improving the specificity of autobiographical memory recall in other 
psychopathological disorders. Although it has been argued that overgeneral 
autobiographical memory recall may function as a transdiagnostic process (Harvey, 
Watkins, Mansell & Shafran, 2004), which would suggest that these therapeutic 
interventions could be applicable to and effective for use with other mental health 
conditions, such as anxiety, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. 
 
1.3.6 Overgeneral Autobiographical Memory in Bipolar Disorder 
As is evident from the previously reviewed studies, there is an abundance of research 
conducted within samples of depressed patients and dysphoric individuals. There is also an 
emerging literature investigating the nature of autobiographical memory recall in 
individuals with diagnoses of bipolar disorder, in the attempt to explore whether an 
overgeneral memory bias is present in bipolar individuals. 
Scott and colleagues (2000) first observed that individuals in remission from 
bipolar disorder recalled more overgeneral autobiographical memories than non-bipolar 
controls, across both positive and negative cues. The bipolar participants also generated 
fewer relevant solutions and less effective solutions on the Means-End Problem Solving 
task, in line with previous observations in depressed samples (Goddard et al., 1996; Raes et 
al., 2005a), and reported more extreme dysfunctional attitudes than controls (Scott et al., 
2000). However, as Scott and colleagues (2000) did not include a comparison group of 
patients with major depressive disorder, it was unclear as to whether overgenerality acts as 
a similar cognitive vulnerability process for both bipolar disorder and major depressive 
disorder. 
 A subsequent study addressed this limitation and reported that individuals in 
remission from bipolar disorder generated more overgeneral memories in response to 
negative cue words in comparison to remitted unipolar patients (Mansell & Lam, 2004). 
The bipolar participants also reported the more frequent recollection of negative memories 
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in everyday life, and the experience of more previous depressed episodes than the 
depressed patients. The extent of overgeneral memory may be a function of the number of 
prior episodes of depression experienced, where the recurrence of clinically significant 
depressed states reinforces overgenerality, possibly by reinforcing negative self-schemas. 
Alternatively, the overgeneral recall and the more frequent rehearsal of negative memories 
may have been caused by rumination, particularly as research has suggested that negative 
ruminative thought processes are prevalent even during remission from bipolar disorder 
(Thomas et al., 2007; Van der Gucht et al., 2009). Mansell and Lam (2004) also noted that 
95% of the specific autobiographical memories involved the recall of a mental image, 
consistent with hypothesised role of sensory-perceptual information in the identification 
and recall of specific memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
 A later study by Tzemou and Birchwood (2007) reported no significant differences 
in memory specificity or problem-solving capabilities between currently hospitalised 
bipolar and unipolar patients, although both patient groups recalled fewer specific 
memories and generated fewer solutions to problems than non-depressed controls. 
However, the bipolar patients reported more specific autobiographical memories for 
positive cues and improved problem-solving at a 12 week follow-up compared to 
depressed patients. Both bipolar and unipolar participants reported the experience of 
intrusive memories, whilst the authors noted that those individuals who reported fewer 
intrusive memories also reported more extreme overgeneral memory specificity (Tzemou 
& Birchwood, 2007). This association would support the hypothesised affect regulatory 
role of overgeneral memory, whereby the avoidance of recalling memories in specific 
levels of detail prevents the recall of unpleasant emotions associated with such memories. 
Both the unipolar and bipolar patients performed similarly on the AMT and problem-
solving tasks, suggesting that similar patterns of deficits in these cognitive processes are 
shared by these conditions.  
A recent study reported that currently manic bipolar patients generated fewer 
specific memories in response to negative cue words compared to non-bipolar controls 
(Van der Gucht et al., 2009). The same study also reported similar mean numbers of 
specific negative memories recalled by currently depressed and remitted bipolar patients, 
but found no significant correlations between manic and depressive symptoms with 
memory specificity (Van der Gucht et al., 2009). The lack of significant relationships 
between current symptoms and memory specificity could be consistent with the notion that 
it is the maladaptive cognitive processes and not current moods or symptoms which are 
associated with overgenerality.  
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 Interestingly, a case study of a patient with rapid cycling bipolar disorder, who 
experienced cycling in moods from depression to mania on a daily basis, reported that 
depressed days were associated with the recall of more general and less pleasant 
autobiographical memories, whilst manic days were associated with the recall of more 
specific memories (Lam & Mansell, 2008). Memory recall was also faster on manic days, 
but was slower and appeared to be more effortful on depressed days. 
 In a study investigating the affect regulation hypothesis, Mowlds and colleagues 
(2010) failed to observe an association between the severity of childhood trauma and the 
overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories in adult patients with bipolar disorder. 
The study did find that the severity of childhood trauma was associated with the severity of 
inter-episode depressive mood states (Mowlds et al., 2010). However, the study assessed 
the severity of traumatic experiences via self-report questionnaire measures, which has 
previously been criticised for ignoring the more subjective aspects of experienced traumas 
(Raes et al., 2005b). Whilst Mowlds and colleagues‟ study (2010) has focused upon the 
role of traumatic life events in relation to overgeneral memory, there is still a paucity of 
research into the role of traumatic and non-traumatic life events in the specificity of 
autobiographical memory recall in bipolar individuals. It is feasible that the experience of 
childhood traumas may be implicated in the development of overgeneral memory 
specificities in bipolar adults, particularly as research has associated the experience of life 
events with symptom exacerbation in bipolar individuals (Johnson, 2005a; Johnson et al., 
2008b). Overgeneral autobiographical memory in bipolar disorder may not just be a 
function of the experience of traumatic childhood events, but more of an interaction 
between childhood trauma and life events experienced in adulthood. 
At present, only one study has taken a behavioural high-risk approach when 
investigating whether an overgeneral autobiographical memory bias contributes to the 
vulnerability to bipolar disorder. Delduca and colleagues (2010) reported that individuals 
at an elevated risk for hypomania generated more specific negative autobiographical 
memories than low-risk individuals. High-risk participants were also faster to recall 
specific negative memories than individuals at a low-risk for mania (Delduca, Jones & 
Barnard, 2010). Whilst Delduca and colleagues present their findings in relation to the 
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems framework (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991), where specific 
memory recall is considered to arise due to experiential forms of processing associated 
with mania, the specific recall of negative memories in hypomanic individuals may also 
lend support to the manic defence/depression avoidance hypothesis. The increased 
availability of negative autobiographical memories in the hypomanic participants in 
Delduca and colleagues‟ (2010) study, possibly relating to underlying negative self-
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schemas, may prompt exacerbations in (hypomanic) mood states in a dysfunctional attempt 
to cope with self-negative cognitions. 
 The notion of a negative self-concept in relation to autobiographical memory in 
bipolar disorder has also been described in a qualitative analysis of autobiographical 
memories from a previous study (Mansell & Lam, 2004; Mansell & Hodson, 2009). 
Mansell and Hodson (2009) identified several themes from recalled memories relating to a 
negative self-concept, as well as to feelings of isolation and victimisation. Positive 
memories were associated with themes relating to perceptions of the self from the 
perspective of other individuals, including memories of positive feedback and interactions 
with other individuals. Mansell and Hodson (2009) did not find evidence to support the 
notion of a positive self-concept which is internally devised and independent from outside 
influence. Rather, their analyses suggested that bipolar individual‟s memories related very 
much to a pervasive negative self-concept and need for positive feedback from other 
individuals (Mansell & Hodson, 2009). One interpretation of this finding may again relate 
to the manic-defence/depression avoidance hypothesis, whereby the existence of a 
pervasive negative self-concept could be rooted within the autobiographical memory 
knowledge base. Individuals with bipolar disorder may attempt to avoid self-negative 
information in the form of autobiographical memories by aborting recall at an intermediate 
level in the memory system, to avoid recalling memories associated with negative 
emotions and unpleasant information about the self. 
However, a limitation with Mansell and Hodson‟s (2009) study is that their 
analyses were conducted upon data collected in an earlier study where individuals in 
remission from bipolar disorder reported more overgeneral negative memories than 
remitted depressed patients, and had experienced more previous episodes of depression 
(Mansell & Lam, 2004). The observations that bipolar disorder is associated with extreme 
negative self-concepts may reflect the frequency of depressed episodes experienced by the 
bipolar patients in that particular study.  
A separate line of research has explored the role of imagery in relation to goals 
associated with autobiographical memories. Conway and colleagues (2004) have suggested 
that goals are implicit processes derived from the available self-knowledge in 
autobiographical memory. In relation to psychopathology, it has been suggested that 
imagery may contain information relating to avoidance goals (Conway, Meares & 
Standart, 2004), with high prevalences of intrusive images in memories relating to 
avoidance and approach goals noted within a transdiagnostic clinical sample (Reid, 2009). 
As such, mental imagery pertaining to goals is considered to reflect the ongoing concerns 
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of the individual, and may serve to direct future goal-related behaviours in order to address 
current concerns.  
Whilst it has been suggested that autobiographical memory, mental imagery and 
goals are inter-related, little research has been conducted into the role of these factors in 
relation to the experience of bipolar disorder, which is surprising given that bipolar 
individuals are particularly sensitive to goal-directed behaviours and cognitions (Johnson, 
2005b).  
Gregory and colleagues (2010) conducted a study which investigated the 
prevalence of intrusive memories and mental imagery relating to goals in past hypomanic, 
depressive and euthymic episodes. Using a semi-structured interview, a sample of 
currently euthymic bipolar individuals reported that previously experienced euthymic 
states were associated with intrusive memories of the past, often relating to past negative 
experiences, which were rated as being less distressing and intrusive compared to negative 
memories which intruded previous depressed episodes. Hypomanic episodes were 
associated with images related to positive future events, with such images rated as being 
experienced as particularly vivid, enjoyable, and real, whilst intrusive images relating to 
past negative experiences were less frequently reported as occurring during previous 
hypomanias. Interestingly, both positive and negative mental imagery relating to the future 
were rated as being high in their realism and were goal-related in nature (Gregory, Brewin, 
Mansell & Donaldson, 2010). A summary table (Table 1.3.3) detailing the published 
research investigating autobiographical memory specificity in bipolar disorder is presented 
on the following page. 
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Table 1.3.1. A table of studies investigating autobiographical memory specificity in samples of bipolar patients and at-risk individuals. 
 
 Sample Design Findings 
Scott et al. (2000) 41 euthymic BD, 20 HC 
Cross-sectional  
AMT & MEPS 
Overgeneral AM: BD > HC, BD = poorer MEPS performance 
than HC 
Mansell & Lam (2004) 
19 remitted BD, 16 remitted 
UD 
AMT 
BD recalled more negative OG AMs than UD, Specific AMs 
associated with mental images 
Tzemou & Birchwood (2007) 29 episodic BD, 21 UD, 20 HC 
AMT & MEPS (inc.  
12 week follow-up) 
BD and UD performed similarly on OG AM and MEPS 
effectiveness, but both worse than HC. 
Lam & Mansell (2008) 1 rapid cycling BD patient 
Case study, non-
standardised AMT 
Depressed mood associated unpleasant & OG AMs, Mania 
associated with pleasant and specific AM recall 
Mansell & Hodson (2009) (same as Mansell & Lam, 2004) IPA 
IPA suggested that AM in BD features a pervasive negative self-
concept 
Van der Gucht et al. (2009) 
41 HC, 30 depressed BD, 34 
hypo/manic BD, 43 euthymic 
BD 
AMT (+ many other 
psychological tests) 
Currently hypo/manic BD patients recall more OG negative 
AMs than other participants. 
Delduca et al. (2010) 
14 high-risk & 14 low-risk 
students (HPS scores) 
AMT 
High-risk students faster to recall more specific negative AMs 
than low-risk students 
Gregory et al. (2010) 29 euthymic BD AM Interview 
Euthymia and depression associated with neg intrusive AMs and 
imagery, hypomania associated with pleasant future images  
Mowlds et al. (2010) 52 BD  AMT 
Low AM specificity in BD, but no association between 
childhood trauma and AM 
  
Key: AM = Autobiographical Memory, AMT = the Autobiographical Memory Test, BD = Bipolar Disorder (patients), HC = healthy controls, HPS = Hypomanic 
Personality Scale, IPA = Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, MEPS = Means-End Problem Solving task, OG = Overgeneral (autobiographical 
memories), UD = Unipolar Depression. 
7
8
 
 
 79 
1.3.7 Conclusions 
It is clear from this review that the overgeneral recall bias for autobiographical memories is 
implicated in the affective disorders, functions as a cognitive vulnerability factor for 
depression, and is associated with poorer illness outcomes in depressed patients. There is 
some research to suggest that the overgenerality is modifiable through therapy (e.g., 
Williams et al., 2000; McBride et al., 2007; Raes et al., 2007), suggesting that these poor 
outcomes in patient samples may be avoidable through effectively designed and targeted 
therapeutic interventions. There also appear to be a number of different pathways to 
overgenerality in autobiographical memory, which may or may not be inter-related, such as 
the engagement in ruminative and verbal thought processes (e.g., Crane et al, 2007), 
reduced executive processing capacities (e.g., Dalgleish et al, 2007), and the attempt to 
regulate current mood states through overgenerality (e.g., Hermans et al., 2005; 2007), 
often following the experience of traumatic life events (e.g., Hauer et al., 2008). 
 Whilst studies have suggested that the overgeneral recall of autobiographical 
memories may be as much of a feature of bipolar disorder as unipolar depression (e.g., 
Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004), few studies have been conducted in bipolar 
samples. There are also some methodological limitations with these studies, which present 
some challenges to understanding the role of autobiographical memory in bipolar disorder. 
For example, patients in different stages of illness have been sampled across studies, 
ranging from remitted and euthymic patients (Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004), to 
acutely unwell patients (Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007; Lam & Mansell, 2008). Tzemou and 
Birchwood‟s (2007) use of a sample of patients currently experiencing various bipolar 
episodes may have ignored some subtle differences in autobiographical memory, 
particularly as Gregory and colleagues (2010) have suggested that different memory 
processes occur across different bipolar mood states. There are also some issues regarding 
inter-study differences in the assessment of autobiographical memory. For example, 
Mansell and Lam (2004) asked their participants to qualify their identified 
autobiographical memories across a number of features prior to the full recall of these 
memories, which may have unintentionally primed the recall of additional information 
which may not have been recalled under normal conditions. Some studies have also used 
non-standardised assessments of memory recall, such as semi-structured interviews 
(Gregory et al., 2010). Whilst other studies have adopted cue words used in previous 
research conducted within depressed and suicidal samples, which may not adequately 
prime memories of positive experiences associated with bipolar disorder (Delduca et al., 
2010). Although, Mansell and Lam (2004) have used a number of bipolar-relevant cues in 
their study which would appear to more adequately probe bipolar-relevant experiences. 
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It remains unclear how the psychological mechanisms associated with 
overgenerality are implicated in overgeneral memory in individuals with bipolar affective 
disorders. Although the study by Van der Gucht and colleagues (2009) measured 
rumination and memory specificity in bipolar participants, they did not investigate the 
associations between these variables. Mowlds and colleagues (2010) reported an 
investigation into the affect regulation hypothesis in adult bipolar patients but failed to 
observe an association between the severity of childhood trauma and memory specificity. 
Tzemou and Birchwood‟s (2007) noted that those individuals who didn‟t experience 
intrusive memories were more overgeneral in their autobiographical memory recall, across 
both unipolar and bipolar patients, suggesting that these participants were avoiding 
potentially stressful memories through overgenerality. However, the experience of trauma 
in Tzemou and Birchwood‟s study was largely confined to adulthood, suggesting that more 
recently experienced life events are associated with overgenerality in bipolar disorder. The 
hypothesis that adult traumatic experiences are associated with reduced memory 
specificities in bipolar patients would be consistent with the lack of an association between 
childhood traumas and adulthood overgenerality reported by Mowlds et al. (2010).  
No study has yet investigated whether the relationship between executive 
processing capacities and overgenerality is applicable to bipolar disorder. There is mixed 
evidence as to whether individuals currently in remission from bipolar symptoms continue 
to experience dysfunctions in executive function, with studies suggesting that executive 
dysfunction are only associated with depressed states (Maalouf et al., 2010), with other 
studies suggesting that bipolar individuals in remission from symptoms experience 
ongoing executive dysfunction (Ferrier, Stanton & Scott, 1999; Mur et al., 2007). In sum, 
there has been a limited attempt to understand the psychological processes associated with 
the specificity of autobiographical memory recall in bipolar spectrum individuals. 
Whilst non-clinical studies have suggested that the overgeneral memory bias may 
function as a cognitive risk factor for depression (Gibbs & Rude, 2004), only one study has 
explored memory specificity in relation to the vulnerability to bipolar disorder (Delduca et 
al., 2010). At present, it is not clear whether similar biases in autobiographical memory 
recall are shared by individuals on the bipolar spectrum, inclusive of at-risk individuals and 
patients diagnosed with bipolar disorder. It is also unclear how the mechanisms implicated 
in the overgeneral autobiographical memory bias may be associated with the vulnerability 
to bipolar disorder. Further research is required to establish whether bipolar disorder and 
the risk for bipolar disorder are associated with overgenerality, particularly for negative 
memories, and how the psychological mechanisms implicated in overgeneral memory 
recall in unipolar forms of depression contribute to memory specificity in bipolar disorder. 
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Section 1.4 
The Current Thesis: Theory, Research Aims & Hypotheses 
This section will provide an outline of the work presented in the thesis, including a 
theoretical background based upon the previous literature reviews, a description of the 
research aims and hypotheses, and an overview of the studies reported in subsequent 
sections. 
 
1.4.1 Autobiographical Memory Recall in Bipolar Disorder 
There is now a growing empirical literature which has investigated the nature of 
autobiographical memory recall in individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder, although 
these studies remain few in number in comparison to the literature in major depressive 
disorder. An emergent pattern from these studies is that individuals with bipolar disorder 
appear to possess an overgeneral recall bias for autobiographical memories, particularly 
during remission from symptoms (e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004). Although 
one study has suggested that individuals in remission from bipolar disorder are more 
overgeneral in their recall of negative autobiographical memories, when compared to 
remitted unipolar patients (Mansell & Lam, 2004). However, further investigation is 
warranted into autobiographical memory recall in bipolar disorder in order to determine 
whether this overgeneral bias for emotionally negative memories is not simply a function 
of the methodological issues highlighted in previous studies (see Section 1.3).  
 The availability of overgeneral negative autobiographical memories for recall by 
bipolar individuals may reflect the highly accessible nature of negative self-schematic 
models (e.g., Mansell & Lam, 2004; Mansell & Hodson, 2009), where both general 
memories and schematic models feature propositional information about the self in relation 
to past experiences. The availability of negative self-propositional information in the form 
of autobiographical memories may be prompted by the activation of negative self-schemas, 
and may also reinforce such schematic models in a negative feedback loop, which is 
maintained by and encourages ruminative thought, leading to overgenerality in 
autobiographical memory through mnemonic interlock (Williams, 1996, 2006). Even in 
remission, bipolar disorder has been associated with the engagement in negative 
rumination (Thomas et al., 2007; Van der Gucht et al., 2009), the overgeneral recall of 
autobiographical memories (Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004), as well as with the 
endorsement of negative dysfunctional attitudes relating to self-schemas (Scott et al., 
2000). Whilst bipolar individuals recall negative memories in more general levels of detail, 
they also report the more frequent recollection of these memories in day-to-day life, 
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suggesting that self-negative information in the form of memories remains readily 
accessible even during euthymic states (Mansell & Lam, 2004). Although bipolar disorder 
is characterised by extreme mood swings, incorporating both elevated and depressed mood 
states, there appears to be empirical and theoretical support for the argument that bipolar 
disorder is associated with an overgeneral recall bias for negative autobiographical 
memories, possibly reflecting readily available self-negative information, similar in nature 
to the bias reported in unipolar depression. It is currently unclear, based upon the 
theoretical models of bipolar disorder and the previous autobiographical memory whether 
bipolar individuals may have an overgeneral bias for positive memories.  
  From the perspective of the bipolar disorder continuum, there is a lack of clarity 
regarding the role of autobiographical memory recall specificity as a potential risk factor 
for bipolar disorder, and how memory recall may be associated with other cognitive 
processes in conferring a vulnerability to bipolar spectrum disorders. For example, the 
engagement in negative forms of ruminative thinking styles and the inability to generate 
effective solutions to psychosocial problems have individually, and in combination, been 
associated with the vulnerability to unipolar depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Raes et al., 2005a). In terms of autobiographical 
memory recall, negative rumination is considered to restrict the recall of specific 
representations of autobiographical memories through “mnemonic interlock” (Williams, 
1996), with the inability to fully recall memories considered to restrict the application of 
previously successful problem-solving strategies to current and future problems (Raes et 
al., 2005a; Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2006). Whilst there is the argument that similar 
processes may be implicated in the vulnerability to bipolar disorder and major depressive 
disorder (Scott et al., 2000), due to the shared experiences of depression in the two 
conditions, it is unclear how cognitive processes such as rumination, memory recall and 
problem-solving are together associated with the vulnerability to hypomania and future 
bipolar disorder. 
  Although negative ruminative thought processes appear to be implicated in 
overgeneral memory recall, the way in which ruminative responses to positive emotional 
states and experiences affects memory specificity remains unclear. One possibility is that 
the engagement in positive rumination contributes to a positive form of “mnemonic 
interlock” whereby the memory recall process results in the over-elaboration of general 
positive memories, encouraging further positive ruminative thought and the maintenance 
of positive affect in at-risk and bipolar individuals. Positive mnemonic interlock may lead 
to a focus during memory recall upon analysing propositional information about the self in 
relation to past experiences. Alternatively, positive forms of rumination may assist in the 
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specific recall of memories. The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (Barnard & Teasdale, 
1991) framework suggests that thought processes during activated hypo/manic states are 
concentrated on the implicational code, whereby information from across the memory 
stores located at the cognitive subsystems is abstracted into the implicational code in an 
experiential mode of processing (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; Delduca et al., 2010). The 
increased availability of information from the sensory subsystem memory stores is thought 
to assist in the generation of specifically detailed memories through the increased 
availability of event-specific knowledge (Delduca et al., 2010), which is characterised by 
sensory-perceptual information unique to a specific event (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). In support of this, Talarico and colleagues (2009) have reported that positive affect 
appears to enhance the recall of peripheral details for autobiographical memories in a non-
clinical sample, whilst negative affect was more exclusively associated with the recall of 
central memory details (Talarico, Bernsten & Rubin, 2009). Talarico and colleagues‟ study 
may be consistent with the notion that experiential forms of processing associated with 
positive emotional states assist in the recall of more detailed memory representations, 
possibly through the activation and abstraction of information located in the subsystem 
memory stores proposed by ICS (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991). 
 
1.4.2 Research Aims 
Rationale 
The research presented within this thesis is motivated by several factors. Primarily, the 
studies presented in the current thesis are motivated by a lack of research into the 
psychological processes associated with bipolar disorder, particularly a lack of 
understanding regarding the specificity of autobiographical memory recall in bipolar 
individuals and the role of memory specificity as a vulnerability factor for bipolar 
spectrum disorders. Although a small number of studies have investigated memory 
specificity in bipolar samples, there are a number of methodological issues with these 
studies (See Section 1.3). In addition, only one study has investigated whether the 
vulnerability to hypomania and future bipolar disorder is associated with an overgeneral 
memory recall bias, with mixed success (Delduca et al., 2010). 
Theoretically, there are arguments that individuals with bipolar disorder and those 
at-risk may report similar patterns of memory specificity, in line with a continuum 
conceptualisation of bipolar disorder across patients and vulnerable individuals. The 
current thesis aimed to investigate the specificity of autobiographical memory in bipolar 
individuals, by addressing methodological issues identified with previous studies, and also 
aimed to investigate the cognitive processes associated with overgenerality to determine 
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whether similar cognitive vulnerability factors associated with depression are associated 
with the risk for bipolar disorder. There is the potential for the work presented in the 
current thesis to contribute to the refinement of psychological therapies for bipolar disorder 
by improving the scientific understanding of the processes implicated in memory recall.  
As the overgeneral recall appears to be a vulnerability factor for affective disorders (e.g., 
Gibbs & Rude, 2004), and that preliminary studies have suggested that cognitive-
behavioural interventions can assist in improving memory specificity and illness outcomes 
in patients diagnosed with mood disorders (McBride et al., 2007; Raes et al., 2009; 
Williams et al., 2000), the investigation of autobiographical memory specificity for bipolar 
disorder may ultimately assist in refining cognitive and memory-focused therapies for 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorders. A number of broad research aims were 
outlined as part of the current thesis, with more specific hypothesis devised for each 
individual study. 
 
Research Aim 1 
Investigate the associations between positive and negative cognitive style 
measures implicated in mood disorders 
The first research aim of the thesis was to investigate the associations between positive and 
negative forms of rumination and cognitive styles, in particular the conceptual overlap 
across cognitive style measures associated with bipolar disorder (Study One) and how such 
measures are associated with prospective mood symptoms in an analogue sample (Study 
Two). Previous research has suggested that the vulnerability to hypomania and bipolar 
disorder may be associated with the engagement of both positive and negative forms of 
rumination, and the endorsement of both positive and negative forms of self-appraisal. 
However, it was unclear from these previous studies whether self-appraisals or rumination 
make the greater contribution to the vulnerability to bipolar affective disorders.  
Study One investigated the associations between measures of positive and negative 
cognitive style measures in relation to the vulnerability to hypomania and the recent 
experience of depressive symptoms. It was hypothesised that both hypomania and 
depression would be associated with negative forms of cognitive styles, i.e. thought 
processes that encourage increased negative affectivity and depressive symptoms, whilst 
positively oriented cognitive styles were anticipated to be more exclusively associated with 
hypomania vulnerability, not current depressive symptoms. In terms of the conceptual 
overlap of the cognitive style measures, an exploratory principal components analysis 
(PCA) was conducted to assess the extent to which the cognitive style measures captured 
similar emotion regulation responses to both positive and negative experiences. Study Two 
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investigated how both the cognitive style measures and the components derived from the 
PCA were associated with bipolar mood symptoms at a six month follow-up of participants 
from Study 1. It was hypothesised that the positive cognitive style measures would be 
associated with prospective subclinical hypo/manic symptoms, with the negative cognitive 
style measures being more associated with prospective depressive symptoms. It was also 
anticipated that prospective depressive symptoms may be associated with a lack of 
positively valenced thought processes, consistent with previous observations in depressed 
samples (Johnson et al., 2008a). 
 
Research Aim 2 
Investigate the cognitive vulnerability to hypomania in relation to 
autobiographical memory specificity, problem-solving capabilities, and positive 
and negative rumination 
The second research aim was to investigate the associations between autobiographical 
memory specificity, positive and negative rumination, and problem-solving in relation to 
the vulnerability to hypomania within an analogue student population. Previous research 
has identified negative rumination, deficits in psychosocial problem-solving, and a reduced 
specificity of autobiographical memory as separate yet inter-related vulnerability factors 
for depression (e.g., Raes et al., 2005a). However, the way in which these cognitive 
processes may contribute to the vulnerability to hypomania, and bipolar disorders, is 
currently poorly understood. There is also a dearth of research into the contribution of 
psychosocial problem-solving towards hypomania vulnerability in at-risk individuals. 
In order to investigate between-group differences in psychosocial problem-solving 
between students at a low and a high risk for hypomania, a means-end problem-solving 
task was developed for use with British students (the UMEPS: “University Means-End 
Problem-Solving task”). The UMEPS featured problematic situations that British 
undergraduates were likely to encounter whilst studying at a British university, such as 
problems relating to issues regarding student finance, degree coursework, and worries over 
graduate career prospects. Previous research has relied upon the “Means-End Problem 
Solving” task to measure problem-solving in patient samples (Platt & Spivack, 1975); 
however, subsequent studies have had to omit or adapt the items from the original MEPS 
task for use with student samples (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). The UMEPS 
items were developed in Study Three, with performance on the UMEPS compared between 
students currently reporting high and low severities of depressive symptoms to confirm 
whether subclinical depression is associated with deficits in problem-solving. Study Four 
investigated the associations between problem-solving as measured by the UMEPS with 
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appraisals of defeat and entrapment associated with depression and suicidality in a second 
validation of the UMEPS in a separate sample. Study Five adopted a selection of the 
UMEPS items and investigated group differences in problem-solving, ruminative thought 
processes and memory specificity between students at a low and a high risk for hypomania. 
Study Five also adopted a sentence completion measure of autobiographical memory (Raes 
et al., 2007) to allow comparisons with previous other studies which have used the 
traditional cued memory paradigm, namely, the Autobographical Memory Test (AMT; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986). The sentence completion task is considered to be a more 
sensitive measure of trait-based tendencies to recall general memories in non-clinical 
samples compared to the AMT (Raes et al., 2007). 
Study Three hypothesised that effective problem-solving as measured by the 
UMEPS would be negatively associated with the severity of depressive symptoms and 
positively associated with resourcefulness behaviours relating to effective problem-
solving. Study Four hypothesised that self-appraisals of defeat and entrapment would be 
associated with reduced effectiveness of problem-solving within an analogue sample. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the notion that those individuals who are unable to effectively 
problem solve their way out of defeating and entrapping situations would have more 
extreme feelings of defeat and entrapment, increased depression and greater suicide risk. 
Study Five hypothesised that individuals at a high risk for hypomania would report poorer 
means-end problem-solving, greater severities of overgeneral memory recall, and elevated 
tendencies to engage in ruminative responses to positive and negative moods compared to 
low-risk individuals. This hypothesis is consistent with previous observations made in 
samples of bipolar patients (e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007), and is 
consistent with a continuum conceptualisation of bipolar disorder, where patients and at-
risk individuals are located on one spectrum of increasing severity (from individuals at a 
low risk for bipolar disorder to those diagnosed with severe bipolar disorders) (Depue et 
al., 1981; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). 
 
Research Aim 3 
Investigate the relationship between the autobiographical memory specificity 
and the planning and pursuit of goals in relation to hypomania vulnerability 
The third research aim was to conduct a preliminary investigation into the relationship 
between memories for past goal successes and failures with the pursuit of current and 
future goals, in relation to the vulnerability to hypomania within a non-clinical sample. 
Autobiographical memories are considered to form a self-knowledge base from which a 
working self-concept is derived, with goals being implicit processes derived from the 
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content of the autobiographical memory knowledge base (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). Individuals on the bipolar disorder spectrum, inclusive of at-risk analogue 
individuals and bipolar patients, have particular sensitivities towards goals and the 
engagement in goal-directed behaviours (Johnson, 2005; Carver & Johnson, 2009; 
Johnson, Eisner & Carver, 2009), with goal attainment associated with increases in manic 
symptom severities in bipolar patients (Johnson et al., 2000). Previous studies have also 
suggested that individuals with bipolar disorder report the presence of mental imagery in 
their cognitions and autobiographical memories (Mansell & Lam, 2004), which can be 
high in their perceived realism and are often goal-related (Gregory et al., 2010). However, 
the study by Gregory and colleagues‟ (2010) did not specifically investigate the 
relationship between the memory for goal-related events and the planning and pursuit of 
future goals, and no previous study has explicitly investigated the relationship between 
goals and autobiographical memory specificity within a bipolar or at-risk sample using a 
standardised memory test. 
Study Six aimed to specifically investigate the relationship between goal-pursuit 
and goal-related memory processes within a non-clinical sample, considering that both 
vulnerable individuals and individuals with bipolar disorder appear to possess particular 
sensitivities towards goals and have tendencies to engage in goal-directed behaviours 
(APA, 2000; Lam et al., 2004; Johnson, Ruggero & Carver, 2005). Furthermore, goals 
have been conceptualised as processes which are derived from autobiographical memory 
(e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Hence, there is a sound theoretical rationale for 
examining goals in relation to goal pursuit and goal-related memories. It was hypothesised 
that the vulnerability to hypomania would be associated with extreme goal pursuit, and 
increased reward sensitivities through heightened behavioural activation, in line with 
previous observations (e.g., Jones et al., 2007; Carver & Johnson, 2009; Johnson et al., 
2009). Whilst previous research has suggested that individuals at a vulnerability to 
hypomania are more specific in their recall of negative autobiographical memories 
(Delduca et al., 2010), this previous study did not specifically investigate the goal-related 
content of recalled memories. However, goals in autobiographical memories can be 
represented in mental imagery, part of the sensory-perceptual information associated with 
specific memories, or can be more verbal and propositional in content, similar to general 
representations of memories (Conway, Meares & Standard, 2004). In relation to goal-
related memory, it is unclear whether extreme goal-pursuit and hypomania vulnerability 
would be associated with the more specific or general recall of past goal-related events, 
therefore the specificity of goal-related memory recall was explored in Study Six.  
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Research Aim 4 
Investigate the specificity of autobiographical memory in individuals at a low, 
moderate and a high risk for hypomania 
The fourth research aim was to investigate the way in which the specificity of 
autobiographical memory recall is associated with the vulnerability to hypomania using 
Williams & Broadbent‟s (1986) Autobiographical Memory Test. The only previous 
investigation into autobiographical memory specificity in at-risk individuals by Delduca 
and colleagues (2010) reported that high-risk individuals recalled more specific memories 
in response to negative cues on the AMT compared to low-risk individuals. This study has 
been criticised for the use of negatively biased cue words which may have prompted direct 
forms of memory recall in the high-risk group for negative memories (see Section 1.3), a 
criticism acknowledged by the authors themselves (Delduca et al., 2010). 
 Study Seven (Section 5.2) investigated memory specificity in groups of individuals 
at a low, moderate or high risk for hypomania, using the Autobiographical Memory Test 
(Williams & Broadbent, 1986). To overcome potential problems with cue word valences, 
Study Seven subjected a range of positive and negative cues used in previous AMT studies 
to a valency-rating pre-test. It was hypothesised that the increased risk for hypomania 
would be associated with an increased severity of overgenerality (ranging from low, 
moderate to high-risk individuals). Due to the concerns regarding the cue words used in 
Delduca and colleagues‟ (2010) study, Study Seven hypothesised that individuals at a high 
risk for hypomania and future bipolar disorders would report an overgeneral memory bias 
similar in nature to those reported in samples of bipolar patients. Whilst the previous 
investigation into memory specificity and hypomania vulnerability suggested that at-risk 
individuals recall more specific negative memories (Delduca et al., 2010), providing 
tentative support for the depression avoidance hypothesis, it was not clear whether memory 
specificity was related to depression avoidance processes or due to methodological issues 
in that study.  
 
Research Aim 5 
Investigate the specificity of autobiographical memory in remitted bipolar 
individuals and matched non-bipolar controls: is there evidence for an 
overgeneral recall bias for negative autobiographical memories? 
The fifth research aim was to replicate previous investigations into autobiographical 
memory recall in individuals in remission from bipolar disorder using the AMT (Study 
Eight). Previous studies have suggested that bipolar disorder may be characterised by an 
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overgeneral recall bias for negative autobiographical memories (e.g., Mansell & Lam, 
2004; Van der Gucht et al., 2009). However, these previous studies contain a number of 
methodological flaws, including the completion of memory rating tasks prior to the recall 
of autobiographical memories which may have primed the specific recall of memories 
(Mansell & Lam, 2004). In addition, previous studies have sampled bipolar patients across 
different phases of illness, including currently remitted and currently episodic patients, 
which may complicate the interpretation of these findings (see Section 1.3).  
Study Eight replicated the AMT procedure used in Study Seven within a sample of 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder currently in remission from symptoms, to 
avoid potential effects of current mood states upon AMT performance, and a non-bipolar 
control group who were matched for age and gender with participants in the bipolar group. 
It was hypothesised that individuals with bipolar disorder would recall more overgeneral 
negative memories than the non-bipolar control group consistent with research suggesting 
that similar patterns of cognitive vulnerability are shared by bipolar disorder and unipolar 
depression (Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004), and consistent with the notion that 
bipolar disorder is associated with a latent negative self-schema (Winters & Neale, 1985; 
Neale, 1988; Mansell & Hodson, 2009). To overcome methodological issues highlighted in 
previous studies, Study Eight used a series of bipolar-relevant positive and negative cues in 
the AMT (as used in Study Seven, see Section 5.4 for details), and also presented 
participants with a memory rating task after the completion of the AMT recall procedure. 
 
1.4.3 Overview of Studies 
A series of studies which investigate the research aims outlined above are presented within 
this thesis. Study One (Section 2.1) investigated the cross-sectional associations between a 
number of positive and negative cognitive questionnaire measures which have been 
associated with bipolar disorder and bipolar vulnerability, including positive and negative 
rumination and self-appraisal styles. Study One, a web-based study in a sample of non-
clinical participants, conducted a principal components analysis upon scores on the 
cognitive style measures to assess whether similar affect regulatory processes may underlie 
these measures. Study One acted as a screening stage for a subsequent study investigating 
the specificity of autobiographical memory in individuals at a low, moderate and high risk 
for bipolar disorder (Study Seven). Study Two (Section 2.2) describes a six month follow-
up of participants who had completed Study One, and investigated the associations 
between the cognitive style measures and the components produced in the original study 
with prospective bipolar mood symptoms. Subsequent studies in this thesis have 
investigated the associations between the cognitive styles explored in these two studies in 
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relation to the specificity of autobiographical memory recall in both at-risk and bipolar 
individuals. 
Study Three (Section 3.1) describes the development of a task designed to assess 
the effectiveness of problem solving strategies in British undergraduate students. Further 
validation of the problem solving task is described in Study Four (Section 3.2), which 
investigated the effectiveness of problem solving capabilities in relation to the experience 
of feelings of defeat and entrapment within a separate analogue sample. Study Five 
(Section 3.3) applied the problem solving task to investigate the between-group differences 
in positive and negative ruminative thought processes, autobiographical memory 
specificity, and the effectiveness of psychosocial problem solving, within groups of 
participants at a high or a low risk for hypomania and bipolar disorder.  
 Study Six (Section 4) investigated whether the specificity of autobiographical 
memory recall is associated with the specificity and affective polarity of the pursuit of 
goals in relation to the vulnerability to hypomania. Study Six conducted a preliminary 
investigation within an analogue sample to investigate the associations between the 
specificity of autobiographical memory recall for past failures and successes in relation to 
attitudes regarding the need to achieve goals, sensitivities to goals and rewards, as well as 
the imageability of future events. 
Study Seven (Section 5.2) investigated autobiographical memory specificity in 
groups of students at a low, moderate, and a high risk for hypomania and bipolar disorder. 
Participants completed a face-to-face version of the standardised AMT procedure 
(Williams & Broadbent, 1986), which included six positive memory cue words (e.g., 
“happy”, “excited”, “successful”) and six negative cues (e.g., “hate”, “pessimistic”, 
“failure”). Study Eight (Sections 5.3), replicated the AMT procedure reported in Study 
Seven within a sample of individuals in remission from bipolar disorder and a group of age 
and gender matched non-bipolar controls. The study was conducted within a remitted 
bipolar group to ensure that performance on the memory recall tasks was not unduly 
influenced by extreme bipolar mood symptoms. 
Studies One to Seven received institutional ethical approval from the School of 
Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee. Study Eight received ethical approval 
from the NHS Greater Manchester South Research Ethics Committee. 
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1.4.4 The Alternative Format & Publications 
The thesis is presented in the Alternative Format as afforded by the University of 
Manchester in order to facilitate the dissemination of the work in this thesis through peer 
review in academic journals. For all studies, the designs, procedures, data collection and 
analysis, and the writing up of work for submission to journals was conducted by the 
author, under the supervision of Dr Gooding and Professor Jones. A number of 
manuscripts based upon the studies presented in this thesis have been submitted for peer 
review by academic journals, or are currently in preparation for submission (see below). 
 
Section Study Title & Target Journal 
   
2.1 One Dempsey, R. C., Gooding, P. A., & Jones. S. H. (2011).  Positive and 
negative cognitive style correlates of the vulnerability to hypomania.  
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 67(7), 673-690. 
3.1 Three Dempsey, R. C., Jones, S. H., & Gooding, P. A. (submitted-a). The 
development of the University Means-End Problem Solving task as a 
measure of problem solving capabilities in British students. Cognitive 
Therapy & Research. 
3.2 Four Dempsey, R. C., Gooding, P. A., & Jones, S. H. (submitted-b). The 
differential associations between defeat and entrapment with 
psychosocial problem-solving. Further validation of the University 
Means-End Problem Solving Task. Behaviour Research and Therapy. 
3.3 Five Dempsey, R. C., Jones, S. H., & Gooding, P. A. (submitted-c). 
Investigating the cognitive vulnerability to hypomania: Associations 
between autobiographical memory specificity, positive and negative 
rumination, and problem-solving capabilities in high and low risk 
individuals. (Target journal TBC) 
4.0 Six Dempsey, R. C., Jones, S. H., & Gooding P. A. (submitted-d). A 
preliminary investigation into the relationship between goal-related 
memory recall and dysfunctional goal planning and pursuit in 
individuals vulnerable to hypomania. Cognitive Therapy & Research. 
5.2 Seven Dempsey, R. C., Jones, S. H., & Gooding, P. A. (submitted-e).  
Autobiographical memory specificity in individuals vulnerable to 
hypomania. Memory. 
5.4 Eight Dempsey, R. C., Gooding, P. A., & Jones, S. H. (submitted-f). The 
availability and specificity of autobiographical memory in individuals 
in remission from bipolar disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 
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Section 1.5 
The Current Thesis: Methodology 
 
1.5.1 Methodological Approaches 
This section details the reasoning underlying the methodological approaches utilised in this 
thesis, and describes the specific measures used across the various studies presented in 
subsequent sections. 
 
Assessing the specificity of Autobiographical Memory Recall 
The dominant experimental paradigm used to investigate the specificity of 
autobiographical memory recall is the cued memory task devised by Williams and 
Broadbent (1986), the “Autobiographical Memory Test” (AMT). The AMT presents 
participants with a series of cue words and requires participants to recall specific 
autobiographical memories within a specified time limit (between 30-60 seconds). 
Responses on the AMT are recorded for later transcription and are coded as to whether 
responses refer to specific or general events, with general events differentiated according 
to whether they refer to extended events (e.g., “When I spent a week on holiday in…”), 
repeating events or categories of events (e.g., “When I went to watch the football…”), or 
semantic information about the self (e.g., “I was always good at school…”). The response 
latency, the time taken for participants to recall a memory, can also be taken as a 
measurement of the availability of memories for recall (e.g., Delduca et al., 2010). 
However, it has been argued that the AMT may not be sufficiently sensitive to 
detect subclinical tendencies to recall autobiographical memories in general levels of 
detail, particularly in student samples (Raes et al., 2007). Indeed, previous studies have 
identified that low frequencies of general memories are recalled on the AMT task in 
student populations, and it has been suggested that non-clinical participants with trait-
based tendencies to be overgeneral in memory recall are more specific in their memory 
recall on the AMT task due to the repetition of task instructions and use of practice trials 
(Raes et al., 2007). To counter this, Raes and colleagues (2007) devised a sentence 
completion task as a more sensitive measure of overgenerality in autobiographical memory 
in student samples (the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test: SCEPT). In 
this task, participants are asked to complete a number of sentence stems in reference to a 
past event (e.g., “Last year I…”), with less emphasis placed upon recalling a specific 
memory. Indeed, Raes and colleagues (2007) noted that a greater number of overgeneral 
responses were made on the SCEPT in comparison to the standardised AMT in a sample of 
non-depressed students (see Appendix for SCEPT items).  
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In the current thesis, Study Five, an internet-based study, adopted the SCEPT to 
investigate the group differences in memory specificity, problem solving, and positive and 
negative forms of rumination in students at low and high risks for hypomania. Study Six 
used an adapted version of the SCEPT to assess the specificity of goal-related memories 
for previous successes and failures (the SCEPT-WL, see Appendix for items), and also 
presents data using a validated modification of the SCEPT to assess the planning and 
imageability of future events (The Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Test: 
SCEFT, Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009). Considering these limitations, Study Seven adopted 
the AMT to assess memory specificity in a face-to-face study, to allow comparisons in 
findings with a previous AMT study conducted in groups of students identified as being at 
high and low risks for hypomania (Delduca et al., 2010). The standardised AMT procedure 
from Study Seven was used to assess autobiographical memory specificity in a bipolar 
sample to allow comparisons with previous AMT studies conducted within clinical 
samples (Study Eight). The General Discussion (Section 6) will consider the effectiveness 
of the AMT and SCEPT tasks as measures of autobiographical memory specificity.  
 
The use of self-report questionnaire measures 
A number of validated self-report questionnaire measures have been adopted across the 
studies presented within this thesis. Detailed psychometric information about each of these 
measures is presented within the chapters (copies of these measures are included in the 
Appendix). The questionnaire measures used in the thesis fall into a number of categories, 
including measures of hypomania vulnerability (the Hypomanic Personality Scale, HPS, 
Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), current bipolar mood symptoms (the Internal States Scale, 
ISS, Bauer et al., 1991), current depressive symptoms (the Centre for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression scale, CES-D: Radloff, 1977), and measures of current emotional states 
(the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). 
In addition, the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS: Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991) and the Responses to Positive Affect scale (RPA: Feldman, Joormann & Johnson, 
2008) were used to assess the effect of negative and positive forms of ruminative cognitive 
styles in relation to the specificity of autobiographical memory. Additional cognitive style 
measures used in the thesis included the Hypomanic Interpretations Questionnaire (HIQ: 
Jones, Mansell & Waller, 2006), and the Interpretations of Depression Questionnaire (IDQ: 
Jones & Day, 2008), which assess tendencies to make dysfunctional self-appraisals. The 
Problem Solving Scale, a measure of resourcefulness behaviours during problem-solving 
(PSS, Center for Cognitive Therapy), was used to assist in the validation of the UMEPS 
problem-solving task (Study Three). The Defeat and Entrapment scales (Gilbert & Allen, 
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1988), and the Beck Hopelessness Scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974) were 
used in Study Four, in a second validation of the problem solving task. Study Six (Section 
4) used the Behavioural Inhibition and Activation Scales (BIS/BAS: Carver & White, 
1994) to assess the sensitivity to goals, rewards and punishment, based upon the 
behavioural activation theory. Study Seven also used a relatively new measure designed to 
asses the pursuit of extremely unlikely goals, the Willingly Approached Set of Statistically 
Unlikely Pursuits scale (WASSUP: Johnson & Carver, 2006). 
 
Novel measures 
A visual analogue rating scale of the experience of positive and negative life events was 
used in Study Two (see Appendix). Study Three details the development of a novel 
measure of means-end problem solving designed for use with British student samples (The 
University Means-End Problem Solving task, UMEPS). Previous problem-solving studies 
conducted in student samples have used the Means-End Problem Solving task (MEPS: 
Platt & Spivack, 1975), which was developed to assess problem-solving in patient samples. 
Previous studies have had to adapt the MEPS to create situations of relevance to students 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), whilst there has been a previously unsuccessful 
attempt by American researchers to develop a “college” student version of the MEPS 
(Blankstein et al., 1992). The UMEPS was developed to assess problem-solving in British 
student samples using problematic situations which are likely to be encountered whilst 
studying at university. Study Three details the development and validation of the UMEPS 
as a problem-solving measure. Study Four describes a further validation of the UMEPS in 
relation to the appraisals of defeat and entrapment implicated in the experience of 
depression and suicide. Study Five describes an investigation into the role of problem-
solving using the UMEPS task, positive and negative rumination, and autobiographical 
memory, in conferring the vulnerability to bipolar disorder in at-risk individuals.  
 
Assessing the vulnerability to hypomania and future bipolar disorders 
Six studies presented in this thesis have investigated cognitive processes in individuals 
considered to have a trait-based vulnerability to experiencing hypomania and developing 
future bipolar disorders. The studies in this thesis have used the Hypomanic Personality 
Scale (HPS: Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) to assess the vulnerability to bipolar disorder in 
student-based samples.  
The HPS is a 48-item questionnaire designed to assess the prevalence of hypomanic 
personality traits which are characteristic of clinical hypomanic mood states (Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1986). The HPS has been widely used as a screening measure to identify 
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individuals who are at an elevated risk for hypomania and bipolar disorder, allowing for 
the exploration of subclinical processes and risk factors associated with clinical 
presentations of bipolar disorder (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Individuals who score 
highly on the HPS, who self-endorse possessing hypomanic personality characteristics, 
have been demonstrated to be at a greater risk of experiencing hypomanic episodes and 
future bipolar disorders, as well as a range of related mental health conditions including 
psychosis, substance abuse disorders and major depressive disorder (Eckblad & Chapman, 
1986; Kwapil et al., 2000). In addition, high HPS scorers are more likely to have 
experienced past hypomanic and manic episodes, and have diagnosed bipolar disorders 
than low-HPS scorers (Meyer & Hautzinger, 2003). Elevated HPS scores have also been 
associated with an increased risk of experiencing future mood episodes and with a shorter 
time to the onset of a mood episode in individuals diagnosed with bipolar I disorder (Kam, 
Bolbecker, O'Donnell, Hetrick, & Brenner, in press), supporting the notion that hypomanic 
personality traits are associated with an increased risk for bipolar symptoms and relapse 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). 
Non-clinical individuals who endorse high numbers of hypomanic personality traits 
also appear to share many of the same characteristics associated with the experience of 
clinical hypomanic mood states in bipolar samples. Indeed, individuals who possess 
hypomanic personality traits are typically creative, energetic, gregarious, and goal-
directed, and are able to function successfully whilst juggling numerous social 
commitments, often requiring few hours of sleep to do so (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). 
Individuals with elevated levels of hypomanic personality traits also report elevated levels 
of current bipolar mood symptoms (Udachina & Mansell, 2007), more frequent past 
experiences of hypomanic mood states (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), as well as increased 
tendencies to engage in substance and alcohol abuse (Krumm-Merabet & Meyer, 2005), 
and more variable sleep and activity patterns than individuals who endorse low levels of 
hypomanic personality traits (Ankers & Jones, 2009; Meyer & Maier, 2006). Whilst these 
personality traits are considered to represent subclinical trait-based forms of hypomanic 
symptoms, high HPS scorers are also at an elevated risk of developing clinically significant 
bipolar symptoms over the long term (Blechert & Meyer, 2005; Kwapil et al., 2000). 
Whilst the cross-sectional validity of the HPS as a risk measure for bipolar disorder 
has been demonstrated across a variety of studies, there is less supporting evidence for the 
prospective validity of the HPS in relation to the development of clinically significant 
bipolar symptoms. Although other risk measures for bipolar disorder exist, such as the 
General Behaviour Inventory (GBI: Depue et al., 1981), the HPS was utilised as a risk 
measure in the current thesis to allow comparisons with the previous investigation into 
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autobiographical memory processes in an at-risk student sample (Delduca et al., 2010), as 
well as previous investigations into the cognitive processes associated with bipolar 
disorder vulnerability (e.g., Johnson & Jones, 2009). The HPS has also been more widely 
used to assess the cognitive vulnerability to bipolar disorder across a range of student 
samples compared to the GBI. The GBI was also deemed unsuitable for use for the present 
research due to the increased number of items presented to participants compared to the 
HPS, as well as the GBI‟s presentation of more complexly worded items which may 
contribute to heightened attrition from the internet-based studies presented in this thesis. In 
contrast to the HPS, which requires participants to rate whether simple traits are 
representative of their own personality, the GBI requires participants to rate the past 
experience of clinical symptoms and directly asks questions potentially upsetting questions 
(e.g., “Have there been times of several days or more when you were so sad that it was 
quite painful or you felt that you couldn't stand it?”). The HPS was deemed to be a more 
appropriate measure of a personality trait based vulnerability to bipolar disorder than the 
GBI which is more focused upon past unipolar and bipolar disorder symptom experiences. 
 
Analogue studies 
The use of student samples within the studies in the current thesis is justified for a number 
of reasons. As this thesis aims to explore the vulnerability to bipolar disorder in relation to 
autobiographical memory specificity, non-clinical student samples were used to identify 
individuals at different levels of risk according to scores on validated self-report measures. 
At present, only one study has used an at-risk design in the investigation of 
autobiographical memory in individuals vulnerable to bipolar disorders (Delduca et al., 
2010). Whilst student samples are an available source of potential participants, previous 
studies have identified high prevalences of hypomanic symptoms and bipolar-relevant 
experiences in student samples (Depue & Iacono, 1989; Udachina & Mansell, 2007).  
There are some limitations in the use of student samples, which consist of relatively 
homogenous groups of individuals who may have similar experiences in relation to 
educational achievements, IQ, and socio-economic status. The results of studies conducted 
in student samples can be limited in their generalisability to the wider general population, 
particularly given the higher proportion of female to male students who participate in 
psychological research and the younger age range of the typical undergraduate sample. 
However, the recruitment of students allows for the collection of meaningfully sized data-
sets which permits adequately powered statistical analyses, and allows for the investigation 
of potential risk factors for bipolar disorders in at-risk individuals, which may assist in 
furthering the understanding of the vulnerability to and development of bipolar disorder. 
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2.1.1 Abstract 
Specific forms of rumination and self-appraisals have been implicated in the development 
of bipolar symptomatology. This study investigated the associations between measures of 
positive and negative forms of appraisals and rumination with vulnerability to hypomania, 
and also investigated the conceptual overlap between these measures in terms of their 
responses to emotional experiences. Hypomania vulnerability was associated with positive 
cognitive style measures, whilst current depressive symptoms were explained by scores on 
measures of negative cognitive styles in an analogue sample of 353 participants. A 
principal components analysis conducted upon the rumination and appraisal measures 
yielded three components representing positive and negative cognitive styles, and a 
normalising of symptoms component. The implications of these results are discussed. 
 
2.1.2 Introduction 
Rumination has traditionally been defined as a negative cognitive style characterised by 
persistent thoughts focused on the causes and consequences of recent negative experiences, 
moods and symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination has commonly been viewed 
as arising in response to the experience of negative emotional states and symptoms of 
depression (Lyubomirsky & Tkach, 2003); although a number of different 
conceptualisations of rumination currently exist (Smith & Alloy, 2009). However, recent 
research has started to investigate the role of positive rumination in the vulnerability to 
bipolar disorder (Feldman et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008a).   
The manner in which individuals respond to the experience of positive mood states 
has been suggested to confer a vulnerability to hypomania (Johnson et al., 2005b), similar 
in nature to the vulnerability for depression associated with negative rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Indeed, research has indicated that an elevated risk for hypomania is 
associated with intense ruminative and emotional reactions toward positive stimuli (Carver 
& Johnson, 2009). The manner in which an individual responds to the recent experience of 
positive emotions is considered to contribute to subsequent changes in mood, particularly 
through positive ruminative thinking which contributes to ascents of mood into manic 
states (Feldman et al., 2008; Johnson, 2005b).   
Johnson and colleagues have developed and validated a self-report measure to 
assess how positive rumination contributes to the development of bipolar symptoms (the 
Responses to Positive Affect scale, RPA: Feldman et al., 2008). The RPA was constructed 
as a counterpart to Nolen-Hoeksema‟s Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and contains three factors measuring three distinct positive 
ruminative cognitive styles. These factors include attempts to intensify the experience of 
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recent positive mood states (“Emotion-Focused” positive rumination); responses that focus 
upon the self and goal-attainment (“Self-Focused” positive rumination); and strategies that 
attempt to reduce the intensity of positive emotional states (“Dampening”) (Feldman et al., 
2008). Positive rumination appears to be uniquely associated with bipolar disorder, where 
students diagnosed with bipolar disorder report tendencies to engage in both positive and 
negative rumination, whilst students with major depressive disorder only reporting 
tendencies to engage in negative rumination (Johnson et al., 2008a). 
Research has also indicated that both bipolar disorder and hypomanic personality 
traits, a known vulnerability factor for bipolar disorder (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) are 
closely associated with negative rumination (Thomas & Bentall, 2002; Knowles et al., 
2005; Thomas et al., 2007; Van der Gucht et al., 2009). Thomas et al. (2007) observed 
higher self-reported negative rumination in remitted compared to depressed and manic 
bipolar patients, whilst Van der Gucht and colleagues (2009) noted higher rumination 
scores in currently depressed compared to currently manic and euthymic bipolar patients. 
However, the prevalence of negative ruminative thinking patterns during remission may be 
due to the experience of ongoing subsyndromal mood symptoms, particularly as research 
has suggested that bipolar individuals may experience ongoing low levels of depressive 
symptoms (Post et al., 2010) which may be sufficient to drive negative ruminative thinking 
patterns. Although it has been suggested that a negative cognitive style may act as a 
vulnerability factor in bipolar individuals, which when activated leads to a cycle of 
negative thoughts about the self, rumination and depression (Van der Gucht et al., 2009). 
Whilst ruminative cognitive styles appear to be a feature of bipolar disorder and 
hypomania vulnerability, recent theoretical models have implicated the appraisal of 
hypomania and depression related experiences, and of changes in internal physiological 
states, in the development of symptoms (Jones, 2001; Mansell, Morrison, Reid, Lowens & 
Tai, 2007). These models suggest that it is the manner in which changes in internal state 
are interpreted is associated with the exacerbation of bipolar symptoms. Both models 
permit an influence of positive and negative appraisals in the transition to symptoms, 
which contribute to ascents and descents in mood through changes in behaviour and 
cognition. Individuals with bipolar disorder and those at-risk report tendencies to endorse 
positive self-appraisals experiences associated with hypomanic mood states (Jones & Day, 
2008; Jones et al., 2006). Although individuals with hypomanic personalities also endorse 
negative self-appraisals, only positive self-appraisals make a unique contribution to 
hypomania vulnerability (Jones & Day, 2008). The endorsement of positive self-appraisals 
by bipolar individuals also distinguishes group membership between bipolar patients and 
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controls (Jones et al., 2006). Positive self-appraisals would appear to be important in the 
development of hypo/manic symptoms. 
Despite research indicating that individuals with bipolar disorder and those at risk 
engage in positive and negative ruminative cognitive styles, and endorse positive and 
negative self-appraisals, no study has yet investigated the cross-sectional associations 
between these appraisals and ruminative cognitive styles. It is also unclear how much of a 
conceptual overlap exists between appraisal and ruminative cognitive styles. Many of the 
commonly used measures of rumination and self-appraisal appear to capture similar 
response styles to emotional experiences. These include strategies that attempt to reduce 
current emotional states, as measured by the Reflective rumination (RRS) and Dampening 
of positive affect (RPA) scales, and the normalising appraisal scales of hypomanic and 
depressive experiences (Interpretations of Depression Questionnaire, IDQ: Jones & Day, 
2008; Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire HIQ: Jones, et al., 2006). There are also 
some similarities across the rumination and appraisal measures which describe response 
styles that increase the intensity of current moods, including the self and symptom-focused 
rumination scales of the RPA and RRS, and the positive and negative self-appraisal 
measures of the HIQ and IDQ. Despite this potential overlap, it remains unclear whether 
dysfunctional appraisal styles or ruminative cognitive styles make the greater contribution 
to the vulnerability to hypomania in at-risk individuals. 
The current study investigated the associations between positive and negative 
cognitive styles as measured by self-report measures of rumination (the RPA and RRS), 
and positive and negative self-appraisals (the HIQ and IDQ), in relation to the experience 
of depressive symptoms and hypomania vulnerability. The measures included in the 
current study were chosen due to their structural similarity, as the RPA measure was 
designed to complement the RRS, and the IDQ was designed to complement the HIQ. The 
current study focused upon the associations between the cognitive style measures with the 
CES-D depressive symptom and HPS trait measures to explore how positive and negative 
cognitive styles are associated with the vulnerability to hypomania, whilst also taking 
potential confounds with depression into account. The study focused upon possible 
confounds with depression, rather than with hypo/manic symptoms, as the HPS is 
considered to capture behavioural traits pertaining to hypomanic mood symptoms and 
measures a vulnerability to experience future hypomanic states (Eckblad & Chapman, 
1986). Measures of current bipolar symptoms (the Internal States Scale: Bauer et al., 1991) 
and the recent experience of hypomania and depression-relevant events (the “Experience” 
subscales of the HIQ and IDQ) were included to account for potential effects of these 
variables upon scores on the cognitive style measures. 
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First, it was predicted that the self-reported hypomania vulnerability, as measured 
by the HPS (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), would be positively associated with measures of 
both positive and negative appraisal and ruminative cognitive styles, reflecting the 
bipolarity of affect associated with both hypomanic personality and clinical presentations 
of bipolar disorder (Hofmann & Meyer, 2006). Second, it was predicted that the negative 
cognitive style measures, but not measures of positive cognitive styles, would be 
associated with self-reported depression symptoms, reflecting the absence of positive 
cognitive styles in depressed states (Johnson et al., 2008a). Whilst it has been suggested 
that there exist different forms of positive cognitive style correlates of the vulnerability to 
hypomania (Johnson & Jones, 2009), due to the absence of a self-report measure of current 
depressive symptoms, this previous study could not suggest how these distinct positive 
cognitive styles may relate to the experience of depressive symptoms, a key feature of 
bipolar disorder. A final aim was to explore the extent of the overlap in the responses to 
mood states described by the rumination and appraisal self-report measures through a 
principal components analysis.   
 
2.1.3 Method 
Participants 
353 participants from the University of Manchester took part in the study (Mean age = 
22.62 years, S.D. = 6.38; 277 Females, 76 Males; 339 students, 14 University staff). Whilst 
those participants who were members of staff were of an older age (Mage = 28.93 years, 
S.D. = 5.76) than the student participants (Mage = 21.60, S.D. = 5.15; t(315) = -5.35, p 
<.001), t-tests indicated that there were no significant differences between the staff and 
student participants for scores on the HPS, or the mood and symptom measures (CES-D 
and ISS) (all t values < 1.5, p values > .17). 
 
Hypomania Vulnerability Measure 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS: Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) 
The HPS is a 48 item true-false self-report measure which assesses the presence of 
hypomanic personality traits. Although the HPS would appear to capture relatively stable 
personality traits similar in nature to the clinical experience of hypomania, items on the 
HPS measure the lability of mood, energy and behavior associated with bipolar disorder 
(e.g., “I seem to be a person whose mood goes up and down easily”). High scores on the 
HPS have been observed to be predictive of concurrent and future bipolar symptoms 
(Blechert & Meyer, 2005; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Kwapil et al., 2000; Meyer & 
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Hautzinger, 2003). The HPS has good test-retest reliability (r = .81) and good internal 
consistency (α = .87; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). 
 
Symptom Measures 
The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D: Radloff, 1977) 
The CES-D scale is a 20 item measure of current depressive symptoms which has been 
widely used in non-clinical samples (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008a; Jones & Day, 2008).  
Items on the CES-D describe a variety of depressive symptoms (e.g., “I felt that I could not 
shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends”), which are rated on a scale 
from 0 (“Rarely”) to 3 (“Most of the time”) indicating the experience of each symptom in 
the past week. Research has suggested that a score of 16 and above on the CES-D is 
indicative of clinical depression (Radloff, 1991). The CES-D has demonstrated good 
reliability (Cronbach‟s α = .79-.87, Radloff, 1991). 
 
Internal States Scale (ISS: Bauer et al., 1991) 
The ISS is a 15-item self-report measure designed to assess current manic and depressive 
bipolar symptoms (example items: “today I feel depressed”, “today I feel impulsive”). 
Participants rate the extent to which they have felt each symptom in the past 24 hours on a 
0-100 analogue scale (0 = “Not at all/Rarely” to 100 “Very much so/Much of the time”). 
The ISS has four subscales: a Well-Being scale measuring general emotional well-being 
with low scores indicating depressed mood (ISS-WB), an Activation scale measuring 
manic symptoms (ISS-A), a Depression scale measuring depressive symptoms (ISS-D), 
and Perceived Conflict, measuring conflict within the self and others (ISS-PC). 
Participants also complete a single item measure of their current state on the day (“Today I 
feel”, Depressed = -50 to Manic = +50). Scores on the ISS have been found to be 
associated with clinician ratings of bipolar symptoms (Bauer et al., 1991). Acceptable 
levels of reliability have been previously demonstrated for the ISS subscales (Cronbach‟s α 
= .73-.82; Jones & Day, 2008). 
 
Cognitive Style Measures 
Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire (HIQ: Jones et al., 2006) 
The HIQ is a 10 item measure which assesses tendencies to make overly positive self-
appraisals for hypomanic experiences. The HIQ consists of a list of hypomania relevant 
situations (e.g., If I felt impulsive, I would probably think it was because…”), each of 
which is followed by two explanations, a positive self-appraisal (e.g., “…I could make 
rapid decisions and good choices.”), and a normalising appraisal (e.g., “…there are lots of 
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external demands.”). Participants rate the extent to which each appraisal explains the 
aforementioned experience on a scale from one (“Not at all”) to four (“A great deal”), with 
higher scores indicating the greater endorsement of hypomanic (HIQ-H) and normalising 
appraisals (HIQ-N). Participants also indicate (yes/no) whether they have experienced each 
situation in the past three months (HIQ-Experience scale). The HIQ subscales have 
demonstrated acceptable reliability (α = .70-.83, Jones et al., 2006; Jones & Day, 2008). 
 
Interpretations of Depression Questionnaire (IDQ: Jones & Day, 2008) 
The IDQ is a recently developed self-report measure designed to assess the tendency to 
make depressive and negative self-appraisals. Participants are presented with ten 
depression relevant situations and rate a normalising appraisal (IDQ-N) and a negative 
self-appraisal (IDQ-D) for each situation. Similar to the HIQ, participants rate the extent to 
which the normalising and negative appraisals explain each situation (from “Not at all” to 
“A great deal”), with higher scores indicating a greater endorsement of that appraisal style.  
Participants also indicate whether they have experienced that situation in the past three 
months (yes/no) (IDQ-Experience). The IDQ has demonstrated high reliability (α = .90-
.91: Jones & Day, 2008). 
 
Responses to Positive Affect Scale (RPA: Feldman et al., 2008) 
The RPA is a 17 item self-report questionnaire which measures ruminative responses to the 
experience of positive emotional states. Each item describes a possible response to a 
positive mood state (e.g., “When you are feeling happy, how often do you savor this 
moment”). The RPA consists of three factors measuring positive rumination on mood and 
bodily experiences (“Emotion-Focus” positive rumination), rumination on the self and the 
attainment of goals (“Self-Focus”), and thought processes that attempt to reduce the 
intensity of positive emotions (“Dampening”). Higher scores on the RPA indicate greater 
propensities to ruminate in response to positive affect. The three subscales of the RPA 
have demonstrated adequate reliability (RPA-E α = .76, RPA-S α = .73, RPA-D α = .79; 
Feldman et al., 2008) 
 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS: Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
The RRS is a 22 item measure of the tendency to engage in ruminative thinking styles 
following the experience of negative affective states (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Each item describes a potential response to the experience of a negative emotional state 
(e.g., “Think about how alone you feel”). Responses are rated on a four point scale, 
ranging from one (“Never respond in this way”) to four (“Always respond in this way”), 
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with high scores indicating a ruminative cognitive style. The RRS has been widely used in 
a variety of clinical (Johnson et al., 2008a; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Antz & van Os, 
2008) and non-clinical samples (Feldman et al., 2008; Olson & Kwon, 2008).  
A factor analysis of the RRS has identified a three factor structure representing 
rumination upon current depressive symptoms (“Depression Related Rumination”), 
maladaptive brooding upon discrepancies between the self and unachieved goals 
(“Brooding”), and a more adaptive cognitive style which attempts to alleviate depressive 
symptoms through cognitive problem solving (termed “Reflection”) (Treynor et al., 2003). 
The subscales of the RRS have demonstrated adequate reliability (Brooding α = .71, 
Depression α = .84, Reflection α = .90; Johnson et al., 2008).  
  
Procedure 
Participants were directed to the study‟s website via advertisements displayed on poster 
notice boards in various locations in the University of Manchester campus, as well as 
advertisements placed on University research volunteering intranet websites. The first page 
of the study‟s website presented electronic versions of the participant information sheet 
and consent form. Following informed consent, participants completed a short 
demographics questionnaire and the remaining self-report measures in a random order.  
The participants either received course credits or were entered into a prize draw for 
shopping vouchers in return for participating in the study. The study received institutional 
ethical approval from the University of Manchester.   
 
Data Analysis 
Normality of data was checked via review of histograms, calculation of skewness and 
kurtosis statistics for each measure, and by checking for outliers through the calculation of 
z-scores (note that Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests can be unreliable with large datasets and 
were not conducted for the current study, Field, 2005). Bivariate correlations were 
conducted to investigate the associations between scores on the cognitive style measures 
with self-reported hypomanic personality traits and current mood symptoms. Hierarchical 
linear regression analyses were conducted to investigate the associations between the 
cognitive style measures with hypomania vulnerability and depression controlling for 
current bipolar mood symptoms. A principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted to 
investigate potential item redundancy across the cognitive style measures. Associations 
between the cognitive style components produced by the PCA with hypomania 
vulnerability and depression were analysed using bivariate correlations and hierarchical 
regression analyses controlling for current mood symptoms. 
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2.1.4 Results 
Review of histograms with normality curves and the calculation of z-scores indicated that 
the data across the questionnaire scales did not significantly differ from normality. 
Kurtosis and skewness statistics were not substantially larger than zero and were well 
within the acceptable limits (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
There was no evidence of significant outliers across the measures, with 99.8% of z-scores 
less than 3.29 (Field, 2005). Descriptive statistics and Cronbach‟s α for scores on the self-
report measures are presented in Table 2.1.1.  
 
Table 2.1.1.  Means and standard deviations for scores on the questionnaire measures. 
 
 Mean S.D. Range α 
Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale  
18.89 11.27 0-56 .91 
Hypomanic Personality Scale 17.13 9.12 1-45 .89 
Internal States Scale (ISS)     
ISS Activation 123.37 89.87 0-382 .75 
ISS Depression 47.51 50.84 0-200 .81 
ISS Perceived Conflict 126.25 95.47 0-390 .77 
ISS Well-Being 139.15 65.54 0-299 .79 
Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire 
(HIQ) 
    
HIQ - Hypomanic Appraisals 21.39 5.73 10-40 .83 
HIQ - Normalising Appraisals 25.36 4.83 12-39 .73 
Interpretations of Depression 
Questionnaire (IDQ) 
    
IDQ-Normalising Appraisals 26.81 5.95 10-40 .88 
IDQ-Depressogenic Appraisals 16.33 5.92 10-40 .89 
Responses to Positive Affect (RPA)     
RPA Dampening 15.83 5.23 8-32 .85 
RPA Emotion Focused 13.83 3.00 5-20 .72 
RPA Self Focused 9.93 2.78 4-16 .76 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS)     
RRS Brooding 11.62 3.49 5-20 .79 
RRS Reflection 11.50 3.55 5-20 .78 
RRS Depression-Focused 28.91 7.62 12-48 .90 
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As shown in Table 2.1.1 above, mean HPS scores were similar to those reported in 
previous studies (Johnson & Jones, 2009; Dodd et al., 2010), although mean CES-D scores 
were higher than those reported by a previous study conducted in a similar sample (Jones 
& Day, 2008). Mean scores on the ISS symptom, the self-appraisal and rumination 
measures in the current study were consistent with the mean scores reported in previous 
studies conducted within non-clinical samples (Jones & Day, 2008; Mansell et al., 2008; 
Johnson & Jones, 2009; Dodd et al., 2010).  
 
Correlational Analysis 
A series of bivariate correlations were conducted to investigate the associations between 
scores on the cognitive style measures with self-reported hypomanic personality traits and 
current affective symptoms (see Table 2.1.2).   
Scores on the Hypomanic Personality Scale were positively correlated with the 
rumination and appraisal cognitive style measures, but were not correlated with the 
normalising appraisal measures (HIQ-N and IDQ-N). Scores on the CES-D were positively 
correlated with negative rumination (Brooding, Reflection and Depression-Related 
Rumination), RPA Dampening, negative self-appraisals (IDQ-D) and with appraisals that 
normalise hypomanic experiences (HIQ-N). CES-D scores were also negatively correlated 
with the Self-Focused positive rumination scale. The CES-D was not correlated with the 
depression normalizing appraisals (IDQ-N) or hypomanic appraisals measures (HIQ-H). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 107 
Table 2.1.2.  Correlations between scores on self report symptom, self-appraisal, activation and cognitive style measures. 
 HPS ISS A ISS D ISS PC ISS WB HIQ H HIQ N IDQ D IDQ N RPA D RPA E RPA S RRS B RRS R RRS D 
CESD .272*** .181*** .636*** .480*** -.491*** -.076 .129* .009 .564*** .393*** .006 -.124* .472*** .184*** .598*** 
HPS  .501*** .259*** .317*** .094 .494*** -.027 -.033 .258*** .178*** .306*** .278*** .217*** .320*** .265*** 
ISS A   .352*** .449*** .251*** .321*** -.002 -.034 .167** .192*** .222*** .219*** .204*** .185*** .185*** 
ISS D    .657*** -.398*** -.035 .008 -.112* .440*** .333*** -.050 -.133* .388*** .167** .431*** 
ISS PC     -.225*** .033 .083 -.084 .330*** .299*** .055 -.026 .316*** .156** .326*** 
ISS WB      .337*** -.111* -.033 -.310*** -.237*** .200*** .348*** -.186*** .062 -.291*** 
HIQ H       -.070 .152** .121* -.106* .339*** .362*** .061 .264*** .055 
HIQ N        .475*** .442*** .203*** .127* .036 .197*** .131* .263*** 
IDQ D         .024 -.065 .245*** .142** .197*** .219*** .218*** 
IDQ N          .425*** -.050 -.065 .593*** .261*** .628*** 
RPA D           .122* .023 .462*** .150** .425*** 
RPA E            .558*** .134* .216*** .154** 
RPA S             .106* .239*** .063 
RRS B              .493*** .738*** 
RRS R               .489*** 
 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Spearman's correlations are in italics, other correlations are Pearson. 
 
Key: CESD = Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale, HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, ISS = Internal States Scale (A = Activation, D = 
Depression, PC = Perceived Conflict, WB = Well-being) , HIQ = Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire (N = Normalising Appraisals, H = Hypomanic 
Appraisals), IDQ = Interpretations of  Depression Questionnaire (D = Depressogenic Appraisals, N = Normalising Appraisals), RPA = Responses to Positive 
Affect scale (D = Dampening, E = Emotion-focused, S = Self-focused positive rumination), RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale (B = Brooding, R = 
Reflection, D = Depression-focused rumination). 1
0
7
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Regression analyses 
Regression analyses were conducted to determine which of the cognitive style measures 
contributed the greatest variance to scores on the measures of the vulnerability to 
hypomania (HPS) and depressive symptomatology (CES-D). 
For the HPS regression analysis, scores on the ISS subscales (A, D, WB and PC) 
and CES-D scores were entered into the first block of the regression to control for effects 
of current mood symptoms. Scores on the “Experience” subscales of the HIQ and IDQ 
were included to control for the recent experience of hypomania and depression relevant 
events. Each of the cognitive style measures which were significantly correlated with HPS 
scores were entered into the second block of the regression (HIQ-H, IDQ-D, RPA-D, RPA-
E, RPA-S, RRS-B, RRS-R, RRS-D). As shown in Table 2.1.3, next page, the model was 
significant (F(10, 329) = 34.264, p < .001) and explained 51% of the variance in HPS scores, 
and was not unduly influenced by multicolinearity between predictor variables (Variance 
Inflation Factors < 1.8, Tolerances > 0.5). Scores on the Hypomanic Appraisals scale, the 
Reflection subscale of the Ruminative Responses Scale, and the Self-Focused positive 
rumination subscale of the RPA were significant contributors to variance in HPS scores. In 
sum, the endorsement of hypomanic self-appraisals, the engagement in reflective 
rumination in response to negative affect and self-focused positive rumination were 
associated with HPS scores. 
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Table 2.1.3 Regression analysis investigating the contribution of the cognitive style 
measures to scores on the Hypomanic Personality Scale. 
 
 Standardised 
Beta 
Step 1  
Internal States Scale  
Activation .18*** 
Depression .00 
Perceived Conflict .06 
Well-being -.01 
Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale .23*** 
Hypomania Interpretations (HIQ) – Experience Scale .27*** 
Interpretations of Depression (IDQ) – Experience Scale -.06 
Step 2  
Hypomania Interpretations - Hypomanic Appraisals (HIQ-H) .32*** 
Ruminative Responses Scale - Reflective Rumination (RRS-R) .90* 
Reponses to Positive Affect - Self-focused Rumination (RPA-S) .94* 
Step 1 R
2
 .402*** 
Step 2 ΔR2 .108*** 
d.f. 10, 329 
F 34.264*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
To explore which variables contributed to CES-D scores, a similar hierarchical 
regression analysis was conducted. Scores on the ISS subscales, HPS scores, and the recent 
experiences of depression and hypomania-relevant events (IDQ-E and HIQ-E) were 
entered into the first block. Variables with significant correlations with the CES-D were 
then entered into the second block of the regression equation (HIQ-N, IDQ-D, RPA-D, 
RPA-S, RRS-B, RRS-R, and RRS-D). As shown in Table 2.1.4 below, the regression 
model was significant (F(9, 330) = 57.933, p < .001) and explained 61.2% of the variance in 
CES-D scores, and was not unduly influenced by multicolinearity (VIFs < 1.9, Tolerances 
> 0.5). Scores on the RRS Depressive Rumination scale, IDQ Depressive appraisals scale, 
and the Self-Focused Positive Rumination scale were significant contributors to variance in 
CES-D scores. Tendencies to engage in rumination upon depressive symptoms and to 
endorse negative self-appraisals were positively associated with CES-D scores, whilst the 
engagement in self-focused positive rumination was negatively associated with CES-D. 
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Table 2.1.4 Regression analysis investigating the contribution of the cognitive style 
measures to scores on the depressive symptom measure (CES-D). 
 
 Standardised 
Beta 
Step 1  
Internal States Scale (ISS)  
Activation .00 
Perceived Conflict .19*** 
Well-being -.24*** 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) .14** 
Hypomania Interpretations (HIQ) – Experience Scale -.10* 
Interpretations of Depression (IDQ) – Experience Scale .27*** 
Step 2  
Ruminative Responses Scale - Depressive Rumination (RRS-D) .25*** 
Interpretations of Depression - Depressive Appraisals (IDQ-D) .11* 
Responses to Positive Affect - Self-focused Rumination (RPA-S) -.87* 
Step 1 R
2
 .54*** 
Step 2 ΔR2 .08*** 
d.f. 9, 330 
F 57.93*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Principal Components Analysis 
A principal components analysis was conducted on the rumination (RRS and RPA) and 
appraisal measures (IDQ and HIQ) to investigate the conceptual overlap between the 
cognitive style measures. Using a direct oblimin rotation, a three component solution was 
suggested by review of the scree plot and by a parallel analysis (O‟Connor, 2000a). The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure confirmed that the sample was adequate for principal 
components analysis (KMO = .861), whilst Bartlett‟s test of sphericity was significant (X
2
 
(2775) = 12130.082, p < .001) indicating that the correlations between variables were 
sufficiently large. Items were removed from the initial solution if they loaded on more than 
one component to a similar magnitude, or if they failed to adequately load on one 
component (i.e. load less than .30).   
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Table 2.1.5. Item loadings following the Principal Components Analysis conducted on the 
rumination and self-appraisal measures. 
 
 
Factor loadings 
1 2 3 
IDQD_6 If I felt down on myself I would probably think it was 
because I am a bad person, even towards myself. 
.696     
IDQD_5 If I had upsetting or bad thoughts going through my mind I 
would probably think it was because I am a worthless person to have 
these types of thoughts. 
.684     
RRS18_D Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults and 
mistakes. 
.682     
IDQD_9 If I have periods of time when I felt a persistent sense of 
gloom I would probably think it was because I am a failure and a 
burden to others. 
.679     
RRS22_D Think about how angry you are with yourself. .674     
IDQD_7 If I felt that the future was bleak and things were unlikely to 
improve I would probably think it was because I am a negative 
pessimistic person. 
.667     
RRS16_B Think “why can‟t I handle things better?” .663     
IDQD_10 If I felt that nothing was working out for me I would 
probably think it was because I struggle to get anything right in my 
life. 
.643     
RRS6_D Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel. .631     
RRS19_D Think about how you don‟t feel up to doing anything. .630     
IDQD_2 If I experience guilty feelings even though I may not have 
done anything particularly wrong I would probably think it was 
because I am a bad person and deserve to be punished. 
.622     
IDQD_8 If there were times when I struggled to control an urge to 
cry or found myself crying without really understanding why I would 
probably think it was because I am a weak, pathetic, person. 
.616     
RRS10_B Think “why do I always react this way?” .607     
RRS15_B Think “why do I have problems other people don‟t have?” .598     
RRS14_D Think “I won‟t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this 
way”. 
.572     
RPA14_D When you are feeling happy, how often do you think "I 
don't deserve this"? 
.570     
IDQD_1 If I felt I couldn‟t enjoy life as easily as other people, I 
would probably think it was because I don‟t get pleasure from 
anything anymore. 
.566     
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 Factor loadings   
 1 2 3 
RPA10_D When you are feeling happy, how often do you remind 
yourself that these feelings won't last? 
.566     
RRS8_D Think about how you don‟t seem to feel anything anymore. .560     
RRS17_D Think about how sad you feel. .554     
RRS2_D Think “I won‟t be able to do my job if I don‟t snap out of 
this”. 
.551     
RPA15_D When you are feeling happy, how often do you think "My 
streak of luck is going to end soon"? 
.548     
RRS1_D Think about how alone you feel. .542     
IDQD_3 If I have exploded at others and afterwards felt bad about 
myself I would probably think it was because I am a nasty person. 
.538     
RPA9_D When you are feeling happy, how often do you think about 
things that could go wrong? 
.529     
RRS4_D Think about how hard it is to concentrate. .529     
IDQD_4 If I felt cut off from other people I would probably think it 
was because I am an insensitive person. 
.496     
RRS13_B Think about a recent situation wishing it had gone better. .493     
RRS3_D Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness. .485     
RRS9_D Think “why can‟t I get going?” .484     
RRS5_B Think “what am I doing to deserve this?” .483     
RPA11_D When you are feeling happy, how often do you think 
“People will think I am bragging”? 
.480     
RPA17_D When you are feeling happy, how often do you think 
about the things that have not gone well for you? 
.431     
RPA12_D When you are feeling happy, how often do you think 
about how hard it is to concentrate? 
.392     
RPA6_D When you are feeling happy, how often do you think "It is 
too good to be true”? 
.383     
RRS11_R Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this 
way. 
.363     
IDQN_6 If I felt down on myself I would probably think it was 
because current problems are leading me to be rather hard on myself. 
  .727   
IDQN_4 If I felt cut off from other people I would probably think it 
was because things are difficult at the moment and I have little energy 
for other things. 
  .694   
IDQN_9 If I have periods of time when I felt a persistent sense of 
gloom I would probably think it was because things are going wrong 
for me just at present. 
  .653   
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 1 2 3 
IDQN_5 If I had upsetting or bad thoughts going through my mind I 
would probably think it was because I am rather low at present but 
when things improve the thoughts will go. 
  .638   
IDQN_8 If there were times when I struggled to control an urge to 
cry or found myself crying without really understanding why I would 
probably think it was because my difficulties have affected me just at 
the moment. 
  .632   
IDQN_3 If I have exploded at others and afterwards felt bad about 
myself I would probably think it was because I am under a lot of 
pressure at the moment. 
  .620   
IDQN_2 If I experience guilty feelings even though I may not have 
done anything particularly wrong I would probably think it was 
because I am being hard on myself because I under strain at the 
moment. 
  .602   
IDQN_7 I felt that the future was bleak and things were unlikely to 
improve I would probably think it was because situations look bleak, 
but will change as things improve. 
  .599   
IDQN_10 If I felt that nothing was working out for me I would 
probably think it was because too many obstacles are being put in my 
way at present. 
  .599   
IDQN_1 If I felt I couldn‟t enjoy life as easily as other people, I 
would probably think it was because current pressures are distracting 
me from my interests. 
  .576   
HIQ_N1 If I thought my thoughts were going too fast I would 
probably think it was because there are too many competing tasks for 
me at present. 
  .470   
HIQ_N9 If I found my thinking was very quick and clear, I would 
probably think it was because there are few distractions at present. 
  .435   
HIQ_N4 If I was feeling „sped up‟ inside, I would probably think it 
was because I am under pressure from work or social demands. 
  .408   
HIQ_N5 If I felt physically restless and kept moving from one 
activity to the next, I would probably think it was because there is too 
much pressure and I need a break. 
  .390   
HIQ_N3 If my thoughts were coming so thick and fast that other 
people couldn‟t keep up, I would probably think it was because there 
are too many demands on my time.                                                     
  .387   
HIQ_N7 If I felt in high spirits and full of energy, I would probably 
think it was because things happen to be going well for me at present. 
  .381   
HIQ_N2 If I was on the go so much that other people couldn‟t keep 
up with me, I would probably think it was because: I am overdoing it 
and will soon need a rest. 
  .380   
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 1 2 3 
HIQ_N6 If I felt impulsive, I would probably think it was because 
there are lots of external demands.       
  .333   
HIQ_N10 If I found that tastes, smells or things I touched seemed 
more vivid, I would probably think it was because it is just a phase 
and will pass. 
  .313   
HIQ_H7 If I felt in high spirits and full of energy, I would probably 
think it was because I am a talented person with lots to offer. 
    .718 
HIQ_H9 If I found my thinking was very quick and clear, I would 
probably think I am clever and talented. 
    .685 
HIQ_H1 If I thought my thoughts were going too fast I would 
probably think it was because I am intelligent and full of good ideas. 
    .639 
HIQ_H3 If my thoughts were coming so thick and fast that other 
people couldn‟t keep up, I am full of good ideas and others are too 
slow.   
    .612 
RPA13_S When you are feeling happy, how often do you think "I am 
achieving everything"? 
    .578 
RPA16_S When you are feeling happy, how often do you think about 
how proud you are of yourself? 
    .571 
HIQ_H6 If I felt impulsive, I would probably think it was because: I 
could make rapid decisions and good choices? 
    .555 
HIQ_H8 If I woke up earlier than normal and felt full of energy, I 
would probably think it was because I am a happy, positive and 
energetic person. 
    .538 
RPA8_E When you are feeling happy, how often do you think about 
how strong you feel? 
    .536 
RPA5_S When you are feeling happy, how often do you think "I am 
living up to my potential"? 
    .530 
HIQ_H4 If I was feeling „sped up‟ inside, I would probably think it 
was because I am in good spirits and can take on challenges. 
    .520 
HIQ_H5 If I felt physically restless and kept moving from one 
activity to the next, I would probably think it was because I am full of 
energy and raring to go. 
    .510 
HIQ_H2 If I was on the go so much that other people couldn‟t keep 
up with me, I would probably think it was because I have more 
stamina than other people. 
    .510 
RPA4_E When you are feeling happy, how often do you think about 
how you feel up for doing everything? 
    .438 
RPA1_E When you are feeling happy, how often do you notice how 
you feel full of energy? 
    .421 
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Factor loadings  
1 2 3 
HIQ_H10 If I found that tastes, smells or things I touched seemed 
more vivid, I would probably think it was because I am more 
sensitive and „tuned in‟ than other people. 
    .420 
RRS12_R Write down what you are thinking and analyze it     .340 
RPA3_S When you are feeling happy, how often do you think "I am 
getting everything done"? 
    .330 
RPA2_E When you are feeling happy, how often do you savour this 
moment? 
    .327 
RPA7_E When you are feeling happy, how often do you think about 
how happy you feel? 
    .326 
 
Key: HIQ = Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire (N = Normalising Appraisals, H = 
Hypomanic Appraisals), IDQ = Interpretations of Depression Questionnaire (D = 
Depressogenic Appraisals, N = Normalising Appraisals), RPA = Responses to 
Positive Affect scale (D = Dampening, E = Emotion-focused, S = Self-focused 
positive rumination), RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale (B = Brooding, R = 
Reflection, D = Depression-focused rumination). 
 
 
The final solution accounted for 32.6% of the total variance, with the three 
components having eigenvalues of 12.40, 6.97 and 5.06. As shown in Table 2.1.5, the first 
component (termed “Negative Cognitive Style”) incorporated items from the IDQ 
Depressive appraisals measure, items from the RPA Dampening scale, and items from the 
Brooding and Depression Related rumination scales of the RRS, with one item from the 
RRS Reflection subscale. All items positively loaded onto this component. The second 
component included positively loading items from the normalising appraisals scales from 
the HIQ and IDQ (component termed “Normalising of Symptoms”). The third component 
(termed “Positive Cognitive Style”) included positively loading items from the hypomanic 
appraisals subscale of the HIQ, items from the RPA Emotion Focused and RPA Self 
Focused rumination, and one item from the RRS Reflection subscale. 
A series of correlations were conducted to investigate the associations between the 
new emergent component from the principal components analysis and scores on the 
symptom measures (the ISS subscales, HPS, and CES-D) (see Table 2.1.6).  
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Table 2.1.6.  Bivariate correlations between symptom measures and the three cognitive 
style components produced in the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
 
 Cognitive Style Component 
 
Negative 
Cognitive Style 
Normalising of 
Symptoms 
Positive 
Cognitive Style 
CES-Depression Scale .638** .062 -.091 
Hypomanic Personality Scale .254** -.029 .542** 
ISS Activation .180** -.022 .348** 
ISS Depression .492** -.056 -.093 
ISS Perceived Conflict .416** -.004 .074 
ISS Well Being -.329** -.075 .391** 
Negative Cognitive Style 1.000 .170** .071 
Normalising of Symptoms  1.000 .139* 
Positive Cognitive Style   1.000 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale; ISS 
= Internal States Scale. 
 
No significant correlations were noted between the Negative and Positive Cognitive 
Style components, however, the Normalising of Symptoms component was weakly 
positively correlated with both the Negative and Positive Cognitive Style components. The 
Negative Cognitive Style component was also highly positively associated with measures 
of depressive symptoms (the CES-D, ISS-D, and ISS-PC), modestly positively correlated 
with HPS and ISS-A scores, and negatively correlated with ISSWB scores. The Positive 
Cognitive Style component was positively correlated with scores on the HPS, ISS-A and 
ISS-WB, but no significant correlations were found between Positive Cognitive Style and 
any of the measures of depressive symptoms.   
To explore whether the three components made unique contributions to the 
variance in scores on the Hypomanic Personality Scale, a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis was conducted, controlling for current affective symptoms (see Table 2.1.7 
below). Scores on the ISS subscales (D, WB, A, PC) and scores on the HIQ and IDQ 
Experience scales were entered into the first block of the regression, with the three 
components entered into the second step. The regression model was significant (F(10, 329) = 
35.639, p < .001) and explained 52.0% of variance in HPS scores. Scores on the Positive 
Cognitive style component were positively associated with unique variance in HPS scores, 
whilst the Normalizing of Symptoms component was negatively associated with HPS 
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scores. The Negative Cognitive style component made no independent contribution to HPS 
scores. 
A second regression analysis was conducted to investigate whether the components 
contributed to variance in CES-D scores (see Table 2.1.7). Scores on the ISS subscales (A, 
PC, WB), the IDQ and HIQ Experience subscales were entered into the first step of the 
regression analysis with the three components entered into the second step. The model was 
significant (F(9, 330) = 57.765, p < .001) and explained 61.2% of variance in CES-D scores. 
Scores on the Negative Cognitive Style component were positively associated with unique 
variance in CES-D scores, whilst scores on the Positive Cognitive Style component were 
negatively associated with unique variance in CES-D scores. The Normalising of 
Symptoms component made no significant contribution to variance in CES-D scores. 
 
 
Table 2.1.7 Results of the regression analyses for the associations between the cognitive 
style components with hypomania vulnerability and depressive symptoms 
 
 HPS CES-D 
 Standardised 
Beta 
Standardised 
Beta 
Step 1   
Internal States Scale   
Activation .17** .01 
Depression -.09  
Perceived Conflict .04 .24*** 
Well-being -.02 -.23*** 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS)  .17*** 
Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression (CES-D) .21**  
Hypomania Interpretations (HIQ) – Experience Scale .29*** -.10* 
Interpretations of Depression (IDQ) – Experience Scale -.04 .29*** 
Step 2   
Negative Cognitive Style component .04 .33*** 
Positive Cognitive Style component .40*** -.11* 
Normalising of Symptoms component -.13* -.03 
Step 1 R
2
 .40*** .542*** 
Step 2 ΔR2 Change .12*** .070*** 
d.f. 10, 329 9, 330 
F 35.639*** 57.765*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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2.1.5 Discussion 
Previous research has suggested that the vulnerability to hypomania is associated with 
positive and negative forms of rumination (Johnson et al., 2008a), and with positive and 
negative self-appraisals (Jones & Day, 2008). However, it was unclear from previous 
studies whether rumination or self-appraisals contribute differentially to hypomania 
vulnerability, and whether these measures capture similar responses to emotional states.   
The vulnerability to hypomania was positively correlated with self-report measures 
of positive and negative cognitive styles, supporting our first prediction. However, only 
scores on the hypomanic self-appraisal, reflective negative rumination, and self-focused 
positive rumination measures were significant contributors to variance in hypomania 
vulnerability using regression analysis. The reflection subscale of the Ruminative 
Responses Scale, in addition to positively contributing to hypomania vulnerability, was 
also positively associated with measures of negative rumination. On closer inspection, the 
reflective rumination, hypomanic self-appraisal and the self-focused positive rumination 
scales all capture similar responses to emotional states that attempt to improve current 
mood states. Improvements in mood could be achieved through the alleviation of negative 
affect during reflective thinking, or via an increased focus upon the self as reflected by the 
hypomanic appraisal and self-focused positive rumination measures. The contribution of 
reflective negative rumination to the self-reported vulnerability to hypomania was an 
unanticipated finding. Reflective rumination, thought to comprise cognitive problem-
solving responses to negative moods (Treynor et al., 2003), may represent the first stage of 
emotion regulation from a negative mood up to a positive mood state. Positive forms of 
rumination may emerge following successful reflective problem-solving leading to positive 
self-appraisals and ascents in mood in bipolar-vulnerable individuals. 
In contrast to a previous study (Johnson & Jones, 2009), dampening did not 
contribute unique variance to the vulnerability to hypomania. Dampening of positive affect 
has previously been associated with current and past histories of depressive symptoms 
(Eisner, Johnson & Carver, 2009; Feldman et al., 2008), and with hypomania vulnerability 
(Feldman et al., 2008), but no associations have been reported between dampening and 
current or past histories of manic symptoms (Johnson et al., 2008a). Dampening in the 
current study was more strongly correlated with current depressive symptoms than with 
hypomania vulnerability and manic symptoms. As the current study‟s sample reported 
mean CES-D scores greater than Radloff‟s (1991) suggested cut-off of 16 for clinically 
significant depressive symptoms, participants in the current study may have more readily 
engaged in negative forms of rumination rather than dampening as a means of down-
regulating mood, due to current depressive symptoms. 
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Indeed, the severity of current depressive symptoms was observed to be associated 
with negative cognitive response styles that attempt to reduce positive and increase 
negative emotional states, supporting our second prediction. Current depression symptoms 
were either uncorrelated or negatively correlated with the positive rumination and appraisal 
measures, supporting our prediction and previous observations (Johnson et al., 2008a). 
Rumination upon depressive symptoms, negative self-appraisals, and a lack of self-focused 
positive rumination, each made significant contributions to the variance in self-reported 
severity of depression. A lack of self-focused rumination in response to positive mood 
states in depressed individuals is consistent with previous observations (Johnson et al., 
2008a). Self-focused positive rumination captures cognitive responses thought to be 
implicated in the intensification of positive affect (Feldman et al., 2008), and it has been 
argued that depressed individuals are unable, or unwilling, to focus upon and elaborate 
positive aspects of the self (Feldman et al., 2008; Joormann & Siemer, 2004), meaning that 
positive moods are only sustained for short periods of time. Self-focused positive 
rumination in depressed individuals may only serve to further highlight the discrepancy 
between their current and desired selves, worsening depressive feelings and maintaining 
negative ruminative thought processes (Joormann & Siemer, 2004). 
It is interesting to note that current depression symptom severities and hypomania 
vulnerability were strongly associated with the self and symptom focused rumination 
subscales from the positive and negative rumination measures respectively. This indicates 
that response styles which focus upon the self and one‟s current state make significant 
contributions to vulnerability to hypomania and current depressive symptom severities. 
Whilst a lack of self-focused positive rumination made a significant contribution to current 
depression, a lack of self and symptom focused depressive rumination did not emerge as a 
significant contributor to variance in hypomania vulnerability. This supports the argument 
that whilst hypomania vulnerability can be associated with negative rumination, it is the 
engagement in positive cognitive response styles that confers a vulnerability to hypomania. 
 For our third aim, a principal components analysis was used to explore the overlap 
and item redundancy across the ruminative and appraisal cognitive style measures. A 
three-component solution was produced, including a negative cognitive style component, a 
positive cognitive style component and a normalising of symptoms component. The 
negative cognitive style component captured strategies that attempt to amplify negative 
emotional states and reduce positive emotional states, including items from the negative 
self-appraisal, symptom-focused negative rumination and dampening measures. The 
positive cognitive style component captured strategies which focus upon and amplify 
positive affective states, and included items from the positive self-appraisal, self and 
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emotion-focused positive rumination measures. Although the measures included in the 
positive and negative cognitive style components are designed to capture different forms of 
positive and negative cognitions, the principal components analysis suggested these 
measures may simply be reduced to cognitive response styles that attempt to increase or 
decrease mood states, in addition to a normalising of symptoms component. This 
normalisation component included items from the hypomania and depression normalising 
appraisal measures, suggesting that the normalisation of experiences may reflect a different 
type of response style than the two other emotional processing components. This may 
reflect a generic reappraisal process where the individual makes a more conscious effort to 
rationalise emotional experiences. Alternatively, the two emotional processing strategies 
indicated by the principal components analysis may reflect a simpler process of engaging 
in a positive or negative thinking style in response to current affective states. A similar 
normalising component emerged in a previous study, which was composed of the 
normalising items from the hypomanic appraisals measure (Johnson & Jones, 2009). 
In relation to the overlap between self-appraisals and ruminative thought processes, 
tendencies to make positive self-appraisals and to engage in positive rumination were 
associated with the vulnerability to hypomania. Although scores on the hypomanic self-
appraisal scale were found to make the greater contribution to variance in scores on the 
hypomania vulnerability measure compared to positive rumination. Whilst such an 
assertion would require testing, positive forms of rumination may occur prior to the 
endorsement of positive self-appraisals, with these overly positive self-appraisals 
becoming endorsed through repetitive self-thought. However, it is unclear whether a 
similar relationship between ruminative self-thought and negative self-appraisal may exist 
in relation to depression vulnerability, as the current study did not include a trait-based 
measure of the vulnerability to depression. One possible implication of these findings is 
that training individuals to better regulate their cognitive responses to mood states may 
assist in reducing the endorsement of extreme appraisals of the self, which assists with the 
more effective regulation of subsequent behavioural reactions to mood states. 
In sum, the current study suggests that the vulnerability to hypomania is primarily 
associated with a positively orientated cognitive style, consistent with previous 
observations in bipolar and at-risk samples (Carver & Johnson, 2009; Johnson et al., 
2008a). In addition, regression analyses conducted upon the components identified by the 
principal components analysis indicated that the vulnerability to hypomania was inversely 
associated with the endorsement of normalising appraisals, supporting previous 
observations (Jones et al., 2006; Jones & Day, 2008; Johnson & Jones, 2009). Rather than 
reappraising a hypomanic or depression relevant event, hypomanic individuals may instead 
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endorse a positive or negative self-appraisal or respond by focusing their thinking in a 
positive or negative ruminative manner. This may prompt the engagement in behaviours 
and cognitive styles which further exacerbate current mood and symptoms. Research has 
suggested that reappraising the personal meanings associated with recently experienced 
events can assist in controlling subsequent behavioural responses to events (Gross & John, 
2003). A lack of the endorsement of normalising appraisals may contribute to subsequent 
inflations in mood and behaviour in hypomania. This would be consistent with prior 
observations that hypomania is associated with poor self-regulation, such as the tendency 
for hypomanic individuals to actively pursue unrealistically achievable goals in the attempt 
to maintain positive emotional states (Johnson, 2005b; Johnson & Carver, 2006).   
There are a number of limitations to consider with the current study. A number of 
items from the reflective rumination subscale failed to load on one component or loaded on 
more than one to a similar magnitude in the principal components analysis. The lack of 
significant loadings for some of the reflective items may indicate that the RRS Reflection 
subscale was not purposefully constructed as a measure of reflective thinking in response 
to negative emotional experiences and only emerged in a previous factor analysis (Treynor 
et al., 2003). The study was also conducted in a predominantly female and high-
functioning sample of individuals from a higher education institute in the UK, and it is not 
clear what proportion of participants had previously contacted mental health services 
and/or had been diagnosed with a mental health condition as this data was not collected. 
Future research will be required to investigate these findings within a bipolar population.   
The current study is also cross-sectional in design and relies upon the self reporting 
of moods and cognitive styles, albeit using established and validated psychometric 
measures. However, it is still unclear how positive forms of rumination are associated with 
prospective mood symptoms. Whilst the current study controlled for the effect of current 
activated mood states upon cognitive styles in the regression analyses, the study did not 
incorporate a measure of more enduring manic symptomatology comparable to the CES-D 
scale, which measures depressive symptom severity over the previous week.  Although 
individuals who report HPS high scores are considered to be vulnerable to experiencing 
both current and future hypomanic symptoms (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), future studies 
are required to investigate how positive rumination is related to prospective mood and 
symptoms. Future research may wish to incorporate more objective and less self-report 
reliant indices of rumination, in tandem with prospective designs, to ascertain how 
ruminative cognitive styles contribute to the development of bipolar symptoms over time. 
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2.1.6 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the current study has suggested that the vulnerability to hypomania is 
primarily characterised by positive cognitive styles, which appear to be more implicated in 
conferring a vulnerability to hypomania than negative cognitive styles. Whilst hypomanic 
personality traits were also positively associated with measures of negative cognitive 
styles, only positive cognitive measures emerged as significant contributors to the self-
reported risk for hypomania. Future research should take into account the sensitivity of 
individuals at a high vulnerability for hypomania to both positive and negative emotional 
experiences. In particular, researchers should consider how the propensity to engage in 
specific forms of cognitive styles in response to emotional experiences may contribute to 
the development of manic and depressive symptoms following environmental stressors. 
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2.2.1 Abstract 
A previous study (Section 2.1) had identified that similar emotion regulatory processes 
appeared to be captured by a set of commonly used cognitive style measures, including 
processes implicated in increasing and decreasing mood states, and a normalising appraisal 
process for the experience of bipolar symptoms. However, it was unclear how these 
cognitive styles may be associated in long term changes in bipolar symptoms. The current 
study comprised a six month follow-up of the participants from the previous study and 
assessed mood symptoms, hypomania vulnerability and the experience of life events 
between time points.  
Scores on the negative cognitive style component at Time 1 were associated with 
elevated scores across the Time 2 manic and depressive symptom and hypomania 
vulnerability measures, as well as with lower well-being scores. Scores on the positive 
cognitive style component were associated with increased hypomania vulnerability and 
well-being, but were negatively correlated with depressive symptoms at the six month 
follow-up. Whilst the experience of positive life events were not associated with scores on 
the symptom or vulnerability measures, the experience of negative life events were 
associated with elevated scores across all the symptom and vulnerability measures, 
including reduced well-being, and was the only variable which was associated with 
increases in self-reported hypomania vulnerability at follow-up. These results lend 
tentative support to the manic defence hypothesis, whereby increases in hypomania 
vulnerability and subclinical symptoms are considered to stem from attempts to cope with 
and avoid depressogenic cognitions and experiences. 
 
2.2.2 Introduction 
A previous study (Study One, Dempsey et al., 2011) conducted a principal components 
analysis (PCA) upon a number of self-report measures of positive and negative rumination 
and self-appraisal to investigate whether these measures may capture similar affect 
regulatory processes.  
The PCA produced a three component solution reflecting three distinct 
components, the first reflected a negative cognitive style component consisting of brooding 
and depressive symptom focused negative rumination, negative self-appraisal and 
dampening responses to positive emotions. The second component represented a 
normalising of depressive and hypomanic symptoms process, which appeared to be similar 
to reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003). The third component represented a positively oriented 
cognitive style incorporating self and emotion-focused positive ruminative thought 
processes, and positive self-appraisals. Cross-sectional positive correlations were observed 
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between the negative cognitive style component with self-reported hypomanic personality 
traits, and subclinical depressive and manic symptoms, whilst the negative cognitive style 
component was negatively associated with self-reported well-being scores. The 
normalising of symptoms component was not associated with any of the self-report 
personality or symptom measures. However, the positive cognitive style component was 
positively associated with hypomanic personality traits, well-being, current hypomanic 
symptoms, and with scores on the normalising component. Although the negative 
cognitive style component was positively associated with current depressive and manic 
symptoms, and the positive cognitive style component was positively associated with 
manic symptoms and increased well-being, it was not clear how these cognitive styles may 
be associated with prospective symptom severities and the vulnerability to hypomania at a 
longer term follow-up. 
The current study consisted of a six month follow-up of participants from the 
original study (Dempsey et al., 2011). The main aim of the study was to investigate the 
prospective associations between the cognitive style measures from Study One with the 
self-reported severity of bipolar mood symptomatology at a six month follow-up.  
Previous research has suggested that the vulnerability to hypomania is 
predominantly associated with a number of positively orientated cognitive styles (Dempsey 
et al., 2011), including tendencies to react intensely to positive stimuli and engage in affect 
regulatory strategies that attempt to increase and maintain positive mood states (Carver & 
Johnson, 2009; Johnson & Jones, 2009). Although it has also been suggested that 
hypomania vulnerability is associated with the engagement in negative cognitive styles, 
particularly negative rumination (Thomas & Bentall, 2002), and with thought processes 
which attempt to dampen positive emotional states (Feldman et al., 2008; Johnson & Jones, 
2009). 
Taking into consideration Dempsey and colleagues‟ (2011) study, which had 
indicated that HPS scores were cross-sectionally associated with the positive cognitive 
style measures and that depressive symptoms were primarily associated with the negative 
cognitive style measures; one possibility is that these associations will remain for 
prospective symptoms. Indeed, positive ruminative thought processes are considered to be 
associated with exacerbations in manic symptoms (Feldman et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 
2008a), and negative rumination with the maintenance of depressed states and with the 
vulnerability to depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Smith 
& Alloy, 2009). However, theories such as the manic defence hypothesis (Neale, 1988), 
and its supporting research, suggest that hypo/mania can be associated with sensitivities to 
negative information about the self (Bentall & Thompson, 1990), including labile self-
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esteem (Winters & Neale, 1985) and the engagement in negative rumination (Thomas & 
Bentall, 2002; Van der Gucht et al., 2009; Dempsey et al., 2011), which may be indicative 
of a latent negative self-concept (Neale, 1988). Attempts to avoid self-negative cognitions 
through the use of distraction and risky behaviours may lead to increases in positive affect 
(Thomas et al., 2007).  
However, prospective hypo/manic symptoms may be associated with a combination 
of both positive and negative cognitive styles, reflecting the bipolarity of mood and 
cognitive processes noted across the bipolar spectrum. Whilst in relation to depression, 
prospective depressive symptoms may be more associated with the engagement in negative 
cognitive styles and a lack of positively orientated cognitive styles as suggested by 
previous research (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Johnson et al., 2008a). In relation to this, 
our first hypothesis was that the engagement in negative cognitive styles would be 
associated with prospective increases in depressive symptomatology, and to a lesser extent 
increases in manic symptomatology, whilst positive cognitive styles would be 
predominantly associated with increases in hypo/manic, but not depressive, symptoms. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the observations made in Study One where positively 
oriented cognitive styles were associated with increased hypomanic symptoms (ISS 
Activation) and well-being scores, but negative cognitive styles were positively associated 
with depressive symptoms and to a lesser extent with hypomanic symptoms. 
 Study Two also investigated the contribution of negative and positive life events to 
the vulnerability to hypomania and the experience of prospective mood symptoms. 
Previous research has implicated the experience of life events in the exacerbation of mood 
symptoms (Johnson, 2005a; Johnson et al., 2008a), with the experience of negative life 
events associated with prospective changes in depressive but not manic symptoms in 
patients with Bipolar I Disorder (Johnson et al., 2008a). In relation to at-risk individuals, 
the experience of stressful life events may act as a trigger for increases in mood symptoms, 
particularly in the manner in which individuals respond to positive and negative life events. 
Previous research has suggested that individuals with hypomanic personality traits and 
bipolar disorder may interpret experiences in both self-positive and self-negative manners 
(Jones et al., 2006; Jones & Day, 2008; Dempsey et al., 2011), and also engage in both 
positive and negative ruminative response styles to experiences (Johnson et al., 2008a; 
Dempsey et al., 2011). Because individuals on the bipolar spectrum may respond to 
experiences in both self-positive and self-negative manners, it is currently unclear how at-
risk individuals respond to the experience of positive and negative life events, and what 
effect this may have upon their prospective mood symptoms.  
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 Although it has been have suggested that the experience of life events can trigger 
exacerbations in manic and depressive symptoms in patients with bipolar disorder 
(Johnson, 2005a), it is not currently clear how the experience of life events influences 
mania vulnerability in at-risk individuals, and whether the experience of more positive 
and/or negative events is associated with exacerbations in mania vulnerability. It is 
possible that the experience of negative life events in hypomanic individuals may prompt 
descents in mood leading to depressed states, or may prompt attempts to increase positive 
mood states and avoid depressive feelings through the engagement in goal-related or risky 
activities (Thomas & Bentall, 2002; Thomas et al., 2007). Alternatively, the experience of 
positive life events may be associated with ascents in mood and symptoms; as such life 
events may trigger positive thoughts about the self, through positive rumination, leading to 
endorsement of more grandiose self-beliefs and ascent behaviours. The current study 
represented an exploratory investigation into the prospective associations between positive 
and negative cognitive styles with mood symptoms at a six month follow-up.  
 
2.2.3 Method 
Participants 
A total of 127 participants (104 female, 23 male; Mean Age = 24.30 years, S.D. = 8.04) 
from the sample of 353 participants in Study One (Dempsey et al., 2011) completed the 
follow-up self-report measures (a 36% conversion from Time 1 to Time 2). 
 
Materials 
Time 1 Measures 
Full details of the baseline questionnaire measures and the results of the Principal 
Components Analysis conducted upon these measures are described in Study One (Section 
2.1).  
 
Time 2 Measures 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) 
The HPS is a 48 item true-false questionnaire designed to assess the presence of 
personality traits associated with hypomanic symptoms, such as mood lability and 
grandiosity (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Individuals who report elevated scores on the 
HPS have been observed to be at a higher risk of experiencing more severe bipolar 
symptoms (Blechert & Meyer, 2005), and more likely to experience hypomanic episodes, 
psychotic symptoms, and abuse substances than low HPS scorers at long-term follow-up 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). The HPS has demonstrated good test-retest reliability (r = 
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.81; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) and high levels of internal consistency (Cronbach‟s α = 
.87-.89; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Dempsey et al., 2011). 
 
Internal States Scale (ISS) 
The ISS is a 16 item measure designed to assess current bipolar symptomatology (Bauer et 
al., 1991). Each of the items on the ISS refers to the experience of bipolar symptoms 
relating to depression (ISS-D), hypo/mania (ISS-Activation), perceived interpersonal 
conflict (ISS-PC) and well-being (ISS-WB). Participants rate the intensity of each bipolar 
symptom over the past 24 hours on 100mm rating scales which are anchored at the 
extremes by “Not at all/Rarely” to “Very much so/Much of the time” (Example items 
include: “Today my mood is changeable”, “Today I feel “sped up” inside”). Scores on the 
ISS are associated with clinician-made ratings of bipolar symptom severities (Bauer et al., 
1991), with high levels of internal consistency for the ISS subscales reported in previous 
studies (αs = .70-.83, Jones & Day, 2008; Dempsey et al., 2011). 
 
Event-rating scale (ERS: Novel scale) 
To assess the experience and appraisal of positive and negative life events in the six month 
period between time points, a novel self-report measure was devised. Although other life 
event appraisal measures exist, such measures are more focused upon the appraisal of 
solitary stressful life events (e.g., the Appraisal of Life Events Scale; Ferguson, Matthews 
& Cox, 1999). A novel measure was devised in order to allow the measurement of the 
cumulative experience and appraisal of both positive and negative life events over a six 
month period. The event rating scale requires participants to rate the frequency of positive 
and negative life events experienced over the previous six months, rate how emotionally 
positive or negative these events were, rate their emotional state for when they look back 
over the events of the prior six months, and provide a rating of their optimism or 
pessimism for the next six months of their life. Participants made their ratings according to 
100mm scales, with higher ratings indicating the experience of greater numbers of positive 
and negative events, and with greater optimism and more positive appraisals of these 
events (see Appendix). 
 
Procedure 
Participants from a previous online study (Dempsey et al., 2011) had consented to being 
contacted about future research and were invited via email to take part in the current study. 
The email message contained a link to the study‟s website where electronic versions of the 
information sheet and consent form were presented. Following informed consent, 
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participants completed the HPS, ISS, and the Event-Rating Scale. Those participants who 
completed the follow-up study were entered into a prize draw for vouchers as an incentive. 
The study received institutional ethical approval from the University of Manchester. 
 
Data Analysis 
Data normality was investigated through the use of Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests, 
calculation of z-scores, and review of histograms. Associations between the Time 1 
cognitive style measures and the Time 2 symptom and vulnerability measures were first 
investigated by correlational analysis, with hierarchical regression analyses conducted to 
establish whether these associations remain when controlling for baseline mood symptoms. 
As preliminary data analyses failed to find evidence of significant interactions between the 
baseline vulnerability and cognitive style measures and scores on the event appraisal 
measures in relation to prospective symptoms, the analysis focused upon the associations 
between baseline cognitive styles and the severity of mood symptoms at a six month 
follow-up. 
 
 
2.2.4 Results 
Review of histograms, z-scores, and the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnoff indicated that the 
data distributions did not significantly differ from normality. An independent samples t-test 
was first conducted to determine whether significant differences in age existed between 
those participants from Time 1 who completed and did not complete Time 2. Participants 
who did not complete Time 2 were younger in age (Mean age = 21.73 years, S.D. = 4.90) 
compared to participants who completed Time 2 (M = 24.29 years, S.D. = 8.05) (t(353) = -
3.81, p < .001, r = .20). No significant differences in gender ratios between completers and 
non-completers were noted (Pearson‟s X² = .787, p = .375). In addition, no significant 
differences between completers and non-completers were noted for Time 1 scores on the 
HPS (t(370) = 1.70, p = .09), the CES-D (t(352) = -1.08, p = .28), or on the Depression 
(t(352) = -.49, p = .66), Activation (t(352) = -.56, p = .57) and Perceived Conflict (t(352) = 
-.51, p = .61) subscales of the Internal States Scale. However, those participants who 
completed Time 2 reported significantly lower Time 1 scores on the Well-Being subscale 
of the Internal States Scale (M = 126.14, S.D. = 60.44) compared to non-completers (M =  
145.66, S.D. = 66.98) (t(352) = 2.67, p < .01, r = .14). Mean scores on the Time 2 
measures are presented in Table 2.2.1 below.  
  
 
 
 130 
Table 2.2.1 Means and standard deviations for the Time 2 self-report measures 
 
  Mean S.D. Ranges 
Internal States Scale (ISS)    
Activation 121.54 97.29 0-500 
Depression 46.92 47.74 0-195 
Perceived Conflict 110.83 83.45 0-360 
Well-Being 146.66 66.28 0-300 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) 15.70 8.95 1-40 
HPS Change Score -.27 4.80 -14 to 13 
 
Note: HPS Change scores = Time 2 HPS score – Time 1 HPS score 
 
Mean scores on the ISS subscales, as shown in Table 2.2.1, are consistent with 
mean scores reported in previous non-clinical studies (Mansell et al., 2008; Dodd et al., 
2010). Whilst mean HPS scores appeared lower than the mean reported in Study One 
(MHPS = 17.13) this difference was at a non-significant trend level (p = .09). The mean 
HPS score reported in Table 2.2.1 is consistent with HPS means reported by previous 
studies conducted in similar British student samples (Knowles et al., 2005; Mansell et al., 
2008; Jones & Day, 2008). A series of bivariate correlations were next conducted to 
investigate the associations between the Time 1 cognitive style measures and the Time 2 
symptom measures (see Table 2.2.2). 
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Table 2.2.2. Bivariate correlations between scores on the Time 1 cognitive style self-report 
measures and Time 2 symptom and vulnerability measures. 
 
 
    Time 2 Measures HPS ISS A ISS D ISS PC ISS WB HPS Change 
Time 1 Measures       
HPS .850
***
 .325
**
 .041 .146  .038 -.184
*
 
HIQ Hypomanic .419
***
 .149 -.124 .016 .131 -.006 
HIQ Normalising -.004 .056 .029 .052  -.069 .061 
IDQ Normalising .046 .024 -.157 -.115 .029 .041 
IDQ Depressogenic .170 .163 .299
**
 .296
**
  -.252
**
 .097 
ISS Activation .347
***
 .316
***
 .151 .141  -.062 -.141 
ISS Depression .057 .122 .361
***
 .260
**
  -.258
**
 -.036 
ISS Conflict .206
*
 .206
*
 .307
***
 .329
***
  -.170 -.133 
ISS Well-Being .088 .059 -.202
*
 -.058 .242
**
 -.132 
RPA Dampening .140 .150 .126 .062  -.158 .059 
RPA Emotion .166 -.024 -.193
*
 -.205
*
 .222
*
 -.054 
RPA Self .171 -.014 -.189
*
 -.146 .231
**
 -.125 
RRS Brooding .247
**
 .232
**
 .311
***
 .245
**
  -.255
**
 .095 
RRS Reflection .377
***
 .186
*
 .061 .062  -.022 .095 
RRS Depression .326
***
 .270
**
 .283
**
 .235
**
  -.282
**
 .121 
Pos Life Events .063 -.048 -.163 -.070 .115 -.082 
Neg Life Events .281
**
 .191
*
 .410
***
 .314
***
  -.226
*
 .224
*
 
Negative PCA .273
**
 .223
*
 .316
***
 .246
**
  -.306
***
 .131 
Normalising PCA .012 .008 -.099 -.066  -.010 .074 
Positive PCA .377
***
 .069 -.213
*
 -.114 .248
**
 -.072 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Key: HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS Change = Time 2 HPS – Time 1 HPS), 
HIQ = Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire, IDQ = Interpretations of Depression 
Questionnaire, ISS = Internal States Scale, RPA = Responses to Positive Affect Scale, 
RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale, PCA = Components from the Principal Components 
Analysis produced in Study 1. 
 
 
Cross-sectional correlations between the Time 1 measures were reported in Section 
2.1. In relation to the associations between the Time 1 and Time 2 measures, as displayed 
in Table 2.2.2 above, scores on the hypomanic appraisals measure were positively 
associated with follow-up HPS scores. Depressive appraisals (IDQ-D) were positively 
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associated with scores on the ISS Depression and Perceived Conflict subscales, and 
negatively with ISS Well-Being at six months. Scores on the positive rumination scale (the 
RPA) were negatively associated with ISS Depression (Emotion and Self-focused), ISS 
Perceived Conflict (Emotion focused rumination only), and positively with ISS Well Being 
scores (Self and Emotion focused rumination). In terms of negative forms of rumination, 
positive associations were noted between all three negative rumination subscales with 
Time 2 HPS scores and ISS Activation scores, whilst positive correlations with ISS 
Depression and Perceived Conflict were noted for the Brooding and Depression-related 
rumination subscales. Negative associations were also noted between ISS Well Being with 
Brooding and Depression-related rumination scores. 
Scores on the Positive Life Events scale of the Event Rating Scale, higher scores on 
which reflect the experience of greater numbers of positive life events between Time 1 and 
Time 2, were not associated with any of the symptom or vulnerability measures. However, 
scores on the Negative Life Events scale were positively associated with scores on the 
HPS, all of the ISS symptom subscales except Well-Being which was negatively 
associated with Negative Life Events, and positively with HPS Change scores, which 
reflect changes in HPS scores from Time 1 to Time 2 (a more positive HPS change score 
reflects increases in HPS scores at Time 2 compared to Time 1). Interestingly, none of the 
cognitive style measures were associated with HPS Change scores. 
In relation to the cognitive style components produced in the previous study, scores 
on the negative cognitive style component were positively associated with Time 2 HPS, as 
well as with scores on the ISS subscales (A, D and PC), although a negative correlation 
was noted with scores on the ISS Well Being measure. Scores on the positive style 
component were positively associated with HPS and ISS Well Being, but negatively with 
ISS Depression scores. 
A series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to assess 
which of the cognitive style measures taken at Time 1 explained the most variance in 
scores on the Time 2 symptom and vulnerability measures. To control for possible effects 
of baseline symptoms, those subscales of the Internal States Scale which significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable were entered into the first block of the regression 
equation. The cognitive style measures which were significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable were entered into the second step of the regression using stepwise 
regression (see Table 2.2.3 below). 
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Table 2.2.3. Results of the regression analyses investigating the associations between the 
Time 1 cognitive style measures and the Time 2 symptom and life event measures 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Step  β SE β Total R² ∆R² 
T2 HPS 1 T1 ISS A  .194*  .008   
  T1 ISS PC  .057  .009 .123  
 2 HIQ-H  .334***  .138 .258 .135*** 
 3 Neg Life Events  .252**  .027 .329 .072*** 
 4 RRS Reflection  .231**  .213 .377 .048** 
T2 ISS A 1 T1 ISS A  .277**  .106   
  T1 ISS PC -.010  .109 .104  
 2 RRS Depression  .219* 1.234 .145 .041* 
T2 ISS D 1 T1 ISS Activation  .095  .057   
  T1 ISS PC  .111  .052   
  T1 ISS WB -.092  .076 .126  
 2 Neg Life Events  .308***  .156 .202 .101*** 
 3 RRS Brooding  .184* 1.159 .256 .028* 
 4 RPA Emotion -.174* 1.361 .284 .028* 
T2 ISS PC 1 T1 ISS PC  .284**  .099   
  T1 ISS D -.024  .192 .112  
 2 Neg Life Events  .241**  .282 .168 .056** 
 3 RPA Emotion -.187* 2.496 .201 .033* 
T2 ISS WB 1 T1 ISS D -.082  .138   
  T1 ISS WB  .114  .106 .088  
 2 RRS Depression -.217*  .860 .119 .031* 
 3 RPA Emotion  .184* 2.040 .151 .032* 
HPS Change 1 Neg Life Events  .224*  .017 .050 .050* 
 
 
 Note. * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p < .001. T1 = Time 1 measure, T2 = Time 2 measure. HIQ-H = 
Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire – Hypomanic Appraisals Scale, HPS = Hypomanic 
Personality Scale, ISS = Internal States Scale (A = Activation, D = Depression, PC = Perceived 
Conflict, WB = Well-being), RPA = Responses to Positive Affect scale, RRS = Ruminative 
Responses Scale. 
 
 
Scores on the HIQ-H, Negative Life Events and RRS Reflective Rumination Scales 
were found to make significant positive contributions to variance in Time 2 HPS scores. 
Scores on the ISS Activation measure were associated with Time 1 Activation symptoms 
and scores on the Depression-focused Rumination subscale of the RRS. Whilst none of the 
baseline ISS subscales were associated with Time 2 ISS-Depression, Negative Life Events 
and Brooding made significant positive contributions to ISS-D variance at Time 2, in 
addition to a lack of RPA Emotion focused positive rumination. Time 2 ISS Perceived 
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Conflict scores were associated with Time 1 PC scores, in addition to positive associations 
between Time 2 PC and the experience of Negative Life Events and a lack of Emotion-
focused positive rumination (RPA-E). Depression focused negative rumination and 
Emotion-focused positive rumination were negatively and positively associated with Time 
2 ISS Well-being scores respectively. Interestingly, only scores on the Negative Life 
Events measure made a significant positive contribution to variance in HPS Change scores.  
To investigate the proportion of variance in the Time 2 symptom measures 
explained by the cognitive style components and life event measures, a series of regression 
analyses were conducted. To control for any effect of baseline symptoms, those subscales 
on the Time 1 ISS which were correlated with the dependent variable were entered into the 
first block of the regression equation. The cognitive style components and life event 
measures which were significantly correlated with the dependent variable were entered 
into the second block (see Table 2.2.4 below). 
 
 
Table 2.2.4 Regression analyses investigating the associations between the Time 1 
cognitive style components and scores on the life events measure with scores on the Time 
2 symptom and vulnerability measures 
 Time 2 Measures 
Time 1 HPS ISS A ISS D ISS PC ISS WB HPS 
Measures Standardised B    Change 
Step 1       
ISS A .197* .293**     
ISS D   .174 .011 -.036  
ISS PC .001 -.030 .063 .227*   
ISS WB     .024  
Step 2       
Negative PCA .190* .165 .147 .098 -.253*  
Positive PCA .363**    .205*  
Negative Life  
Events 
.269** .134 .317*** .237** -.128 .224* 
Step 1R² .123*** .104** .126*** .112** .088 .050 
Step 2 ∆R² .210*** .045* .118*** .063* .084  
df (5, 121) (4, 122) (4, 122)  (4, 122) (5, 121) (1, 125) 
F 12.09*** 5.33** 10.61*** 6.49*** 5.04*** 6.57* 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, ISS = Internal 
States Scale (A = Activation, D = Depression, WB = Well-being, PC = Perceived Conflict), 
PCA = Principal Components Analysis Component 
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Current manic symptoms (ISS A), negative life events, and scores on the negative 
and positive cognitive style components were all significant contributors to variance in 
Time 2 HPS scores, whilst only baseline scores on the ISS A at contributed to variance in 
Time 2 ISS A scores. In relation to current depressive symptoms, only the reporting of 
negative life events made a significant contribution to variance in ISS D scores. Scores on 
the negative life events measure also made a significant positive contribution to variance in 
ISS Perceived Conflict scores at Time 2, in addition to baseline ISS PC scores. For Time 2 
ISS Well-being, scores on the negative cognitive style component made a significant 
negative contribution to variance in Time 2 ISS WB, whilst the positive cognitive style 
component made a significant positive contribution. None of the cognitive style 
components made any contribution to HPS Change scores, only the reporting of negative 
life events explained variance in the change of HPS scores from Time 1 to Time 2. 
 
2.2.5 Discussion 
Previous research has implicated the engagement in positive and negative cognitive 
thought processes in the vulnerability to affective disorders, in the maintenance of positive 
and negative emotional states, and in the development of bipolar symptoms (Johnson et al., 
2008b). Whilst a previous study had suggested that similar affect regulatory processes may 
underlie commonly used measures of positive and negative forms of rumination and self-
appraisal, it was unclear which of these processes were associated with prospective 
symptoms (Dempsey et al., 2011). The current study investigated the prospective 
associations between positive and negative forms of cognitive styles with the self-reported 
severity of bipolar mood symptoms and vulnerability at a six month follow-up. 
 Prospective hypomanic and depressive symptoms were associated with negative 
life events appraisals, with negative forms of rumination (brooding and depression-related 
rumination) and with a lack of emotion-focused positive rumination. These results were 
broadly in line with our predictions, except that neither the individual positive cognitive 
style measures nor the positive component from Time 1 were associated with prospective 
hypomanic symptoms. Although, it was noted that the positive PCA component and 
emotion-focused positive rumination measures were associated with higher scores on the 
ISS Well-Being measure at Time 2, consistent with the notion that positively focused 
cognitive styles can be associated with increased and healthy levels of positive affect. 
Hypomania vulnerability scores at Time 2 were positively associated with 
tendencies to make positive self-appraisals, more negative appraisals of life events and 
with reflective forms of rumination, although only appraisals of negative life events 
measure made a significant contribution to increases in hypomania vulnerability from 
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Time 1 to Time 2. The associations between the Time 1 measures and Time 2 scores on the 
hypomania vulnerability measure are similar to the cross-sectional associations reported in 
Study One, where HPS scores were associated with positive self-appraisals, reflective 
rumination and self-focused positive rumination. The absence of significant correlations 
between positive life events appraisals and prospective symptoms may be due to the life 
events scale not accounting for the experience of goal-attainment events, which may have 
explained greater proportions in variance of prospective hypomanic symptoms. 
Contrary to predictions, the positive cognitive style measures were not associated 
with prospective scores on the hypomania vulnerability or symptom measures. Although, 
emotion and self-focused positive rumination were found to be associated with increased 
well-being, and were negatively correlated with depressive symptoms and perceived 
conflict, positive rumination was not associated with prospective hypo/manic symptoms. 
However, in contrast, Time 1 scores on the hypomanic symptoms measure were positively 
associated with prospective hypomanic symptoms. Prospective subclinical hypomanic 
symptoms were associated with the brooding, reflection and depression-focused 
components of negative rumination, as well as with the reporting of negative life events. 
Whilst it has been suggested that manic symptoms may be associated with 
ruminative responses to positive mood states (Johnson, 2005b; Feldman et al., 2008), the 
findings suggest that prospective hypo/manic and depressive symptoms are associated with 
negative cognitive styles, in contrast to research reporting cross-sectional associations 
between positive rumination and hypomanic symptoms (Dempsey et al., 2011; Feldman et 
al., 2008). Although, a lack of positive rumination was associated with prospective 
depressive symptoms in the current study, in accord with previous cross-sectional 
observations (Feldman et al., 2008), and a lack of negative rumination was associated with 
greater well-being. Positive rumination may only contribute to short-term increases in 
manic symptoms and positive mood states, and may be more effortful to enact than 
negative ruminative cognitive styles, particularly in at-risk and clinical samples. 
Alternatively, the lack of associations between positive rumination with hypo/manic 
symptoms may be due to the non-clinical nature of the sample, who may be less likely to 
engage in positive rumination or to respond as intensely to recent positive and goal-
attainment events compared to bipolar samples. However, there was a trend for lower HPS 
scores to be reported by those participants who completed the follow-up measures. The 
lack of associations between the positive cognitive style measures with prospective 
symptoms may be in part due to the attrition of participants who report elevated hypomanic 
personality traits who may be more likely to engage in positive ruminative thought 
processes, and experience more intense mood symptoms, than low HPS scorers. 
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In relation to the appraisals of life events, only negative life event appraisals were 
associated with increased bipolar symptoms and increased hypomania vulnerability at 
follow-up, no associations were observed with the appraisals of positive life events. Whilst 
the simplistic rating scale measure of life event appraisals used in the current study may 
not have adequately measured the qualitative experience of positive life events; it may be 
that the appraisal of negative life events has a more enduring and powerful effect upon 
prospective bipolar symptoms in at-risk individuals. The appraisal of the experience of 
negative life events may prompt attempts to comprehend the reasons for the event‟s 
occurrence, through negative rumination, which could unintentionally result in prolonged 
depressive states in ruminating individuals. Alternatively, at-risk individuals for 
hypomania and bipolar disorder may be more likely to engage in initial ruminative 
attempts to understand the causation of negative experiences followed by attempts to avoid 
negative feelings associated with rumination through pleasant distraction or the 
engagement in risky activities, which may lead to subsequent ascents in mood and 
increased subclinical manic symptoms. In comparison, the experience of positive life 
events may only have a small impact upon mood symptoms within non-clinical individuals 
There are a number of limitations to consider with the study. A major limitation of 
is that the rating scale of life events may not have accounted for the influence of events 
relating to goal-attainment, which may have explained prospective hypomanic symptoms. 
Although appraisals of negative life events made a significant contribution to variance in 
HPS change scores, negative life event appraisals only explained a small proportion of 
variance. Greater proportions of variance may be explained through the use of a more 
sensitive measure of negative life events, which may more accurately measure schema-
activating life events relating to failures for example. Future studies may consider using 
validated measures such as the Life Events Scale for Students, a measure of the experience 
of events likely to be encountered by student participants (Clements & Turpin, 1996), or 
using a more qualitative measure of life events to assess the extent to which life events 
associated with goals or negative dysfunctional attitudes contribute to prospective 
symptom exacerbation. There may also have been confounds between the appraisal-based 
nature of the ERS with scores on the ISS mood measures, whereby higher ratings for the 
experience of life events on the ERS may have simply reflected the current experience of 
intense mood symptoms given the correlations reported between the ERS scales and ISS 
measure. In light of these limitations, future research should consider using validated 
assessments of life events and event appraisals rather than the ERS, such as the Appraisals 
of Life Events scale (Ferguson et al., 1999). The current study also only included a 
measure of transient bipolar symptoms (the “Internal States Scale”), which measures the 
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experience of symptoms over the past 24 hours, which may not have adequately assessed 
more enduring mood symptoms associated with bipolar disorder.  
It was also noted that only a third of participants from Study One completed the 
follow-up study. Those participants who completed Time 2 reported lower scores on the 
ISS Well-Being scale and were older than the non-completing participants, and there was a 
trend for lower HPS scores reported at Time 2 compared to Time 1. These results suggest 
that there may have been an attrition of higher HPS scorers at the six month follow-up, 
which may provide a partial explanation for the lack of associations between positive 
rumination and prospective mood symptoms given that high HPS scorers are more likely to 
engage in positive ruminative thought processes (Feldman et al., 2008). The low-
completion rate for the follow-up may have been influenced by the internet-based nature of 
the study, which relied upon participants having regular email access in order to complete 
the Time 2 measures. Also, as data collection for the current study was conducted during 
the spring semester (March to July), student participants may have been too preoccupied 
with university coursework deadlines and examinations to participate in the study. As was 
the case in Study One, which sampled the same participants as Study Two, the sample was 
largely female and it is unclear whether the participants had previously experienced some 
form of mental illness. Future studies should attempt to recruit more equal numbers of 
males and females to avoid potential gender biases in findings, and also consider including 
measures to screen out participants with histories of mental health problems. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusions  
The current study has suggested that negative cognitive response styles are associated with 
heightened prospective mood symptoms. Whilst positive rumination appeared to be 
associated with greater self-reported well-being at follow-up and less severe depressive 
symptoms, no associations were noted between positive rumination and manic 
symptomatology contrary to predictions and previous observations. More negative life 
event appraisals were associated with the increased vulnerability to hypomania and were 
positively associated with prospective bipolar symptoms. Whilst the study may be limited 
by a high rate of attrition and the use of a student sample, it would appear that the 
experience and appraisal of negative life events may impact the experience of future 
subclinical mood symptoms, although the precise mechanism underlying these associations 
is unclear. Although caution is advised in the interpretation of these findings, there is a 
clear need for more research investigating how positive and negative cognitive styles 
contribute to the vulnerability to affective disorders and the experience of bipolar 
symptoms over time. 
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3.1.1 Abstract 
The assessment of solution generation processes during psychosocial problem-solving has 
typically been assessed by the Means-End Problem-Solving Task (MEPS: Platt & Spivack, 
1975), although there are concerns that some of the MEPS items are outdated and 
unsuitable for use with non-clinical student samples. The current study describes the 
development of the University Means-End Problem Solving task (UMEPS), an adapted 
version of the MEPS featuring problematic situations suitable for use with British student 
samples. Eighty British students rated a series of problematic situations for their realism, 
described the steps they would take to resolve each situation, and rated the effectiveness of 
their solutions. Participants also completed self-report measures of depression and the use 
of resourcefulness behaviours during problem-solving. The severity of current depressive 
symptoms was associated with reduced resourcefulness, and with the generation of fewer 
effective and less specifically detailed solutions. Observer-made ratings of solution 
efficacy were positively associated with the generation of relevant solutions and with 
greater resourcefulness. The generation of fewer relevant solutions also predicted the 
increased severity of depressive symptoms, and also distinguished group membership 
between students experiencing high and low levels of subclinical depressive symptoms. 
Although further validation is required, the UMEPS appears to be a promising measure of 
problem-solving. 
 
3.1.2 Introduction 
Deficits in psychosocial problem-solving capabilities are prevalent in a variety of mental 
health conditions, including major depressive disorder (Garland et al., 2000), bipolar 
disorder (Scott et al., 2000), and suicidality (Pollock & Williams, 2004). Deficits in 
problem solving also appear to be a cognitive vulnerability factor for depression (Nezu, 
1987), in addition to the overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories (Gibbs & Rude, 
2004), and ruminative responses to depressed mood states (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  
 The ability to effectively resolve problems appears to be an important factor in 
maintaining positive well-being. Many cognitive-behavioural therapies for depression and 
other psychiatric disorders incorporate some form of problem-solving skills training (Nezu 
& Perri, 1989; Lam et al., 2000; Malouff, Thorsteinsson & Schutte, 2007). Meta-analyses 
of problem solving therapy (PST), a cognitive-behavioural intervention specifically 
designed to promote problem-solving capabilities in patient populations, have indicated 
that PST is effective in treating both mental and physical health complaints (Malouff et al., 
2007), particularly in reducing the severity of depressive symptoms (Bell & D'Zurilla, 
2009). These meta-analyses indicate that training in problem-solving appears to be 
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fundamental to promoting an individual‟s wellbeing, as well as in reducing the risk of 
future relapse, and suggests problem-solving is modifiable through psychological therapy. 
Investigations into problem-solving effectiveness have typically used the Means-
End Problem Solving (MEPS) task (Platt & Spivack, 1975) as an assessment of individual 
differences in solution generation, across both clinical and non-clinical samples (Platt & 
Spivack, 1975; Kao, Dristchel & Astell, 2006; Williams et al., 2006; Tzemou & 
Birchwood, 2007). The MEPS consists of a series of hypothetical problematic situations 
and requires participants to describe the steps, or “means”, that they would take in order to 
resolve the described problem, usually according to a final outcome provided by the 
researcher. Performance on the MEPS can be assessed in a variety of ways, including 
measuring the number of effective steps the participant has described in order to resolve 
the problem, as well as observer-made ratings of the effectiveness and the level of 
specificity described in the solution (Platt & Spivack, 1975; Marx et al., 1992). 
Previous research has indicated that individuals diagnosed with major depressive 
disorder generate less effective solutions on the MEPS compared to anxious individuals 
and non-clinical controls (Marx et al., 1992). Less effective problem-solving on the MEPS 
has also been associated with increased depressive symptom severities in individuals who 
have recently attempted suicide (Sidley et al., 1997). Interestingly, performance on the 
MEPS in clinically depressed samples appears to remain stable over time. No significant 
changes in the number of relevant solutions and observer-rated effectiveness ratings on 
MEPS were noted in a sample of depressed individuals at a six month follow-up, despite 
improvements in problem-solving confidence appraisals and improved depressive 
symptom severities (Garland et al., 2000). The lack of changes in performance on the 
MEPS suggests that solution generation may reflect a more trait-based process, whilst self-
perceptions of problem-solving abilities reflect more transient, state-based processes 
relating to the experience of current depressive symptoms. Although, one study conducted 
within a non-clinical student sample noted that appraisals of low problem-solving 
confidence are associated with increased depressive symptoms at a six month follow-up, 
and also that appraisals of low problem-solving confidence can in themselves be a 
symptom of depression (Dixon, Heppner, Burnett, Anderson & Wood, 1993). The use of 
self-report questionnaire measures of problem-solving may be limited to assessing an 
individual‟s appraisal of their own problem-solving ability, and may not measure the 
solution generation process when individuals are faced with psychosocial problems. In 
relation to this, there is a currently a lack of a measure of means-end problem solving 
which is specifically suited for investigating problem-solving in student samples. The 
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purpose of the current study was to develop and validate a measure of means-end problem-
solving suited for use with student samples. 
There has been one previous attempt to develop a student version of the means-end 
task featuring problematic situations of relevance to student samples (the “College Means-
End Problem Solving” procedure, CMEPS; Blankstein, Flett & Johnston, 1992). The 
CMEPS featured problematic situations generated by a large sample of Canadian 
university students, including problems of an interpersonal nature (e.g., arguments with 
roommates or boy/girlfriends), an intrapersonal nature (e.g., losing essay materials), or an 
emotional nature (e.g., experiences of depressed feelings). The final set of eighteen 
CMEPS items were subsequently administered to a depressed group and a non-depressed 
group of students in order to investigate whether depressed students would report less 
effective problem-solving than their non-depressed peers. However, Blankstein and 
colleagues (1992) failed to observe significant differences in problem solving skills 
between the two groups according to performances on the CMEPS task, but did observe 
that the depressed group made more pessimistic appraisals of their own performances on 
the problem solving task (Blankstein et al., 1992). Despite attempting to devise the 
CMEPS as a valid measure of the problematic scenarios faced by university students, the 
CMEPS failed to differentiate between students currently reporting high and low levels of 
depressive symptoms in terms of their generation of solutions to hypothetical problems.  
Unsurprisingly, subsequent studies have continued to use and adapt items from the 
original Means-End problem solving item set when investigating problem solving in 
student samples (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). Previous studies have also had 
to omit inappropriate items such as “killing a former SS trooper”, “stealing a diamond”, 
and “getting revenge”, from the original MEPS item set when assessing problem-solving in 
student samples (Nezu & Ronan, 1988; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). At 
present, there is an absence of a means-end problem solving task designed for specific 
usage with samples of university students which is sufficiently sensitive to differentiate 
individual differences in solution generation during problem-solving between students 
currently experiencing high and low severities of depressed moods.  
The primary aim of the current study was to develop and validate a version of the 
means-end problem solving task which incorporates descriptions of problematic situations 
which are suitable for use with British student samples (The University Means-End 
Problem Solving task, “UMEPS”). The development of a measure of problem-solving for 
specific use with student samples would assist in the exploration of the cognitive 
vulnerability to psychopathological disorders, by featuring problematic situations that may 
be encountered in the student environment. The UMEPS was designed to incorporate 
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situations that British students are likely to face, particularly given recent changes to 
university education in the United Kingdom, such as the introduction and rise in tuition fee 
costs, the increased financial pressures on students relating to the student loan system and 
graduate debt, and the increased competition for graduate jobs. 
 Self-report measures of depressive symptoms and resourcefulness problem-solving 
behaviours, as measured by the Problem Solving Scale (Centre for Cognitive Therapy, 
1988), were included to assess the validity the UMEPS task as a measure of problem-
solving. It was hypothesised that greater resourcefulness would be associated with more 
effective performance on the UMEPS, in terms of the number of solution means generated 
for each problematic situation, and the effectiveness and specificity of these solutions. It 
was hypothesised that effective problem solving on the UMEPS would be negatively 
correlated with the severity of current depressive symptoms, as measured by the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies‟ Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff, 1977), in line with previous 
observations (Marx et al., 1992; Goddard et al., 1996; Raes et al., 2005). In contrast to the 
student means-end problem-solving task developed by Blankstein and colleagues (1992), it 
was anticipated that more effective problem-solving, as measured by the UMEPS task, 
would differentiate between students reporting high versus low severities of depressive 
symptoms. 
 
3.1.3 Method 
Participants 
A total of 81 students (Mean age = 21.01 years, S.D = 4.90; 74 females, 7 males) from the 
University of Manchester took part in the study in exchange for course credit or voluntarily 
took part for no incentive (67 participants received course credits, 14 participated for no 
incentive).  
  
Materials 
The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D: Radloff, 1977) 
The CES-D scale is a measure of depressive symptoms which has been used in a variety of 
clinical samples (Knubben et al., 2007; Calam, Jones, Sanders, Dempsey & Sadhnani, 
submitted), and non-clinical student samples (Radloff 1977, 1991; Johnson et al., 2008a), 
including samples of British students (Jones & Day, 2008; Dempsey et al., 2011). The 
CES-D is a 20-item self-report scale which describes a variety of depressive symptoms 
(e.g., “I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends”; 
“I thought my life had been a failure”). Each of these symptoms is rated for their 
occurrence in the previous week on a scale from 0 (“Rarely”) to 3 (“Most of the time”). A 
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score of 16 and above on the CES-D has been suggested to be indicative of clinical levels 
of depression (Radloff, 1991). The CES-D has demonstrated good internal validity in 
student samples (Cronbach‟s α = .79-.91; Radloff, 1991; Dempsey et al., 2011). 
 
The Problem Solving Scale (PSS: Center for Cognitive Therapy, 1988) 
The PSS is a 15-item self-report measure derived from the Self Control Schedule 
(Rosenbaum, 1980), which in turn is a 36-item measure of the tendency to use self-control 
strategies in the attempt to overcome problematic situations, with high scores indicating 
effective self-management skills. Fifteen items from the Self Control Schedule were used 
to construct the PSS as a measure of problem-solving capabilities as a component of 
learned resourcefulness (Moorey, Hughes, Knynenberg & Michael, 2000). Each item on 
the PSS describes a self-control behaviour which individuals may apply when 
encountering a behavioural problem (e.g., "When I find that I have difficulties in 
concentrating on my reading, I look for ways to increase my concentration”; “Facing the 
need to make a decision I usually find out all the possible alternatives instead of deciding 
quickly and spontaneously”). Participants rate how characteristic of themselves each 
behaviour is on a six-point scale, ranging from +3 (“Very characteristic of me”) to -3 
(“Very uncharacteristic of me”), with a total score produced by summing responses across 
all items (total scores range from -45 to +45). Higher total scores on the PSS reflect more 
effective problem-solving capabilities, greater self-reliance, and higher levels of learned 
resourcefulness. Lower scores on the PSS are predictive of poorer illness outcomes in 
clinically depressed patients (Scott, Harrington, House & Ferrier, 1996), and are predictive 
of poorer outcomes following cognitive-behavioural therapy in clinically depressed 
patients (Moorey, Holting, Hughes, Knynenberg & Michael, 2001). Higher scores on the 
PSS have also been associated with greater autonomy, as measured by the Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, and with reduced severities of depressive symptoms (Scott et al., 1996). 
The PSS has demonstrated adequate internal validity (Cronbach‟s α = 0.81; Moorey et al., 
2000). 
 
The University Means-End Problem Solving Task (UMEPS) 
A set of 22 problematic situations tailored for British students were devised by the first 
author (R.D.) from reviewing newspaper articles produced for the student community in 
Greater Manchester, and based upon the item descriptions included in the college student 
version of the means-end problem solving task (Blankstein et al., 1992). These items 
included situations describing student worries regarding future graduate careers, worries 
over repaying debts accrued from student loans and worries regarding ongoing financial 
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issues, as well as descriptions of more generic educational experiences, such as, 
interpersonal problems resulting from collaborative group work for degree courses. Each 
situation consisted of a single paragraph describing the problematic scenario. An example 
item is presented below (see Appendix for a full list of the UMEPS items). 
 
Problem: Worry about how to pay back student loan 
 
Like many students you took out a student loan to help pay your tuition fees, rent and 
living costs. You have just checked your bank and student loan statements and realise that 
your overall debt is much larger than what you anticipated. You are also concerned that 
you don‟t have a job lined up for when you graduate. As you look at your statements you 
wonder how you will repay your debts. We end the story with you overcoming your 
worries regarding the repayment of your debt. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via advertisements displayed on an online research volunteering 
website hosted by the University of Manchester. These advertisements directed 
participants to an electronic version of the participant information sheet and consent form. 
Following informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. 
Due to the large number of problematic situations generated for the UMEPS, which 
totalled 22 situations, each group presented participants with seven UMEPS situations. In 
addition, the results of an early pilot study produced weaker realism ratings for Item 8 
(“Stranded after a night out”). Following the pilot study, Item 8 was rewritten and 
presented in each group of the current study so that each of the three groups of participants 
was presented with 8 problematic situations from the UMEPS.  
For each UMEPS item, participants read a description of a problematic situation, 
and were then asked to provide a rating for how realistic that situation was from their 
experience of university education (on a five point scale from “Very Unrealistic” to “Very 
Realistic”). Participants were also asked to describe the solution that they would use to 
overcome that problem, state the outcome of using that solution, and provide a rating of the 
likelihood of their stated solution solving that particular problem (on a five-point scale 
from “Very Unlikely” to “Very Likely”). This procedure was then repeated for each of the 
UMEPS items. Participants were then presented with electronic versions of the PSS and 
CES-D scales, and an optional open-ended feedback form regarding the appropriateness of 
the UMEPS problems in relation to their experiences at university. The study was 
conducted in accordance with ethical guidelines following institutional ethical approval 
from the University of Manchester. 
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Data Analysis 
A number of performance indices for the UMEPS were calculated to assess the 
effectiveness of the participant‟s problem solving skills. Responses on the problem solving 
task were first coded by the first author (R.D.). An independent rater received training 
using the UMEPS coding manual (available from the corresponding author), and 
conducted an inter-rater reliability check by coding a random sample of 25% of the 
responses on the problem solving task. 
First, each response on the problem solving task was coded for the number of 
relevant solution means or steps described for each problem. This is a count of the number 
of steps described in the solution, with each mean or step referring to a potentially effective 
step that assists in achieving the desired outcome (Bray, Barrowclough & Lobban, 2007). 
A count of irrelevant solution means, where the participant describes a solution mean 
which has no relevance to the problem, was also made. Example irrelevant solution steps 
included references to panicking or “becoming depressed” when encountering a problem. 
Each solution was also rated for its effectiveness, based upon the coding scheme for 
means-end problem solving tasks used in previous studies (Marx et al., 1992; Scott et al., 
2000). In the current study observers rated the efficacy of solutions according to a five 
point scale (from “Very effective” to “Very ineffective”). The solution was rated as “very 
effective” if it presented a clear focus on solving the problem, described a number of 
solution steps and had a very high likelihood of resolving the problem (Bray et al., 2007). 
A rating of “very ineffective” was allocated to solutions which failed to attempt to resolve 
the stated problem, or had high probabilities of exacerbating the problem or creating new 
problems. Each solution was also coded for specificity, in terms of the level of detail 
described in each solution, based upon the coding scheme used by Bray et al. (2007). Each 
solution was rated for specificity on a five point scale, with a rating of 5 (“Very specific”) 
being allocated to solutions which provided very clear and detailed solutions with 
additional detail regarding the solution steps whilst containing no ambiguous information. 
A rating of 1 (“Very unspecific”) was given to solutions which were vague and described 
solutions in minimal detail. 
 Bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to investigate the associations 
between depressive symptoms and problem-solving performance on the UMEPS task, with 
those significant associations tested with regression analysis whilst controlling for scores 
on the Problem Solving Scale (PSS) and age and gender ratios where necessary. A logistic 
regression analysis was conducted in order to establish whether the UMEPS task is able to 
differentiate between students currently reporting low and high severities of current 
depressive symptoms, and allow comparisons with the CMEPS task which had previously 
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failed to differentiate between students reporting low and high severities of depression in 
terms of problem-solving effectiveness (Blankstein et al., 1992).    
 
3.1.4 Results  
One participant was removed from the dataset prior to data analysis after failing to make a 
response on more than half of the UMEPS items. Statistical analyses were conducted on 
the remaining 80 participants. Scores on the UMEPS problem solving task and the self-
report questionnaire measures (PSS, CES-D) were checked for normality using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and from review of histograms. The relevant solution means 
data was transformed using a square root transformation to correct for mild positive skew. 
Analyses of variance were also conducted to investigate whether there were differences 
between the study groups in terms of the performance on the UMEPS task. No significant 
differences were noted across groups for the relevant solution means (F(2, 77) = 1.319, p = 
.273), irrelevant solution means (F(2, 77) = .467, p = .629), solution specificity (F(2, 77) = 
1.406 , p = .251), or for either observer-made (F(2, 77) = .992, p = .376) or participant-made 
solution effectiveness ratings (F(2, 77) = 2.213, p = .127), indicating that the three study 
groups were presented with items from the UMEPS task that were equivalent in their 
difficulty and scores on the UMEPS task.  
Means and standard deviations for scores on the CES-D and PSS scales, and for the 
performance indices on the UMEPS task, are presented in Table 3.1.1 below. Cohen‟s 
Kappa values are presented in Table 3.1.1 for the categorical measures on the UMEPS task 
(Observer-rated solution efficacy and solution specificity data), whilst Intraclass 
correlation coefficients are presented for the continuous measures (the relevant and 
irrelevant solution means data).   
 As shown in Table 3.1.1, below, whilst the mean CES-D scores in the current study 
(M = 14.66, scores ranged from 0 to 49) were below Radloff‟s (1991) recommended cut-
off that scores above 16 on the CES-D are indicative of clinical depression, a large 
proportion of the sample reported CES-D scores greater than 16 (33 participants, 41% of 
the sample). Mean CES-D scores were also similar to those reported in a previous study 
(Jones & Day, 2008). Mean scores on the Problem Solving Scale (PSS; mean = 11.85) 
were greater than those reported in a sample of patients referred for cognitive therapy 
(Moorey et al., 2000, Mean = 4.89, S.D. = 15.95), indicating that the current primarily 
student sample possessed more effective resourcefulness behaviours. The mean numbers of 
relevant and irrelevant solutions generated on the UMEPS problem-solving task, as well as 
the mean effectiveness ratings, were also consistent with mean scores reported on a means-
end problem solving task in a previous study (Blankstein et al., 1992). 
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Table 3.1.1 Means, standard deviations, internal validity (Cronbach‟s alpha) and inter-rater 
reliability (Cohen‟s κ) statistics for scores on the self-report measures and performance 
indices on the University Means-End Problem-Solving task (UMEPS). 
 
 Mean S.D. α 
Inter-rater 
reliability 
Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression scale (CES-D) 
14.66 9.44 .89  
Problem Solving Scale (PSS) 11.85 13.12 .77  
University Means-End Problem 
Solving Task (UMEPS) 
    
No. of Relevant Means   .80 .91
b
 
  - non-transformed scores 2.21 1.02   
  - transformed scores 1.47 .33   
No. of Irrelevant Means .84 1.04 .31 .87
 b
 
Solution Specificity 2.21 .70 .77 .86
a
 
Observer-rated solution efficacy 3.47 .44 .78 .78
a
 
Participant-rated solution efficacy 3.85 .49 .65  
 
Note: 
a
 = Cohen‟s Kappa, b = Intraclass Correlation Coefficient. 
 
 
Inter-rater Reliability 
High levels of agreement between the first rater (R.D.) and the second independent rater 
were noted for the UMEPS problem-solving performance measures (Cohen‟s Kappas 
ranged from .78-.86, Intraclass Correlation Coefficients ranged from .87-.91). In terms of 
reliabilities in scores for each of the problem-solving measures, good levels of reliabilities 
were noted for the relevant solution means, solution specificity and the effectiveness 
measures (Alphas ranged from .65-.80). A low alpha value was noted for the irrelevant 
means data (α = .31), which reflects the very low frequency of irrelevant means coded 
across the sample compared to relevant solution means (a total of 73 irrelevant means were 
coded compared to 1326 relevant means across the whole sample). Table 3.1.2, below, 
presents the realism ratings for the UMEPS items, these ratings are based upon the 
participant-made ratings on a scale of one (“Very Unrealistic”) to five (“Very Realistic”) 
for each problematic scenario. 
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Table 3.1.2. Realism ratings for the items from the University Means-End Problem-
Solving Task (UMEPS) (means and standard deviations) 
 
UMEPS Problem 
 Realism Rating 
M SD 
19. Worry over job hunting 4.63 .50 
5. Problems with course mates 4.58 .58 
15. Stress over deadlines 4.58 .65 
16. Exam revision 4.44 .71 
12. Worry about finances 4.34 .55 
18. Argument with housemates 4.28 .68 
11. Worry about how to pay back student loan 4.21 .98 
3. Trouble with job supervisor 4.21 .62 
13. Alcohol abuse 4.00 1.20 
2. Want to have a relationship 3.93 .70 
22. Losing self-confidence 3.92 .86 
1. Break up with boyfriend/girlfriend 3.88 1.15 
14. Social isolation 3.79 1.24 
21. Abdominal pain 3.72 .75 
20. Sleeping problems 3.63 .92 
6. Lost essay materials 3.62 1.05 
17. Excitement at start of new university year 3.58 .97 
7. Friend is avoiding you 3.54 .78 
10. Depressed feelings 3.45 1.18 
8. Stranded after a night out 3.27 1.05 
9. Poor relationship with parents 3.25 1.23 
4. Gambling 2.92 1.50 
Overall Mean Realism 3.90 0.90 
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Bivariate correlational analyses were next conducted to assess how performance on 
the remaining UMEPS items was associated with resourcefulness behaviours, as measured 
by the Problem Solving Scale, and with depressive symptoms, as measured by the CES-D 
scale (see Table 3.1.3 below). 
 
Table 3.1.3. Correlations between resourcefulness, depression and problem-solving. 
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CES-D -.238* -.252* -.170 -.096 .073 -.191* 
PSS  .246* -.052 .238* .058 .259* 
No. of Relevant 
Solution means 
  .156 .742** .014 .875** 
No. of Irrelevant 
Solution means 
  
 
 .097 .023 .163 
Solution efficacy 
(observer rated) 
  
 
 .259* .806** 
Solution efficacy 
(participant rated) 
  
 
  .173 
 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001. CES-D = Centre for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale. PSS = Problem Solving Scale 
 
 
As shown in Table 3.1.3, scores on the CES-D scale were negatively correlated 
with scores on the Problem Solving Scale (PSS), and also with the number of effective 
solution means generated on the UMEPS and the specificity of UMEPS solutions. The 
pattern of correlations supported the hypothesis that increased depressed mood is 
associated with poorer problem solving capabilities, whereby fewer relevant and less 
specific solution means are generated for problems. Scores on the Problem Solving Scale, 
a measure of resourcefulness behaviours, were positively associated with the generation of 
more relevant solution means, with more specifically detailed solutions, and with more 
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effective solutions as rated by an observer, supporting the prediction that resourcefulness 
behaviours would be associated with improved problem solving abilities as measured by 
the UMEPS. A moderate positive correlation was also observed between observer-made 
ratings and participant- made ratings of solution effectiveness. The specificity of the 
described solutions was strongly positively correlated with both the mean number of 
solution means described and with the observer-rated solution effectiveness. 
Significant bivariate correlations were also noted between participant ages and the 
mean number of relevant solutions generated on the UMEPS (r = .374, p < .001), the 
observer-rated effectiveness of solutions (r = .334, p < .001), and the specificity of 
solutions (r = .279, p < .001), indicating that the older participant ages were associated 
with more effective problem solving capabilities. No significant differences on the UMEPS 
performance measures or on the CES-D and PSS scales were found between male and 
female participants. 
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to investigate which of 
the measures from the problem solving task explained the largest quantity of variance in 
scores for the self-reported severity of current depressive symptoms on the CES-D scale. 
Participant ages and scores on the Problem Solving Scale were entered into the first block 
of the regression equation to control for potential effects upon depression scores. The 
number of relevant solution means (transformed scores), number of irrelevant solution 
means, specificity of solutions and effectiveness of solutions were entered as predictors 
into the second block. The magnitude of the some of the inter-predictor correlations and 
initial analyses confirmed the presence of multicolinearity between the predictor variables 
taken from the problem solving task, in relation to the relevant and irrelevant means, 
solution specificity and solution effectiveness measures (VIFs = 2.2 – 5.2, Tolerances = .20 
- .45). The presence of multicolinearity in the initial regression analyses may have been a 
result of the coding scheme used to score the responses on the problem solving task, where 
more effective and more specifically detailed solutions were also more likely to describe 
more individually relevant solution means. The regression analysis was repeated omitting 
the solution specificity and solution efficacy predictors from the second stage of the 
regression (see Table 3.1.4 below). 
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Table 3.1.4. Results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the prediction of 
depression scores from the mean number of solutions generated on the University Means-
End Problem-Solving Task (UMEPS). 
 
 R² change Standardized Beta t 
Step 1 .06   
Constant   3.54** 
Age  .03 .03 
Problem Solving Scale (PSS)  -.24 -2.15* 
Step 2 .11   
Constant   4.15** 
Age  .89 .76 
Problem Solving Scale (PSS)  -.19 -1.73 
Relevant Solution Means  -.25 -2.01* 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
 
The regression model was significant (F3, 76 = 3.045, p < 0.05), with the number of 
relevant means the only significant contributor to variance in CES-D scores when 
controlling for age and scores on the Problem Solving Scale (VIFs = 1.05-1.19, Tolerances 
= .84-.96). The regression model accounted for 17% of the total variance in CES-D scores. 
Separate regression analyses were also conducted to explore the contributions of solution 
specificities and effectiveness to variance in CES-D scores, whilst controlling for PSS 
scores and age. Neither analysis produced significant regression models. 
 Next, a binary logistic regression was conducted to determine whether the number 
of solution means generated on the UMEPS task could correctly classify membership of 
participants to groups of high or low depressed participants. Participants were first 
allocated to high or low depressed groups according to whether they scored within the top 
or bottom quartile of scores on the CES-D scale. Participant ages and scores on the PSS 
were entered into the first block of the regression, with the mean number of relevant 
solution means generated on the problem solving task entered into the second block. The 
groups were coded 1 for the high CES-D scorers and 0 for the low scoring group. The 
regression model was significant (χ2 = 9.977, d.f. = 3, p < .05) and correctly classified 70% 
of participants (12/19 High CES-D scorers, 17/22 low CES-D scorers). As shown in Table 
3.1.5 after controlling for effects of age and scores on the Problem Solving Scale, the 
number of relevant solution means generated on the UMEPS made a significant 
contribution to the regression model. The Exp. (β) statistic for the number of relevant 
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means indicates that as the number of relevant solution means generated on the UMEPS 
task increased, the odds of being classified in the high-depressed group decreased. 
 
Table 3.1.5. Results of the binary logistic regression for the prediction of depressed or non-
depressed group membership from the number of relevant solution means generated on the 
University Means-End Problem Solving Task (UMEPS) 
 
 β S.E. Wald Exp(β) p 
Block 0      
Constant -.19 .31 .38 .83 .83 
Block 1      
Age .02 .11 .51 .976 .82 
Problem Solving Scale (PSS) -.04 .03 1.92 .96 .17 
Block 2      
Relevant Means -4.01 1.86 4.65 .18 .03 
 
 
3.1.5 Discussion 
The current study described the development of a problem solving task for use with British 
students (the University Means-End Problem Solving task: UMEPS), and investigated how 
performance on this measure was associated with depressive symptomatology and 
resourcefulness behaviours in a sample of British students. Previously, means-end problem 
solving capabilities have been assessed using items from the original Means-End Problem 
Solving Procedure (MEPS) which was originally developed for use with clinical samples 
(Platt & Spivack, 1975). Because of this, subsequent studies have had to adapt items from 
the MEPS to assess problem solving capabilities in student samples (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). There has been a previous attempt to devise a university (college) 
student version of the MEPS by researchers in North America (Blankstein et al., 1992). 
However, this American version of the means-end problem solving procedure failed to 
distinguish between groups of depressed and non-depressed college students in relation to 
their problem-solving capabilities. 
The primary aim of the current study was to assess the validity of the problem 
solving situations devised for the UMEPS task in relation to the severity of self-reported 
depressive symptoms and resourcefulness behaviours in a sample of British studies. The 
severity of current depressive symptoms was associated with the generation of fewer 
effective solutions means on the UMEPS task, and also with the generation of less specific 
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and less detailed solution means, supporting previous observations between reduced 
problem solving efficacy and increased depressive symptom severities (Goddard et al., 
1996, 2001; Raes et al., 2005). Scores on the Problem Solving Scale (PSS: Centre for 
Cognitive Therapy, 1988), a self-report measure of learned resourcefulness behaviours 
associated with more effective problem-solving, were associated with the generation of a 
greater number of relevant solution means, the generation of more effective solutions as 
rated by an observer, more specifically detailed solutions, and with reduced severities of 
depressive symptoms. Mean PSS scores in the current study (mean = 11.85) were greater 
than those reported in a sample of patients referred for cognitive therapy (Moorey et al., 
2000, Mean = 4.89, S.D. = 15.95), indicating that the current sample possessed more 
effective resourcefulness behaviours.  
The generation of fewer relevant solution means on the UMEPS was also 
associated with the increased severity of depressive symptoms consistent with observations 
made in samples of depressed outpatients on the original MEPS task (Garland et al., 2000), 
although the correlation between relevant solutions and depression was weaker in the 
current study than reported by Garland and colleagues (2000). Also in contrast to previous 
studies conducted in clinical samples (Sidley et al., 1997), there was no correlation 
between solution effectiveness on the UMEPS and depression. The generation of relevant 
solutions on the UMEPS also predicted the membership of participants to high or low 
depressed groups in the regression analyses, in contrast to the student means-end problem 
solving task developed by Blankstein and colleagues (1992). Although Blankstein et al 
(1992) did note that depressed students made more pessimistic appraisals of their own 
problem-solving than individuals with low levels of depression. However, the current 
study has demonstrated that a means-end problem solving task targeted at university 
students can distinguish between individuals experiencing high and low levels of 
subclinical depression. 
Generally, items on the UMEPS were rated by participants as being realistic to their 
experiences of university education in the UK. The weaker realism ratings for some items 
may reflect that these items are not explicitly related to university experiences from a 
purely educational perspective, such as the “gambling” and the “stranded on a night out” 
situations. However, participant feedback regarding the UMEPS situations was generally 
positive, and many commented on the appropriateness of the problems in relation to the 
participant‟s own experiences at university (e.g., “I feel all the situations were very 
realistic of university life”, “I thought the problems were quite realistic and likely to 
happen at university”). Whilst not all of the UMEPS items were relevant to the 
participant‟s own experiences, a number of participants commented that they were aware 
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of other students who had experienced similar situations. For example, one participant 
commented: “The scenarios I was faced with (in the task) are very real and I found that 
I've been in most of them. Some were not characteristic of me, but I know of others who 
have found themselves in such situations”.  
There are a number of limitations to highlight with the current study. Whilst the 
sample in the current was largely female, consistent with the gender ratios of previous 
studies conducted at the same institution (e.g., Jones & Day, 2008; Dodd et al., 2010); no 
significant differences in scores on the CES-D, PSS or the UMEPS problem-solving 
measures were noted between male and female participants. The results of the study should 
be treated with caution in terms of its generalisability, as the largely female student sample 
is not fully representative of the wider general population. Whilst previous research has 
failed to find significant gender differences on the Means-End Problem-Solving task 
(Sidley et al., 1997), given that the UMEPS task is still a new measure, further research is 
required to assess whether gender differences may arise on the UMEPS and to assess the 
generalisability of the UMEPS items across genders. Also, there was no correction for 
multiple testing in the current study and there is a risk of Type 1 errors. In relation to 
opportunistic nature of the student sample recruited for the study, the associations between 
UMEPS performance and the severity of depressive symptoms may become more 
pronounced in more severely depressed groups. Whilst the participants were not screened 
for past histories of depression, a large proportion (41%) of the students sampled in this 
study reported CES-D scores greater than Radloff‟s (1991) recommended cut-off of 16 for 
clinically significant levels of current depressive symptoms. Future studies may consider 
screening out students for histories of depression or for current depressive symptoms by 
using clinical self-report measures or diagnostic interviews, and then comparing problem-
solving capabilities between individuals currently experiencing high and low levels of 
depressive symptoms. The association between depressive symptom severities and reduced 
problem solving capabilities may also be explained by a third variable, such as rumination 
or the overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories. Further research is required to 
assess whether this association between depression and poorer performance on the UMEPS 
could be explained by one of these factors. 
 Despite the reliance on a self-report measure of depression in the current study, the 
severity of current depressive symptoms were associated with poorer performances on the 
means-end problem solving task, specifically in the generation of fewer effective solution 
means. To provide a more stringent assessment of depression, future studies may also wish 
to consider incorporating a prospective design to investigate how performance on the 
UMEPS task is associated with the development of depressive symptoms over time, in 
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addition to other cognitive vulnerability factors, particularly as there remains a lack of 
clarity over the precise causal relationship between problem-solving and the development 
of depressive symptoms. 
 
 
3.1.6 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the UMEPS shows promise as a measure of problem-solving for use with 
British student samples and has been demonstrated to distinguish between individuals with 
high versus low levels of current depressive symptoms in relation to their capability to 
successfully resolve problems. However, further validation of the problematic situations 
described in the UMEPS is required, particularly across student samples located in 
different universities across the UK. There is the potential for future studies to continue to 
develop and adapt the UMEPS items for specific research aims and hypotheses, aside from 
the aims described in the current study. 
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3.2.1 Abstract 
Appraisals of defeat and entrapment have been implicated in depression and suicidality. 
Whilst previous research has reported that depressed and suicidal individuals have deficits 
in problem-solving, no study has specifically investigated whether perceptions of defeat 
and entrapment are associated with ineffective problem-solving as measured by a process-
focused problem-solving task. The current study investigated means-end problem-solving 
in relation to defeat and entrapment within an analogue student population. 146 
participants completed self-report measures of depression, hopelessness, defeat and 
entrapment, and generated solutions to a series of problematic situations on a means-end 
problem-solving task designed for usage with British students. Depression was correlated 
with the generation of irrelevant solutions to problems and with pessimistic appraisals of 
solution efficacy. However, mediation analyses indicated that defeat and entrapment 
appear to possess differential associations with problem-solving. Entrapment fully 
mediated the relationship between depression and the generation of irrelevant solutions to 
problems, whilst defeat mediated the relationship between depression and appraisals of 
solution efficacy. The current research supports the notion that defeat and entrapment 
represent two different processes, rather than a single construct representing perceptions of 
failure without available means of escape, and suggests potential clinical avenues for 
promoting effective problem-solving behaviours. 
 
3.2.2 Introduction 
Theoretical frameworks of suicide have implicated appraisals of being defeated and 
entrapped by current circumstances as being associated with increased depression 
severities and suicidality (Johnson, Gooding & Tarrier, 2008c; Taylor et al., 2010a; Taylor, 
Wood, Gooding & Tarrier, 2010b). Defeat refers to negative self-perceptions relating to 
low social rank and failed struggles, whilst entrapment refers to feelings of being trapped 
by internal and external events (Gilbert & Allan, 1998). Although a number of 
psychosocial factors have been associated with suicidality, including hopelessness, the 
availability of social support and the severity of depressive symptoms, appraisals of defeat 
and entrapment appear to confer a greater risk of suicidality than the aforementioned 
environmental and psychosocial factors (Taylor, Gooding, Wood & Tarrier, in press). 
Although the defeat and entrapment questionnaires were originally devised to 
measure separate constructs (Gilbert & Allan, 1998), it has recently been suggested that 
these scales may actually measure a unitary factor which encompasses perceptions of loss 
and failure without available means for escaping from the current situation (Johnson et al., 
2008c; Taylor et al., 2009). Within non-clinical student samples, this combined factor-
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analytically driven defeat and entrapment construct has been demonstrated to mediate the 
relationship between self-appraisals of social support and problem-solving capabilities 
with suicidality (Taylor et al., 2010b). Furthermore, research conducted in individuals 
diagnosed with schizophrenia spectrum disorders has observed that a combination of 
defeat and entrapment mediate the relationship between the severity of positive psychotic 
symptoms and suicidality, even when current depressive symptoms and feelings of 
hopelessness are accounted for (Taylor et al., 2010a). As such, feelings of defeat and 
entrapment are considered to confer a risk of suicide in vulnerable individuals, rather than 
just the severity of depressive symptoms or feelings of hopelessness. 
One avenue of research which has not been fully explored in relation to defeat and 
entrapment is the role of psychosocial problem-solving. The ability to effectively 
overcome and resolve psychosocial problems may assist in reducing perceptions of defeat 
and entrapment by providing individuals with a viable mechanism for escape from their 
current situation. The reduced effectiveness of problem-solving has previously been 
observed in a range of clinical and non-clinical samples, ranging from dysphoric students 
(Dempsey et al., submitted-a), samples of clinically depressed patients (Marx et al., 1992; 
Garland et al., 2000), and samples of suicidal individuals (Evans et al., 1992; Pollock & 
Williams, 2004). Whilst defeat and entrapment have been reported to mediate the role of 
appraisals of social support and problem solving upon suicidality in a non-clinical student 
population (Taylor et al., 2010b), no published research has assessed the association 
between problem-solving capabilities using a more objective process-focused measure of 
problem-solving in relation to defeat and entrapment. Although numerous self-report 
questionnaire measures of problem-solving capabilities are available, such measures are 
limited to assessing an individual‟s appraisals of their own problem-solving capabilities 
and not of their ability to generate effective solutions to problematic situations. 
The current study had two aims. The first aim was to investigate the association 
between appraisals of defeat and entrapment with the capability to effectively resolve 
psychosocial problems on a means-end measure of problem-solving. The second aim of the 
study was to further validate a measure of means-end problem solving designed for use 
with British student samples (the UMEPS task). The original Means-End Problem-Solving 
Task was devised in the 1970s for use with patient samples (Platt & Spivack, 1975) and 
has since been used in numerous studies (e.g., Evans et al., 1992; Garland et al., 2000; 
Marx et al., 1992). However, there are fears that some of the original MEPS items are not 
suitable for use with student samples. Indeed, previous studies have had to adapt items 
from the MEPS when assessing means-end problem-solving in non-clinical samples and 
have omitted items such as “stealing a diamond”, “killing a former SS trooper”, and 
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“getting revenge” from the original MEPS item set (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1995; Nezu & Ronan, 1988). There has also been one previous attempt to devise a student 
version of the MEPS in North America (The “College MEPS”, CMEPS; Blankstein et al., 
1992). However, this task failed to differentiate between groups of students reporting high 
and low levels of depressive symptoms in terms of their problem-solving capabilities, but 
the authors did report that depressed students were more pessimistic in their appraisals of 
their own performances on the CMEPS (Blankstein et al., 1992). In contrast to this, the 
UMEPS task has been demonstrated to differentiate between individuals currently 
reporting high and low severities of depressive symptoms in terms of their ability to 
generate relevant solution steps to psychosocial problems (Dempsey et al., submitted-a). 
In relation to the current study, it was anticipated that defeat and entrapment in 
general would be associated with poorer performances on the UMEPS task, in terms of the 
generation of fewer relevant solution means, more irrelevant solution steps and the 
generation of less effective and specifically detailed solutions. However, as defeat is 
considered to capture a perception of failure and low social rank, and entrapment is 
considered to capture appraisals of being trapped by current events and a desire to escape 
from these events (Gilbert & Allan, 1998), defeat and entrapment may be differentially 
associated with problem-solving. Defeat would appear to encapsulate a pessimistic 
appraisal of the individual‟s status and abilities, which may interfere with solution 
generation during problem-solving. Defeated individuals may perceive that their low social 
rank and failures mean that they are unlikely to ever effectively resolve the current 
situation thereby preventing the engagement in problem-solving behaviours. In contrast, 
entrapment refers more to an escape motivation and may reflect a more active, if ill-
advised, attempt to problem-solve out of a current problematic situation, and may be more 
associated with poor and ineffective problem-solving behaviours compared to defeat.  
The current study presented participants with a series of problematic scenarios from 
the UMEPS, and measured the associations with self-appraisals of defeat and entrapment, 
current depressive symptoms, and feelings of hopelessness which are similar in concept to 
the negative self-appraisals as captured by defeat and entrapment (Johnson et al., 2008; 
Taylor et al., 2010b). Due to some disagreement in the literature as to whether defeat and 
entrapment as measured by Gilbert and Allen‟s self-report measures represent separate 
factors (Gilbert & Allan, 1998), or a single construct (Taylor et al., 2009), performance on 
the problem-solving task was analysed with defeat and entrapment as both separate and 
combined constructs. 
 
 
 161 
3.2.3 Method 
Participants 
An opportunistic sample of 146 participants from the University of Manchester took part in 
the study (Mage = 20.79 years, S.D. = 4.87; 122 female, 24 male; 130 undergraduate 
students, 13 postgraduates, 3 not stated). 
 
Measures 
Defeat Scale 
The defeat scale is a 16 item self-report measure designed to assess self-perceptions of 
failed struggles and low social rank associated with depression (Gilbert & Allan, 1998). 
Respondents rate their experiences of defeat over the previous seven days using a five 
point scale (“Never” to “Always/All the time”), with higher scores reflecting greater 
feelings of defeat. Example items include: “I feel that I have lost my standing in the 
world”, and “I feel that I am one of life's losers”. The defeat scale has demonstrated high 
levels of internal consistency across both student (α = .83 - .85) and clinical samples (α = 
.86 - .94) (Gilbert & Allan, 1998; Taylor et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2010a; Taylor et al., 
2010b). 
 
Entrapment Scale 
This a 16 item questionnaire scale which assesses perceptions of feeling trapped by 
internal factors and external events, and the desire to escape such situations (Gilbert & 
Allan, 1998). Example items include: “I would like to escape from my thoughts and 
feelings” and “I feel trapped by other people”. Participants rate the extent to which they are 
currently experiencing each item on a five point scale (from “Not at all like me” to 
“Extremely like me”), with higher scores reflecting more extreme perceptions of 
entrapment. The entrapment scale has demonstrated excellent internal validity across 
studies conducted in students (α = .93 - .95) and clinical populations (α = .86 - .95) (Gilbert 
& Allan, 1998; Taylor et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2010b). 
 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) 
This is a 20 item true-false measure which assesses the prevalence of perceptions of 
hopelessness over the past seven days (Beck, Weissman, Lester & Trexler, 1974). Higher 
scores reflect more extreme perceptions of hopelessness. Example items include: “All I can 
see ahead of me is unpleasantness rather than pleasantness”, and “The future seems vague 
and uncertain to me”. The BHS has demonstrated high levels of internal validity (α = .93), 
and good test-retest reliability over 3 weeks (r = .85) (Holden & Fekken, 1988). 
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The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 
The CES-D is a 20 item measure designed to assess the severity of current depressive 
symptoms in non-clinical populations (Radloff, 1977), and has previously been used within 
British student samples (Dempsey et al., 2011). Participants are required to rate the 
occurrence of twenty depressive symptoms over the previous seven days on a four point 
scale (0 = “Rarely/0 days”, to 3 “Most of the time/5-7 days”). Higher scores on the CES-D 
reflect greater severities of depressive symptoms, with scores greater than 16 considered to 
reflect clinically significant depression (Radloff, 1991). The CES-D has demonstrated high 
levels of internal validity (α = .79-.91) (Radloff, 1991; Dempsey et al., 2011). 
 
The University Means-End Problem Solving Task (UMEPS) 
The UMEPS is a means-end problem solving task designed to assess the effectiveness of 
problem solving capabilities in British students (Dempsey et al., submitted-a). The UMEPS 
is based upon the Means-End Problem Solving task which was originally developed for 
use in patient samples (Platt & Spivack, 1975). The UMEPS task features problematic 
situations which are likely to be encountered by students at British universities, including 
problems relating to university education (e.g., exam revision, managing coursework 
deadlines), graduate careers and job opportunities (e.g., worries over job prospects and 
competition for jobs), student finance (e.g., repaying student loans), in addition to 
interpersonal (e.g., managing peer group work, resolving arguments between flatmates) 
and emotional problems (e.g., resolving depressed feelings and homesickness). 
Performance on the UMEPS has been observed to distinguish between students 
reporting elevated and low severities of current depressive symptoms, with depressed 
students found to generate fewer relevant solutions to problematic situations (Dempsey et 
al., submitted-a). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited from adverts displayed on an online research volunteering 
website hosted by the University of Manchester, which directed participants to the study‟s 
website where electronic versions of the information sheet and consent form were 
displayed. Following informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
groups. Due to the large number of items originally developed for the UMEPS task, each 
group was presented with different six situations taken from the UMEPS task. For each 
UMEPS item, participants read a description of the problem and were asked to describe the 
steps they would take in order to resolve the problem. Participants were also asked to rate 
how realistic they felt each item was in relation to their experiences at university (on a five 
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point scale from “Very Realistic” to “Very Unrealistic”), and appraise the likelihood of 
their solution fully resolving the problem (on a five point scale from “Very Likely” to 
“Very Unlikely”). Participants also provided a rating of how effortful they felt their 
solution would be to apply (on a five point scale from “Very little effort” to “Extremely 
effortful”). This procedure was repeated for each UMEPS item. 
After completing the UMEPS solution generation task, participants were presented 
with electronic versions of the self-report questionnaire measures (Defeat, Entrapment, the 
Beck Hopelessness Scale, and the CES-D depression scale). Participants were also 
provided with an optional open-ended feedback form on the final page of the study‟s 
website. 
 
Data Analysis 
The solutions generated on the problem-solving task were coded for the number of relevant 
and irrelevant solution means, referring to effective and ineffective steps described in the 
solutions respectively. The described solutions were also rated for their effectiveness and 
specificity of detail according to five point likert scales, with higher ratings indicating 
more effective and more specifically detailed solutions (see appendix for coding scheme). 
The first author (R.D.) coded the UMEPS performance measures (solution means, 
specificity and effectiveness). Three undergraduate student volunteers from the University 
of Manchester received formal training in using the coding manual and conducted an inter-
rater reliability check, and together coded 25% of the data. 
 Scores on the self-report measures and problem-solving performance measures 
were screened for normality from review of histograms and checking for outliers via 
calculation of z-scores. Two participants were identified as extreme outliers on the relevant 
solution means and solution specificity measures on the UMEPS problem-solving task (zs 
> 3.5) and were removed from the data set. Data analyses were conducted on the remaining 
144 participants. Scores on the CES-D scale and the solution specificity and effectiveness 
measures of the UMEPS task did not substantially deviate from normality. Square root 
transformations were conducted to correct for positively skewed data on the Defeat and 
Entrapment scales, and on the means for the number of relevant and irrelevant solution 
steps generated on the UMEPS task. Positive skew for scores on the Beck Hopelessness 
Scale was corrected using a logarithmic transformation. 
Bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to investigate the associations 
between the self-report measures of defeat, entrapment, depression and hopelessness with 
performance measures on the UMEPS task. To assess whether a combined 
defeat/entrapment construct was a better predictor of problem-solving capabilities than 
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separate defeat and entrapment variables, a factor analysis using Maximum Likelihood 
extraction was conducted upon scores on the Defeat and Entrapment scales. Follow-up 
partial correlations were conducted to ascertain whether the associations between the 
appraisal and problem-solving measures remained when including scores on the CES-D 
depression scale. Mediation models indicated by the partial correlational analyses were 
tested using bootstrapping procedures. 
 
3.2.4 Results 
Means and standard deviations for scores on the self-report measure and the UMEPS task 
are presented in Table 3.2.1. High levels of agreement existed between the first author and 
the three independent raters for the UMEPS task measures (Cohen‟s Kappas = .86 for rater 
one, .81 for rater two, and .85 for rater three). In addition, high levels of reliability were 
observed for the defeat, entrapment, hopelessness and depression self-report measures 
(Cronbach‟s α). 
 
Table 3.2.1. Means and standard deviations for scores on the self-report questionnaire 
measures and the University Means-End Problem-Solving Task (UMEPS)  
 
 Untransformed data Transformed data  
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) α 
Self-report measures    
Defeat 16.64 (11.43) 3.82 (1.44) .95 
Entrapment 14.32 (13.27) 3.24 (1.95) .95 
BHS Hopelessness 5.94 (4.16) .67 (.31) .86 
CES-D Depression 16.44 (10.36)  .92 
University Means-End Problem Solving Task (UMEPS) 
Relevant means 2.36 (1.07) 1.50 (.33)  
Irrelevant means .08 (.15) .14 (.24)  
Solution Effectiveness 
(observer-rated) 
3.16 (.64)   
Solution Specificity 2.60 (.77)   
Solution Effectiveness 
(participant-rated) 
3.89 (.40)   
Solution Effort 3.27 (.49)   
 
Note: BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale, CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale 
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Mean scores on the hopelessness, defeat and entrapment measures were equivalent 
to those reported by a study conducted in a similar student sample (Taylor et 2010b), 
whilst the mean self-reported CES-D depression scores were between those reported by 
previous studies (Jones & Day, 2008; Dempsey et al., 2011). Mean scores on the UMEPS 
problem-solving task measures (relevant and irrelevant solutions, specificity and 
effectiveness) were consistent with scores reported in previous means-end problem-solving 
studies (Blankstein et al., 1992; Dempsey et al., submitted-a). Analyses of variance 
confirmed that there were no differences between the study groups for the UMEPS task 
measures, including the relevant solution means (F(3, 139) = .052, p = .984), irrelevant 
solution means (F(3, 139) = 1.324, p = .269), solution specificity (F(3, 139) = .505, p = .679), 
solution effort ratings (F(3, 139) = 1.830, p = .145), or for either the observer-made (F(3, 139) = 
.291, p = .832) or participant-made solution effectiveness ratings (F(3, 139) = .955, p = .416). 
Table 3.2.2, below, details the inter-rater reliability statistics for the coding of the 
UMEPS problem solving task with intra-class correlations presented for the continuous 
UMEPS measures (the relevant and irrelevant solution mean counts) and Cohen‟s Kappa 
values for the categorical measures (the solution specificity and the observer-made ratings 
of solution effectiveness). 
 
Table 3.2.2. Inter-rater reliability statistics for the University Means-End Problem-Solving 
Task measures (UMEPS) (intraclass correlations and Kappa values). 
 
UMEPS task measure Statistics Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 3 
Number of Relevant means Intra-class correlation 0.90 0.92 0.75 
Number of Irrelevant means Intra-class correlation 1.00 0.87 0.99 
Solution Effectiveness  
(observer-rated) 
Cohen‟s Kappa 0.78 0.71 0.87 
Solution Specificity Cohen‟s Kappa 0.70 0.86 0.79 
 
Note: The inter-rater reliability statistics reported in Table 3.2.2 are comparisons between 
the researcher (R.D.) and each rater separately (e.g., for relevant means .90 is the 
agreement between the researcher and Rater 1, .92 is the agreement between the researcher 
and Rater 2, .75 is the agreement between the researcher and Rater 3) 
 
As shown in Table 3.2.2, there were high levels of agreement between the first 
author‟s coding and the coding from each of the independent raters. The perfect agreement 
between the first author and Rater 1 for the “Number of Irrelevant means” reflects that 
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there were few instances of irrelevant solutions means in the coding check conducted by 
Rater 1. The following table (3.2.3, below) details the participant-made realism ratings for 
the problematic situations used in the UMEPS task (N.B. Realism ratings range from 1 
(“Very Unrealistic”) to 5 (“Very Realistic”); Effort ratings from 1 (“Very Little Effort”) to 
5 (“Extremely Effortful”). 
 
Table 3.2.3. Participant ratings for mean solution effort and realism ratings for items on the 
University Means-End Problem-Solving task (UMEPS) (sorted by realism ratings) 
 
Item Description Realism Rating Effort Rating 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
15. Stress over deadlines 4.43 (.65) 3.51 (1.02) 
24. Dislikes degree subject 4.22 (.82) 3.51 (.93) 
12. Worry about finances 4.18 (1.06) 3.41 (.98) 
2. Want to have a relationship 4.08 (.92) 3.70 (.74) 
16. Exam Revision 4.08 (1.04) 4.13 (.97) 
14. Social Isolation 4.00 (1.05) 2.90 (.90) 
19. Worry over job hunting 4.00 (.96) 3.64 (.93) 
11. Worry about how to pay back student loan 3.97 (1.09) 3.44 (.90) 
10. Depressed feelings 3.97 (.90) 3.20 (1.10) 
23. Homesickness 3.97 (.90) 3.09 (.96) 
13. Alcohol abuse 3.92 (1.09) 2.56 (1.05) 
5. Problems with course-mates 3.88 (.81) 3.34 (.94) 
21. Abdominal pain 3.86 (.67) 2.78 (.95) 
18. Argument with housemates 3.86 (1.13) 3.14 (.93) 
7. Friend is avoiding you 3.73 (1.02) 2.86 (.75) 
22. Losing self-confidence 3.69 (1.01) 3.08 (1.00) 
17. Start of new university year 3.65 (.88) 2.41 (.98) 
9. Poor relationship with parents 3.62 (1.16) 3.05 (1.20) 
3. Trouble with job supervisor 3.56 (.99) 3.38 (.91) 
20. Sleeping poorly 3.47 (1.16) 3.17 (.90) 
6. Lost essay materials 3.42 (1.18) 4.25 (.91) 
1. Break up with boyfriend/girlfriend 3.33 (1.28) 3.46 (1.10) 
4. Gambling 3.24 (1.21) 3.34 (1.07) 
8. Stranded after a night out 2.89 (1.12) 3.00 (1.15) 
Overall Mean Realism  3.79 (1.00) 3.27 (.97) 
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Factor Analysis 
A factor analysis using Maximum Likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation was 
conducted on participant scores on the Defeat and Entrapment scales to investigate whether 
scores on these measures represent a single factor as suggested by previous research 
(Taylor et al., 2009). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO = 
.918) and Bartlett‟s test (χ2 (496) =3832.46, p < .001) indicated that the sample size and the 
correlations between variables were sufficient for factor analysis. The initial factor analysis 
produced four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (16.53, 1.99, 1.46, and 1.184). The 
decision about the number of factors to extract was based upon review of the scree plot 
(see Figure 3.2.1 below) which suggested one clear factor, whilst a parallel analysis 
(O‟Connor, 2000a, 2000b) suggested two factors with eigenvalues greater than the mean 
and 95
th
 percentiles.  
 
Figure 3.2.1. Scree plot of the eigenvalues from the factor analysis 
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However, the two factor solution suggested by the parallel analysis was deemed to 
be a poor fit of the data, as all the items from the defeat and entrapment were more 
strongly loaded onto the first single-factor solution compared to their loadings on the 
second factor. Once extracted, the single factor solution had an eigenvalue of 16.54 and 
accounted for 51.67% of the variance in items (see Table 3.2.4 below for item loadings on 
this single factor). 
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Table 3.2.4. Factor loadings for items from the Defeat (D) and Entrapment (E) scales for 
the single factor solution (continues on next page). 
 
Item Loading 
E6 I feel I'm in a deep hole I can't get out of .826 
D14 I feel down and out  .822 
E4 I feel trapped inside myself  .818 
E7 I am in a situation I feel trapped in  .816 
D7 I feel powerless  .805 
E13 I can see no way out of my current situation  .804 
D10 I feel that I have sunk to the bottom of the ladder  .779 
E11 I feel powerless to change things  .777 
D12 I feel that I am one of life's losers  .773 
D13 I feel that I have given up  .757 
D15 I feel I have lost important battles in life  .754 
E5 I would like to get away from who I am and start again  .747 
D11 I feel completely knocked out of action  .739 
D3 I feel defeated by life  .738 
D1 I feel that I have not made it in life  .734 
E3 I would like to escape from my thoughts and feelings  .732 
D5 I feel that I have lost my standing in the world  .729 
D16 I feel that there is no fight left in me .724 
E8 I have a strong desire to escape from things in my life  .716 
E1 I want to get away from myself  .703 
D8 I feel that my confidence has been knocked out of me .700 
E14 I would like to get away from other more powerful people in my life .680 
E2 I feel powerless to change myself  .664 
E12 I feel trapped by my obligations  .664 
D6 I feel that life has treated me like a punch bag  .663 
E16 I feel trapped by other people .656 
E10 I often have the feeling that I would just like to run away  .652 
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D2r I feel that I am a successful person  .605 
E15 I have a strong desire to get away and stay away from where I am now  .595 
D4r I feel that I am basically a winner  .484 
D9r I feel able to deal with whatever life throws at me  .422 
E9 I am in a relationship I can't get out of  .280 
D = Defeat scale, E = Entrapment Scale. 
 
 
Correlational Analyses 
A series of correlational analyses were conducted to investigate the relationships between 
performance on the UMEPS task with the symptom and appraisal measures (see Table 
3.2.5). Bivariate correlations indicated that scores on the CES-D depression scale, Beck 
Hopelessness and Defeat and Entrapment scales were all highly positively correlated. In 
terms of the associations between the UMEPS problem-solving performance measures and 
the self-report measures, the generation of irrelevant solution means was positively 
associated with current depressive symptoms, with appraisals of entrapment and with the 
factor-analytically derived single construct of defeat/entrapment. No significant 
correlations between hopelessness and the generation of relevant or irrelevant solutions on 
the problem-solving task were found. Depression, hopelessness, defeat, entrapment, and 
the combined single defeat/entrapment factor were all negatively associated with the 
participants‟ own appraisals of their solution‟s effectiveness, with higher scores on these 
measures associated with more pessimistic appraisals.  
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Table 3.2.5. Bivariate correlations between scores on the self-report measures and problem-solving performance on the University Means-End Problem-
Solving Task (UMEPS). 
      University Means-End Problem-Solving Task (UMEPS) 
  Defeat Entrapment D/E  BHS  
Relevant 
Solutions 
Irrelevant 
Solutions 
Solution 
Efficacy 
Solution 
Specificity 
Solution 
Likelihood 
Solution 
Effort 
CES-D .825*** .773*** .836*** .560***  -.086 .179* -.046 -.031 -.280*** -.050 
Defeat  .840*** .929*** .711***  -.093 .095 -.048 -.028 -.327*** -.063 
Entrapment   .919*** .651***  -.081 .229** -.042 .021 -.295*** -.003 
Defeat/Entrapment     .685***  -.107 .168* -.070 -.024 -.299*** -.033 
BHS      -.075 .048 -.023 -.039 -.238** -.033 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
Note: BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale, CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale, D/E = Single Defeat/Entrapment factor produced by 
factor analysis, Solution Likelihood = participant‟s own rating of the likelihood that their solution will resolve the problem, Solution Efficacy = observer-
made rating of the solution‟s effectiveness.
1
7
0
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Partial Correlations  
Partial correlations were conducted to ascertain whether the associations between the 
defeat, entrapment and hopelessness measures and UMEPS performance measures, as 
detailed in Table 3.2.5, remained significant after controlling for depression.  
The mean number of irrelevant solution means generated on the UMEPS remained 
positively correlated with entrapment (partial r = .146, p < .05). However, the correlation 
between entrapment and participants‟ appraisals of their solution effectiveness (the 
“likelihood” of their solution resolving the problem) was rendered non-significant once 
CES-D scores were accounted for (partial r = -.128, p = .06), as was the correlation 
between hopelessness and participant‟s ratings of their own solution effectiveness (partial r 
= -.106, p = .10). Defeat remained significantly correlated with appraisals of solution 
efficacy when controlling for CES-D (partial r = -.177, p < .05). When accounting for 
scores on the CES-D, correlations between the factor-analytically produced combined 
Defeat/Entrapment construct and the generation of irrelevant solutions (partial r = .020, p = 
.406) and participant‟s appraisals of their solution effectiveness (likelihood) (partial r = -
.122, p = .072) were not significant. 
In sum, when controlling for current depressive symptoms, entrapment remained 
positively associated with the generation of more irrelevant solutions on the UMEPS 
problem-solving task. However, only perceptions of defeat, but neither entrapment nor 
hopelessness, remained associated with participants‟ more pessimistic appraisals of the 
likelihood of their solutions resolving the problems encountered on the UMEPS task. 
Associations between participant‟s appraisals of solution effectiveness and irrelevant 
solution means with the combined defeat/entrapment construct were not significant when 
accounting for current depressive symptoms, suggesting that defeat and entrapment are 
differentially associated with problem-solving appraisals and solution generation. 
 
Mediation Analyses  
Bootstrapping analyses were conducted using the SPSS Macro provided by Preacher & 
Hayes (2004) to assess whether defeat and entrapment mediate the relationship between 
depressive symptoms and solution effectiveness appraisals and the generation of irrelevant 
solutions respectively, as had been suggested by the partial correlations. Bootstrapping is a 
non-parametric method which allows for the indirect effect of the independent variable on 
the dependent variable via the mediator to be tested for statistical significance. 
Bootstrapping is preferred over the use of the Sobel test and Baron and Kenny‟s (1986) 
method of mediation analysis as it avoids potential Type 1 errors through multiple 
regression analyses and does not assume that the sampling distribution of the indirect 
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effect (ab, the product of path a from the independent variable to the mediator and path b 
from the mediator to dependent variable) is normally distributed. Both mediation models 
were tested via bootstrapping using 5000 random samples, as recommended by Hayes 
(2009), to generate confidence intervals for the indirect effects. 
 As the 95% confident intervals for the mediation of the effect of depressive 
symptoms upon the generation of irrelevant solutions via entrapment did not bridge zero 
(95% CI = .001, .014), it was concluded that the indirect effect was significantly different 
from zero at p < .05 (see Figure 3.2.2 below for the mediation diagram for entrapment with 
the beta and alpha values for each path). Multicolinearity between the predictor variables 
in the final regression analysis remained within acceptable levels (Tolerance > .4, VIFs < 
2.3).  
 
Figure 3.2.2. Mediation of the association between depression and the generation of 
irrelevant solution means by appraisals of entrapment 
 
(standardised Betas and alpha values presented for each path, values in parentheses are for 
path ab with both entrapment and depression regressed onto irrelevant solution means) 
 
 
For the mediation of the relationship between depression and participant‟s 
appraisals of the likelihood of their own solutions resolving problems by defeat, a similar 
bootstrapping analysis was conducted, using 5000 random samples to generate confidence 
intervals. As the 95% confident intervals for the mediation of the effect of depressive 
symptoms upon the solution effectiveness appraisals via defeat did not bridge zero (95% 
CI = -.02, -.001), it was concluded that the indirect effect was significantly different from 
zero at p < .05 (see Figure 3.2.3 for the mediation model and path statistics). Although 
defeat and CES-D scores were previously observed to be highly correlated (r = .825), 
levels of collinearity between defeat and CES-D in the regression analyses were within 
acceptable limits (Tolerances > .3, VIFs < 3.5). 
 
 
β = .227, p < .01 
(β = .246, p < .05) 
 
β = .179, p < .05 
(β = -.062, p = .61) 
 
β = .745, p < .001 
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Figure 3.2.3. Mediation of the association between depression and participant-made 
pessimistic appraisals of solution effectiveness by appraisals of defeat 
 
(standardised Betas and alpha values presented for each path, values in parentheses are for 
path ab with both defeat and depression regressed onto irrelevant solution means) 
 
 
3.2.5 Discussion 
The current study investigated the associations between appraisals of defeat and 
entrapment with performance on a process-focused measure of means-end problem-solving 
designed for usage with British student samples (the UMEPS; Dempsey et al., submitted-
a). Whilst previous research has suggested that defeat and entrapment in combination 
mediate the relationship between self-appraisals of problem-solving capabilities and 
suicidality in non-clinical samples (Taylor et al., 2010b), no previous study had assessed 
problem-solving using a means-end problem-solving task (Platt & Spivack, 1975; 
Dempsey et al., submitted-a).   
The current study observed that both defeat and entrapment were associated with 
the generation of irrelevant solution steps to hypothetical psychosocial problems and with 
participants‟ pessimistic appraisals of the likelihood that their solutions would resolve the 
stated problem. However, partial correlations and mediation analyses suggested that defeat 
and entrapment were differentially associated with problem-solving capabilities, with 
defeat found to mediate the relationship between current depressive symptoms and the 
appraisal of solution efficacy, and entrapment mediating the relationship between 
depression and the generation of irrelevant solution means. Although hopelessness was 
associated with pessimistic appraisals of solution effectiveness, this association was not 
significant when accounting for current depressive symptoms. In contrast to previous 
research suggesting that a combined defeat/entrapment construct mediates the relationship 
between self-appraisals of problem-solving capabilities and suicidality (Taylor et al., 
2010b), the current study suggests that defeat and entrapment may possess differential 
associations with problem-solving capabilities according to performance on a process-
β = -.340, p < .001 
(β = -.303, p < .001) β = .830, p < .001 
Depression 
(CES-D) 
Solution 
Likelihood 
Defeat 
β = -.296 p < .001 
(β = -.044, p = .75) 
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focused measure of psychosocial problem-solving. These results suggest that it is the 
appraisals of defeat and entrapment, not just the experience of depressive symptoms, which 
are associated with greater pessimism regarding problem-solving in relation to defeat, and 
the generation of irrelevant solutions to problems in relation to entrapment. 
In contrast to the previous study using the UMEPS task (Dempsey et al., submitted-
a), current depressive symptoms were not negatively correlated with the generation of 
relevant solutions but were instead positively correlated with the generation of irrelevant 
solution means. The previous study had reported a similar magnitude of correlation 
between depression and irrelevant solutions, albeit at a non-significant trend level. Whilst 
both studies recruited samples from the same population, with similar mean ages and 
gender ratios, the lack of a significant correlation between relevant means and depression 
in the current study may be due to an unmeasured factor, such as suicidality or 
resourcefulness in problem-solving as measured in the previous study (Dempsey et al., 
submitted-a). Indeed, previous research has noted that suicidal individuals generate more 
irrelevant solutions on the means-end problem-solving task than non-suicidal controls 
(Schotte & Clum, 1987; Evans et al., 1992). It may be possible that the current sample 
were experiencing greater suicidal ideation than the previous study‟s sample (Dempsey et 
al., submitted-a), with the more depressed and suicidal individuals more likely to generate 
more irrelevant solution steps to the UMEPS problems than to generate fewer relevant 
solution means. Interestingly, the defeat and entrapment measures, which are highly 
associated with suicidality, were only associated with the generation of irrelevant solutions 
on the UMEPS. In addition, the mean CES-D score in the current study was greater than 
Radloff‟s (1991) suggested cut-off for clinically significant depressive symptoms, which 
may be indicative of elevated suicidality in the current sample. However, this remains 
speculative as neither study incorporated a measure of suicidality. Future research should 
consider the inclusion of a suicidal ideation measure in order to account for potential 
effects of suicidality upon problem-solving, even in investigations of cognitive processes 
implicated in subclinical depression. 
In line with a previous study (Taylor et al., 2009), the present study observed that 
defeat and entrapment appeared to represent a similar unitary construct through a factor 
analysis of scores on the Defeat and Entrapment scales. Scores on this combined 
Defeat/Entrapment measure were associated with the generation of irrelevant solution 
means and more pessimistic participant appraisals of solution effectiveness. Although 
previous research has suggested that defeat and entrapment may constitute the same 
construct (Taylor et al., 2009), a combined defeat/entrapment factor produced by factor 
analysis in the current study did not remain significantly associated with poor problem-
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solving when accounting for current depressive symptoms. Taylor et al. (2010b) noted that 
a combined defeat/entrapment construct mediated the relationship between problem-
solving appraisals, as measured by the Confidence subscale of the Problem-Solving 
Inventory (Heppner, & Petersen, 1982), and suicidality in a non-clinical sample. The 
current study suggests that defeat, but not entrapment, is associated with greater pessimism 
in the solutions individuals actually generate for problems, whereas Taylor and colleagues‟ 
(2010b) study suggests that defeat/entrapment as unitary construct is more associated with 
a lack of confidence about problem-solving in general prior to solution generation. There is 
a clear need for future work to investigate the solution generation process in defeated and 
entrapped individuals, as well as in at-risk and currently suicidal individuals. 
The differential properties of defeat and entrapment as suggested by the current 
study would appear to be in accord with a social problem-solving theory advocated by 
D‟Zurilla and colleagues (D‟Zurilla & Goldfried 1971; Bell & D‟Zurilla, 2009). This 
model has two dimensions: problem-solving orientation, referring to an individual‟s 
awareness of the problem, their motivation and appraisal of their own ability to effectively 
resolve problems; and problem-solving style, referring to cognitive and behavioural 
strategies individuals adopt to understand the nature of problems and develop means to 
resolve such problems (Bell & D‟Zurilla, 2009). In relation to this model, defeat would 
appear to relate to a negative problem-solving orientation, relating to a lack of motivation 
and/or pessimism regarding the individual‟s ability to resolve the problem. Entrapment, on 
the other hand, would appear to be associated with a poor or ineffective problem-solving 
style, whereby entrapped individuals have the motivation to escape and resolve the 
problem but implement poor strategies to do so. Interestingly, previous research using a 
self-report measure of problem-solving based upon this theory has suggested that suicidal 
inpatients report negative problem orientations and avoidant problem-solving styles 
(D‟Zurilla, Chang, Nottingham, & Faccini, 1998). There may also be a considerable 
discord between an individual‟s perception of their own problem-solving capability and 
their actual ability to resolve problems in situ. Whilst a previous study had suggested that 
defeat and entrapment mediate the relationship between self-appraisals of problem-solving 
abilities and suicidality (Taylor et al., 2010b), defeated individuals may simply have 
greater pessimism about whether their solutions will resolve problems, as suggested by the 
current study, and may be less likely to fully engage in solution generation. The targeting 
of motivational interventions with individuals high in defeat may assist in improving 
problem-solving orientations and the engagement in solution generation. 
There are a number of limitations to consider with this study. The current research 
is limited by its analogue sample and cross-sectional correlational design, meaning it is 
 176 
difficult to specify the precise causal relationship between defeat, entrapment and problem-
solving over time. In addition, a self-report measure of suicide was omitted from the study 
due to ethical concerns regarding the web-based and non-clinical nature of the sample, 
particularly in the ability of the researchers to offer support to vulnerable and potentially 
suicidal individuals. Whilst similar gender ratios were recruited for the current study as 
compared with previous research (e.g., Taylor et al., 2010b), the sample was 
predominantly female and it is unclear whether the findings were significantly gender-
biased. Also, the participants were not screened for their past clinical histories, meaning 
that some participants with past histories of clinical depression may have been recruited 
into the current study which may have biased the results. The current study also requires 
replication within a clinical suicidal sample to assess the effectiveness of patients‟ 
problem-solving behaviours on a means-end measure, and test whether the differential 
properties of defeat and entrapment in relation to problem-solving are present as suggested 
in the current study. There is also an issue of bidirectionality in the mediation models, with 
evidence suggesting that defeat and entrapment may precede depression and also that 
depression may precede appraisals of defeat and entrapment (see Taylor et al., in press, for 
a review). Future studies could also develop specific problematic situations relating to 
defeating and entrapping situations experienced by suicidal individuals as previously 
suggested (Johnson et al., 2008c). However, there is a general a need for research to focus 
upon both problem-solving appraisal and solution generation processes, in addition to 
evaluating problem-solving using both objective and subjective measures, rather than 
solely relying on subjective self-appraisal measures of problem-solving. 
 
3.2.6 Conclusions 
In sum, the current study has indicated that defeat and entrapment appear to have 
differential properties in relation to psychosocial problem-solving. Defeat appeared to 
represent an appraisal process relating to an individual‟s pessimism of their ability to 
produce effective solutions to problems, whilst entrapment was associated with poorer 
problem-solving behaviours, relating to the generation of irrelevant and unfocused 
solutions to psychosocial problems. This pattern of results supports the notion that defeat 
and entrapment represent two qualitatively different appraisal processes, and suggest that it 
is feelings of defeat and entrapment, rather than sole the presence of depressive symptoms, 
which are associated with impairments in problem-solving. Although, there remains the 
possibility that targeting problem-solving focused therapies with motivational components 
will reduce appraisals of defeat and entrapment, improve problem-solving orientations and 
solution generation behaviours, and assist in alleviating psychopathological symptoms. 
 177 
 
Section 3.3 
 
 
Study Five 
 
Investigating the cognitive vulnerability to hypomania:  
Autobiographical memory specificity, positive and negative 
rumination, and psychosocial problem-solving  
 
 
Robert C. Dempsey 
Steven H. Jones 
& 
Patricia A. Gooding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 178 
3.3.1 Abstract 
Rumination, overgeneral autobiographical memory and poor psychosocial problem-solving 
are inter-related cognitive vulnerability factors for depression. Although preliminary 
research has suggested that individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder possess similar 
biases in these processes, it is not clear whether these processes contribute to the 
vulnerability to bipolar disorders in at-risk individuals. The current study investigated 
whether hypomania vulnerability is associated with biases in memory specificity, 
rumination, and problem-solving in high versus low-risk individuals. An analogue sample 
of 222 participants were screened into high (n = 30) or low-risk (n = 32) groups and 
completed measures of autobiographical memory specificity, problem-solving, and self-
report measures of mood, and positive and negative rumination. High-risk participants 
reported elevated tendencies to engage in positive and negative rumination, less effective 
problem-solving and greater overgenerality in memory recall. However, once current mood 
symptoms were accounted for, only tendencies to engage in emotion focused positive 
rumination, depression focused negative rumination, and the recall of general negative 
memories differentiated the high and low-risk groups. These results suggest that whilst 
mechanisms underlying the vulnerability to hypomania share some similarities with those 
mechanisms underlying the depression vulnerability, in relation to negative rumination and 
recall of overgeneral negative memories, hypomania vulnerability is characterised by the 
engagement in positive rumination but not poor problem-solving capabilities. 
 
3.3.2 Introduction 
Similar cognitive processes have been implicated in the vulnerability to bipolar disorder 
and unipolar forms of depression (Scott et al., 2000; Scott & Pope, 2003). These processes 
include negative rumination, poor psychosocial problem-solving, and the overgeneral 
recall of autobiographical memories (e.g., Nezu, 1987; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Gibbs & 
Rude, 2004). The current study investigated whether individuals at a high risk for 
hypomania and future bipolar disorders report similar patterns of cognitive vulnerability in 
these processes. 
Negative rumination is a repetitive thought process where the individual focuses 
upon the causes and consequences of recent negative experiences (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991), and is associated with the maintenance of depressed moods (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Morrow & Fredrickson, 1993), and with the vulnerability to depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Smith & Alloy, 2009). Individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder also report 
tendencies to engage in negative rumination (Van der Gucht et al., 2009), even during 
remission from symptoms (Thomas et al., 2007), suggesting that negative ruminative 
 179 
thinking patterns may confer a risk of future relapse. Individuals vulnerable to hypomania 
and future bipolar disorders also readily engage in rumination, distraction and the 
engagement in risky behaviours in response to negative moods, suggesting that hypomania 
may result from dysfunctional attempts to cope with negative emotional states (Thomas & 
Bentall, 2002; Knowles et al., 2005). 
Recent research has also indicated that tendencies to engage in ruminative thinking 
patterns in response to positive experiences and mood states are associated with bipolar 
disorder and hypomania vulnerability (Feldman, et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008a; 
Dempsey et al., 2011). Responses to positive affect appear to be crucial to emotion 
regulation, whereby emotion-focused and self-focused positive rumination assist in 
elevating and maintaining positive moods, and strategies that attempt to dampen positive 
moods assist with the down-regulation of mood (Feldman et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 
2008a). One possibility is that both at-risk individuals and those with bipolar disorder have 
poor emotion regulation strategies and may readily engage in ruminative responses in 
response to both positive and negative experiences, contributing to mood lability 
(Dempsey et al., 2011). Indeed, research has indicated that whilst negative rumination 
appears to be a feature of both bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder, only 
positive rumination is associated with bipolar disorder (Johnson et al., 2008a), suggesting 
that individuals on the bipolar disorder spectrum have a particular sensitivity to engage in 
rumination in response to both positive and negative experiences. 
At present, no research has investigated whether the vulnerability to hypomania is 
associated with deficits in psychosocial problem-solving. The ability to effectively resolve 
problems appears promote mental and physical well-being (Malouff et al., 2007; Bell & 
D‟Zurilla, 2009), with poor problem-solving capabilities reported in samples of dysphoric 
students (Dempsey et al., submitted-a), clinically depressed patients (Watkins & Baracaia, 
2002; Raes et al., 2005a), suicidal individuals (Evans et al., 1992; Marx et al., 1992), and 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder (Scott et al., 2000; Tzemou & Birchwood, 
2007).  
Individuals currently in remission from bipolar disorder tend to generate fewer 
solutions to psychosocial problems on the Means-End Problem Solving Task (Platt & 
Spivack, 1975) compared to non-bipolar controls (Scott et al., 2000), but appear to possess 
similar problem-solving deficits as reported in patients with unipolar depression (Tzemou 
& Birchwood, 2007). However, it is currently unclear whether individuals with 
vulnerabilities to hypomania report similar deficits in problem-solving as reported in 
bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder. If individuals at an elevated risk for 
hypomania represent a vulnerable population for bipolar disorder, similar deficits in 
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problem solving as found in bipolar samples may be anticipated. Although, hypomania 
vulnerability can be associated with increased reward sensitivity and goal-striving (Jones et 
al., 2007; Carver & Johnson, 2009), which may suggest that high-risk individuals are more 
likely to engage in behaviours to achieve rewards associated with successful problem-
solving. Interestingly, research has suggested that high-risk individuals for hypomania do 
not necessarily perform better at goal-related activities, such as academic work, but still 
have overly optimistic beliefs about their own abilities (Meyer & Krumm-Merabet, 2003). 
At-risk individuals may be less likely to engage in problem-solving and perform more 
poorly on solution generation measures of problem-solving. Whether problem-solving is a 
vulnerability factor for hypomania is not currently clear. 
The lack of specific detail in the recall of autobiographical memories has been 
demonstrated in individuals diagnosed with major depressive disorder (Williams et al., 
2007). This “overgeneral” recall bias is a consequence of the termination of retrieval 
processes prior to the activation of specific memory representations, leading to the recall of 
generic memory descriptions low in specific detail (Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2007). 
Research has indicated that individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder appear to possess 
an overgeneral recall bias for negative autobiographical memories (Mansell & Lam, 2004; 
Van der Gucht et al., 2009), similar to the patterns of overgenerality associated with major 
depression (Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007). In at-risk samples, one study has reported that 
the higher risk for hypomania is associated with the recall of specific negative memories 
(Delduca et al., 2010). This finding contrasts previous observations made in bipolar 
samples (e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004), and suggests that the ready 
availability of self-negative information via memory recall may prompt dysfunctional 
response styles and ruminative thinking patterns leading to exacerbations in mood and 
symptoms (Thomas et al., 2007). However, a major concern with Delduca and colleagues‟ 
(2010) study is their use of negatively biased cue words, meaning that the specific recall of 
negative memories may have been prompted by the use of highly imageable negative cues 
(e.g., “angry”, “hurt”) compared to less imageable positive cues (e.g., “safe”, “surprised”). 
There is a clear need for further research to investigate whether the individuals at a higher 
risk of hypomania and future bipolar disorder report similar patterns of overgenerality in 
memory recall. 
 
The current study 
The primary aim of Study Five was to assess whether the vulnerability to hypomania, as 
measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), is associated 
with similar patterns of ruminative thought, deficits in problem-solving, and a reduced 
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specificity of autobiographical memory recall as demonstrated in bipolar disorder and in 
relation to the vulnerability to depression.  
The Sentence Completion for Events from the Past task (SCEPT) was adopted to 
assess the specificity of autobiographical memory recall (Raes et al., 2007). The sentence 
completion task was used to avoid potential effects of cue word valence upon memory 
recall, following concerns in a previous study (Delduca et al., 2010). The SCEPT presents 
participants with a series of non-valenced sentence stems probing memories for past events 
(e.g. “Last year I…”), which participants complete in relation to a different memory. The 
SCEPT is considered to be a more sensitive measure of overgeneral memory in non-
clinical samples compared to the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986), as low frequencies of general memories have been highlighted in 
previous AMT studies conducted within student samples (Raes et al., 2007). Raes and 
colleagues (2007) suggest that the AMT may not be sufficiently sensitive to detect trait-
based overgeneral memory in non-clinical samples due to the repetition of specificity 
instructions and the completion of practice trials.  
The current study used the University Means-End Problem Solving Task (UMEPS; 
Dempsey et al., submitted-a) to assess between-group differences in means-end problem-
solving. Performance on the UMEPS has been reported to distinguish between groups of 
students reporting low and high severities of depressive symptoms, with students who 
report more severe depressive symptoms found to generate fewer relevant solutions to 
problems (Dempsey et al., submitted-a). Self-report measures of positive and negative 
rumination were also included to assess group differences in rumination (the “Responses to 
Positive Affect” scale; Feldman et al., 2008; the Ruminative Responses Scale, Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Participants also completed the CES-D depression scale 
(Radloff, 1977) and the Internal States Scale (Bauer et al., 1991) to assess current mood 
symptoms. 
 It was predicted that individuals at a high risk for hypomania would recall more 
overgeneral autobiographical memories for negative events, demonstrate less effective 
problem-solving capabilities and be more likely to engage in ruminative responses to 
emotional experiences compared to low-risk individuals. It was anticipated that individuals 
at a higher risk for hypomania would perform in a similar manner on these cognitive tasks 
as has been evidenced in bipolar samples (e.g., Scott et al., 2000); Johnson et al., 2008a), 
with more severe deficits noted in the high-risk compared to the low-risk group.  
 
 
 
 182 
3.3.3 Method 
Participants 
A total of 222 participants from the community of the University of Manchester completed 
the web-based screening stage of the study, which included the Hypomanic Personality 
Scale (HPS: Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). From this, 114 individuals were invited to 
participate in the main phase of the study after scoring either one standard deviation above 
or below the mean HPS score. A total of 62 participants completed the second stage of the 
study (See Table 3.3.1 below for demographic information). T-tests indicated that there 
were no significant differences in the ages or HPS scores of those participants who were 
invited to take part and who did complete part two of the study (Mage = 20.33 years, S.D. = 
2.49; MHPS  = 27.83, S.D. = 4.19) and those who did not participate in the second stage as 
part of the high-risk group (Mage = 20.20 years, S.D. = 2.40; MHPS  = 27.97, S.D. = 4.35) 
(Age, t(59) = 1.648, p = .110, n.s.; HPS score, t(59) = .911, p = .366, n.s.). Similarly, no 
significant differences were noted in age or HPS scores for those participants who were 
invited to the second stage and who did complete (Mage = 21.31 years, S.D. = 5.22 ; MHPS  
6.38, S.D. = 2.50) and did not complete the study as part of the low risk group (Mage =  
21.93 years, S.D. = 6.69; MHPS  = 5.82, S.D. = 2.09) (Age, t(59) = -.040, p = .969, n.s.; 
HPS score, t(59) = -1.093, p = .279, n.s.). There were also no differences in gender ratios 
for those participants who were invited to participate in the second stage of the study as 
part of the high-risk group between those who did and not complete part two (Pearson‟s X² 
= 1.667, p = .197). Similarly no significant differences in gender ratios were noted for 
those participants invited to participate as part of the low-risk group, between those who 
did and did not complete the study (Pearson‟s X² = 1.652, p = .199). Participants completed 
the study either voluntarily for no incentive (n = 24) or received course credit (n = 38). 
 
 
Table 3.3.1 Demographic characteristics for the sample, and by high and low risk groups  
 Total High-risk group Low-risk group 
Gender 9 male, 53 female 4 male, 26 female 5 male, 27 female 
Mean age (S.D.) 20.84 (4.13) 20.33 (2.49) 21.31 (5.22) 
HPS Range Scores  24-36 1-10 
 
Note: HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. 
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Materials 
 
The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 
The CES-D is a 20 item self-report questionnaire measure designed to assess the severity 
of depressive symptoms within non-clinical populations (Radloff, 1977). Participants rate 
the occurrence of twenty depressive symptoms over the previous seven days (from 0 = 
“Rarely”, to 3 = “Most of the time”). Example items include: “I had crying spells”, “I felt 
depressed”, and “I thought my life had been a failure”. Scores on the CES-D range from 0-
60, with scores of 16 or above indicative of clinically significant levels of depression 
(Radloff, 1991). The CES-D has demonstrated good internal validity (Cronbach‟s α = .79-
.89) (Radloff, 1991; Jones & Day, 2008). 
 
The Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) 
The HPS is a 48 item self-report measure designed to assess the presence of hypomanic 
personality traits (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Participants rate whether statements 
pertaining to hypomania-like traits are true or false in relation to their own personality 
(e.g., “I frequently find that my thoughts are racing”). High scorers on the HPS report 
elevated levels of bipolar symptomatology, when measured both concurrently and 
prospectively (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Meyer & Hautzinger, 2003; Blechert & Meyer, 
2005), and are more likely to meet diagnostic criteria for bipolar disorder at long-term 
follow-up (Kwapil et al., 2000). The HPS has demonstrated good re-test reliability (r = .81, 
Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) and good internal validity (α = .87-.89) (Eckblad & Chapman, 
1986; Jones & Day, 2008; Dempsey et al., 2011). 
 
The Internal States Scale (ISS) 
The ISS is a 16 item self-report questionnaire which measures depressive and manic 
symptoms (Bauer et al., 1991). Participants rate the experience of 15 symptoms over the 
previous 24 hours on 100mm visual analogue scales (anchored by 0 = “Not at 
all”/“Rarely” to 100 = “Very much so”/“Much of the time”), and also rate their current 
mood state on a separate 100mm scale (“Today I feel”: “Depressed/Down” = -50, to 
“Manic/High = +50). Items on the ISS comprise separate subscales measuring manic 
symptoms (ISS Activation), depressive symptoms (ISS Depression), interpersonal conflict 
(ISS Perceived Conflict), and general emotional well-being (ISS Well-being). Scores on 
the ISS correlate with clinician-made ratings of symptoms (Bauer et al., 1991). The ISS 
has demonstrated adequate internal validity (α = .73-.82) (Jones & Day, 2008). 
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The Responses to Positive Affect Scale (RPA) 
The RPA is a 17 item measure designed to assess positive forms of rumination (Feldman et 
al., 2008). Items on the RPA refer to various possible responses to positive emotions (e.g., 
“When you are feeling happy, how often do you…think about how happy you feel”, 
“…think about how proud you are of yourself”). Items on the RPA constitute three 
subscales including rumination upon mood and physical experiences (RPA Emotion-
focused positive rumination), rumination upon the self and personally relevant goals (RPA 
Self-focused rumination), and responses which attempt to reduce the intensity of positive 
mood states (RPA Dampening). Participants rate each item according to whether they 
“almost never”, “sometimes”, “often” or “almost always” respond to a positive mood state 
in that manner (on a scale from 1 to 4), with higher scores reflecting greater propensities to 
engage in positive forms of rumination. The RPA and its subscales have demonstrated 
adequate internal validity (α = .72-.85) (Feldman et al., 2008; Dempsey et al., 2011). 
 
The Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) 
The RRS is a 22 item self-report measure of the engagement in ruminative responses to the 
negative emotions and experiences (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Each item on the 
RRS describes a response to a negative emotional state (e.g., “Think about your feelings of 
fatigue and achiness”, “Write down what you are thinking and analyse it”). Items on the 
RRS form three factor-analytically derived subscales, which include rumination upon 
depressive symptoms (RRS Depression-related Rumination), repetitive thought processes 
analysing the discrepancies between the current self and unachieved goals (RRS 
Brooding), and more adaptive attempts to improve mood states through cognitive problem 
solving (RRS Reflection) (Treynor et al., 2003). The subscales of the RRS have 
demonstrated adequate to excellent internal validity (Brooding α = .71-.79; Depression α = 
.84; Reflection α = .78-.90) (Johnson et al., 2008a; Dempsey et al., 2011). 
 
Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT) 
The SCEPT is a sentence completion task designed to measure the specificity of 
autobiographical memory recall in non-clinical groups (Raes et al., 2007). The SCEPT 
consists of a series of 11 sentence stems which probe memories for past experiences (e.g., 
“Last year I…”, “I will never forget…”). Participants are asked to provide a continuation 
to each sentence, and are instructed to complete each sentence with reference to a different 
memory or event. Sentence completions are coded according to whether they refer to 
specific or general memories, with specific memories defined as events which took place at 
a particular time and place that had durations of less than one day. Tendencies to make 
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overgeneral responses on the SCEPT have been positively associated with self-reported 
depression severities and visual analogue scale ratings of rumination (Raes et al., 2007).  
 
 
The University Means-End Problem-Solving Task (UMEPS) 
The UMEPS is a means-end problem solving task designed for use in British student 
samples (Dempsey et al., submitted-a). Each item on the UMEPS describes a problematic 
scenario which may be encountered whilst studying at a British university. These problems 
include situations directly relating to educational activities (e.g., difficulties in managing 
collaborative group work with peers, managing coursework), financial concerns (e.g., the 
repayment of student debt), graduate career prospects (e.g., worries over job hunting), as 
well as emotional (e.g., social isolation), and interpersonal problems (e.g., arguments with 
housemates). Problem-solving capabilities as assessed by the UMEPS can be measured 
according to the number of relevant and irrelevant solution means or steps generated for 
each problem, as well as coding for the effectiveness and specificity of solutions. Five 
items measuring different domains of problem-solving were included in the current study 
based upon the realism ratings measured in the previous two studies and participant 
feedback (“Depressed feelings”, “Problems with course-mates”, “Worry about how to pay 
back student loan”, “Arguments with housemates”, and “Stress”, see Appendix for the 
UMEPS items). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited from advertisements placed on research volunteering websites 
hosted by the University of Manchester. These advertisements directed participants to the 
study‟s website, where the information sheet and consent form were displayed. Once 
participants consented to taking part in the study they completed a short demographics 
questionnaire and the Hypomanic Personality Scale. Those participants who scored within 
the regions of one standard deviation above or below the mean HPS score were later 
invited via email to participate in the second stage of the study. Previous studies have 
screened participants into high and low-risk groups based on HPS scores one standard 
deviation above and below the group HPS mean (e.g., Johnson, Ballister & Joiner, 2005; 
Taylor & Mansell, 2008). 
Participants in the second stage completed the ISS, to assess current bipolar mood 
symptoms, before completing the 11 sentence stems from the SCEPT task (Raes et al., 
2007), followed by the five problematic situations from the UMEPS which were presented 
in a randomised order. Upon completion of these tasks, participants completed online 
versions of the CES-D and rumination questionnaires (the RPA and RRS). The final page 
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of the study‟s website presented a short debrief about the study and an optional feedback 
form. The study received institutional ethical approval from the University of Manchester. 
 
 
Data Coding  
Reponses made on the SCEPT task were coded according to whether completed sentences 
referred to positive or negative events, and whether participants made reference to a 
specific or general event based upon the coding scheme devised by Williams and 
Broadbent (1986). Responses were coded as positive or negative if they made explicit 
references to emotional states, or implicitly described positive or negative events. 
Responses were coded as specific if they referred to an event that occurred at a particular 
time and a place with a duration of less than a day. General sentence completions included 
references to events which took place over a period greater than one day (see Table 3.3.2). 
A response was coded as an omission if the participant failed to complete the sentence or 
made an unintelligible response.  
 
 
Table 3.3.2 Example responses from the Sentence Completion for Event from the Past Test 
(SCEPT) measure of autobiographical memory specificity. 
 
 Autobiographical Memory Valence 
Memory 
Specificity 
Positive Negative 
 
 
Specific 
 
I still recall how... happy I felt 
when I passed my driving test. 
 
I can still picture how… my cat looked when 
he returned after being missing for about a 
week. He looked so thin and hungry. 
 
 
General 
 
I still remember how… fun 
our family holidays were when 
I was young. 
 
At the time when I… wasn't in a relationship 
I felt very lonely. 
 
  
Responses on the UMEPS task were coded for the number of relevant solutions and 
irrelevant solution means generated for the problem solving situations. A relevant solution 
mean refers to a unique potentially effective solution step that has a good probability of 
resolving the problem at hand, whilst an irrelevant solution mean refers to a potentially 
ineffective solution step which has a good probability of exacerbating rather than solving 
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the current problem. Participants‟ solutions on the UMEPS were coded by the first author 
(R.D.) for their effectiveness (on a five point scale, 1 = “very ineffective”, 5 = “very 
effective”), relating to the probability that the solution will resolve the stated problem, and 
their specificity, relating to the level of detail described in the solution (from 1 = “very 
unspecific” to 5 “very specific”) (see Appendix for full coding manual). An independent 
rater coded a random sample of 25% of the items on the UMEPS and SCEPT tasks (see 
Table 3.3.3 in the Results section for inter-rater reliability statistics). 
  
Data Analysis 
Scores on the hypomania vulnerability measure were compared using t-tests to confirm 
whether the screening stage had produced two distinct groups according to HPS scores, 
with multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) being used to compare between-group 
differences in baseline mood symptoms and rumination. Responses on the SCEPT memory 
specificity measure were compared between-groups using a mixed design analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), whilst univariate ANOVAs were conducted for between-group 
differences on the UMEPS problem-solving task. An exploratory binary logistic regression 
analysis was conducted to investigate which of the cognitive vulnerability processes 
(rumination, problem-solving and memory specificity) were predictors of group 
membership for the low and high-risk groups, after accounting for current bipolar mood 
symptoms.  
 
3.3.4 Results 
Inter-rater reliability 
An independent rater conducted a coding check on 25% of the data from the 
autobiographical memory (SCEPT) and problem-solving tasks (UMEPS) (See Table 3.3.3, 
below). As shown in Table 3.3.3, there were high levels of agreement between the raters 
across the memory and problem-solving measures (intraclass correlation coefficients are 
presented for continuous variables and Cohen‟s Kappa values are presented for categorical 
data).  
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Table 3.3.3. Inter-rater reliability statistics for scores on the Sentence Completion Task for 
Events from the Past Test (SCEPT) and the University Means-End Problem-Solving Task 
(UMEPS) (Intraclass correlation coefficients and Cohen‟s Kappa values) 
 
 Inter-rater Reliability 
Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT)  
Positive Specific Memories .94
 b
 
Positive General Memories .89
 b
 
Negative Specific Memories .93
 b
 
Negative General Memories .91
 b
 
University Means-End Problem-Solving Task (UMEPS)  
Relevant Solution Means .96
 b
 
Irrelevant Solution Means .92
 b
 
Solution Specificity .93
 a
 
Solution Effectiveness .79
 a
 
 
 
  Note: 
a
 = Cohen‟s Kappa, b = Intraclass Correlation Coefficient. 
 
 
Comparison of the low and high-risk groups on the vulnerability and mood measures  
The results of an independent samples t-test reported significant differences in mean HPS 
scores between the high (MHPS = 27.83, S.D. = 4.19) and low-risk groups (MHPS = 6.38, 
S.D. = 2.5) (t(61) = -25.067, p < .001) confirming that the screening stage of the study 
produced two distinct groups of HPS scorers. The mean HPS scores of the groups were 
consistent with those reported for the high and low risk groups recruited by Delduca and 
colleagues (2010). The high and low risk groups did not differ with respect to participant 
age (t(60) = .932, p = .355) or gender ratios (Pearson‟s X² = .066, p = .798). Means and 
standard deviations for scores on the symptom measures (the CES-D and ISS scales), and 
reliability statistics (Cronbach‟s α) are presented in Table 3.3.4.  
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Table 3.3.4. Means, standard deviations, reliability statistics, and between-group 
differences for scores on the mood symptoms measures 
 
 
 HPS Group  
 
 
 α Low  High  Total F η² 
CES-D Depression  .91 
12.97  
(9.53) 
22.37 
(10.30) 
17.59 
(10.92) 
14.75*** .20 
ISS Activation .85 
96.23 
(82.56) 
179.37 
(113.54) 
137.11 
(106.75) 
11.72** .16 
ISS Depression .86 
30.06 
(38.33) 
52.73 
(50.13) 
41.21 
(45.61) 
4.35* .07 
ISS Perceived  Conflict .81 
90.42 
(82.31) 
164.23 
(94.96) 
126.72 
(95.55) 
11.40*** .16 
ISS Well-being .76 
149.94 
(58.26) 
143.77 
(52.94) 
146.90 
(55.33) 
.19 .00 
 
 
Note: CES-D = Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale, HPS = Hypomanic 
Personality Scale, ISS = Internal States Scale. Standard deviations in parenthesis, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
A MANOVA was conducted to investigate between-group differences in scores on 
the symptom measures. The MANOVA was significant overall (F(5, 56) = 4.83, p < .01), 
with the high-risk group reporting significantly higher mean scores on the CES-D 
depression, ISS Activation, Depression and Perceived Conflict scales, with no significant 
between-group differences on the Well-being subscale of the ISS. The mean scores on the 
ISS subscales for the HPS groups were also consistent with scores reported by Delduca and 
colleagues (2010). 
 
 
Rumination 
Means and standard deviations for scores on the positive (RPA) and negative rumination 
(RRS) measures are presented in Table 3.3.5. 
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Table 3.3.5. Means, standard deviations (in parenthesis), alpha reliabilities, and between-
group differences in self-reported positive and negative rumination.  
 
  HPS Group    
 α Low  High  Total F η² 
Responses to Positive 
Affect Scale (RPA) 
      
Dampening .80 
12.66  
(4.16) 
15.07  
(4.50) 
13.82  
(4.44) 
4.86* .08 
Emotion-focused .83 
11.88  
(2.49) 
14.43  
(3.55) 
13.11 
 (3.29) 
10.92** .15 
Self-focused .67 
8.34  
(1.84) 
10.00 
(2.70) 
9.15  
(2.43) 
8.03** .12 
Ruminative Responses 
Scale (RRS) 
      
Brooding .83 
9.81  
(3.70) 
11.97 
 (3.45) 
10.85  
(3.89) 
5.62* .09 
Reflection .87 
10.12  
(2.92) 
12.80  
(4.36) 
11.42  
(3.89) 
8.16** .12 
Depression-related .84 
24.59  
(5.82) 
31.17  
(5.48) 
27.77  
(6.52) 
20.88*** .26 
 
Note: HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, d.f. = 6, 53. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
A MANOVA was conducted to investigate between-group differences in 
rumination. The MANOVA was significant overall (F(6, 53) = 5.67, p < .001), with 
univariate ANOVAs indicating that the high-risk group reported more extreme scores 
across the positive and negative rumination measures (see Table 3.3.4 above).  
 
 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
Means and standard deviations for sentence completions on the SCEPT task are presented 
in Table 3.3.6. Whilst the low-risk group appeared to make similar mean numbers of 
sentence completions for specific and general memories, the high-risk group appeared to 
make substantially more completions referring to general than specific memories. 
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Table 3.3.6. Mean autobiographical memory specificity scores, separated according to 
memory valence, for the high and low risk groups (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Low HPS Group High HPS Group Total 
All memories    
Specific 5.25 (1.83) 3.87 (2.19) 4.58 (2.12) 
General 5.59 (1.78) 7.00 (2.08) 6.27 (2.04) 
Omissions .16 (.37) .13 (.43) .15 (.40) 
Positive memories    
Total 8.09 (1.57) 7.23 (1.70) 7.68 (1.68) 
Specific 3.84 (1.71) 2.77 (1.61) 3.33 (1.73) 
General 4.25 (1.55) 4.46 (1.94) 4.35 (1.74) 
Negative memories    
Total 2.75 (1.55) 3.63 (1.71) 3.18 (1.62) 
Specific 1.41 (1.46) 1.10 (1.13) 1.26 (1.31) 
General 1.34 (.86) 2.53 (1.59) 1.92 (1.39) 
 
N.B. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. 
 
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design analysis of variance was conducted to investigate 
between-group differences in memory specificity on the SCEPT task, with memory 
valence (positive vs. negative) and memory specificity (specific vs. general) treated as 
within-subject factors and HPS risk group (low vs. high) treated as a between-subjects 
factor.  
A significant main effect of memory valence was found (F(1, 60) = 122.14, p < .001) 
which indicated that participants were more likely to complete sentences referring to 
positive memories than negative memories irrespective of memory specificity. This main 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect between memory valence and group 
(F(1, 60) = 4.64, p < .05), with greater numbers of positive sentence completions made by 
the low-risk group compared to the high-risk group, whilst greater numbers of negative 
sentence completions were made by the high risk group compared to the low risk group.  
A significant main effect of memory specificity was also observed (F(1, 60) = 12.15, 
p < .01), with a higher mean number of sentence completions made in reference to general 
memories than for specific memories. This main effect was further qualified by a 
significant interaction between memory specificity and group (F(1, 60) = 7.82, p < .01), with 
greater numbers of specific memories recalled on the sentence completion task by the low- 
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risk group than the high group, whilst the high-risk group recalled greater numbers of 
general memories than the low-risk group. No significant effect was noted for the 
interaction between memory valence and memory specificity (p = .38), and the three-way 
interaction between valence, specificity and group was also not significant (p = .81).  
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs were conducted to further explore between-group 
differences in memory specificity, which indicated that the high-risk group recalled fewer 
specific positive memories compared to the low-risk group (F(1, 61) = 6.51, p < .01). The 
high-risk group also recalled more negative general memories than the low-risk group (F(1, 
61) = 13.60, p < .001), but no significant between-group differences were noted for the 
number of general positive memories or negative specific memories recalled on the SCEPT 
task (Fs < 1). A Mann-Whitney test indicated that there were no significant between-group 
differences for the mean number of omissions made on the SCEPT memory task (U = 
455.50, Z = -.594, p = .55). 
 
Problem-Solving 
Means and standard deviations for scores on the UMEPS problem-solving measures are 
presented in Table 3.3.7 below. 
 
 
Table 3.3.7. Performance on the University Means-End Problem-Solving Task (UMEPS: 
means, standard deviations, and Cohen‟s d effect size) across the low and high-risk groups 
 
 Group    
 Low HPS High HPS Total F Cohen‟s d 
University Means-End Problem-Solving Task (UMEPS) 
Relevant Means 3.06 (1.32) 2.43 (1.08) 2.76 (1.24) 4.19* .52 
Irrelevant Means .49 (.45) .59 (.37) .54 (.41) .85 .24 
Solution Specificity 3.50 (.77) 3.29 (.73) 3.40 (.75) 1.29 .28 
Solution Effectiveness 3.42 (.53) 3.07 (.69) 3.25 (.63) 5.21* .57 
 
 
Note: Standard deviations in brackets, * p < .05, ** p < .01, HPS = Hypomanic 
Personality Scale. 
 
 
 
Univariate analyses of variance indicated that there were significant between-group 
differences for the number of relevant means generated on the UMEPS problem-solving 
task, with the low-risk group generating greater numbers of relevant solutions compared to 
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the high-risk group. There was also a significant between-group difference for the mean 
solution effectiveness (observer-made) ratings, with the low-risk group generating more 
effective solutions than the high-risk group. 
 
Which cognitive vulnerability factors predict hypomania vulnerability group membership? 
An exploratory logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate which 
combination of the cognitive vulnerability factors (rumination, problem-solving and 
memory specificity) predicted group membership for the high and low-risk groups. Scores 
on the CES-D and the Activation subscale of the Internal States Scale were entered into the 
first block of the regression model to control for between-group differences in mood 
symptoms, whilst HPS group (low or high) was entered as the dependent variable. ISS 
Depression scores were not entered due to their strong correlation with CES-D scores (r = 
.744, p > .001) to avoid elevated colinearity amongst predictor variables, with the cognitive 
vulnerability variables were entered into the second block using backwards entry. 
The logistic regression was significant overall (χ2 = 46.709, d.f. = 6, p < .001), and 
accounted for between 52.9% (Cox & Snell R Square statistic) and 70.6% (Nagelkerke R 
Square statistic) of variance in group status. The model correctly predicted group 
membership for 87.1% of participants. Higher scores on the self-focused positive 
rumination scale, depressive symptom-focused rumination and the more frequent recall of 
negative general memories were all independent contributors to the regression model once 
concurrent depressive (CESD) and hypo/manic (ISS-A) scores were accounted for (see 
Table 3.3.8, below). The effectiveness of solutions generated on the UMEPS task was not a 
significant predictor of HPS group membership (p = .082). 
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Table 3.3.8 Results of the logistic regression analysis for the prediction of group 
membership to the high and low risk groups. 
 
 β S.E. 
95% Confidence Intervals (CIs) 
for Exp(β) 
Lower CI Exp(β) Upper CI 
Block 0      
Constant -.07 .25  .94  
Block 1      
Constant -2.37 .68  .94  
CES-D .08* .03 1.019 1.081 1.148 
ISS Activation .01* .00 1.001 1.007 1.014 
Block 2      
Constant -11.27** 4.07  .00  
CES-D .02 .05 .93 1.02 1.13 
ISS Activation .01 .00 1.00 1.01 1.02 
RPA Self-focused .76** .26 1.28 2.13 3.54 
RRS Depression Related .17* .08 1.01 1.19 1.40 
Negative general memories 1.04* .43 1.23 2.83 6.51 
UMEPS effectiveness -1.22 .70 .08 .30 1.17 
 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale, ISS = Internal States Scale, RPA = Responses to Positive Affect scale, 
RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale. UMEPS = University Means-End Problem-Solving 
Task 
 
 
3.3.5 Discussion 
Study Five investigated whether the vulnerability to hypomania is associated with similar 
patterns of overgeneral autobiographical memory specificity, ruminative thought 
processes, and the reduced efficacy of psychosocial problem-solving as previously 
identified in relation to the vulnerability to depression.  
Individuals at a high-risk for hypomania reported the increased engagement in 
positive and negative ruminative cognitive styles compared to low-risk individuals, 
supporting previous observations made in both at-risk samples (Dempsey et al., 2011), and 
in individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder (Johnson et al., 2008a). High-risk 
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individuals also generated fewer relevant solution means and less effective solutions to 
problematic situations compared to low-risk individuals, consistent with previous 
observations that individuals in remission from bipolar disorder generate fewer relevant 
solutions on the MEPS task than non-bipolar controls (Scott et al., 2000). However, the 
logistic regression analysis indicated that once current bipolar mood symptoms are 
accounted for, performance on the UMEPS problem-solving task does not differentiate 
between individuals at a high and a low-risk for hypomania, contrary to our predictions.  
In relation to memory recall, a higher risk for hypomania was associated with the 
recall of fewer specific memories and greater numbers of general negative memories on 
the SCEPT sentence completion measure of autobiographical memory, in contrast to 
previous research (Delduca et al., 2010) but supporting our predictions. It was also noted 
that participants across groups made more frequent sentence completions referring to 
general than specific events, supporting Raes and colleagues‟ (2007) argument that the 
SCEPT is a more sensitive measure of overgeneral memory in non-clinical student samples 
than the cued AMT paradigm.  
When the cognitive variables were entered into a logistic regression analysis to 
investigate which combination of the vulnerability processes predicted group membership 
for high and low-risk individuals, only tendencies to engage in self-focused positive 
rumination, depression-focused negative rumination, and the recall of general negative 
memories differentiated group membership independent of current bipolar mood 
symptoms. Whilst the high and low risk groups appeared to differ in their problem-solving 
abilities, once current mood symptoms were accounted for these between-group 
differences were not significant. Deficits in psychosocial problem-solving would not 
appear to be uniquely associated with a trait-based vulnerability to hypomania, but are 
largely associated with the experience of current mood symptoms. Indeed, a similar study 
noted that means-end problem-solving did not differentiate group membership between 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder and healthy controls (Scott et al., 2000). 
Rather, the presence of more extreme dysfunctional attitudes relating to perfectionism and 
the more overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories were significant predictors of 
membership for the bipolar group. Although deficits in psychosocial problem-solving 
appear to be a vulnerability factor for depression (Dempsey et al., submitted-a), based upon 
the results of the current study and Scott and colleagues‟ (2000) work, it would appear that 
problem-solving deficits may not be uniquely associated with bipolar disorders and may be 
accounted for by the experience of current depressive symptoms in bipolar spectrum 
individuals. 
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 Interestingly, previous research has reported that the vulnerability to hypomania is 
associated with the self-reported use of distraction and the engagement in risky and 
potentially dangerous activities, rather than problem-solving, as responses to negative 
mood states (Thomas & Bentall, 2002). Individuals vulnerable to hypomania may be less 
likely to engage in problem-solving following negative experiences and instead engage in 
higher-risk activities to avoid negative emotions through short-term boosts in positive 
mood states, rather than use problem solving as an effective means of coping with negative 
experiences. As individuals at a higher risk for hypomania are also at a heightened 
vulnerability for future depression, with high prevalences of diagnosed depressive 
disorders noted in a long-term follow-up of high-scorers on the Hypomanic Personality 
Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Kwapil et al., 2000), poor psychosocial problem-
solving may only be predictive of future depressive but not hypomanic symptoms in high-
risk individuals. 
There are several limitations to consider with the current study. The study 
predominantly relied upon self-report questionnaire measures to assess the engagement in 
ruminative thought processes, memory specificity and problem solving capabilities. Future 
studies may consider inducing positive and negative forms of rumination in low and high 
risk individuals, and then assessing between-group differences in memory recall specificity 
and problem-solving to investigate the causal relationships between rumination and 
memory specificity and problem-solving. Although poorer psychosocial problem-solving 
was not uniquely associated with hypomania vulnerability in the current study, it is still 
unclear whether individuals currently experiencing hypomanic states report similar deficits 
in problem-solving as reported in currently depressed individuals. Whilst one study has 
suggested that there are no significant differences in problem-solving capabilities between 
currently hospitalised bipolar and unipolar individuals, both patient groups generated fewer 
relevant solutions on the MEPS compared to healthy controls (Tzemou & Birchwood, 
2007). However, the bipolar sample in their study consisted of individuals who had been 
hospitalised for manic and for depressive episodes, which may indicate that the experience 
of extreme mood episodes is associated with deficits in solution generation during means-
end problem-solving. In terms of the current study, the sample was predominantly female 
and no assessment of the participants‟ past clinical histories was included, meaning that the 
sample may be unrepresentative of the processes implicated in hypomania vulnerability in 
males and may have consisted of some individuals who have previously experienced 
clinically significant mood symptoms. 
Although the current study was mostly self-report in nature, the study did attempt 
to overcome problems with the use of the cued Autobiographical Memory Test in non-
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clinical samples by using the SCEPT sentence completion task (Raes et al., 2007). A major 
strength of the SCEPT procedure is that participants are not as aware of the nature of the 
task in relation to the specificity of autobiographical memory recall compared to the AMT, 
whereas the AMT presents participants with practice trials and repeated task instructions. 
Also, the SCEPT task does not require participants to recall memories in response to cue 
words, meaning that there is no requirement to counterbalance cues for their imageability 
or emotional valence. The use of the cued AMT procedure can be problematic, as previous 
research has reported that high-risk individuals for hypomania were more specific in their 
recall of negative autobiographical memories (Delduca et al., 2010), but had appeared to 
use negatively biased cue words, in direct contrast to the current study‟s results from the 
sentence completion task. Finally, our analyses indicated that there was no evidence of 
selective attrition of participants from the screening stage to the main phase of the study 
based upon participant ages, gender ratios or HPS scores. 
 
3.3.6 Conclusions 
Study Five has indicated that the vulnerability to hypomania, and future bipolar disorders, 
is associated with similar patterns of autobiographical memory specificity, rumination, and 
problem-solving capabilities as has previously been associated with the vulnerability to 
unipolar forms of depression. Individuals at a higher risk for hypomania reported 
tendencies to engage in both positive and negative forms of rumination, were more 
overgeneral in their autobiographical memory recall, and recalled fewer specific positive 
memories and more general negative memories than low-risk participants. Whilst high-risk 
individuals appeared to demonstrate poorer psychosocial problem-solving than low-risk 
individuals in terms of generating fewer relevant solution steps to problems, these 
between-group differences did not remain independent of current bipolar mood symptoms. 
There is some convergent evidence to suggest that deficits in psychosocial problem-
solving may not be uniquely associated with hypomania vulnerability or bipolar disorder, 
however, poor problem-solving capabilities may be associated with the experience of 
depressive symptoms associated with bipolar spectrum disorders. 
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4.1.1 Abstract 
The vulnerability to hypomania is associated with goal-directed behaviour, increased 
reward responsivity and extreme goal-pursuit. Although theories of autobiographical 
memory suggest goals are implicit processes derived from memories, no study has yet 
investigated the associations between memory specificity and goal-pursuit with the 
vulnerability for hypomania. A non-clinical sample of 165 participants completed 
assessments of goal-related memory, future event generation, and questionnaires of 
hypomania vulnerability, reward sensitivity and goal planning. Regression analysis 
indicated that the vulnerability to hypomania was independently associated with 
heightened goal sensitivity, goal-planning for extreme goals with potential public rewards, 
tendencies to generate semantic information about the self for goal-related memories and 
the imagination of future repeating successful events. The results suggest that the 
vulnerability to hypomania is associated with tendencies to think about generalised 
information about the self in relation to past goal-related successes, which may contribute 
to self-focused positive rumination and high expectations of future successes leading to 
exacerbations in mood and increased goal-directed activity in bipolar-vulnerable 
individuals. 
 
4.1.2 Introduction 
The vulnerability to hypomania and the experience of clinical hypomanic and manic 
episodes are associated with the engagement in goal-related activities and the heightened 
sensitivity to potential goal-related rewards (APA, 2000). Numerous studies have 
investigated the relationships between goal-pursuit and vulnerability to hypomania, 
vulnerability to relapse in bipolar disorder, and prospective bipolar symptoms, but few 
studies have explored how an individual‟s memory for past goal-related events may be 
associated with future goal-planning and pursuit, and the vulnerability to hypomania. Thus 
the goal of the current study was to investigate the associations between the vulnerability 
to hypomania with goal-related memory processes and goal-pursuit. 
Research has demonstrated that goal-sensitivity and goal-attainment in individuals 
with bipolar disorder can have an important influence upon future illness courses, 
particularly in the development of manic symptoms (Lam & Wong, 1997; Johnson et al., 
2000; Johnson, 2005b; Lam & Wong, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008b). Individuals diagnosed 
with bipolar disorder, and those vulnerable for future bipolar disorders, react intensely to 
the accomplishment of goals, with increases in positive affect, confidence, elevated 
expectancies of future successes, and higher goal-setting observed following recent goal-
related successes (Johnson, 2005b; Johnson et al., 2005). These intense reactions to goal-
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attainment contribute to the further exacerbation of positive affect and manic symptoms in 
vulnerable individuals, with increased goal-striving activity identified as a common 
prodrome for mania (Lam & Wong, 1997; 2005). Indeed, the recent experience of goal-
attainment life events has been associated with increases in manic symptoms in individuals 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder (Johnson et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2008b), and with the 
subsequent experience of hypomanic episodes in students diagnosed with cyclothymia and 
bipolar II disorder (Nusslock, Abramson, Harmon-Jones, Alloy & Hogan, 2007). 
Furthermore, personality traits relating to achievement striving have been associated with 
prospective increases in manic symptoms at a six month follow-up in individuals 
diagnosed with bipolar I disorder (Lozano & Johnson, 2001). 
Individuals with diagnoses of bipolar I disorder also endorse strong beliefs 
regarding the need to accomplish goals even during euthymic states (Lam et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, these goal-striving attitudes appear to be resilient to mood changes, one study 
observed that individuals with bipolar disorder report similar elevated levels of goal-
attainment beliefs pre and post a positive mood induction compared to individuals in 
remission from unipolar depression and healthy controls (Wright et al., 2005). The 
endorsement of strong beliefs regarding the need to accomplish goals in individuals with 
bipolar disorder appears to remain prevalent during mild increases in positive mood states, 
which may further contribute to mood and symptom exacerbation following an initial 
success through increased goal-directed behaviour. 
Goal-striving has also been associated with vulnerability to future hypomania and 
bipolar disorders. The Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) 
has been frequently used to investigate goal-sensitivity and pursuit in individuals at a high 
risk for experiencing future hypomania and bipolar disorders. Hypomanic personality traits 
are considered to be similar to the clinical presentations of hypomanic mood episodes 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), with high scorers on the HPS experiencing more frequent 
episodes of hypomania and depression over a ten year follow-up compared to low HPS 
scorers (Kwapil et al., 2000). A number of studies have reported associations between 
hypomanic personality and heightened incentive motivation as indexed by the behavioural 
activation system (Jones et al., 2007; Jones & Day, 2008; Carver & Johnson, 2009), a 
motivational system responsive to rewards and incentives measured by the BIS/BAS 
questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994), suggesting that vulnerability to hypomania and the 
setting of high goals may be related to the over-activation of an incentive system (Johnson 
& Carver, 2006). 
Hypomanic personality traits have also been associated with tendencies to engage 
in approach behaviours to goals (Jones et al., 2007), with increased expectancies of success 
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and higher goal-setting following reward (Johnson et al, 2005). Individuals with 
hypomanic personalities also pursue goals of an extreme, potentially grandiose, and 
statistically unlikely nature, including the attainment of popular celebrity fame and 
significant financial wealth (Johnson & Carver, 2006; Carver & Johnson, 2009). 
Subsequent research has also suggested that hypomania vulnerability is more associated 
with reward and achievement related emotions (e.g., joy and pride) than prosocial 
emotions (e.g., compassion), and more with setting extrinsic extreme personal goals (e.g., 
political influence) than intrinsic goals which may be less publicly rewarding (e.g., 
relationships with family and friends), even when current manic and depressive symptoms 
are accounted for (Gruber & Johnson, 2009). Individuals at risk for hypomania and future 
bipolar disorders may not simply pursue extreme goals, but are particularly attuned to the 
potential rewards associated with these goals, particularly where goals have a perceived 
high value and public reward. 
One possible cognitive process which may explain excessive goal-pursuit by 
individuals on the bipolar disorder spectrum is autobiographical memory. Goals have been 
described as implicit processes which are grounded in the self-knowledge base formed by 
autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The autobiographical 
memory system contains three levels of memory representation which are differentiated by 
their associated degree of specificity. These representations include: lifetime periods 
relating to general thematic and temporal knowledge (including time periods of several 
months or years, e.g., “working at office x”); general events including extended single 
events (including durations of days or weeks, e.g., “when I went on holiday to…”) and 
thematically associated repeating events (e.g., “going shopping”); and specific events 
associated with sensory-perceptual detail unique to that event (e.g., “when I attended my 
university graduation ceremony”) (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) also suggest that due to the implicit and non-
conscious nature of goals in memory, specific memory representations do not directly 
represent goals but instead represent goal outcomes and plans to achieve these goals. The 
recall of specifically detailed memories may assist in the enactment of specific behavioural 
plans to accomplish goals, and suggest that goals derived from specific memories are 
realistically achievable in nature, whilst general memories may represent non-specific 
behavioural plans to achieve unlikely goals. Indeed, the recall of specific memories has 
been associated with more effective problem-solving behaviours (Williams et al., 2006), 
which may provide tentative support for the proposal that specific memories containing 
behavioural plans assist in successfully completing set goals, in this example through 
successful problem-solving. The availability of autobiographical memories describing past 
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goal-related activities may play an important role in the pursuit of current and future goals, 
although how goal-memory processes are implicated in the vulnerability to hypomania and 
bipolar disorders is unclear. 
There has, however, been little investigation into the association between goals and 
autobiographical memory in bipolar disorder, although a number of studies have suggested 
that individuals with bipolar disorder and those at-risk for hypomania possess 
dysfunctional memory recall strategies. For example, individuals with bipolar disorder 
diagnoses have shown a tendency to generate general descriptions for negative 
autobiographical memories, but retain the ability to recall emotionally positive memories 
in specific detail compared to individuals in remission from unipolar depression (Mansell 
& Lam, 2004). Other studies have suggested that individuals with bipolar disorder have 
low specificities for both positive and negative memories compared to non-bipolar controls 
(Scott et al., 2000). Whilst a separate study reported similar levels of overgenerality in 
groups of individuals currently experiencing bipolar and unipolar mood episodes (Tzemou 
& Birchwood, 2007).  
There is some disagreement as to whether individuals at-risk for hypomania and 
future bipolar disorders report similar patterns of overgeneral memory as found in bipolar 
samples. One study reported that high-risk individuals are more specific in their recall of 
negative memories (Delduca et al., 2010), whilst two recent studies suggest that high-risk 
individuals report similar over-general biases for negative memories as found in bipolar 
samples (Dempsey et al., submitted-c), and more extreme overgenerality across both 
positive and negative memories (Dempsey et al., submitted-e). However, neither of these 
studies specifically focused upon goal-related memory recall, it remains somewhat unclear 
as to how the specificity of memories may influence future goal-pursuit in people at-risk 
for hypomania and future bipolar disorders.  
At present, only one study has taken an explicit goal-related memory focus in 
relation to bipolar disorder, using a semi-structured memory interview in a sample of 
euthymic bipolar individuals (Gregory et al., 2010). Participants in Gregory and 
colleagues‟ study reported that both previous depressed and hypomanic mood episodes 
were associated with mental images relating to future goal events. Although depressive 
episodes were associated with images of future events relating to death and suicide, 
hypomanic episodes were associated with a range of positive goal-related images, such as 
success in managing projects (Gregory et al., 2010). However, the reliance upon 
participant‟s memories for their own previous recall of memories during past bipolar mood 
episodes may not be reliable, particularly where individuals have experienced significant 
mood disturbances and functional impairment. 
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The current study aimed to conduct a preliminary investigation into goal-related 
memory recall and goal-striving in individuals vulnerable for hypomania and future bipolar 
disorders, and specifically investigate whether the vulnerability to hypomania is associated 
with the recall of more general or specifically detailed autobiographical memories for past 
goal-related events. Whilst previous research has suggested that individuals vulnerable to 
hypomania have dysfunctional autobiographical memory recall processes, no research has 
yet investigated the association between autobiographical memory and goal-pursuit in 
individuals with hypomanic personality traits. The current study assessed the specificity of 
autobiographical memories for past goal-related memories, as well as the imageability of 
future events using sentence completion measures of autobiographical memory, to 
investigate whether the pursuit of extreme goals is associated with the specificity of future 
event imagination. 
Recently validated sentence-completion measures were used in the current study to 
assess the specificity of goal-related memory recall and future event-imagination (Raes et 
al., 2007; Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009). Whilst research has suggested that individuals 
remember past events in similar levels of detail as they imagine future events in “mental 
time travel” (D‟Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006), the current study investigated 
whether the specificity of goal-related memory for past events were associated with similar 
biases in future event imagination. Sentence completion tasks were used following Raes 
and colleagues‟ (2007) arguments that the cued-memory Autobiographical Memory Test 
(AMT) (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) may not be sufficiently sensitive to detect 
overgeneral memory within non-clinical samples (Raes et al., 2007). Sentence completion 
assessments avoid the repetition of instructions requiring participants to recall specific 
memory events and avoid the use of valenced cue words to prime memory recall. 
Validated self-report questionnaire measures were also used in the current study to assess 
hypomania vulnerability, current mood symptoms, goal-sensitivity and goal-pursuit.  
It was anticipated that the vulnerability to hypomania would be associated with the 
setting of extreme goals and increased reward sensitivity, consistent with previous 
observations (e.g., Johnson & Carver, 2006; Jones et al., 2007). The secondary prediction 
was that hypomania vulnerability would primarily be associated with the recall of general 
goal-attainment memories compared to the recall of specific memories. The recall of 
specific memories for past goal-related events was also anticipated to be associated with 
less extreme goal setting. Specific memory representations constitute more accurately 
detailed accounts of previous events compared to general memories which may be greater 
in their realism to the original event, feature specific plans for the accomplishment of 
realistic goals, and may represent less overly-positive and self-focused beliefs about goal-
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attainment. Generally detailed memories feature less specific sensory-perceptual detail, 
and may be more propositional and verbal in nature (e.g., “I am more able to achieve high 
goals than ordinary individuals”), which may reinforce positive self-perceptions and 
beliefs that more extreme goals can be attained.  
 
4.1.3 Method 
Participants 
An opportunistic sample of 165 participants was recruited from the University of 
Manchester (Mean age = 21.79 years, S.D. = 5.05), including 132 females (Mean age = 
21.49 years, S.D. = 4.82) and 33 males (Mean age = 23.64, S.D. = 5.68). The sample 
consisted of 119 undergraduate students, 38 postgraduates, 2 staff, whilst seven 
participants did not provide a status (Please note that a “continuum” of participants was 
recruited in order to allow factor analyses to be conducted, these analyses are not reported). 
 
Materials 
 
The Behavioural Inhibition & Activation Scales (BIS/BAS: Carver & White, 1994; 
Holzwarth & Meyer, 2006) 
The BIS/BAS scale is a self-report measure designed to assess the sensitivity of the 
behavioural activation and inhibition systems which are sensitive to signals of reward and 
non-reward/punishment respectively, and have in turn been associated with bipolar 
symptomatology (Carver & White, 1994). The extended 28-item version of the BIS/BAS 
scales was used in the current study, which features the Dysregulation of BAS subscale 
(Holzwarth & Meyer, 2006), in addition to subscales measuring behavioural inhibition 
(BIS), and three subscales measuring different forms of behavioural activation (Drive, 
Reward Responsiveness, and Fun Seeking). Elevated BAS sensitivity, as indicated by 
higher scores on the BAS measures, have been associated with more intense manic 
symptomatology (Meyer et al., 1999), whilst low BAS and greater BIS sensitivities have 
been associated with depressive symptoms (Meyer et al., 2007). Recent research has also 
suggested that the dysregulation of the BAS system is associated with bipolar symptoms in 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder and those vulnerable to bipolar disorders 
(Urošević et al., 2008). The BIS/BAS scales have demonstrated good internal consistencies 
(α = .71-.79, Jones & Day, 2008) as has the dysregulation of BAS subscale (α = .84, 
Holzwarth & Meyer, 2006) (See Table 3.1.2 for Cronbach‟s α statistics for the current 
study). 
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The Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS: Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) 
The HPS is a 48-item true-false self-report questionnaire measure of the endorsement of 
hypomanic personality traits associated with vulnerability to hypomania and future bipolar 
disorders (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Each item refers to a trait associated with the 
experience of hypomanic mood states, with participants being required rate whether each 
trait is true of their own personality (e.g. “I am considered to be kind of a “hyper” person”, 
“I seem to be a person whose mood goes up and down easily”, “I have often felt happy and 
irritable at the same time”). Individuals who report high HPS scores are more likely to be 
currently experiencing bipolar mood symptoms, are more likely to have experienced 
previous hypomanic and manic episodes (Meyer & Hautzinger, 2003), and other mental 
health related symptoms, such as psychosis, at longer-term follow-up than low HPS scorers 
(Kwapil et al., 2000). The HPS has previously demonstrated good test-retest reliability (r = 
.81) (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), and high levels of internal consistency (α = .87-.89) 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Dempsey et al., 2011). 
 
The Internal States Scale (ISS: Bauer et al., 1991) 
The ISS is a 16 item measure of current bipolar mood symptoms. Participants are required 
to rate the extent to which they have experienced fifteen symptoms over the past twenty-
four hours on a series of 100mm visual analogue scale (from “0 Not at all/Rarely” to 100 
“Very much so/Most of the time”). The ISS consists of four subscales measuring 
hypo/manic symptoms (ISS-Activation, example item: “My thoughts are going fast”), 
depressive symptoms (ISS-Depression, example item: “It seems like nothing will ever 
work out for me”), interpersonal conflict (ISS-Perceived Conflict, example item: “I feel 
argumentative”), and well-being (ISS-Well Being, example item: “I actually feel great 
inside”). High scores on the ISS subscales are indicative of the experience of more intense 
bipolar symptoms, and self-reported ISS scores have been associated with clinician-made 
ratings of bipolar symptoms (Bauer et al., 1991). The ISS subscales have demonstrated 
good reliability (ISS-WB α = .79-.82, ISS-A α = .73-.75, ISS-D α = .73-.81, ISS-PC α = 
.77-.80; Dempsey et al., 2011; Jones & Day, 2008).  
 
The Willingly Approached Set of Statistically Unlikely Pursuits scale (WASSUP: Johnson 
& Carver, 2006) 
The WASSUP is a 30-item self-report measure of the pursuit of personal goals of an 
extreme and highly unlikely nature (Johnson & Carver, 2006). The WASSUP has seven 
factor-analytically derived subscales relating to different forms of extreme goal setting, 
including goals relating to Popular Fame (e.g., “you will be famous”, “you will appear 
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regularly on TV”), Wealth (e.g., “you will have 20 million pounds or more”), World 
Impact (e.g., “you will create world peace”), Creative Accomplishments (e.g., “you will 
create a great work of art, music, or poetry”), Political Influence (e.g., “you will be 
important in political circles”), having Idealised Relationships with Friends (e.g., 
“whenever you have a problem, your friends will drop what they are doing to support 
you”), and Idealised Relationships with Family (e.g., “you will have the closest family 
relationships imaginable”) (Johnson & Carver, 2006). Participants are required to rate the 
likelihood of whether they will pursue such high goals, with higher WASSUP scores 
reflecting the more extreme endorsement of these goals (from 1 – “No chance I will set this 
goal for myself” to 5 “Definitely will set this goal for myself”). The WASSUP was 
originally developed for use with North American participants and the wording of a subset 
of items required some modification for use with British English participants (i.e., 
references to dollars changed to pounds, becoming president of your country changed to 
leader). 
Hypomanic personality traits have been associated with the pursuit of goals relating 
to popular fame, political influence, and wealth (Fulford et al., 2008; Carver & Johnson, 
2009; Gruber & Johnson, 2009). Students with lifetime histories of bipolar disorder, as 
assessed by clinical interviewing, also report higher scores on the popular fame and wealth 
subscales (Johnson, Eisner & Carver, 2009). The WASSUP scales have demonstrate good 
internal consistencies (α = .72-.88, Fulford et al., 2008; Carver & Johnson, 2009). 
 
Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test – Win/Loss Version (SCEPT-WL: Novel 
Measure)  
The original SCEPT sentence completion assessment of autobiographical memory 
specificity (Raes et al., 2007) was adapted for use in the current study to assess goal-
related memory specificity. The SCEPT-WL consists of a series of eight sentence stems 
based upon those devised by Raes and colleagues (2007) (e.g., “Last year I...”) which have 
been adapted to include references to goal-related memories (i.e., a “win” or a “loss”, e.g. 
“The time I felt particularly successful...”, “When I failed...”) (see Appendix).  
Sentence completions are coded for their level of memory specificity, with 
completions coded as: specific, referring to an event that lasted less than a day and that 
occurred at a particular time and a place (e.g., “getting my exam results”); extended, 
referring to a specific event with a duration greater than a day (e.g., “revising for my 
exams this week”); categoric, referring to a category of events or repeating events (e.g., 
“going shopping”); semantic associate, referring to generic information about the self (e.g., 
“I‟m good at driving”); or omission for missed or incomplete sentences. Tendencies to 
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make over-general responses on the SCEPT have been associated with self-reported 
rumination scores (Raes et al., 2007), and with the experimental induction of abstract, 
evaluative ruminative-like cognitive styles (Raes et al., 2008b). 
 
Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Test (SCEFT: Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009) 
The SCEFT is an adapted version of the SCEPT designed to assess the specificity of future 
event imagination (Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009). Participants are required to complete 11 
sentence stems with reference to a future event (e.g., „„When I look forward to…‟‟), with 
responses on the SCEFT coded in the same manner as for the SCEPT.  Previous research 
using the SCEFT has indicated that non-clinical student participants appear to be less 
specific in their imagination of future events compared to their recall of past events 
(Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were directed to the study‟s website via advertisements placed on the 
University of Manchester‟s research volunteering intranet site and on the School of 
Psychological Science‟s electronic experimental participation system. The first page of the 
website presented electronic versions of the study‟s information sheet and consent form. 
Following informed consent, participants read instructions for the sentence completion 
tasks. Participants completed the sentence completion tasks prior to the questionnaire 
measures, the latter of which were presented in a randomised order on the study‟s website. 
The study received ethical approval from the School of Psychological Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Manchester. 
 
Data Analysis 
Responses on the sentence completion tasks were coded for their specificity by the first 
author (see Table 4.1.1 for examples), with a random sample of 25% of the sentence 
completions analysed by an independent coder who received training in the use of the 
coding scheme. High levels of agreement were noted between raters for the memory 
specificity codings (Cohen‟s κ = .87). Responses on the sentence completion measures and 
scores on the self-report questionnaire measures were assessed for normality, with no 
substantial deviations from normality observed. Bivariate correlational analyses were 
conducted to investigate the associations between the goal-related memory and future 
event imagination tasks, with the hypomania vulnerability and goal-pursuit questionnaires 
(BIS/BAS and WASSUP scales). An exploratory hierarchical regression analysis was 
conducted to assess which of these variables contributed the most variance to the self-
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reported vulnerability to hypomania, as measured by the HPS, whilst controlling for 
current hypo/manic and depressive symptoms. The survey software was programmed to 
prompt participants to complete any missing sentence completion or questionnaire items 
before responses were saved, therefore no data was missing for the 165 participants. 
 
 
Table 4.1.1. Example responses on the sentence completion tasks. 
 SCEPT 
SCEFT 
 Win Loss 
 
Specific 
 
The time I felt 
particularly successful… 
was during my 
postgraduate degree 
ceremony 
 
When I failed… my 
driving test 
 
Next week I… will 
play a tennis game 
with my brother 
Extended My greatest achievement 
was… getting to Everest 
base camp and travelling 
around India for three 
months 
I was let down when… 
my closest friend got in 
to a new relationship and 
I never heard from her 
very often 
In the future… I plan 
to go travelling around 
Asia 
Categoric I had achieved… many 
dance awards when I was 
dancing 
When I failed… any of 
the tests in secondary 
school I felt disappointed 
Next year… I would 
hope to visit Germany 
a number of times 
Semantic 
Associate 
The time I felt 
particularly successful... 
encourages me to work 
hard to get that feeling 
again 
It was disappointing 
when... I don‟t do as well 
as I think I should 
In the future I can 
clearly see how . . . 
unhappy I might be 
unless I overcome 
some of my many 
hang-ups 
 
 
Note: SCEPT = Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT), SCEFT = 
Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Test. 
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4.1.4 Results 
Means and standard deviations for scores on the self-report measures of hypomania 
vulnerability (HPS), current bipolar mood symptoms (ISS), reward sensitivity (BIS/BAS, 
DYS), and extreme goal-striving (WASSUP) are presented in Table 4.1.2. 
 
 
Table 4.1.2 Means, standard deviations and internal reliability statistics (Cronbach alphas) 
for scores on the symptom, vulnerability and goal measures 
 
 
 Mean S.D. Ranges α 
     
Symptom & Vulnerability Measures     
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) 17.99 8.67 1-43 .88 
Internal States Scale (ISS)     
ISS Activation 112.78 93.54 0-440 .74 
ISS Depression 47.78 52.193 0-200 .67 
ISS Perceived Conflict 122.95 100.73 0-500 .78 
ISS Well-Being 137.87 70.76 0-300 .76 
     
Goal Measures     
Behavioural Activation (BAS) & 
Inhibition Scales (BIS) 
  
 
 
BAS Drive 10.87 2.54 4-16 .81 
BAS Fun Seeking 11.90 2.10 6-16 .59 
BAS Reward Responsivity 17.16 2.04 10-20 .62 
Behavioural Inhibition Scale 22.15 4.09 10-28 .74 
Dysregulation of BAS 11.95 2.65 5-16 .80 
Willingly Approached Set of Statistically 
Unlikely Pursuits Scale (WASSUP) 
   
 
WASSUP Total 64.30 16.28 32-123 .84 
WASSUP Popular Fame 10.48 4.27 7-29 .83 
WASSUP Family Relationships 16.14 5.15 5-25 .80 
WASSUP World Impact 3.30 1.90 2-10 .83 
WASSUP Political Influence 2.73 1.45 2-10 .76 
WASSUP Friend Relationships 12.21 4.27 5-23 .73 
WASSUP Wealth 6.83 3.13 4-17 .70 
WASSUP Creative Accomplishments 12.61 3.64 5-25 .59 
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Mean Hypomanic Personality Scale scores in the current study were equivalent to 
those reported in previous studies sampling British students (Jones et al., 2007; Johnson & 
Jones, 2009; Dodd et al., 2010; Dempsey et al., 2011), as were scores on the behavioural 
activation and inhibition measures (Jones & Day, 2008; Dodd et al., 2010), and the Internal 
States Scale subscales (Mansell et al., 2008; Dodd et al., 2010; Dempsey et al., 2011), 
although mean scores on the Activation subscale were slightly lower than previously 
reported (e.g., Jones & Day, 2008), but were comparable with mean Activation scores 
reported earlier in this thesis (Dempsey et al., 2011; Dempsey et al., Study Two) (Please 
note that previous studies do not report mean WASSUP subscale scores). 
 
Correlations 
Pearson‟s correlations were conducted to investigate the associations between hypomania 
vulnerability (HPS), goal-planning (WASSUP) with memory specificity for past goal-
related events (SCEPT-WL) and the imageability of future events (SCEFT) (See Table 
4.1.3). In relation to our first prediction, that heightened hypomania vulnerability would be 
positively associated with increased reward sensitivity and extreme goal-planning, scores 
on the HPS were positively associated with the WASSUP scales and the BAS subscales, 
whilst HPS scores were negatively associated with BIS, consistent with the first prediction. 
In terms of the second prediction, that hypomania vulnerability would be associated with 
the recall of generally detailed goal-related memories, the recall of specific events relating 
to past goal-successes (SCEPT-Win) was negatively associated with HPS scores and with 
extrinsic extreme goals measured by the WASSUP (World Impact, Political Influence and 
Creative Accomplishments). However, extreme goals relating to Family Relationships 
were positively associated with specific memories for past goal accomplishments.  
Tendencies to generate semantic associations, relating to generalised information 
about the self for past goal-related successes, were positively associated with HPS scores, 
the extrinsic goal-striving subscales of the WASSUP (PF, WI, PI and CA), BAS Drive, but 
negatively with BIS. BAS Fun Seeking and Reward Responsivity were both positively 
associated with the generation of categoric memories for past goal-related successes. HPS 
scores were also positively associated with tendencies to image future repeating events on 
the SCEFT task. Responses on the SCEPT-Loss, relating to memories for past goal-related 
failures, were generally uncorrelated with HPS scores and the goal-measures, except 
specific goal-failure memories which were associated with WASSUP Family Relationships 
(r = .141, p < .05) and Creative Accomplishment (r = -.188, p < .01). However, scores on 
the BAS reward responsivity measure were positively associated with extended memories 
for memories relating to past goal failures and positively with extended future events. 
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Table 4.1.3 Means and Standard Deviations for responses on the sentence completion measures for the goal related memory (SCEPT) and future event 
imagination tasks (SCEFT), and correlations between the goal-striving questionnaire measures (WASSUP, BAS, DYS, BIS) with hypomania vulnerability 
(HPS), past goal-related memory recall (SCEPT-WL) and future event imagination (SCEFT). 
 Mean 
(S.D.) 
HPS 
WASSUP  BAS  
DYS BIS  
 
PF FaR WI PI FrR W CA  D FS RR 
HPS    .413c .203b .314c .324c .234b .348 c .481c  .459 c .389 c .272 c .194b -.168a 
SCEPT Win                 
Specific 1.82 (1.10) -.156
a
 -.096 .183
b
 -.175 
a
 -.190
b
 .078 -.060 -.148
a
  -.123 -.102 -.036 .049 .123 
Extended .81 (.81) -.101 .054 -.121 -.085 -.091 -.177
a
 -.006 -.028  -.045 -.055 -.077 -.067 .045 
Categoric .36 (.62) .033 -.084 .020 .006 -.123 .103 -.047 .026  .112 .142
a
 .185
b
 -.122 .042 
Semantic Associate .52 (.71) .322
c
 .159
a
 -.057 .277
c
 .373
c
 -.047 .128 .185
b
  .162
 a
 .077 .054 .070 -.150
a
 
SCEPT Loss                 
Specific 2.22 (1.09) -.114 -.121 .141
a
 -.088 -.016 .040 -.048 -.188
b
  -.049 -.107 -.030 .019 .058 
Extended .66 (.79) .024 .126 .007 .031 -.016 -.031 .105 .110  .018 .045 .167
a
 -.003 -.109 
Categoric .37 (.60) -.051 -.078 -.104 -.076 -.062 -.033 -.061 .062  -.005 .035 -.010 -.102 .125 
Semantic Associate .57 (.68) .093 .118 -.070 .066 .019 .050 -.001 .076  .032 .067 -.067 -.003 .007 
SCEFT                 
Specific 1.74 (1.18) -.014 -.110 .047 -.085 -.041 .026 .006 .001  -.090 -.048 -.020 -.001 .104 
Extended 3.90 (1.79) -.082 .074 .170
a
 -.038 -.048 .065 .120 .105  .056 -.035 .168
a
 -.108 .042 
Categoric .65 (.84) .132
 a
 .047 -.004 -.027 -.072 .062 .022 .047  -.018 .007 .026 -.118 .001 
Semantic Associate 4.22 (2.06) -.003 -.040 -.119 .106 .050 -.031 -.126 -.077  .046 .073 -.035 .117 -.029 
NB: Willingly Approached Set of Statistically Unlikely Pursuits (WASSUP): PF = Popular Fame, FaR = Family Life, WI = World Impact, PI = Political Influence, FrR = Friend 
Relationships, W = Wealth, CA = Creative Accomplishments. BIS = Behavioural Inhibition, Behavioural Activation System (BAS) Subscales: D = Drive, FS = Fun Seeking, RR = 
Reward Responsivity, DYS = BAS Dysregulation, HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. Significant correlations in bold, 
a
 p < .05, 
b 
p < .01, 
c
 p < .001
2
1
1
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Regression Analysis 
An exploratory hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to investigate 
which combination of the goal-striving, reward sensitivity, extreme goal-planning, and 
goal-related memory measures explained the largest proportion of variance in HPS scores.  
 HPS scores were entered as the dependent variable, with scores on the ISS 
Activation and ISS Depression measures entered into the first block of the regression to 
account for the effect of current subclinical bipolar mood symptoms upon memory recall 
and scores on the goal-related questionnaires. The goal-related memory questionnaire 
measures which correlated with HPS scores were entered into the second block using 
forward entry, to allow the assessment of the additive contributions of the goal measure 
subscales to be examined (including the WASSUP and BIS/BAS Scales), with the memory 
recall and future event measures entered into the third block (SCEPT-Win specific 
memories and semantic associates, and SCEFT categoric memories) (see Table 4.1.4). 
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Table 4.1.4 Results of the regression analysis investigating the proportion of variance 
explained in HPS scores according to extreme goal-striving, reward sensitivity, goal-
related memory recall and future event imagination. 
 
 R
2
 B SE B β t 
Step 1 .218***     
ISS Activation  .04 .01 .47 6.45*** 
ISS Depression  .00 .01 .01 .10 
Step 2 .314***     
ISS Activation  .02 .01 .21 3.26*** 
ISS Depression  .01 .01 .05 .85 
WASSUP Creative Accomplishments  .66 .14 .28 4.76*** 
WASSUP Political Influence  1.30 .34 .22 3.78*** 
BAS Drive  .90 .20 .27 4.49*** 
BAS Fun Seeking  1.09 .24 .26 4.60*** 
Step 3 .032**     
ISS Activation  .02 .01 .23 3.68** 
ISS Depression  .01 .01 .05 .90 
WASSUP Creative Accomplishments  .60 .14 .25 4.41*** 
WASSUP Political Influence  1.06 .36 .18 2.95** 
BAS Drive  .85 .20 .25 4.31*** 
BAS Fun Seeking  1.06 .23 .26 4.59*** 
SCEPT Win Semantic Associate  1.98 .80 .16 2.47* 
SCEPT Win Specific Memories  .52 .49 .06 1.06 
SCEFT Categoric  1.41 .55 .14 2.56* 
 
Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01,* p < .05. BAS = Behavioural Activation, ISS = Internal 
States Scale, WASSUP = Willingly Approached Set of Statistically Unlikely Pursuits 
Scale, SCEPT = Sentence Completion for Events in the Past Test, SCEFT = Sentence 
Completion for Events in the Future Test. 
 
The regression equation was significant overall (F(8, 156) = 22.539, p < .001) and 
explained 56.7% of variance in HPS scores. The regression met criteria for independent 
errors (Durbin-Watson = 2.065), and no substantial multicolinearity existed between 
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predictor variables (VIFs < 1.2, Tolerances > .80). When controlling for current 
hypo/manic and depressive symptoms in the first block (ISS Activation and Depression 
subscales), tendencies to plan extreme goals relating to creative accomplishments and 
political influence (WASSUP scales), the heightened sensitivity to rewards and drive in the 
pursuit of goals (BAS Drive and Reward Responsivity), and tendencies to associate past 
goal success to semantic self-information (SCEPT Win) and imagine future repeating 
events (SCEFT) were independent predictors of HPS scores. 
 
4.1.5 Discussion 
The current study investigated the associations between goal-striving and reward 
responsivity in relation to the vulnerability to hypomania and bipolar disorder. Whilst 
previous research has suggested that individuals with bipolar disorder and those at-risk 
may possess dysfunctional recall strategies for autobiographical memories (e.g., Scott et 
al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004; Delduca et al., 2010; Dempsey et al., submitted-c, e, f), no 
study has investigated the way in which goal-related memory recall may influence 
vulnerability to hypomania in relation to goal-pursuit. Although one previous study had 
suggested that the experience of hypomanic episodes by individuals diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder appeared to be associated with the imagination of vivid images relating to future 
enjoyable events (Gregory et al., 2010), it was unclear how goal-related memory recall 
processes may be associated with hypomania vulnerability in at-risk individuals. 
The results of the current study supported our first prediction that the vulnerability 
to hypomania would be associated with the setting of extreme goals and increased reward 
sensitivity, with HPS scores positively associated with all of the extreme goal subscales of 
the WASSUP scale and with increased reward responsivity as measured by the BAS 
subscales, consistent with previous observations (e.g., Johnson & Carver, 2006; Jones et 
al., 2007). In relation to our second prediction, that hypomania vulnerability would be 
associated with the recall of overgeneral memories for past goal-related events, HPS scores 
were positively associated with tendencies to generate memories relating to generic 
semantic information about the self during past goal-related successes. The greater 
vulnerability to hypomania was also associated with the generation of fewer specific 
memories relating to past goal-related successes, consistent with our predictions.  
In terms of the associations between goal-related memory and extreme goal-
planning, it was noted that tendencies to plan extreme goals relating to extrinsic and public 
success were correlated with hypomanic personality traits and with tendencies to produce 
semantic associates for past successes. Semantic associates refer to a class of generic 
memory representations which incorporate general information about the self without 
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reference to a specific event or to an extended period of time. In the current study, 
semantic associates for past successes included statements such as: “The time when I felt 
particularly successful... everything seemed easy”, “I had achieved… the ability to 
overcome any problems thrown at me”, “I had achieved… academic success and 
development as a person”. Rather than being associated with the recall of specific 
successes (e.g., winning a competition), individuals at a higher vulnerability to hypomania 
appear to focus more upon generalised information about the self. Regression analysis also 
indicated that the vulnerability to hypomania was associated with the pursuit of extreme 
goals relating to creative accomplishments and political fame, behavioural activation in 
relation to fun seeking and drive to accomplish goals, and with the recall of generalised 
information in relation to past goal-related successes and the imagination of future 
categoric, or repeating, events, independent of current bipolar symptoms.  
 That hypomanic personality traits are associated with the setting of extreme goals 
which may attract public attention and rewards, such as achieving celebrity fame, is 
consistent with previous research (Gruber & Johnson, 2009). The setting of extreme goals 
was also associated with hypomania vulnerability when controlling for current bipolar 
mood symptoms, again consistent with previous observations (Johnson & Carver, 2006). 
These results lend support to the hypothesis that the extreme goal-striving associated with 
hypomania vulnerability is not just due to the current experience of hypo/manic or 
depressive symptoms, but does suggest that other psychological factors may confer 
vulnerability, namely heightened reward sensitivity and goal-related memory processes. 
The current study is also consistent with previous observations that individuals vulnerable 
to hypomania and individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorders have tendencies to recall 
their autobiographical memories in general levels of detail (Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & 
Lam, 2004; Dempsey et al., submitted-c). However, the current study suggests that at-risk 
individuals tend to focus upon general semantic information about the self for past goal-
achievements rather than recall specific memories for past successes.  
One mechanism which may explain the recall of goal-related successes in general 
detail is positive rumination, which encapsulates three different forms of cognitive 
responses to positive affect. One subtype of positive rumination is self-focused rumination, 
relating to repetitive thought processes focused upon the self and goal-accomplishment 
(Feldman et al., 2008). Higher scores on the self-focused subscale of the Responses to 
Positive Affect scale developed by Feldman and colleagues (2008) have been associated 
with elevated self-esteem, hypomania vulnerability and manic symptoms within non-
clinical samples (Feldman et al., 2008). The engagement in self-focused positive 
rumination may assist in the excessive focus upon generalised self-focused goal-related 
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successes relating to one‟s capabilities in achieving goals, rather than the recall of specific 
successful events which may not portray the self in a self-positive manner. Whilst the 
current study cannot account for the influence of positive ruminative thought processes on 
goal-related memory recall, further research is required to evaluate whether positive 
rumination is associated with the embellishment of goal-related events in memory and 
whether such events have been subjected to self-appraisal biases, contributing to more 
extreme goal-pursuit in vulnerable individuals.  
 There are some additional limitations to consider. Due to the cross-sectional nature 
of the study it is unclear as whether striving for extreme goals and goal-related memory 
processes are associated with hypomania vulnerability over the long term. It also unclear 
whether vulnerable individuals continue to endorse these extreme goals and what the 
impact of long term extreme goal-pursuit may have on an individual‟s well-being. It may 
be possible that the association between extreme goal setting and hypomania could be due 
to a third factor, such as self-focused positive rumination which may be a stronger 
prospective predictor of hypomania vulnerability than dysfunctional goal-related memory. 
Due the exploratory nature of the correlational analyses conducted in the current study, 
there is a risk of Type 1 errors through multiple comparisons. The current sample was also 
largely female and there was no assessment of the participants‟ past clinical histories. It is 
possible that some participants may have previously experienced clinically significant 
mood symptoms, and may have scored more highly on the goal sensitivity measures, for 
example, due to their past experiences of bipolar spectrum symptoms. Whilst the current 
study focused upon individuals with personality traits associated with a predisposition for 
hypomania, whether similar goal-related memory processes are prevalent in individuals 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder requires investigation. 
 
4.1.6 Conclusions 
In sum, whilst previous research has suggested that individuals on the bipolar disorder 
spectrum possess dysfunctional “overgeneral” autobiographical memory recall strategies, 
the current study suggests that at-risk individuals have tendencies to focus upon 
generalised self-knowledge rather than individual occasions of success when thinking 
about past goal-related memories. The recall of semantic information for past goal-related 
successes was also independent of bipolar mood symptoms, suggesting that the recall of 
self-information for past goal successes is not just due to heightened activated states. The 
results of the current study are in line with the self-focused positive rumination literature 
which suggests that thought processes focused upon the self and the accomplishment of 
goals are associated with hypomania vulnerability and extreme goal-pursuit. 
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5.0 Abstract  
The overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories is prevalent in major depressive 
disorder and appears to be a cognitive vulnerability factor for depression in non-clinical 
samples. Previous research has suggested that individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder, 
and those at-risk for bipolar illnesses, can experience similar difficulties in the recall of 
specific autobiographical memories. Although there is a developing body of research 
investigating memory specificity in bipolar samples, many of these studies are associated 
with methodological issues, particularly in the use of non-standardised memory 
assessments. The following section details two studies which investigated autobiographical 
memory specificity in individuals currently in remission from bipolar disorder and a 
sample of healthy controls, as well as in individuals considered to be at risk for 
experiencing future bipolar disorders. 
 Study Seven investigated the specificity of autobiographical memory recall in 
individuals considered to be at a low, moderate, or a high risk for hypomania using 
Williams & Broadbent‟s (1986) Autobiographical Memory Test. In contrast to previous 
research, Study Seven found that individuals at a high-risk for hypomania reported greater 
overgeneral autobiographical memory across positive and negative memories compared to 
low and moderate-risk participants, but there were no significant between group 
differences in response latencies for the time taken to recall memories. Study Eight 
investigated autobiographical memory specificity in a sample of eighteen individuals 
currently in remission from bipolar disorder and a comparison group of eighteen age and 
gender-matched non-bipolar control participants. Bipolar participants demonstrated greater 
overgeneral autobiographical memory than the control group, with bipolar participants also 
recalling more negative general memories than the control group. Whilst the bipolar group 
were more overgeneral in their memory recall, participants diagnosed with bipolar disorder 
were also significantly faster to recall specific negative autobiographical memories than 
controls.  
The results of Studies Seven and Eight support a continuum view of increased 
overgenerality across vulnerable individuals and individuals diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder. Study Eight suggests that whilst bipolar disorder is associated with a general 
tendency to be overgeneral during autobiographical memory recall, individuals with 
bipolar disorder have ready access to specific negative memories via more direct forms of 
memory recall. The increased availability of self-negative memories is consistent with 
previous research demonstrating that bipolar individuals have particular sensitivities to 
self-negative information even during remission. The implications of these results are 
discussed. 
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Section 5.1 
 
Introduction: Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
Across the Bipolar Disorder Spectrum 
 
5.1.1 General Introduction 
Similar cognitive factors are thought to underlie the vulnerability to major depressive 
disorder and bipolar disorder. Research has suggested that the engagement in ruminative 
thought patterns (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), tendencies to make dysfunctional self-
appraisals (Jones et al., 2006; Mansell et al., 2007; Jones & Day, 2008), and the 
overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories are associated with the vulnerability to 
mood disorders (Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Delduca et al., 2010). 
Autobiographical memory is a form of hierarchically structured episodic memory, 
where memory representations are differentiated according to the specificity of the detail 
described for the original memory event (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Lifetime 
periods are the broadest level of representation, which encapsulate memories for periods of 
time lasting years, organised by thematic content (e.g., “relationships”). General Events are 
a more specific intermediate level of representation which encompass memories for events 
with shorter durations than lifetime periods (e.g., “when I went on holiday to…”), and can 
also feature repeating occurrences of the same type of event (e.g., “going shopping”). 
Memory representations at the General Events level also form clusters of generally-
detailed events, usually according to thematic content, such as self-propositional 
information or goal-attainment knowledge. The most detailed level of memory 
representation, Event Specific Knowledge (ESK), refers to the memory for specific events 
which are unique events with durations of less than a day (e.g., “during my job interview”) 
(Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Representations at the ESK level are associated with 
sensory-perceptual information relating to the original event (e.g., mental imagery), the 
recall of which allows for the correct identification and detailed recall of that specific event 
(Johnson et al., 1988; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
 Memory recall within the autobiographical memory system can occur in one of two 
ways, through generative or direct recall. Generative recall refers to a staged, top-down 
recall process whereby a specific memory representation is identified through the 
activation of representations located at the Lifetime Periods level, through to General 
Events, and the activation of a specific memory in ESK. Direct recall refers to the 
immediate activation of a specific memory through the presentation of a cue that activates 
the ESK unique to that event.  
 220 
A variety of studies have indicated that a number of mental health conditions are 
associated with difficulties in the full and specific recall of autobiographical memories, 
including major depressive disorder (Williams & Scott, 1988), suicidality (Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Dritschel, 1988), and bipolar disorder (Scott et al., 2000; 
Mansell & Lam, 2004). Individuals diagnosed with these conditions tend to generate 
general descriptions of memories, known as the “overgeneral” memory bias, where the 
recall process becomes stuck at the intermediate general memory representations of the 
memory system (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The overgeneral recall of 
autobiographical memories has been associated with poorer illness outcomes in depressed 
individuals (Peeters et al., 2002; Raes et al., 2006; Sumner et al., 2010), including greater 
probabilities of remaining clinically depressed at a four week follow-up (Hermans et al., 
2008), and with poorer responses to antidepressant medication (Brittlebank et al., 1993) 
and electro-convulsive therapy (Raes et al., 2008a). The inability to recall specific 
autobiographical memories would appear to have an important impact upon an individual‟s 
psychological well-being. 
Although few studies have been conducted in bipolar samples, research has 
suggested that individuals in remission from bipolar disorder and depressed individuals 
report low specificities of autobiographical memory (Scott et al., 2000; Mowlds et al., 
2010). However, one study has suggested that remitted bipolar patients are more general in 
their recall of negative memories compared to remitted unipolar patients (Mansell & Lam, 
2004). Somewhat mixed findings have been reported in samples of currently unwell 
bipolar individuals, with similar patterns of memory specificity reported between currently 
manic and depressed bipolar patients and currently depressed unipolar patients (Tzemou 
and Birchwood, 2007). However, Van der Gucht and colleagues (2009) observed that 
currently hypomanic and manic bipolar patients recalled fewer specific negative memories 
than non-bipolar participants. Although Tzemou and Birchwood (2007) and Van der Gucht 
and colleagues (2009) reported little difference in memory specificity between currently 
manic and depressed bipolar patients, Gregory and colleagues have suggested that different 
bipolar mood episodes are associated with qualitatively different memory recall processes 
(Gregory et al., 2010). Using a memory-focused interview, currently euthymic bipolar 
individuals reported that past euthymic states were associated with intrusive memories and 
mental imagery of the past, which were rated as less distressing compared to intrusions 
during past depressive episodes. In contrast, previous hypomanic episodes were associated 
with pleasant and vivid images of imagined future events, whilst previous depressions 
were associated with intrusive memories of past negative events and with vivid and 
distressing images of future negative events (Gregory et al., 2010). 
 221 
Few studies have investigated the specificity of autobiographical memory in 
individuals considered to be at-risk for future bipolar disorder. Delduca and colleagues 
(2010) compared performance on the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT: Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986) between groups of students reporting high or low scores on the 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), an established self-report 
measure of the risk for future hypomania and bipolar disorder. Basing their hypotheses on 
the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) framework (Barnard & Teasdale, 1991), 
Delduca and colleagues predicted that high-risk individuals would recall more specific 
autobiographical memories than low-risk participants, assuming that the high-risk 
participants are more likely to be engaged in experiential modes of processing associated 
with specific memory recall and hypomanic states. Delduca and colleagues (2010) reported 
that the high-risk group recalled more specific memories in response to negative cue words 
than the low-risk group, with no group differences in the recall specificities of positive 
memories. The high-risk participants were also faster to recall memories across cue 
valences and for negative memories.  
One interpretation of these findings is that the behavioural risk for hypomania is 
associated with an increased availability of self-negative information in autobiographical 
memories, possibly reflecting a latent negative self-concept or self-schema. The 
availability of negative information about the self may prompt potentially dysfunctional 
emotion regulation strategies that attempt to reduce negative moods and increase positive 
affect (Thomas & Bentall, 2002), as has been suggested by the depression avoidance and 
response styles literatures. However, there is a concern regarding the cue words used in 
Delduca and colleagues‟ (2010) study, where the negative cue words may have prompted 
the direct recall of specific negative memories (e.g., “angry”, “lonely”, “sorry”) compared 
to the use of less positive “pleasant” cues which may not have activated specific 
representations of positive memories (e.g., “safe”, “surprised”, “interested”). Although, 
Delduca and colleagues (2010) acknowledge this, it remains unclear how individuals at-
risk for future bipolar disorder perform on the Autobiographical Memory Test. 
 A recent study by Dempsey and colleagues (submitted-c) used a sentence 
completion measure of autobiographical memory specificity, and observed that individuals 
at a high risk for hypomania recalled more general negative autobiographical memories 
than individuals at a low-risk for hypomania, in contrast to Delduca et al‟s findings. A 
second study by Dempsey et al. (submitted-d) suggested that individuals at a higher risk for 
hypomania have more overgeneral memory biases for past goal-related events, particularly 
in relation to semantic information about the self in the pursuit of goals, which was 
associated with heightened sensitivity to rewards and more extreme goal-pursuit. 
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 Although there is a growing body of research investigating autobiographical 
memory specificity in bipolar disorder, many of these studies contain methodological 
flaws. Whilst some studies conducted within bipolar samples have used the standardised 
AMT (Scott et al., 2000; Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007; Van der Gucht et al., 2009), 
subsequent studies have used interview-based assessments of memory specificity (Gregory 
et al., 2010) or have substantially deviated from the standardised AMT procedure (Mansell 
& Lam, 2004). For example, Mansell and Lam (2004) presented their participants with two 
lists of four positive and four negative cue words, and asked participants to recall a 
memory for one word of their choice from each list. Participants in Mansell & Lam‟s study 
may have preferentially recalled particular memories as an affect regulatory strategy, by 
avoiding cue words relating to unpleasant memories. In sum, there is a dearth of research 
investigating autobiographical memory specificity using the standardised AMT procedure 
within samples of individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder and those at-risk for future 
bipolar disorders. At present only one study has investigated the specificity of 
autobiographical memory recall using the standardised AMT procedure in a sample of 
individuals in remission from bipolar disorder (Scott et al., 2000). 
 
5.1.2 The Present Research 
This section details two studies which investigated the specificity of autobiographical 
memory recall using the Autobiographical Memory Test (Williams & Broadbent, 1986), in 
an at-risk sample for hypomania, and within a sample of individuals currently in remission 
from bipolar disorder. Study Seven investigated the specificity of autobiographical 
memory using the AMT in groups of individuals at a low, moderate or high risk for 
hypomania, and aimed to investigate whether high-risk individuals would report similar 
biases in memory specificity as suggested by Delduca and colleagues (2010), or report 
similar levels of overgenerality as suggested by previous studies in bipolar samples (e.g., 
Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004). Study Eight replicated the AMT procedure used 
in Study Seven within a sample of individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder in remission 
from symptoms, and an age and gender matched control group. Study Eight attempted to 
address methodological issues identified in previous studies by using the standardised 
AMT format. A sample of individuals currently in remission from bipolar disorder were 
recruited to avoid potential confounds with the experience of extreme mood states.  
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Section 5.2 
 
Study Seven  
 
The Specificity of Autobiographical Memory in 
Individuals at Risk for Hypomania 
5.2.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of Study Seven was to investigate the specificity of autobiographical 
memory recall in a sample of individuals considered to be at a behavioural risk for 
hypomania and future bipolar disorders. In contrast to the previous study conducted within 
groups of individuals at a low or a high degree of risk for bipolar disorder (Delduca et al., 
2010), the current study investigated memory specificity in individuals considered to be at 
a low, moderate, or a high degree of risk as indexed by scores on the Hypomanic 
Personality Scale (HPS: Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Previous studies have compared 
moderate versus high-risk groups in relation to behavioural activation sensitivities and 
hypomania vulnerability (e.g., Alloy et al, 2006), whilst other studies have sampled groups 
of students at a low, moderate and high risk or “caseness” for bipolar disorder based upon 
HPS scores when investigating between-group differences in mood fluctuations (Hofmann 
& Meyer, 2006) and bipolar symptom experiences (Udachina & Mansell, 2007). The 
current study adopted a similar approach and recruited groups of participants at a low, 
moderate and a high vulnerability for hypomania. 
 The comparison between individuals at a moderate and at a high level of risk 
allows for a more stringent investigation of whether autobiographical memory specificity 
is associated with an elevated risk for bipolar disorder when compared to individuals who 
posses moderate degrees of risk. Comparing between groups of individuals at a high or low 
risk may only assess the presence versus a complete absence of bipolar risk factors, whilst 
the majority of individuals typically report scores of around 15-17 on the Hypomanic 
Personality Scale (e.g., Dempsey et al., in press). Although the personality traits associated 
with hypomania can be associated with negative outcomes, including the vulnerability to 
bipolar disorder and other psychiatric conditions (Kwapil et al., 2000), possessing some 
hypomanic characteristics can be advantageous in moderation, such as increased drive, 
energy, and creativity (Meyer & Hofmann, 2005; Furnham, Batey, Anand & Manfield, 
2008). Individuals who report low scores on the HPS, who therefore posses few of the 
personality traits associated with hypomania, may themselves reflect an “abnormal” group 
of individuals.  
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 Although the majority of the research into autobiographical memory has used the 
standardised Autobiographical Memory Task (AMT) devised by Williams & Broadbent 
(1986), including the previous investigation in an at-risk sample for bipolar disorder 
(Delduca et al., 2010), there has been some concern that the AMT procedure may not be 
sufficiently sensitive to detect overgeneral memory recall within non-clinical samples 
(Raes et al., 2007). Despite these reservations regarding the AMT and it‟s suitability for 
use with non-clinical samples, Study Seven utilised the standardised AMT procedure 
within an at-risk sample in order to allow comparisons with the previous study by Delduca 
and colleagues (2010). The AMT was also used in the current study in order to compare 
performances between an at-risk sample (Study Seven) and a sample of individuals in 
remission from bipolar disorder (Study Eight). The General Discussion (Section 6) will 
consider the methodological issues regarding the assessment of memory specificity using 
the standardised AMT task and the recently devised sentence completion measures of 
memory specificity as used in Studies Five and Six. 
 
Hypotheses 
It was hypothesised that the greater risk for hypomania would be associated with the 
overgeneral recall of negative memories. Due to concerns regarding the use of negatively 
biased cue words in Delduca and colleagues‟ (2010) study, the current study hypothesised 
that individuals at a higher risk for hypomania and future bipolar disorders would report 
similar biases in memory recall as suggested by previous research conducted in bipolar 
patient samples (e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004). This hypothesis is 
consistent with a continuum view of bipolar disorder, whereby individuals at risk for 
experiencing hypomania and developing bipolar affective disorders would be considered to 
perform in a similar manner to bipolar individuals on the AMT. It was anticipated that the 
high-risk group would recall more overgeneral negative memories than the moderate and 
low risk groups, with the low-risk group reporting fewer overgeneral negative memories 
than the moderate-risk group. 
It was also anticipated that participants across groups would recall specific 
memories in shorter (faster) response latencies than general memories, consistent with the 
notion that generative retrieval is more time-consuming and effortful than direct recall 
processes (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In addition, it was anticipated that 
individuals at a higher-risk for hypomania would be faster to recall specific negative 
memories consistent with previous research (Delduca et al., 2009). This fast recall of 
negative memories may reflect a failure to protect the self from the unpleasant emotional 
consequences of recalling specific negative memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), 
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possibly due to poor emotion regulation strategies (Williams, 2006), but also as a 
consequence of direct retrieval processes whereby individuals are unable to avoid recalling 
specific memories through overgenerality (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The fast and 
automatic recall of specific negative memories would then prompt dysfunctional attempts 
to cope with such self-negative information in at-risk individuals, as suggested by the 
rumination literature (Thomas & Bentall, 2002; Thomas et al., 2007). Although high-risk 
individuals may be more overgeneral in their memory recall under generative retrieval 
conditions, these individuals may retain the fast recall of some specific memories due to 
direct retrieval processes, as suggested by previous research conducted in both non-bipolar 
clinical samples (Hauer et al., 2008) and bipolar samples (Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007).  
 
5.2.2 Method 
Design 
The current study used a 3 x 2 x 2 design, with HPS group as a between-subjects factor 
(low, moderate or high), and two within-subject factors on the AMT, cue word valence 
(positive versus negative) and memory specificity (specific versus general).  
 
Participants 
A total of 358 participants from the community of the University of Manchester completed 
the Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) as part of a previous study (Dempsey et al., 2011), 
and consented to leaving their contact details for the current study. 153 participants from 
the screening stage were invited via email to take part in the current study according to 
whether they scored one standard deviation above (High HPS group, n = 62) or below the 
group mean (Low HPS group, n = 54), whilst a group of individuals who reported HPS 
scores that were equal to the mean of the screening group were recruited for the Moderate 
HPS group (n = 37). A final sample of 58 participants took part in the study (19 low, 20 
moderate, and 17 high-risk participants, see Table 5.2.2). Participants took part voluntarily 
for no incentive (n = 11) or received course credits (n = 47). 
 
Materials 
 
The Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) 
The HPS is a 48-item questionnaire designed to assess the prevalence of hypomanic 
personality traits, which have been associated with vulnerability to hypomania and bipolar 
affective disorders (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Participants rate whether each hypomanic 
trait is true or false in relation to their own personality (e.g. “I often feel excited and happy 
for no apparent reason”). Individuals who score highly on the HPS are considered to be at a 
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greater risk for experiencing hypomanic mood episodes, and also at a high risk for 
developing bipolar affective disorders and experiencing psychopathological symptoms 
over time (Eckblad & Chapmn, 1986). The HPS has demonstrated good internal 
consistency (α = .87) and good test-retest reliability (r = .81; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). 
Good internal consistency was demonstrated in the current study (α = .88). 
 
The Internal States Scale (ISS) 
The ISS is a 16-item self-report measure of current bipolar mood symptoms (Bauer et al., 
1991). Each item on the ISS refers to a symptom associated with bipolar disorders, with 
items constituting four subscales measuring depressive symptoms (ISS Depression), 
hypo/manic symptoms (ISS Activation), interpersonal conflict (ISS Perceived Conflict), 
and well-being (ISS Well-Being). Participants rate the intensity of each symptom on 
100mm visual analogue scales anchored by 0 (“Not at all/rarely”) to 100 (“Very much 
so/most of the time”), with greater scores on the subscales reflecting the experience of 
more intense mood symptoms. Self-reported ISS scores are positively correlated with 
ratings of bipolar symptom severities made by clinicians (Bauer et al., 1991). The ISS 
subscales have demonstrated acceptable to good levels of reliability (α = .73-.82; Jones & 
Day, 2008; Dempsey et al., 2011). High levels of reliability were noted in the current study 
across the ISS subscales (ISS Activation, α = .81; ISS Depression, α = .84; ISS Perceived 
Conflict, α = .79; ISS Well-being, α = .86). 
 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
The PANAS is a 20-item measure of current positive and negative emotional states 
(Watson et al., 1988). Participants rate the extent to which they are currently experiencing 
10 positive (e.g., “happy”, “active”, “proud”) and 10 negative emotional states (e.g., 
“hostile”, “ashamed”, “distressed”), on five point scales (from 1 “Very slightly or not at 
all” to 5 “Extremely”). These positive and negative emotional states form two 10 item 
subscales measuring current levels of positive and negative affect. The PANAS subscales 
have demonstrated high levels of reliability in previous studies (Positive Affect, α = .86-
.90; Negative Affect α = .84-.87; Watson et al., 1988) and in the current study (Positive 
Affect, α = .87; Negative Affect α = .81). 
 
 
The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) 
The AMT is a cued memory task designed to assess the specificity of autobiographical 
memory recall (Williams & Broadbent, 1986), which has been used in a variety of clinical 
and non-clinical samples, including patients with recent histories of attempted suicide 
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(Williams & Dritschel, 1988), patients with major depressive disorder (Brittlebank et al., 
1993), hypomanic students (Delduca et al., 2010), and non-clinical student samples (Raes 
et al., 2003).  
Participants completing the AMT are presented with a series of cue words by the 
experimenter and are required to recall a memory that relates to the cue which 
encompasses a specific event, defined as an event that occurred at a particular time and a 
place with a duration of less than one day (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Participants are 
instructed to recall a different memory or event for each cue word, to not recall events that 
have occurred over the previous seven days as these may reflect short-term memories, and 
are also given a time limit in which to recall a memory (60 seconds in the current study).  
A pre-test was conducted in a separate sample prior to the current study to assess 
the emotional valence and intensity of a series of 44 cue words that have been used across 
previous AMT studies. A convenience sample of 30 native English speakers (Mean age = 
26.33 years, S.D. = 5.13; 20 females, 10 males) from the community of the University of 
Manchester completed a short online study and were asked to provide a rating for each cue 
word‟s valence and intensity on a seven-point scale (from -3 to +3, “extremely negative” to 
“extremely positive”). Based upon the results of the pre-test, a series of twelve cue words 
were chosen for use in the current study, including six positive and six negative cues, and 
three high and low intensity cue words for each valence (see Table 5.2.1 below). Eight of 
these cue words had previously been used in a study conducted in a sample of remitted 
bipolar patients (Mansell & Lam, 2004).  
 
 
Table 5.2.1 Cue words used in the current Autobiographical Memory Test. 
  Valence 
  Positive Negative 
Intensity 
High 
Adored* 
Excited 
Optimistic* 
Failure* 
Hate* 
Hopeless 
Low 
Confident* 
Happy 
Successful* 
Guilt 
Pessimistic* 
Unconfident* 
 
* Cue words used by Mansell & Lam (2004) 
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Procedure 
Participants who had been successfully screened into one of the study‟s groups were 
invited via email to take part in the face-to-face AMT study. After obtaining informed 
consent, participants completed the PANAS and the ISS to assess their mood and 
symptoms at baseline, and received standardised instructions for the AMT (see Appendix). 
Participants were instructed not to recall events that occurred within the previous seven 
days to prevent the recall of events from short-term memory. To familiarise the 
participants with the AMT and with the objective of the study to recall specific 
autobiographical memories, participants completed three practice trials (the practice cue 
words included: “Bread”, “Holiday”, and “Library”). The researcher (R.D.) gave a prompt 
if the participant failed to identify a specific event (“Can you think of a specific event? One 
particular episode?”). The researcher commenced the AMT once the participant had 
understood the nature of the AMT task and had successfully recalled three specific 
memories in the practice trials. 
 Participants were given a time limit of 60 seconds for each cue word in which to 
recall a specific memory during the main AMT task. The researcher audio-recorded the 
recalled memories on a digital dictaphone for later transcription. If the participant failed to 
recall a memory within the 60 second time limit this was noted as an omission. The 
participants were presented with twelve cue words in a randomised order. The researcher 
read out each cue in turn and presented participants with the cue word printed on a 
flashcard. Participants also completed a follow-up event-reporting and appraisal diary, 
including daily measures of subclinical bipolar mood symptoms and additional 
questionnaire measures not part of this study. The participants received a full debrief at the 
conclusion of the study, and were thanked for their participation. The study received 
ethical approval from the School of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee at 
the University of Manchester. 
 
Data Coding 
Responses on the AMT recall task were transcribed and coded for their specificity by the 
first author (R.D.). Responses on the memory task were coded as Specific, an Omission, or 
General, with general responses qualified in line with previous studies (Raes et al., 2003; 
(Raes et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2010c). The responses were coded in according to the 
following definitions: Specific, referring to the recollection of a specific event which 
occurred at a particular time and a place with a duration of less than a day (e.g., “my job 
interview at…”); Extended, an event that lasted longer than one day (e.g., “when I went on 
holiday to…”); Categoric, encompassing categories of events or repeating events (e.g., 
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“going to the pub”); Semantic Associate, referring to information about the self or others 
which does not refer to any event (e.g., “I am a poor cook”); or as an Omission. Semantic 
associates, extended and categoric memories were collapsed into one “general memory” 
category for data analysis. The response latency between the presentation of the cue word 
and the participant‟s first utterance relating to the recalled memory was later measured 
using a stopwatch (see Appendix for the coding manual). An independent rater receiving 
training in using the AMT coding scheme and coded a random sample of 25% (n = 14) of 
the memory transcripts for their specificity and recall latencies (in total 168 memories)
1
. 
The independent rater was blind to the group allocations of the transcripts. 
 
Data Analysis 
Memory specificity data, questionnaire scores, and the response latency timings were 
checked for normality from review of histograms and by conducting Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff tests, across individual groups and the sample as a whole. Data did not 
substantially deviate from normality. Between-group differences in questionnaire scores 
were assessed using analyses of variance, as were differences in response latencies on the 
AMT. The proportions of specific and general memories recalled on the AMT were 
compared between-groups using a mixed design analysis of variance and planned 
comparisons, with follow-up univariate ANOVAS employed to further analyse observed 
interaction effects. A Kruskal-Wallis test conducted to investigate between-group 
differences in the number of omissions. 
 
5.2.3 Results 
Preliminary data analysis indicated that two participants in the moderate HPS group were 
outliers on the memory specificity measures (S.D.s > 2.5, above the mean scores for 
omissions and general memories recalled on the AMT) and were excluded from 
subsequent analyses. Data analysis was conducted upon the remaining 56 participants (see 
Table 5.2.2 below for sample characteristics). 
 
 
Sample Characteristics 
Table 5.2.2 displays the demographic characteristics of the low, moderate and high risk 
groups, as well as scores on the Internal States Scale (ISS) and Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS) as measured at baseline, prior to the AMT task. 
                                                 
1
 There are no strict guidelines on the proportion of memories on the AMT that require coding by a second 
rater for the purposes of assessing inter-rater reliability. Previous studies have coded between 10% (Delduca 
et al., 2010), to 20% (Williams et al., 2006) and 33% of recall memories (Mowlds et al., 2010). 
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Table 5.2.2. Demographic characteristics and mean scores on the self-report measures of 
bipolar symptoms and emotional states across the High, Moderate and Low risk groups.  
 
 
Low-risk 
participants 
Moderate-risk 
participants  
High-risk 
participants 
 Mean (S.D) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
N 19 20 17 
Gender 1 male; 18 female 5 male; 15 female 2 male; 15 female 
HPS  5.11 (2.16) 17.27 (1.31) 27.94 (4.32) 
HPS Range scores 2-8 16-19 24-37 
Age (years) 23.58 (3.82) 23.25 (5.30) 21.94 (3.03) 
ISS Activation 107.53 (92.33) 167.50 (84.03) 219.76 (90.85) 
ISS Depression 21.95 (34.36) 34.95 (42.42) 29.29 (38.85) 
ISS Perceived Conflict 79.42 (93.87) 99.18 (62.27) 107.82 (71.64) 
ISS Well-being 173.21 (58.59) 164.27 (72.80) 184.00 (48.23) 
PANAS – PA 27.37 (6.09) 29.55 (7.98) 29.94 (5.27) 
PANAS - NA 12.37 (2.99) 14.55 (6.13) 13.59 (2.94) 
 
 
Note: HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale, ISS = Internal States Scale, PANAS: PA = 
Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect (standard deviations are presented in parentheses) 
 
 
Univariate ANOVAs indicated that there were no significant between-group 
differences in the mean age of the participants (F(2, 53) = .747, p = .479), whilst a separate 
ANOVA indicated that significant differences existed in mean HPS scores across groups 
(F(2, 53) = 198.895, p < .001; planned comparisons, p < .001). Mean HPS and ISS scores for 
the high and low groups were similar to those reported by Delduca and colleagues (2010), 
whilst mean HPS scores of the moderate group were consistent with mean scores reported 
in similar studies (Jones et al., 2007; Dodd et al., 2010). A Fisher‟s exact test using the 
Freeman-Halton extension for 2 x 3 contingency tables confirmed that there were no 
between-group differences in gender ratios (p = .217) (Freeman & Halton, 1951). No 
between-group differences were noted for PANAS or the ISS scores, except for the ISS 
Activation scale (F(2, 55) = 7.208, p < .01), with planned contrasts indicating that the Low-
risk group reported lower ISS Activation scores than the Moderate-risk group (p < .05) and 
high-risk group (p < .05), whilst a non-significant trend was noted between the moderate 
and high-risk groups (p = .074).   
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Inter-rater reliability 
A random sample of 25% transcripts from across the three risk groups were coded by an 
independent rater to check the reliability of the coding for the specificity of the recalled 
memories and the timing of the response latencies. There were high levels of agreement 
between coders for the specificity of the recalled memories (92.86% agreement; Cohen‟s 
Kappa = .79). High levels of agreement in the response latency timings were also observed 
between the coders (r = .95, p < .001), and no significant differences in response latency 
timings between raters were observed (t(167) = -.952, p = .342). 
 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
Table 5.2.3, displays the mean number of autobiographical memories recalled by 
participants across the low, moderate and high-risk groups according to cue word valences 
and the specificity of the recalled memory.  
 
 
Table 5.2.3. The valence and specificity of recalled autobiographical memories across the 
whole sample and by high, moderate and low risk groups. 
 
 HPS Group 
All Groups Memory Specificity 
Mean (S.D.) 
Low Moderate High 
All cues     
Specific 10.15 (1.84) 9.32 (1.95) 8.56 (2.31) 9.38 (2.08) 
General 1.35 (1.76) 1.42 (1.21) 2.88 (1.93) 1.84 (1.75) 
Omissions .53 (.61) 1.15 (1.23) .59 (1.18) .77 (1.06) 
Positive cues     
Total memories 5.79 (.41) 5.65 (.59) 5.82 (.53) 5.75 (.51) 
Specific 5.35 (.99) 4.84 (1.07) 4.69 (1.25) 4.98 (1.10) 
General .45 (.83) .79 (.86) 1.13 (1.15) .77 (.95) 
Omissions .20 (.41) .37 (.60) .19 (.54) .25 (.51) 
Negative cues     
Total memories 5.68 (.48) 5.15 (.81) 5.64 (.71) 5.46 (.71) 
Specific 4.80 (1.01) 4.47 (1.17) 3.88 (1.46) 4.39 (1.25) 
General .90 (1.07) .63 (.68) 1.76 (1.34) 1.07 (1.13) 
Omissions .30 (.47) .84 (.84) .38 (.72) .52 (.71) 
N.B. HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. 
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 A 3 x 2 x 2 mixed design analysis of variance was conducted to investigate 
between-group differences in memory specificity with group as a between-subjects factor 
(low, moderate or high), and cue word valence (positive vs. negative) and memory 
specificity (specific vs. general) as within-subject factors. The ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of cue word valence (F(1, 53) = 1.685, p < .001), with participants 
recalling more memories for positive (M = 5.75, S.D. = .51) than negative cues (M = 5.46, 
S.D. = .71) irrespective of memory specificity, but the group by valence interaction did not 
reach significance (F(2, 53) = 2.110, p = .131). A significant main effect of memory 
specificity was observed (F(1, 53) = 254.831, p < .001), indicating that participants were 
more likely to generate specific (M = 9.38, S.D. = 2.08) than general memories on the 
AMT (M = 1.84, S.D. = 1.75), which was further qualified by a significant interaction 
effect between memory specificity and group (F(2, 53) = 4.098, p < .05) (See Figure 5.2.1 
below). The interaction effect between memory specificity and HPS group was further 
explored in a univariate ANOVA, with the difference in the number of specific versus 
general memories recalled (i.e., specific minus general memories) as the dependent 
variable and group as a between-subjects factor. The ANOVA was significant (F(2, 53) = 
3.556, p < .05), with the high-risk group reporting greater overgenerality than the low 
(planned contrasts, p < .05) and moderate groups (p < .05), in line with predictions.  
 
 
Figure 5.2.1 The interaction effect of memory specificity and risk group (HPS group) 
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Note: HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. 
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 A significant interaction effect between memory specificity and valence was also 
observed (F(1, 53) = 10.400, p < .01), indicating that participants were more likely to recall 
specific memories in response to positive cues and respond more generally to negative 
memory cues, but the three-way interaction between memory valence, specificity and 
group was not significant (F(2, 53) = 1.522, p = .228). A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted 
to investigate whether there were between-group differences in the number of omissions 
made on the AMT, and indicated that there were no significant group differences in 
omissions (χ2 = 4.175, d.f. = 2, p = .124). Although there were some between-group 
differences in ISS Activation scores, no significant bivariate correlations were noted 
between the ISS subscales and the memory specificity data, either within groups or across 
the sample as a whole, therefore activation was not included as a covariate in the analyses. 
 
 
Memory Recall Latencies 
Table 5.2.4 details the mean response latencies in seconds for memories recalled on the 
AMT task according to their cue valence and specificity, and according to HPS group.  
 
Table 5.2.4. Response latencies on the Autobiographical Memory Test across the whole 
sample and the low, moderate and high risk groups 
 
Recall Latency (sec) 
Mean (S.D.) 
HPS Group 
Total 
Low Moderate High 
All cues 
All memories 13.35 (5.48) 15.21 (5.26) 13.38 (5.03) 14.03 (5.24) 
Specific  12.65 (5.58) 13.21 (3.60) 13.16 (7.07) 13.01 (5.41) 
General  12.41 (7.49) 19.56 (11.68) 15.07 (7.57) 16.06 (9.49) 
Positive memories 
All 12.04 (6.33) 15.11 (7.03) 12.44 (6.95) 13.26 (6.80) 
Specific 11.22 (6.45) 12.51 (4.78) 12.73 (9.77) 12.14 (7.05) 
General 12.67 (8.61) 21.08 (14.77) 13.65 (8.70) 16.56 (11.88) 
Negative memories   
All 14.67 (6.54) 15.31 (5.66) 14.33 (5.08) 14.80 (5.72) 
Specific 14.09 (6.45) 13.92 (5.12) 13.59 (7.72) 13.88 (6.33) 
General 13.40 (8.52) 18.83 (10.91) 15.22 (7.99) 15.81 (9.02) 
 
Note: HPS = Hypomanic Personality Scale. 
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Across the whole sample, specific memories were recalled in shorter response 
latencies (Mean RT = 13.01, S.D. = 5.41) than general memories (Mean RT = 16.06, S.D. 
= 9.49) (t = -2.152, d.f. = 40, p < .05) supporting our predictions. However, no significant 
differences in the response latencies for positive (Mean RT = 13.26, S.D. = 6.80) versus 
negative memories (Mean RT = 14.79, S.D. = 5.72) were noted (t = -1.661, d.f. = 55, p = 
.102). When analysed by group, a repeated-measures 2 x 3 ANOVA with memory valance 
treated as a within-subject factor (positive versus negative) and HPS group as a between-
subjects factor (low, moderate, and high), found no main effect of valence upon response 
latencies (F(2, 53) = 2.839, p = .089), and no interaction effect between valence and group 
for response latencies (F(2, 53) = .631, p = .536). Due to some participants recalling twelve 
specific memories, and hence not having response latencies for general memories (i.e., a 
response latency of 0 = immediate memory recall), between-group differences in response 
latencies for positive compared to negative memories (valence), and in the recall of general 
compared to specific memories (specificity) were analysed separately. Univariate 
ANOVAs indicated that there were no significant group differences in response latencies 
for specific (F(2, 55) = .060, p = .942) or general memories (F(2, 40) = 1.929, p = .159). 
 
5.2.4 Discussion 
This study investigated the specificity of autobiographical memory across groups of 
individuals considered to be at a low, moderate or high-risk for hypomania and bipolar 
disorder. Individuals at a high risk for hypomania were found to recall more general 
memories compared to moderate and low-risk individuals, with no observed overgeneral 
bias for the recall of emotionally negative memories, partially supporting the predictions. 
In contrast to the previous AMT study conducted in groups of individuals at a low and a 
high risk for hypomania (Delduca et al., 2010), which reported that high-risk individuals 
were more specific in their recall of negative autobiographical memories than low-risk 
individuals, the current study suggests that the vulnerability to hypomania and future 
bipolar disorders is associated with an overgeneral bias irrespective of memory valence. 
Whilst specific memories were recalled more quickly than general memories across 
groups, in line with the predictions, no significant group differences in recall latencies 
were noted, in contrast to the predictions and previous research (Delduca, et al., 2010). 
The observation that a high risk for hypomania was associated with an overgeneral 
recall bias, irrespective of memory valence, is similar to previous observations made in a 
sample of remitted bipolar individuals by Scott and colleagues (2000). Individuals at a high 
trait-based vulnerability to bipolar disorder, as well as those individuals diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder (Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004), both report an overgeneral 
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autobiographical memory bias compared to low-risk individuals and healthy non-bipolar 
controls, suggesting that overgenerality may be a vulnerability factor for bipolar disorder. 
However, as there were no significant differences in memory specificity between the 
moderate and low-risk groups, it remains unclear as to whether the severity of 
overgenerality increases linearly as the risk for bipolar disorder increases from those at a 
low to a moderate degree of risk.  
In contrast to Study Five, there was no significant interaction between memory 
valence and group; with the three groups recalling similar numbers of memories on the 
AMT irrespective of memory specificity (see Table 5.2.3). The lack of a significant 
interaction appears to be due to the AMT measure, which has previously been criticised for 
not being sufficiently sensitive to autobiographical memory processes in non-clinical 
samples (Raes et al., 2007). A similar pattern has been observed in a previous study, where 
groups of high and low HPS scorers recalled similar numbers of positive and negative 
memories on the AMT (Delduca et al., 2010). In contrast, the SCEPT sentence completion 
task used in the earlier study (Dempsey et al., submitted-c), which presents participants 
with non-valenced sentence stems which are later coded for their valence, appears to be 
more sensitive to group differences in the recall of positive and negative memories as 
indicated by the significant interaction of valence and group reported in that study. As the 
AMT presents a fixed number of valenced cue words, as well as practice trials and the 
repetition of specificity instructions, this may constrain participants‟ trait-based tendencies 
to recall memories of a particular valence compared to the sentence completion task. 
Interestingly, previous research in non-clinical samples has had to collapse data collected 
on the AMT across valence during data analysis (Gibbs & Rude, 2004), all of these points 
suggest that the AMT may be a less sensitive measure of memory valence biases in non-
clinical samples compared to the SCEPT procedure (Raes et al., 2007). 
Study Seven has a number of strengths. Firstly, a set of emotionally balanced cue 
words were selected on the basis of a cue word valence pre-test. The final cue word set 
consisted of a range of positive (e.g., “happy”, “excited”, “successful”) and negative 
memory cues (e.g., “hate”, “failure”, “hopeless”), which appeared to prime a wider range 
of both positive and negative memories compared to the cues used in previous research 
(Delduca et al., 2010). The current study also sampled individuals at a low, moderate and 
high risk for hypomania to more stringently assess whether overgenerality is a marker of 
the heightened vulnerability to hypomania. In sum, the current study suggests that a 
tendency to recall overgeneral memories across both positive and negative cues on the 
AMT is associated with the heightened vulnerability to hypomania, consistent with 
observations made in samples of individuals with bipolar disorder (Scott et al., 2000). 
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There are a number of limitations to consider with the current study. In particular, 
the experimenter was not blind to the group status of participants and it is not clear whether 
this may have affected participants‟ responses on the AMT task. Although there were high 
levels of inter-rater reliability between the experimenter and the group-blind independent 
raters for the memory codings, it is remains unclear whether experimenter bias may 
influence memory specificity (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). In addition, The high-risk 
group recruited in the current study consisted of participants who scored greater than 24 on 
the HPS, consistent with the lower cut-off of the previous study investigating 
autobiographical memory specificity in at-risks group for bipolar disorder (Delduca et al., 
2010), with an upper score of 37. In comparison to other studies, which have often 
recruited participants with HPS scores greater than 30 for high-risk (e.g., Kwapil et al., 
2000), there is the possibility that the high-risk participants in the current study are not 
fully representative of those individuals who are at a heightened risk for bipolar spectrum 
disorders (who may report more extreme HPS scores). Future research may need to 
consider recruiting “high-risk” participants using a more stringent cut-off on the HPS in 
order to more successfully investigate dysfunctional memory processes in those at a high-
risk for bipolar spectrum disorders. 
 In addition, whilst current bipolar mood symptoms were measured using the 
Internal States Scale (Bauer et al., 1991), the current study did not include an assessment of 
participants‟ past clinical histories, such as the previous experiences of clinically 
significant depressed moods, which may have influenced memory specificity (Mansell & 
Lam, 2004). There is also evidence to suggest that ruminative thinking styles and reduced 
executive processing capacities can reduce the specificity of autobiographical memory 
(e.g., Williams, 2006; Dalgleish et al, 2007), however, these factors were not measured in 
the current study and it remains unclear whether an interaction between hypomania 
vulnerability and rumination or executive processes is associated with increased 
overgenerality. Also, the current sample was mostly female, and as there was no screening 
assessment of participants‟ past clinical histories it is not clear whether some participants 
had previously experienced clinically significant mood symptoms and whether such 
individuals were at a heightened risk for bipolar disorder. A final limitation is that the 
current study was cross-sectional in design. There is a clear need for longitudinal studies to 
investigate the causal mechanisms of overgeneral memory specificity in at-risk individuals, 
and the effect of overgeneral memory upon the development of clinically significant 
bipolar symptoms in those at a high risk.  
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5.2.5 Conclusions 
In sum, the results of the current study support the hypothesis that individuals at an 
elevated risk for hypomania report similar overgeneral biases in their recall of 
autobiographical memories as observed in previous studies conducted in samples of 
individuals with bipolar disorder (e.g., Scott et al., 2000). The current study does not 
support previous observations that the heightened vulnerability to bipolar disorder is 
associated with the increased specificity of autobiographical memory recall for negative 
memories (Delduca et al., 2010). This study is the first demonstration that individuals at an 
elevated risk for hypomania report an overgeneral memory bias on the Autobiographical 
Memory Test, and lends support to the hypothesis that overgeneral memory may exist on a 
continuum of increasing severity from high-risk individuals to individuals with diagnosed 
bipolar disorders. 
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Section 5.3 
Study Eight  
The Specificity of Autobiographical Memory Recall in 
Remitted Bipolar Individuals & Matched Controls 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories has been evidenced in a number of 
mental health conditions, including major depressive disorder (Williams & Scott, 1988; 
Barnhofer et al., 2002) and suicidality (Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & 
Dritschel, 1988). Research has suggested that individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder 
also generate such overgeneral biases in autobiographical memory recall (Scott et al., 
2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004; Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007). However, these studies are 
associated with a number of methodological issues, in particular, the use of non-
standardised assessments of autobiographical memory specificity (e.g., Mansell & Lam, 
2004; Gregory et al, 2010). The primary aim of the current study was to investigate the 
specificity of autobiographical memory recall in a group of individuals currently in 
remission from bipolar disorder and in a group of healthy non-bipolar individuals, matched 
for age and gender with the bipolar participants. Individuals currently in remission from 
bipolar disorder were recruited into the study to avoid any potential effects of extreme 
mood disturbances and symptoms upon memory recall.  
Whilst individuals with bipolar disorder appear to possess an overgeneral memory 
bias, it is not currently clear whether individuals in remission from bipolar disorder report 
greater overgenerality for positive or negative cues or across memory valences. The 
current study aimed to replicate Scott and colleagues‟ (2000) previous investigation into 
autobiographical memory specificity in remitted bipolar individuals using the standardised 
AMT procedure, to assess whether bipolar disorder is associated with an overgeneral 
memory bias across memory valences (as suggested by Scott et al., 2000), or with an 
overgeneral memory bias for negative memories (e.g., Mansell and Lam, 2004).  
A sample of individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder in remission from 
symptoms and a control group of healthy non-bipolar individuals matched for age and 
gender with the bipolar participants were recruited for the current study, in order to allow 
comparisons with the investigations conducted in remitted bipolar samples reported by 
Scott and colleagues (2000) and Mansell & Lam (2004). In addition, the study of a 
remitted bipolar sample affords the measurement of cognitive processes in individuals who 
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are not currently experiencing extreme mood symptoms, and allows for the investigation of 
processes which may be impaired during periods of normal functioning and which may 
confer a risk for future relapse. 
 
Hypotheses 
It was hypothesised that individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder would report greater 
overgeneral autobiographical memory biases than control participants in line with previous 
observations (Scott et al., 2000), with bipolar participants predicted to recall more general 
than specific memories in response to negative cue words consistent with previous 
observations (Mansell & Lam, 2004). In relation to the time taken to recall memories, it 
was anticipated that specific memories would be recalled faster than general memories, 
consistent with observations made in Study Seven. Furthermore, it was anticipated that 
individuals with bipolar disorder would be faster to recall specific autobiographical 
memories for negative events. 
 
 
5.3.2 Method 
Design 
The current study incorporated a 2 x 2 x 2 design, with group as a between-subjects factor 
(bipolar vs. control), and memory valence (positive vs. negative) and memory specificity 
(specific vs. general) on the AMT as within-subject factors. 
 
Participants 
A sample of 18 participants diagnosed with bipolar disorder (11 female, 7 male), currently 
in remission from symptoms as confirmed by SCID interview, and a control group of 18 
healthy non-bipolar individuals who were matched for age and gender with the bipolar 
group were recruited (11 female, 7 male) (See Table 5.3.1 for group demographics). 
Participants were recruited using a number of methods. Advertisements for were 
placed on the University of Manchester‟s Research Volunteering website, and on campus 
notice boards. The first author also made short presentations about the study to service-user 
support groups located in the Greater Manchester region, and sent information sheets and 
flyers to local support services with the agreement of local managers. An online 
advertisement was displayed on the Manic Depression Fellowship e-community, a website 
containing self-help information and discussion forums for individuals with bipolar 
disorder. Advertisements for the study were also placed in the Spectrum Participant Pool 
Newsletter, a quarterly newsletter sent to individuals with bipolar disorder who have 
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consented to receiving updates about current research activities from the Spectrum Centre 
for Mental Health Research at Lancaster University. Participants for the control group 
were recruited via the University of Manchester‟s Research Volunteering website 
advertisements placed on community website forums for Greater Manchester.  
Inclusion criteria for the study for the bipolar group included the willingness and 
ability to provide written informed consent as assessed by the researcher, meeting SCID 
criteria for the remission of bipolar symptoms (not meeting criteria for the experience of 
mood symptoms within the past month), fluent English speaking ability, and aged 18 years 
or older. As prior research had suggested that around one third of patients currently 
receiving ECT will experience some form of memory loss (Rose et al., 2003), and the 
severity of overgeneral memory recall is associated with increased substance dependence 
(Gandolphe & Nandrino, 2011), individuals who had received ECT in the previous 12 
months and those who had diagnosed substance abuse disorders were excluded from the 
study (as assessed by the SCID interview). Participants in the control group completed the 
screening module from the SCID and self-certified that they had not been diagnosed with 
any form of mental health condition. Control participants were fluent English speakers and 
aged 18 years or older. 
 
Diagnostic Interview 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Disorders (SCID-I) was used to confirm 
diagnoses of bipolar disorder and current episode status of participants in the bipolar group 
(First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 2002). The first author (R.D.) conducted all interviews 
in face-to-face meetings with the participants, and completed the following SCID modules: 
Screening module, Current and Past Mood Episodes (Module A), the Psychotic Symptom 
Screener (Modules B/C), and Substance Use (Module E). The SCID interview was audio-
recorded on a digital dictaphone with the participant‟s consent. 
The first author received a combination of training in administering the SCID 
interview through role-play activities, watching SCID training DVDs, and through the use 
of the published training manual for the SCID (First, Gibbon, Spitzer & Williams, 2002). 
 
Questionnaire Measures  
To assess current mood states and bipolar mood symptoms, participants completed the 
CES-D scale, Internal States Scale (ISS) and the PANAS (see Section 5.2.2 for details on 
the PANAS and ISS). The CES-D scale is a 20-item measure of current depressive 
symptoms (Radloff, 1977), which has been used to assess the prevalence of depressive 
symptoms in both clinical (Calam et al., submitted) and non-clinical samples (Dempsey et 
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al., 2011). Each item on the CES-D refers to a symptom relating to depression, with 
participants required to rate the extent to which they have experienced each symptom over 
the past week on a four point scale (from 0 = “Rarely”, to 3 = “Most of the time”). 
Example items include: “thought my life had been a failure”, “I talked less than usual”, and 
“I had crying spells”. Higher scores on the CES-D reflect the experience of more intense 
depressive symptoms, with scores of 16 and above indicative of clinically significant levels 
of depression (Radloff, 1991). High levels of internal consistency have been reported in 
previous studies (Cronbach's α = .89-.91; Dempsey et al., 2011; Jones & Day, 2008).  
 
 
Autobiographical Memory Measures 
The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) procedure from Study Seven was used in the 
current study (as described in Section 5.2). 
 
 
Procedure 
Participants were directed by the advertisements to contact the researcher to express their 
interest in taking part in the study, and were sent copies of the Participant Information 
Sheet and Consent Form. Once participants had decided to take part, the researcher 
confirmed that the participant understood the objectives and procedures involved in the 
study and were willing to give their informed consent to participating in the study. 
The researcher met the participants twice over a one-week period, either at their 
home, at the University of Manchester, or in a meeting room of a local support service, 
depending on the participant‟s wishes. The first meeting consisted of the SCID interview, 
and the completion of a series of baseline questionnaires. The second meeting took place a 
week later and involved completing the AMT procedure and additional measures not 
reported here. Participants also completed some additional questionnaire measures relating 
to memory recall and cognitive style which are not germane to the current study
2
. At the 
end of the second meeting, participants received a full debrief about the study and were 
provided with a sheet containing contact details for local support services and a feedback 
questionnaire which the participant could complete anonymously and return via post at a 
later date. The study received full ethical approval from the NHS Greater Manchester 
South Research Ethics Committee.  
 
 
                                                 
2
 In addition to the AMT task, participants completed self-report measures of cognitive styles during the first 
meeting as well as an event and symptom reporting diary in the seven days between meetings, with event 
appraisal processes and symptom fluctuations as recorded by the diary compared with performance on the 
AMT. Data analysis did not indicate any relationship between memory specificity and the diary measures, 
therefore the diary was not analysed further 
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Data Coding 
Responses on the AMT were coded for their specificity and recall latencies using the same 
coding scheme from Study Seven (see Section 5.2), with the recalled memories coded as 
Specific, as an Omission for non-responses, with general memories qualified as either 
Extended or Categoric memories, or as a Semantic Associate. The response latency 
between the presentation of the cue word and the participant‟s recall of a memory was 
measured by a stopwatch based upon the digital recordings. The memory specificity and 
response latency data were coded by the first author (R.D.), whilst three independent raters 
coded 25% of the memory recall and latency data to check the reliability of the coding. 
 
Data Analysis 
Data was screened for normality via review of histograms and was screened for outliers by 
calculation of z-scores. Data did not substantially deviate from normality except for the 
number of omissions made on the AMT, which were analysed using non-parametric 
statistics. A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to assess between-group 
differences in scores on the mood and symptom measures (CES-D, ISS and PANAS 
scales). The mean number of autobiographical memories recalled on the AMT, with the 
general memories collapsed into one category, was subjected to a 2 (group) x 2 (memory 
valence, positive vs. negative) x 2 (memory specificity, specific vs. general) mixed design 
analysis of variance to investigate between-group differences between the bipolar and non-
bipolar groups. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to investigate between-group 
differences in response latencies. 
 
5.3.3 Results 
Sample Characteristics 
The final sample included 18 individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder (14 bipolar I 
disorder; 4 bipolar II disorder), and 18 non-bipolar controls matched for age and gender 
with the bipolar participants (see Table 5.3.1 for demographic information).  
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Table 5.3.1 Demographic characteristics of the bipolar and control groups 
 
 Bipolar Group Control Group 
Mean age in years (S.D.) 36.28 (14.00) 35.39 (13.48) 
Age range (years) 19 - 65 19 - 65 
Gender ratio 11 Female, 7 Male 11 Female, 7 Male 
Highest Educational Attainment   
PhD 2 2 
Masters degree (MSc/MA) 3 4 
Bachelors degree (BSc/BA) 5 3 
Further Education/A-Level 7 7 
GCSE/O-Level 1 2 
Employment status   
Full-time Student 5 10 
Full-time Employed 0 5 
Part-time Employed 1 2 
Retired 3 1 
Self-employed 1 0 
Unemployed 8 0 
Ethnicity   
Caucasian-British 17 17 
Caucasian-European 1 1 
 
 
An independent samples t-test confirmed that there were no significant differences 
in mean participant ages between the bipolar and non-bipolar groups (t(34) = .194, p = 
.847, ns). Participants in the bipolar group had a mean age of 27.65 years (S.D. = 11.49) at 
their first diagnosis of bipolar disorder, and a mean of 9.17 years (S.D. = 11.68) since their 
first diagnosis. A number of participants in the bipolar group had received previous 
diagnoses of major depressive disorder (n = 5) or severe comorbid depression and anxiety 
(n = 2) prior to receiving formal bipolar diagnoses. Participants in the bipolar group had 
experienced a mean number of 13.71 depressive episodes (S.D. = 10.38), 4.53 manic 
episodes (S.D. = 3.52), 10.88 hypomanic episodes (S.D. = 11.85), and a mean number of 
3.00 mixed mood episodes (S.D. = 4.99). Participants in the bipolar group had a mean 
number of 1.83 hospitalisations for past mood episodes (S.D. = 2.71). In contrast to a 
previous autobiographical memory study, bipolar participants in the current study reported 
the experience of more depressive and manic episodes, and were of a younger age than 
participants in remission from bipolar disorder recruited in a previous investigation 
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(Mansell & Lam, 2004) (Please note that other autobiographical memory studies present 
little information regarding the clinical characteristics of their bipolar samples). 
Two participants in the bipolar group were not currently receiving any form of 
medication for bipolar disorder, whilst the remaining participants either received 
monotherapy (n = 5) or polytherapy (n = 11) medication regimes. Prescribed medications 
included mood stabilisers (n = 9), antidepressants (n = 9), anticonvulsants (n = 7), 
antipsychotic (n = 7), and tranquiliser medications (n = 1), whilst three participants 
received medication for pain-related conditions. 
In relation to psychological therapies, thirteen participants had previously received 
some form of psychological therapy for bipolar disorder, including cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (n = 7), cognitive therapy (n = 1), relapse prevention training (n = 1), 
psychoanalytic therapy (n = 1), psychoeducation (n = 1), whilst two participants had 
received non-structured outpatient contact with a psychologist (n = 2). Participants had 
received an average of 28.71 hours of psychological therapy (S.D. = 27.68). 
 
Inter-rater Reliability 
A random sample of 40% of the transcripts (15 transcripts in total) was coded by three 
independent raters who received training in the use of the AMT coding manual and were 
blind to group allocation
3
. There were high levels of agreement between the first author 
and the independent raters in the memory specificity codings (Cohen‟s Kappas = .84 for 
rater one, .82 for rater two, and .77 for rater three; 90% agreement across all raters)
4
. A 
separate independent rater coded the response latencies for the AMT task, with high levels 
of agreement in response latency codings noted between the independent rater and the first 
author (r = .91, p < .001), and no significant differences between raters were noted for the 
response latency data (t(179) = -.554, p = .580). 
 
Baseline Mood Symptoms 
A MANOVA was conducted to investigate between-group differences in mood symptom 
scores (CES-D, ISS and PANAS) between the bipolar and non-bipolar control participants. 
The MANOVA was significant overall (F(1, 35) = 2.884, p < .05). However, only scores on 
the CES-D scale differed between groups (F(1, 35) = 6.45, p < .05), with bipolar participants 
reporting higher scores than controls (see Table 5.3.2). Scores on the mood measures (ISS, 
                                                 
3
 Three psychology undergraduate students from the University of Manchester assisted in conducting a 
coding check on the memory specificity. The volunteers were trained by the first author (RD) in using the 
coding scheme and completed a series of practice items. 
4
 Although there exist inter-rater reliability calculations for occasions where three or more raters have coded 
the same data (e.g., Fleiss‟ Kappa), as the three volunteers coded separate portions of data (which collectively 
totalled 25% of the sample) only separate Cohen‟s Kappas could be computed to compare coding with the 
first author. 
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PANAS and CES-D) measures for both the control and bipolar participants were consistent 
with previous research (Knowles et al., 2007; Mansell et al., 2011; Calam et al, submitted). 
 
 
Table 5.3.2 Table of results of the Multivariate Analysis of Variance conducted upon mean 
scores on the baseline mood and symptom questionnaire measures across bipolar and 
control groups (Standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
 Control Group 
Mean (S.D.) 
Bipolar Group 
Mean (S.D.) 
F p η² 
CES-D 7.12 (5.01) 15.22 (11.83) 6.45 .01 .17 
ISS Activation 90.13 (87.30) 122.94 (108.42) .929 .34 .03 
ISS Depression 31.31 (42.99) 21.94 (24.68) .625 .44 .02 
ISS Perceived Conflict 70.39 (64.54) 69.63 (56.40) .001 .97 .00 
ISS Well-Being 143.63 (64.28) 166.44 (66.09) 1.036 .33 .03 
PANAS Negative Affect 12.06 (3.296) 13.83 (5.22) 1.359 .25 .00 
PANAS Positive Affect 31.44 (7.01) 30.61 (6.55) .126 .73 .04 
 
Note: CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale, ISS = Internal 
States Scale, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. 
 
 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity 
Means and standard deviations for the specificities of recalled autobiographical memories 
are presented in Table 5.3.3. The control group recalled a greater mean number of specific 
memories compared to the bipolar group, with a higher mean number of general memories 
across memory valences recalled by the bipolar group compared to the control group. 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
investigate the presence of statistically significant between-group differences in 
autobiographical memory specificity across the bipolar and non-bipolar control groups, 
with group (bipolar vs. control) as a between-participant factor, and memory valence 
(specific vs. general) and memory specificity (positive vs. negative) as within-participant 
factors.  
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Table 5.3.3 Autobiographical memory specificity across the remitted bipolar and non-
bipolar control groups (Means and standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Memory Specificity  Bipolar Group Control Group Total 
All cues 
Total memories 11.33 (1.19) 11.29 (.77) 11.31 (.99) 
Specific 6.39 (2.89) 10.18 (2.16) 8.23 (3.17) 
General 4.94 (2.96) 1.12 (2.32) 3.09 (3.27) 
Omissions .67 (1.19) .71 (.77) .69 (.99) 
Positive cues 
Total memories 5.72 (.46) 5.76 (.43) 5.74 (.44) 
Specific 4.16 (1.47) 5.29 (.85) 4.71 (1.32) 
General 1.56 (1.34) .47 (.87) 1.02 (1.25) 
Omissions .28 (.46) .24 (.44) .26 (.44) 
Negative cues 
Total memories 5.61 (.85) 5.53 (.62) 5.57 (.74) 
Specific 2.22 (1.63) 4.88 (1.65) 3.51 (2.11) 
General 3.39 (1.87) .65 (1.69) 2.06 (2.21) 
Omissions .39 (.85) .47 (.62) .43 (.74) 
 
 
The ANOVA revealed no main effect of memory valence (F(1, 34) = 2.06, p = .160) 
and no interaction between valence and group (F(1, 34) = .26, p = .610). A main effect of 
memory specificity was observed (F(1, 34) = 36.16, p < .001), with both groups recalling 
greater numbers of specific (M = 8.23, S.D. = 3.17) than general memories (M = 3.09, S.D. 
= 3.27). This was further qualified by a significant interaction effect between specificity 
and group (F(1, 34) = 19.24, p < .001), indicating that the non-bipolar control group recalled 
greater numbers of specific memories on the AMT (M = 10.18, S.D. = 2.16) compared to 
the bipolar group (M = 6.39, S.D. = 2.89), and that the control group recalled fewer general 
memories (M = 1.12, S.D. = 2.32) compared to the bipolar group (M = 4.94, S.D. = 2.96).  
A significant interaction effect was also found between memory valence and 
memory specificity (F(1, 34) = 27.61, p < .001), with greater numbers of specific memories 
recalled for positive (M = 4.71, S.D. = 1.32) compared to negative cues (M = 3.51, S.D. = 
2.11), and more general memories recalled for negative (M = 2.06, S.D. = 2.21) compared 
to positive cues (M = 1.02, S.D. = 1.25). This interaction effect was further qualified by a 
significant three-way interaction effect between memory specificity, valence and group 
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(F(1, 34) = 14.73, p < .01). T-tests were conducted to further analyse the three-way 
interaction (with Bonferroni correction applied for multiple comparisons, adjusted p = 
.0125). The t-tests confirmed that there were no differences in the quantities of specific 
(t(17) = 1.130, p = .275) and general memories (t(17) = -.527, p = .61) recalled for the 
positive and negative cue words in the control group, indicating that the non-bipolar 
control participants recalled similar proportions of specific and general memories for both 
positive and negative cues. However, a cross-over interaction effect was noted for the 
bipolar group, whereby the bipolar participants recalled significantly greater numbers of 
general memories for negative compared to positive cues (t(17) = -7.083, p < .001), but 
recalled fewer specific memories for negative compared to positive cues (t(17) = 7.432, p 
< .001).  
 
 
Figure 5.3.1 Interaction effect of memory specificity and valence for the bipolar group 
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Figure 5.3.2 Interaction effect of memory specificity and valence for the control group 
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A Mann-Whitney test indicated that the bipolar and non-bipolar groups did not 
differ in the number of omissions made on the AMT task (U = 130.500, p = .405). Current 
hypo/manic symptoms (ISS Activation) or depressive symptoms (CES-D scores) were not 
significantly correlated with any of the memory specificity measures within or across 
groups; neither ISS Activation nor CESD required covarying in the memory specificity 
analyses. No significant correlations were noted between the number of hours of 
psychological therapies received by the bipolar group and memory specificity. 
 
 
Memory Response Latencies 
Table 5.3.4, below, presents the mean and standard deviations for the response latencies on 
the AMT according to the valence and specificity of the recalled memories, and across the 
bipolar and non-bipolar control groups and the sample as a whole. As shown in Table 
5.3.3, faster response latencies were recorded for the control group for positive cues 
compared to the bipolar group, although the bipolar group appeared to be faster to recall 
memories for negative cues across specificities, with bipolar participants appearing to be 
faster to recall specific negative memories than general negative memories. 
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Table 5.3.4. Response latencies (seconds) on the Autobiographical Memory Test across the 
bipolar and non-bipolar control groups 
 
Response Latency 
Mean (S.D.) 
Bipolar Group Control Group Total 
All cues 
Total 17.98 (12.51) 17.27 (4.80) 17.64 (9.44) 
Specific memories 18.77 (19.37) 16.91 (5.49) 17.87 (14.24) 
General memories 18.47 (13.31) 19.24 (6.23) 18.61 (12.20) 
Positive memories 
All 20.94 (15.41) 15.42 (3.83) 18.26 (11.55) 
Specific 20.62 (20.46) 15.30 (5.37) 18.04 (15.17) 
General 23.46 (19.15) 16.82 (7.41) 22.28 (17.66) 
Negative memories 
All 15.02 (10.19) 19.11 (8.31) 17.01 (9.41) 
Specific 11.20 (5.84) 18.51 (8.39) 15.09 (8.09) 
General 16.84 (12.12) 20.32 (3.57) 17.21 (11.51) 
 
  
A series of independent samples t-tests were conducted to investigate whether 
statistically significant between-group differences in response latencies existed between 
the bipolar and control groups
5
. Four individual t-tests with Bonferroni corrections 
(corrected α = .0125) were conducted to control for Type I errors through multiple testing. 
The t-tests indicated that whilst there were no between-group differences in the response 
latencies for specific positive (t(19.458) = -1.065, p = .300), for general positive           
(t(15) = -.579, p = .571), or for general negative memories (t(17) = .395, p = .698), 
participants in the bipolar group were significantly faster to recall specific negative 
memories (Mean response latency = 11.20 seconds, S.D. = 5.84) than the non-bipolar 
participants (M = 18.51, S.D. = 8.39) (t(30) = 2.825, p < .01). 
 
5.3.4 Discussion 
The current study attempted to address methodological issues highlighted in previous 
investigations into autobiographical memory in individuals with bipolar disorder, and to 
assess whether individuals in remission from bipolar disorder reported similar biases in 
their recall of autobiographical memories as reported in depressed and suicidal individuals. 
                                                 
5
 T-tests and not ANOVAs were conducted due to some participants in the control group recalling twelve 
specific memories on the AMT, meaning that a 2x2x2 ANOVA could not be conducted on the response 
latency data due to these participants not having response latencies for general memories.  
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Participants diagnosed with bipolar disorder reported more extreme overgeneral 
autobiographical memory compared to the non-bipolar participants, with the bipolar group 
recalling fewer specific and more general memories than the control group in line with the 
predictions. The bipolar participants also recalled more general memories and fewer 
specific memories for negative compared to positive cues, whilst the non-bipolar 
participants recalled similar proportions of specific and general memories for the positive 
and negative cues on the AMT. These results are consistent with our predictions and with 
previous observations (Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004). The current study also 
provides the first data relating to the response latencies for the recall of autobiographical 
memories by individuals with bipolar disorder. Although the bipolar participants were 
more overgeneral in their autobiographical memory recall, when bipolar individuals were 
able to recall specifically detailed negative memories they did so more quickly than the 
controls. Whilst overgenerality in bipolar individuals may predominantly due to generative 
memory recall, a top-down recall process (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the fast 
recall of specific negative memories would suggest that individuals with bipolar disorder 
have ready access to self-negative information possibly through direct retrieval processes. 
The overgeneral recall of autobiographical memories and the specific recall of 
negative memories by individuals with bipolar disorder may have an important impact 
upon an individual‟s well-being during remission. The overgeneral recall of memories is 
considered to arise as a consequence of mnemonic interlock, where attempts to recall 
specific memories are aborted in the general memory representations leading to the 
establishment of an over elaborated network of general memories, which is “encouraged 
by and itself encourages ruminative self-focus” (p. 261, Williams, 1996). The generative 
recall process becomes trapped within the general memory representations, leading to the 
overgeneral recall of memories. The prevalence of overgeneral memory during remission 
from bipolar disorder may explain the presence of negative rumination and subsyndromal 
depressive symptoms in remitted individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder (Post et al, 
2003b; Thomas et al., 2007; Van der Gucht et al., 2009). These over-elaborated networks 
of general memories may become easily activated during remission, which when coupled 
with further ruminative self-focus and dysfunctional coping strategies leads to the 
maintenance of depressive mood states. Indeed, previous research has suggested that whilst 
individuals in remission from bipolar disorder recall more overgeneral negative memories, 
these memories are more frequently rehearsed on a daily basis (Mansell & Lam, 2004).  
Interestingly, whilst the current study suggests that individuals with bipolar 
disorder were more overgeneral in their memory recall than non-bipolar controls, bipolar 
individuals also had shorter response latencies for the recall of specific negative memories. 
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The fast and specific recall of negative memories by individuals with bipolar disorder 
suggests that some negative memories are readily available through direct memory recall. 
This may have an important implication on an individual‟s emotional well-being, 
particularly as specific memories are more image-based than general memories (Williams, 
et al., 1999; Mansell & Lam, 2004), and imagery is associated with the amplification of 
mood states in bipolar disorder (Holmes, Geddes, Colom & Goodwin, 2008). Although the 
current study did not assess whether these specific negative memories were intrusive or 
featured traumatic events, previous research has suggested that individuals with bipolar 
disorder recall high frequencies of intrusive images and memories (Tzemou & Birchwood, 
2007; Gregory et al., 2010). Research has also suggested that individuals with bipolar 
disorder who don‟t experience intrusions are more overgeneral in their memory recall, 
lending support to the hypothesis that overgenerality can function as an emotion regulation 
strategy for avoiding unpleasant but non-intrusive memories (Williams, 2006; Tzemou & 
Birchwood, 2007). The fast recall of specific negative memories in the current study may 
be indicative of poor emotion regulation in the bipolar group, where individuals are unable 
to use abortive generative retrieval to avoid recalling unpleasant specific memories. 
Alternatively, the fast recall of the specific negative memories may have resulted from the 
presentation of negative cue words which immediately primed the recall of specifically 
detailed memories via direct retrieval processes (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
However it is unclear whether this is unique to bipolar disorder as similar differences in 
memory specificity under direct and generative retrieval conditions have been reported in 
individuals with histories of past traumatic abuse (Hauer et al., 2008). Although the mode 
of memory retrieval may determine the specificity and speed of recall in bipolar samples, 
this may be a more transdiagnostic process and not limited to bipolar disorder.  
Another possibility is that the frequent recall of specific negative memories 
following environmental cues leads to the development of direct associative links between 
the cue and recalled memory. The establishment of these associative links may result in the 
direct, automatic, and fast recall of specific negative memories following a commonly 
encountered cue, similar to the associative route to emotion described by the SPAARS 
framework (Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Jones, 2001). As these specific negative memories 
become more automatically recalled they would become increasingly experienced as 
“coming out of the blue” (Jones, 2001), and may be appraised as unpleasant, intrusive and 
distressing (Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007). The establishment of these direct associative 
links would mean that the individual is unable to suppress or avoid the recall of these 
specific negative memories through generative memory recall, which would ordinarily 
result in the generation of an overgeneral memory and the avoidance of recalling 
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particularly unpleasant memories in specific detail (Williams, 2006). However, due to a 
lack of transdiagnostic studies into autobiographical memory specificity it is unclear 
whether these associative memory processes are unique to bipolar disorder 
 From a methodological perspective, there is an ongoing discussion regarding the 
role of task instructions upon memory specificity, with the suggestion that a poor memory 
for AMT task instructions is associated with greater overgenerality (Yanes, Roberts & 
Carlos, 2008). Whilst the bipolar sample in the current study demonstrated marked 
overgenerality compared to the control participants, the majority of participants retained 
and repeated the specificity instructions when attempting to recall a specific memory. 
Although the current study did not explicitly test the participant‟s memory for the task 
instructions, participants in the bipolar group still generated more generic descriptions of 
their autobiographical memories despite having appeared to retain the specificity 
instructions, suggesting that overgenerality in bipolar samples may not be simply due to 
poor memory for task instructions. As per Study Seven, the experimenter was not blind to 
the participant‟s group membership, however, the independent raters were not aware of 
whether the participants were part of the bipolar or control groups, and high levels of inter-
rater reliability were noted across raters. Although the experimenter could influence 
whether participants feel more or less comfortable in recalling personal memories on the 
AMT task, it is unlikely that the experimenter can influence memory specificity to a great 
extent given the independent coding check conducted as part of the AMT. 
 There are some additional limitations to consider with Study Eight. As the control 
participants were not screened for family histories of mental health disorders this may have 
led to the recruitment of individuals who may be highly vulnerable to bipolar disorder.  
Future studies should consider screening the family histories of control participants and 
using standard clinical interviewing assessments to ensure that control group volunteers 
have not experienced past mental health problems, especially as such individuals may not 
have sought medical help but may have experienced clinically significant symptoms. In 
addition, it was not possible to fully account for various clinical variables and their effects 
upon memory specificity due to the small-scale nature of the study, such as the effects of 
CBT and substance use. Participation in CBT has been associated with post-therapy 
improvements in memory specificity in depressed individuals (e.g., Williams et al., 2000; 
McBride et al., 2007). Research has also suggested that the active use of substances is 
associated with overgenerality, particularly current cannabis use (Gandolphe & Nandrino, 
2011). Although participants with diagnosed substance use disorders were screened out of 
Study Eight, no study has yet considered how current substance use is associated with 
memory specificity in bipolar samples or how the lifetime use of substances may affect 
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autobiographical memory specificity. It may be reasonable to suspect that the lifetime use 
of illicit substances may contribute to impairments in the ability to recall specific 
autobiographical memories given the high prevalence of co-morbid substance use disorders 
and substance use in individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder (Regier et al., 1990; 
McElroy et al., 2001; Merikangas et al., 2007; Agrawal et al., 2011). Future investigations 
should consider the role of both past and current substance use upon autobiographical 
memory and executive processing capacities. Although the results may suggest that the 
bipolar participants could have been avoiding recalling some unpleasant negative 
memories through abortive generative memory recall, as the current study did not include a 
measure of avoidant coping styles, such as those used by Hermans et al (2005), it is unclear 
whether these results are truly due to an avoidant emotion regulation strategy. 
The recruitment of participants diagnosed with bipolar disorder was also reliant 
upon the SCID interview (First et al., 2002a; 2002b), where participants were classified as 
in remission if they had not experienced any bipolar symptoms within the past four weeks. 
However, the formal DSM-IV-TR criteria for remission are for two months free of 
symptoms (APA, 2000). The participants in Study Eight may have been experiencing some 
subsyndromal mood symptoms as suggested by the elevated CES-D depression scores. 
However, the current study and previous research has indicated that memory specificity is 
not associated with current bipolar symptoms (Van der Gucht et al., 2009). Taking these 
points into consideration, future memory studies may need to carefully consider how to 
screen individuals in remission from bipolar disorder, and will also need to incorporate 
measures of current mood symptoms to ensure that patterns of memory specificity in 
“remitted” bipolar individuals may not just be the result of subsyndromal mood symptoms. 
  
5.3.5 Conclusions 
In sum, the results of Study Eight support previous observations of overgenerality in 
autobiographical memory recall in bipolar disorder, particularly in the generative recall of 
general negative memories, but suggest that bipolar individuals have ready access to some 
specific negative memories potentially through more direct forms of memory recall. Study 
Eight successfully addressed methodological issues highlighted in previous research and 
suggests that overgeneral memory in bipolar disorder is not simply due to the use of non-
standardised assessments of autobiographical memory specificity. The results of the 
current study also highlights the need for future research into the basic scientific processes 
underlying autobiographical memory specificity in bipolar disorder, and suggests some 
important avenues for future investigations, particularly into the nature of generative 
versus direct forms of memory recall in individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 
 254 
Section 5.4 
General Discussion for Studies Seven & Eight 
5.4.1 General Discussion 
Two studies were conducted to investigate the specificity of autobiographical memory 
recall in individuals identified as possessing personality traits which act as a predisposition 
for experiencing hypomania and developing future bipolar disorders (Study Seven), and 
within a sample of individuals who have been diagnosed with bipolar disorder currently in 
remission from symptoms (Study Eight). 
Study Seven investigated autobiographical memory specificity in individuals at a 
low, moderate or high risk for hypomania using the standardised AMT. Individuals at a 
high risk for hypomania were more overgeneral in their recall of both positive and negative 
autobiographical memories compared to moderate and low risk individuals, consistent with 
previous observations made in remitted bipolar individuals (Scott et al., 2000). This pattern 
of increased overgenerality was in contrast to Delduca and colleagues‟ (2010) study who 
reported that high-risk participants recall more specific negative memories than low-risk 
individuals, and were faster to recall memories than low-risk individuals. However, no 
between-group differences in response latencies were noted in Study Seven, although 
specific memories were recalled in shorter response latencies than general memories. 
Although the results of Study Seven contrast with the previous study conducted in an at-
risk sample (Delduca et al., 2010), both studies sampled participants from the same 
university community, used similar sample sizes, and similar mean scores on the Internal 
States Scale measure of bipolar symptoms were reported by the high and low groups across 
studies. These similarities suggests that the differences in results are not due to differences 
in sample characteristics but may instead be related to procedural differences between 
studies, possibly in relation to the cue words used by the studies. 
Study Eight replicated the AMT procedure from Study Seven in a sample of 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder, who were currently in remission from 
symptoms, and a control group of non-bipolar individuals who were matched for age and 
gender with the bipolar participants. The results of Study Eight indicated that the bipolar 
group reported greater overgenerality in autobiographical memory recall compared to the 
control group consistent with previous observations (Scott et al., 2000). Furthermore, the 
remitted bipolar participants recalled more general and fewer specific negative memories, 
consistent with previous work (Mansell & Lam, 2004). Study Eight also provided the first 
evidence regarding the time taken to recall autobiographical memories by individuals with 
bipolar disorder (the “response latency”). The results suggested that whilst bipolar disorder 
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is primarily characterised by an overgeneral memory bias, individuals with bipolar disorder 
appear to have fast and ready access to memories relating to specific emotionally negative 
events. These results are consistent with the two proposed forms of memory recall as 
described by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000), where individuals with bipolar disorder 
report more overgeneral memories during generative recall, but are able to recall specific 
negative memories in short response latencies due to more direct memory recall processes. 
Whilst this should be treated as preliminary evidence, future investigations should consider 
manipulating memory recall processes and assessing memory specificity in bipolar 
individuals. For example, Hauer and colleagues (2008) have previously manipulated the 
imageability of memory cue words in order to elicit direct and generative forms of memory 
recall within a clinical sample, with highly imageable cues considered to immediately 
activate the specific memory representations leading to direct memory recall.  
The results of Study Eight further extend Scott and colleagues‟ (2000) investigation 
into memory specificity in bipolar disorder by suggesting that whilst bipolar disorder is 
associated with a propensity to recall memories in general levels of detail, individuals 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder appear to have ready access to some specific negative 
memories. This suggests some interesting avenues for future research, in particular the 
nature of generative versus direct forms of memory recall in bipolar disorder. Despite 
bipolar disorder being associated with greater overgenerality, individuals diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder appear to have ready access to some specific memories for emotionally 
negative events, although it is unclear why certain specific negative events are recalled 
faster than other negative memories.  
In relation to the wider theoretical implications of these studies, there is support for 
the notion that there exists a continuum of increasing overgeneral memory severity 
incorporating low to high risk individuals through to individuals with formal bipolar 
diagnoses. The results of Study Eight, in particular, are consistent with psychological 
models of bipolar disorder which highlight the role of self-negative processes and 
cognitions in the experience of bipolar disorder, particularly the Depression Avoidance 
Hypothesis and the (negative) Ruminative Responses literatures. The tendency by 
individuals in remission from bipolar disorder to recall autobiographical memories in 
general levels of detail may result from the engagement in ruminative thought processes, 
and the subsequent establishment of over-elaborated networks of general memories as 
suggested by Williams‟ (1996) mnemonic interlock concept. Indeed, propensities to 
engage in ruminative responses to both positive and negative experiences have been 
reported in bipolar samples (Johnson et al., 2008a), with the negative rumination remaining 
prevalent even during remission from symptoms (Thomas et al., 2007; Van der Gucht et 
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al., 2009). One possibility is that the availability of general memories during remission 
from bipolar disorder encourages ruminative thought processes, as described by mnemonic 
interlock (Williams, 1996), and may explain the prevalence of subsyndromal depressive 
symptoms and prolonged ruminative self-focus in individuals in remission from bipolar 
disorder (Post et al., 2003b; Thomas et al., 2007). 
There is also some evidence to suggest that individuals with bipolar disorders are 
highly sensitive to self-negative information (Bentall & Thompson, 1990; French et al., 
1996), possess negative attributional styles (Lyon et al., 1999; Knowles et al., 2007) and 
have low underlying self-esteem despite outward appearances of high self-esteem (Winters 
& Neale, 1985), which may reflect latent negative self-beliefs and schemas of low self-
worth (Bentall et al., 2006). Interestingly, a qualitative analysis of the memories recalled 
by Mansell and Lam‟s (2004) participants indicated that autobiographical memories were 
associated with themes relating to a pervasive negative self-concept (Mansell & Hodson, 
2009). The direct availability of some specific negative memories in bipolar individuals, as 
suggested by the current study, would lend support to these observations and could suggest 
that individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder may be unable to avoid certain negative 
unpleasant memories through overgenerality, with those memories possibly relating to a 
higher-order negatively biased self-concept consistent with the Depression Avoidance 
Hypothesis (Neale, 1988; Bentall et al., 2006).  
 Although Study Eight addressed methodological issues in the investigation of 
autobiographical memory in individuals currently in remission from bipolar disorder, it is 
still unclear how memory specificity differs between currently manic and depressed 
bipolar individuals. Whilst Van der Gucht and colleagues (2009) administered the AMT to 
groups of currently manic, depressed and euthymic bipolar individuals, they only reported 
between-group differences in the recall of specific but for not general memories. It is 
unclear whether bipolar mood episodes were associated with overgeneral memory recall in 
Van der Gucht and colleagues‟ study, as has previously been suggested (Tzemou & 
Birchwood, 2007). There is also the practical issue of whether currently unwell bipolar 
individuals are able to fully engage with the AMT procedure, or whether autobiographical 
memory specificity during severe depressive and manic episodes is affected by extreme 
mood disturbances.  
There are a number of strengths associated with the research presented within this 
section. Both studies Seven and Eight utilised standardised assessments of 
autobiographical memory specificity, in the form the cued-memory AMT task, and used a 
range of cue words to prime a range of positive and negative memories. Previous research 
has used sets of negatively biased cue words (Delduca et al., 2010), or have deviated from 
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the standard AMT procedure (Mansell & Lam, 2004), which may have unintentionally 
confounded results. Whilst there has been one previous investigation using the standard 
AMT procedure in a remitted bipolar sample (Scott et al., 2000), there had been no 
subsequent attempt to replicate their study using the standardised AMT procedure within a 
sample of remitted bipolar individuals. 
There are a number of considerations for future investigations into memory 
specificity following the current research. Whilst both studies focused upon addressing 
methodological issues in the assessment of autobiographical memory in previous studies, 
neither study assessed the extent to which executive processing capacities may have 
influenced memory specificity. Executive processes are considered to moderate 
autobiographical memory recall processes (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), with 
research indicating that reductions in processing capacities are associated with greater 
overgenerality (Dalgleish et al., 2007; Ros et al, 2010). However, none of the previous 
investigations in memory specificity in bipolar samples had evaluated the effect of 
executive processing capacities upon memory specificity, so this criticism is not just 
limited to the current research. Ruminative thought processes have also been associated 
with reduced memory specificities (Lyubormirsky et al., 1998), and with reduced executive 
processing capacities (Watkins & Brown, 2002; Philippot & Brutoux, 2008). However, 
neither positive nor negative forms of rumination were significantly associated with the 
specificity of autobiographical memory in Study Eight. Future evaluations of memory 
specificity require the assessment of executive processing capacities and ruminative 
thought processes and their effects upon memory, both of which are components of the 
CaRFAX framework as detailed by Williams (2006). 
From a methodological perspective, it is recommended that future studies adopt the 
standardised AMT procedure and a balanced set of cue words which prime emotionally 
positive and negative experiences relevant to bipolar disorder. As the current study has 
suggested that direct and generative memory recall processes may be associated with 
different memory specificities, future research should consider the mode of memory recall 
as well as the psychological processes underlying memory specificity. In relation to this, 
Study Eight was not sufficiently powered to allow for the analysis of whether trait positive 
and negative rumination were associated with memory specificity. Future investigations 
will require better powered designs than the current study. Ideally, studies should 
incorporate two control groups, including a clinical comparison group of individuals with 
major depressive disorder and a healthy control group, to more stringently investigate 
whether bipolar disorder is characterised by an overgeneral memory bias.  
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Finally, from a wider theoretical perspective, none of the main psychological 
theories for bipolar disorder provide an adequate description of how autobiographical 
memory specificity is related to the experience of bipolar disorder. There is a clear need for 
future investigations into the processes implicated in autobiographical memory recall in 
bipolar individuals as previously suggested, but also in the development of robust 
theoretical frameworks which integrate the more basic cognitive processes with higher-
order processes (e.g., self-appraisal) within the development of symptoms and experience 
of bipolar disorder. 
 
5.4.2 Conclusions 
The current section detailed two studies which investigated the specificity of 
autobiographical memory recall in individuals at-risk for hypomania and future bipolar 
disorder, and in individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder and a group of non-bipolar 
controls. Study Seven reported that the higher risk for hypomania was associated with 
increased overgenerality in memory recall compared to low and moderate risk participants, 
in contrast to previous observations (Delduca et al,. 2010), although no specific effects of 
valence upon memory specificity were noted. Study Eight observed that individuals with 
bipolar disorder reported more extreme overgenerality in autobiographical memory than 
non-bipolar control participants, with tendencies to recall greater numbers of negative 
memories and fewer specific negative memories compared to positive memories by the 
bipolar participants. This pattern of memory recall in the bipolar group may be indicative 
of avoidance of unpleasant memories through generative memory processes as suggested 
by the functional avoidance mechanism described in Williams‟ (2006) CaRFAX model. 
Despite this possibly trait-based tendency to be overgeneral, bipolar individuals also 
recalled specific negative memories in faster response latencies than controls. Both studies 
suggest avenues for further research into memory specificity in bipolar disorder, 
particularly into the mode of memory recall and the effects of generative versus direct 
recall processes upon symptom courses in individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 
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Section 6 
General Discussion 
The research presented within this thesis was motivated by the limitations of the previous 
investigations into the nature of autobiographical memory specificity in bipolar disorder, 
and also the limited understanding of how the specificity of memory recall is associated 
with the vulnerability to hypomania and future bipolar disorders. A series of eight studies 
were conducted under five broad research aims. 
 
6.1 Research Aim 1 - Investigate the associations between positive and 
negative cognitive style measures implicated in mood disorders 
Research Aim 1 was to further investigate the associations between positive and negative 
cognitive styles associated with bipolar disorder in relation to the vulnerability to 
hypomania. Two studies were conducted as part of this research aim. Study One 
investigated the cross-sectional associations between measures of positive and negative 
cognitive styles, including rumination and self-appraisal styles which have been implicated 
in the exacerbation of mood symptoms and the development of mood disorders, and also 
investigated the similarity and potential redundancy of these measures through a principal 
components analysis. Study Two consisted of a six month follow-up of Study One and 
investigated which of the positive and negative cognitive style measures were associated 
with prospective bipolar mood symptoms. 
 The results of Study One indicated that the whilst vulnerability to hypomania was 
associated with both positive and negative forms of rumination and self-appraisal, only 
cognitive style measures relating to attempts to increase and maintain positive emotional 
states were associated with the vulnerability to hypomania when accounting for concurrent 
subclinical mood symptoms. Current depressive symptoms as measured by the CES-D 
scale were correlated with cognitive styles associated with the reduction of positive mood 
states and the maintenance of negative moods, including a lack of self-focused positive 
rumination. The measures in Study One were reduced to three components relating to 
cognitive styles that attempt to increase positive affect, increase negative affect, and a 
normalisation of experiences component, reflecting a reappraisal process.  
Study Two, a six month follow-up of participants from Study One, indicated that the 
engagement in negative cognitive styles was prospectively associated heightened mood 
symptoms, including sub-clinical forms of hypo/manic, depression and interpersonal 
conflict as measured by the Internal States Scale. However, positive cognitive styles, and 
the positive style component produced in Study One, were negatively correlated with 
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prospective depressive symptoms and were not significantly correlated with follow-up 
hypo/manic symptoms. This latter finding is contrary to suggestions that cognitive thought 
patterns that amplify positive mood states are associated with exacerbations in manic 
symptoms in individuals vulnerable to hypomania (Feldman et al, 2008). One explanation 
is that cognitive responses to positive affect may only increase moods and hypo/manic 
symptoms in the short-term in at-risk individuals, and that more negatively biased thought 
processes are implicated in the development of not just depressive but also hypomanic 
symptoms over long periods of time. In relation to this, Study Two noted that only the 
reporting of negative life events experienced between time-points were associated with 
increases in hypomania vulnerability scores. Although hypomania vulnerability appears to 
be cross-sectionally associated with positive cognitive style biases, negative cognitive 
processes and negative life events appear to be prospectively associated with an increased 
vulnerability to hypomania. However, there remains a relative dearth of research 
investigating the prospective associations between cognitive styles and mood symptoms 
within vulnerable samples for bipolar disorder. 
 
6.2 Research Aim 2 - Investigate the cognitive vulnerability to hypomania: 
autobiographical memory specificity, problem-solving capabilities, and 
positive and negative rumination 
Three studies were conducted as part of Research Aim 2. Study Three described the 
development of the UMEPS means-end problem solving task. Study Four performed a 
further validation of the UMEPS in a separate sample and investigated how problem-
solving capabilities are associated with appraisals of defeat and entrapment implicated in 
depression and suicidality. Study Five investigated the cognitive vulnerability to 
hypomania in relation to autobiographical memory specificity, positive and negative 
rumination, and problem-solving effectiveness as measured by the UMEPS, to investigate 
whether similar patterns of cognitive vulnerabilities are associated with hypomania as 
previously suggested for depression.  
 Study Three detailed the development of the UMEPS task, a process-focused 
measure of psychosocial problem-solving. Whilst self-report questionnaire measures of 
problem-solving exist, these measures do not necessarily measure the process of solution 
generation but more appraisals of low confidence in problem-solving. It has been 
suggested that problem-solving appraisals may be symptomatic of low-esteem during 
depressed states and also a contributing factor to the development of depressive symptoms 
(Dixon et al., 1993). Therefore, the UMEPS task was designed to feature a range of 
problematic situations which were likely to be encountered by student populations in order 
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to avoid the reliance upon measures of more generic participant-made appraisals of their 
own problem-solving abilities. Performance on the UMEPS was compared to current 
depressive symptoms and the use of resourcefulness behaviours in problem-solving. It was 
hypothesised that more effective problem-solving as measured by the UMEPS task, in 
terms of the generation of more relevant solution means, more specifically detailed and 
more effective solutions would be associated with greater resourcefulness and with 
reduced depressive symptoms. 
Indeed, current depressive symptoms were associated with lower resourcefulness, the 
generation of fewer relevant solution steps to problems and with less specifically detailed 
solutions. In contrast, resourcefulness was associated with the generation of more relevant 
solution steps, with more effective and more specifically detailed solutions as rated by an 
observer. The number of relevant solution means generated on the UMEPS also 
differentiated between groups of students reporting high and low levels of depressive 
symptoms, in accord with previous studies in clinically depressed individuals (e.g., Marx et 
al., 1992). In contrast to Study Three, a student version of the MEPS task developed in a 
North American sample had failed to demonstrate that the generation of solutions 
differentiated between students reporting high and low severities of current depressive 
symptoms (Blankstein et al., 1992). 
Study Four aimed to further validate the UMEPS task in a separate sample and 
investigate whether self-appraisals of defeat and entrapment implicated in the development 
of depression and suicidality are associated with differential components of problem-
solving. Previous studies had only investigated the associations between defeat and 
entrapment in relation to confidence in problem-solving and not solution generation 
(Taylor et al., 2010b). As there is some debate as to whether defeat and entrapment 
represent the same construct, relating to perceptions of failure without available means to 
escape (Taylor et al, 2009), or inter-related but qualitatively different constructs (Gilbert & 
Allen, 1998), Study Four explored whether separate or combined defeat and entrapment 
constructs were associated with problem-solving capabilities. Partial correlations 
controlling for the effect of current depressive symptoms indicated that whilst defeat was 
associated with more pessimistic self-appraisals of solution effectiveness, entrapment was 
associated with the generation of irrelevant and unfocused solutions to problematic 
situations. These associations were also supported in mediation analyses. In sum, Study 
Four suggested that the associations between depression and poorer problem-solving may 
be better explained by the differential associations between defeat and entrapment. These 
associations also appeared to be consistent with a model of social problem-solving 
(D‟Zurilla & Goldfried, 1970; D'Zurilla & Nezu, 1990; Bell & D‟Zurilla, 2009), whereby 
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defeat appears to represent a negative problem-solving orientation, relating to negative 
self-appraisals of problem-solving abilities, but entrapment relates to an ineffective 
problem-solving style, relating to the use of poor strategies to address and overcome 
problems (Bell & D‟Zurilla, 2009). 
Study Five investigated between-group differences in rumination, problem-solving 
and autobiographical memory specificity across high and low-risk individuals for 
hypomania. Individuals at a higher risk for hypomania reported greater tendencies to 
engage in both positive and negative rumination, poorer problem-solving and greater 
overgeneral memory than low-risk participants. However, only tendencies to engage in 
self-focused positive rumination, depression-focused negative rumination, and the recall of 
negative general memories differentiated between the high and low-risk groups once 
concurrent bipolar mood symptoms were accounted for. Although these results are broadly 
consistent with observations made in bipolar samples (e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & 
Lam, 2004; Johnson et al., 2008), the lack of significant between-group differences in 
problem-solving once current mood symptoms are controlled for is consistent with 
observations made in a similar study which compared group membership between 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder and healthy controls (Scott et al., 2000). 
Similar patterns of cognitive vulnerability in relation to hypomania as previously suggested 
for depression were observed, in relation to negative rumination and overgeneral memory, 
although the higher risk for hypomania was also associated with self-focused forms of 
positive rumination but not poorer problem-solving. Poorer problem-solving appeared to 
be better explained by current mood symptoms and may not form part of a trait-based 
vulnerability to hypomania. 
 
6.3 Research Aim 3 - Investigate the relationship between the specificity of 
goal-related autobiographical memory and extreme goal-pursuit 
Study Six was a preliminary investigation into the associations between goal-sensitivity 
and the specificity of goal-related memories in relation to hypomania vulnerability. As 
previous research had suggested that the association between goal-directed behaviours and 
hypomania vulnerability is independent of current bipolar mood symptoms (Gruber & 
Johnson, 2009), Study Six investigated whether a trait-based bias in goal-related memory 
recall may explain the relationship with extreme goal pursuit in hypomanic individuals. 
 A non-clinical sample of 165 participants completed self-report measures of 
extreme goal-planning, reward sensitivity, hypomania vulnerability, sub-clinical bipolar 
mood symptoms, and sentence completion measures of the specificity of autobiographical 
memories for past goal-related events and of future event imagination. The vulnerability to 
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hypomania was associated with the recall of semantic associate information for past goal-
related successes, relating to generalised information about the self for past 
accomplishments, as well as with the imagining of future repeated successes, the setting of 
extreme extrinsic goals with potential public rewards and increased behavioural activation, 
independent of current depressive and hypo/manic mood symptoms. Tendencies to recall 
semantic information about the self in relation to past goal-related successes were also 
associated with the pursuit of extreme extrinsic goals on the WASSUP, including creative 
accomplishments and world influence, heightened behavioural activation but lower 
behavioural inhibition.  
 The results of Study Six were consistent with previous observations that extreme 
goal-planning and hypomania vulnerability are not simply due to current bipolar mood 
symptoms (Gruber & Johnson, 2009), but also suggest that the recall of generalised 
memories for past goal-related successes is associated with extreme goal-striving in 
hypomanic individuals. Although future investigations are required, one suggestion is that 
high-risk individuals may over-embellish past goal accomplishments in the form of 
memories via positive ruminative thought processes, which may in turn contribute to 
increases in positive affect, goal-directed behaviours, and hypo/manic symptoms. 
 
6.4 Research Aim 4 - Investigate the specificity of autobiographical memory 
in individuals at a low, moderate and high risk for hypomania 
Study Seven was conducted to investigate Research Aim 4, and was a partial replication of 
a previous AMT study (Delduca et al., 2010). Study Seven investigated memory specificity 
using the AMT in three groups of HPS scorers (low, moderate, and high). Individuals at a 
higher risk for hypomania reported more extreme overgeneral autobiographical memory 
compared to moderate and low-risk individuals, with no specific effects noted for the recall 
of positive or negative memories. Whilst no between-group differences were noted in the 
time taken to recall memories in response to cues, specific memory representations were 
recalled in faster response times than general memories.  
Study Seven represents the second attempt at investigating autobiographical memory 
specificity within an at-risk sample for bipolar disorders using the standardised AMT 
paradigm. In contrast to Delduca and colleagues‟ (2010) study which suggested that 
hypomania vulnerability is associated with the faster and more specific recall of negative 
memories, Study Seven suggested that the higher risk for hypomania is associated with an 
increased overgeneral memory bias, but found no between-group differences in response 
latencies. Studies Five to Seven suggest that the higher risk for hypomania and future 
bipolar disorders is associated with an increased overgeneral memory bias across a range 
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of memory assessments, similar to observations made of overgenerality in bipolar samples 
(e.g., Scott et al., 2000; Mansell & Lam, 2004; Tzemou & Birchwood, 2007), indicating 
that increased overgenerality may function as a risk factor for bipolar disorder. 
  
6.5 Research Aim 5 - Investigate the specificity of autobiographical memory 
in remitted bipolar individuals and matched non-bipolar controls: is there 
evidence for an overgeneral recall bias for negative autobiographical 
memories? 
Study Eight investigated the specificity of autobiographical memory within a sample of 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder currently in remission from symptoms, and a 
sample of healthy non-bipolar controls. Whilst there have been a small number of studies 
conducted within bipolar samples, some of these studies had diverged from the 
standardised AMT procedure (Mansell & Lam, 2004; Gregory et al., 2010), or had 
sampled participants across different phases of bipolar disorder (e.g., Tzemou & 
Birchwood, 2007; Van der Gucht et al., 2009), meaning that it was somewhat unclear as to 
what form of an overgeneral memory bias is associated with bipolar disorder in remission, 
which may function as a vulnerability factor for future relapse. Study Eight adopted the 
standardised AMT procedure used in Study Seven to assess autobiographical memory 
specificity. 
 The results of Study Eight indicated that individuals in remission from bipolar 
disorder reported more extreme autobiographical overgeneral memory than the non-bipolar 
controls, consistent with previous observations (Scott et al., 2000; Tzemou & Birchwood, 
2007). Individuals with bipolar disorder were also faster to recall specific negative 
memories than controls, although there were no other between-group differences in 
response latencies. These results suggest a possible dichotomy in the recall of 
autobiographical memories, whereby bipolar disorder would appear to be associated with a 
general trait-based tendency to be overgeneral during generative memory recall but may 
have more direct access to some specific memories for negative events. Study Eight is the 
first study to report data relating to the response latencies for memory recall in bipolar 
individuals, and suggests some intriguing questions for further research.  
 
6.6 Discussion of results across studies 
A number of common patterns and themes have emerged across the studies conducted 
within this thesis. In terms of ruminative thought processes, individuals at a higher risk for 
hypomania demonstrated tendencies to engage in rumination in response to both positive 
and negative events. Although, Study One suggested that hypomania vulnerability was 
 265 
primarily cross-sectionally associated with positive cognitive styles, a six month follow-up 
suggested that negative forms of rumination were associated with increased prospective 
bipolar symptom severities, including depressive and hypo/manic symptoms. In addition, 
increases in the self-reported vulnerability to hypomania were associated with the reporting 
of negative life events between time points. Although positive ruminative cognitive styles 
are considered to contribute to the development of manic symptomatology (Feldman et al, 
2008), positive rumination may only contribute to short term increases in mood and 
symptoms. 
That positive forms of rumination may only be associated with short-term boosts in 
mood may be consistent with the results of Study Six, which discussed how self-focused 
positive rumination may assist in the over embellishment of generalised self-focused 
accounts of past goal related successes. This over-exaggeration of past goal successes via 
rumination may contribute to increased positive affect, goal-directed behaviours, grandiose 
thoughts about the self, and activated (hypomanic) symptoms, and may fundamentally 
constitute a depression avoidance mechanism through excessive positive ruminative 
thought processes and biased memory recall. 
Further investigations are required to assess the precise time course of these 
positive ruminative strategies and whether these positively focused cognitive styles 
contribute to short term or longer term increases in positive affect and in hypo/manic 
symptoms. If this short-term positive rumination represents a depression avoidance 
strategy, possibly to cope with self-negative cognitions and schemas, the prospective 
associations between negative cognitive styles and bipolar mood symptoms in Study Two 
may reflect that positive rumination is only associated with short-term increases in mood in 
vulnerable individuals. The positive rumination measure used in this thesis (the Responses 
to Positive Affect Scale; Feldman et al., 2008) has not yet been used with currently manic, 
hypomanic or depressed bipolar patients, so it is not fully clear how positive and negative 
rumination are associated with clinically significant bipolar mood episodes. 
In relation to problem-solving, whilst Study Five suggested that high-risk 
individuals performed more poorly on the UMEPS problem-solving task than low-risk 
participants, these between-group differences disappeared once concurrent mood 
symptoms were accounted for. An alternative proposition is that hypomanic individuals 
may only be motivated to participate in problem-solving behaviours where there are clear 
goal-related outcomes. There is some evidence to suggest that individuals vulnerable to 
hypomania are highly sensitive to rewards associated with goal-attainment (Johnson & 
Carver, 2006; Jones et al., 2007) and engage in approach behaviours to goals (Jones et al., 
2007). Individuals with hypomanic tendencies may only fully engage in problem-solving 
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approach behaviours when the resolution of problematic situations is associated with a 
definite reward, similar to the sensitivities to extrinsic goals associated with hypomania 
vulnerability in previous research (Gruber & Johnson, 2009). Alternatively, problematic 
situations may be appraised as having a low-reward value, as resolving the problem may 
only assist in escaping a negative situation and not assist in accomplishing a significant and 
extrinsically rewarding goal. Hypomanic individuals may be more likely to avoid 
problematic situations and instead use more distraction-based responses, and endorse the 
use of risky and dangerous activities as responses to negative experiences as suggested by 
previous research (Thomas & Bentall, 2002). Although the UMEPS studies presented 
within this thesis did not consider the possible role of problem-solving outcomes upon the 
engagement in solution generation behaviours, whether individuals at a heightened 
vulnerability to hypomania are more likely to generate solution means to problems 
associated with high and public reward may be an interesting avenue for future research to 
explore. 
 Four studies conducted separate investigations into the specificity of 
autobiographical memory recall in relation to the vulnerability to hypomania and the 
experience of bipolar disorder. The first study, Study Five, investigated between-group 
differences in memory specificity, rumination and problem-solving in high and low-risk 
individuals for hypomania. Study Five observed that individuals at a higher risk for 
hypomania recalled fewer specific positive memories and greater numbers of general 
negative memories than low-risk individuals on a sentence completion measure of memory 
specificity.  
Study Six, a preliminary investigation into the relationships between memory 
specificity and goal-pursuit, suggested that the higher risk for hypomania is associated with 
the recall of generalised semantic information about the self in relation to past goal-related 
successes. The tendency to generate semantic associates for past goal-related successes 
was also associated with the planning of extreme extrinsic goals, including goals relating to 
celebrity fame and worldwide influence. These associations were independent of current 
mood symptoms and suggests that the heightened sensitivity towards goals in hypomanic 
individuals may be in part explained by goal-related memory recall biases. As generalised 
memory representations do not describe specific behavioural plans to accomplish goals, 
but more goal-related outcomes (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), Study Six‟s results 
suggest that the tendency to strive for extreme goals may be related to the over 
embellishment of past successes and the overly positive interpretation of propositional 
information about the self in the form of generalised memories. Whilst previous research 
conducted within a bipolar sample had suggested that hypomanic episodes can be 
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associated with mental imagery relating to future positive events (Gregory et al, 2010), 
Study Six was the first investigation into goal-related memory processes in relation to 
hypomania vulnerability. 
 Study Seven investigated the specificity of autobiographical memory within 
individuals at a low, moderate or high risk for hypomania using the AMT. Individuals at a 
higher-risk for hypomania reported more extreme overgeneral autobiographical memory 
than moderate and low-risk individuals. Study Eight replicated Study Seven‟s AMT 
procedure and reported that individuals in remission from bipolar disorder reported more 
extreme overgenerality for negative memories than a matched group of non-bipolar healthy 
controls. Convergent evidence has been provided by these four studies to suggest that the 
vulnerability to hypomania and the experience of bipolar disorder is associated with an 
overgeneral memory bias. 
 
6.7 Methodological Considerations 
 
6.7.1 Assessing the Specificity of Autobiographical Memory 
A considerable challenge in researching the specificity of autobiographical memory recall 
is the measurement of memory specificity. Two different forms of memory assessments 
were used in the current thesis, the standardised cued memory paradigm, the 
“Autobiographical Memory Test” (Williams & Broadbent, 1986), and sentence completion 
measures of memory specificity (SCEPT: Raes et al., 2007) and of future event 
imagination (Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009).  
 In the current thesis, individuals at a higher risk for hypomania reported more 
extreme overgenerality on the AMT and sentence completion measures (Studies Five, Six 
and Seven). The results of these studies raise further questions about the previous AMT 
study conducted in samples of individuals at low and high risk for hypomania (Delduca et 
al., 2010), which reported that high-risk individuals were more specific in their memory 
recall than low-risk individuals on the AMT task. Study Five also supported Raes and 
colleagues‟ (2007) claim that the SCEPT task is more sensitive measure of overgeneral 
autobiographical memory compared to the cued AMT task, with greater numbers of 
sentence completions made in reference to general than specific memories across low and 
high-risk groups. Study Seven, in comparison, noted that participants across groups were 
more likely to recall specific than general memories in response to cue words on the AMT.  
Whilst the AMT has remained the most widely used measure of memory specificity 
across a range of clinical and non-clinical studies, a number of concerns have been 
highlighted in the use of the AMT. These concerns include the reduced anonymity of the 
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participant when completing the face-to-face AMT, meaning that participants may be more 
guarded in their memory recall and less likely to fully disclose information relating to their 
memories for past experiences for fear of embarrassment. The extent to which responses 
on the face-to-face AMT may be affected by the experimenter is unclear, particularly as 
the experimenter was not blind to the group status of participants in the two AMT studies 
presented in this thesis. Possible experimenter effects upon participant responses on the 
AMT have not yet been debated within the research literature, although experimenter bias 
may have affected cue word presentation. Indeed a recent review has highlighted 
differences across studies in the presentation of cues and in the time limit to recall 
memories as possible contributing factors to the variability of results between studies 
investigating overgeneral memory (Griffiths et al., in press). Although it may not always 
be possible to ensure that the experimenter is blind to the group status of participants in 
AMT studies, future studies should include group-blind independent coders and 
interviewers to minimise possible experimenter bias. Internet-based studies remove any 
experimenter influence from performance on the memory recall task, assuming that 
participants may be more truthful and honest in their recall of memories through increased 
anonymity (e.g., Studies Five and Six). The AMT also requires the selection of balanced 
cue words to ensure that a range of positive and negative memories are primed for recall.  
There has also been some research to suggest that the specificity of 
autobiographical memory recall on the AMT may be influenced by a participant‟s memory 
for task instructions (Yanes et al., 2008). It has been argued that the use of extensive 
instructions, practice trials, and the repetition of specificity prompts during the AMT may 
lead to non-clinical individuals who are habitually overgeneral to overcome their 
overgeneral tendencies and recall specific memories under the conditions of the AMT 
(Raes et al., 2007, Debeer, Hermans & Raes, 2009). Interestingly, a “minimal instructions” 
version of the AMT, which omits the specificity instructions, has been reported to detect 
higher prevalences of overgeneral memory in non-clinical student participants than the 
traditional AMT instructions (Debeer et al., 2009). As previously discussed, participants 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder appear to retain the specificity instructions during the 
AMT task described in Study Eight, and would often repeat the instructions when 
attempting to retrieve a specific memory. Although neither of the AMT studies in this 
thesis assessed participants‟ memory for task instructions, participants across studies 
appeared to retain the specificity instructions across trials despite recalling overgeneral 
memories. 
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6.8 Strengths & Limitations of the Current Thesis 
There are a number of strengths and limitations to consider in relation to the research 
presented in this thesis. A key strength of the current research is the use of a variety of 
methodological approaches across studies, including the use of validated self-report 
questionnaire measures of mood, cognitive styles (e.g., rumination, appraisal styles), the 
development and application of a new process-focused measure of problem solving (the 
“UMEPS” task), and the use of standardised memory recall assessments including the 
AMT and sentence completion tasks to assess memory specificity in individuals vulnerable 
to hypomania and future bipolar disorders.  
The studies conducted in the thesis have used Eckblad and Chapman‟s (1986) 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) as a measure of the vulnerability to hypomania and 
future bipolar disorders. As discussed in the study chapters, mean scores on the HPS 
reported in the current thesis were consistent with scores reported in previous studies 
conducted within similar British student samples using the “pure” HPS scale (e.g., Dodd et 
al., 2010). Although a minority of studies have mixed the items of the HPS in order to 
address potential participant response bias (e.g., Meyer & Hofmann, 2005), research has 
failed to find evidence of associations between HPS scores and socially desirability using 
the pure HPS scale (Johnson et al., 2008a), and there is no clear evidence that mixing items 
improves the sensitivity of the HPS. The use of the pure HPS scale in the current thesis has 
been justified given the high degree of consistency between mean HPS scores reported in 
the studies described in this thesis and those conducted in similar British samples using the 
pure HPS (e.g., Jones et al., 2007; Jones & Day, 2008; Dodd et al., 2010).  
There are some ethical issues to consider when identifying individuals from 
analogue and student samples as being at risk for bipolar disorder, particularly in the 
potential for individuals to be wrongly identified to be at-risk, or even diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder, through the use of clinical interviewing instruments such as the SCID 
(First et al., 2002a, 2002b). In relation to this, because the student-based studies in the 
thesis did not include a measure of whether participants had previously experienced mental 
health problems, it is possible that some participants who have experienced clinically 
significant mood symptoms were recruited into these samples. Also as the majority of the 
student studies conducted in this thesis were internet-based, there are further ethical 
considerations regarding the ability of the researcher to provide support to individuals who 
are identified as being vulnerable based upon scores on clinical measures.   
In light of these concerns, a decision was made to use the HPS to assess the 
cognitive vulnerability to hypomania before commencing this programme of research. The 
HPS measures personality traits associated with non-episodic presentations of bipolar 
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disorder, as currently euthymic bipolar and cyclothymic individuals appear to possess 
hypomania-related personality traits outside of clinically significant mood episodes 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Whilst other measures of mood disorder vulnerability exist 
(e.g., the General Behavior Inventory, GBI; Depue et al., 1981), these measures may be 
unsuitable for use with non-clinical studies incorporating screening stages. In particular, 
the large number of items and verbose nature of some items on the GBI may increase rates 
of attrition during web-based screening stages. Although the HPS ranges for the high-risk 
groups sampled in the current thesis are similar to those used by a previous 
autobiographical memory investigation (Delduca et al., 2010), other studies have used 
more stringent cut-offs and higher HPS scores to identify individuals at an elevated risk for 
bipolar disorder (e.g., Hofmann & Meyer, 2006; Ankers & Jones, 2009). Using more 
stringent cut-offs on the HPS may more accurately sample individuals at an elevated risk 
for bipolar disorder in the investigation of autobiographical memory processes.  
A limitation associated with the use of the Internal States Scale (ISS) across various 
studies in the thesis is that the ISS is only a measure of transient (24 hour) mood symptoms 
(e.g., Studies One, Two, Five to Seven). Future studies may need to consider how 
autobiographical memory processes are associated with more enduring mood symptoms in 
bipolar samples. However, previous research has failed to note significant associations 
between more sensitive clinician-rated measures of manic and depressive symptoms with 
autobiographical memory specificity within currently unwell and remitted bipolar 
individuals (Van der Gucht et al., 2009). In addition, a small number of members of staff 
from the University of Manchester were recruited into Studies One and Six, who were of 
an older age than the undergraduate students who made up the majority of the studies‟ 
samples. Whilst the inclusion of these participants did not appear to have biased the results, 
it is possible that the sampling of significant numbers of older aged participants may be 
problematic in the investigation of processes implicated in the risk for bipolar disorder, 
particularly as the average age of onset for bipolar affective illness is considered to be in 
the mid to late twenties (Goodwin & Jamieson, 1990; Depp et al., 2009; Baldessarini et al., 
2010). Future studies should consider screening out older aged participants in student 
samples, particularly mature students who may be significantly older than the average 
undergraduate student. 
Different recruitment strategies were used for the non-clinical autobiographical 
memory studies in this thesis, including the screening of participants into high versus low 
risk groups based upon HPS scores (Study Five), or into low, moderate and high risk 
groups (Study Seven), and also the use of a non HPS screened continuum sample (Study 
Six). A common pattern across these studies is that the higher risk for bipolar disorder, in 
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terms of HPS score and HPS group, was associated with an increased overgeneral memory 
bias. Whilst the continuum sample in Study Six was recruited for the purposes of powering 
factor analyses, which were ultimately not reported here, the sampling of risk groups in 
Studies Five and Seven was to afford direct comparisons with previous research. The use 
of these different sampling strategies and convergence of their findings is a key strength of 
the current thesis 
In relation to participant genders, greater numbers of female compared to male 
participants were recruited across the non-clinical studies reported in this thesis (Studies 
One to Seven), with similar percentages of female participants recruited in these studies 
compared to similar studies conducted in British samples (e.g., 70-90% female; Knowles et 
al., 2005; Jones & Day, 2008; Mansell et al., 2008; Dodd et al., 2010). There is a concern 
that these studies may not accurately reflect potential gender differences in the cognitive 
processes implicated in the affective disorders. However, the largely female samples in the 
current thesis and the aforementioned research are representative of the largely female 
student populations at the sampled institutions, although such samples are unlikely to be 
generalisable to the wider general population and this is a clear limitation associated with 
the sampling of undergraduate university students. Considerable attempts were made to 
increase the numbers of male participants recruited into the studies presented here, 
although anecdotally male participants were be harder to contact and less motivated to 
participate in studies. Future research may need to incorporate more attractive incentives in 
order to improve the gender ratios of their samples. 
Whilst the current research has investigated whether autobiographical memory 
specificity is associated with the cognitive vulnerability to hypomania and bipolar disorder, 
whether individuals with more a biological vulnerability to bipolar disorder report similar 
overgeneral memory biases is not currently clear. Although overgenerality appears to be a 
cognitive phenomenon (Dalgleish et al., 2001), no studies have been conducted within 
groups of individuals at a genetic vulnerability to bipolar disorder, for example, relatives of 
individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder. If overgeneral autobiographical memory recall 
is not prevalent in individuals with a biological vulnerability to bipolar affective illness, 
this would lend further credence to the argument that reduced memory specificity is largely 
a cognitive phenomenon, and would support the development of cognitive-behavioural 
techniques to improve memory specificity. 
 Study Eight sampled individuals currently in remission from bipolar disorder to 
ensure that performance on the study procedures was not substantially influenced by 
current mood states. The sampling of currently unwell and episodic patients raises complex 
ethical and practical issues, particularly in the obtainment of informed consent from 
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individuals who may not have the full mental capacity to do so. In addition, currently 
unwell participants may not have the ability or motivation to fully engage with study 
procedures, experimental tasks, and careful consideration is required to ensure that 
participation in research does not impact upon the participant‟s wellbeing. The sampling of 
currently euthymic and remitted bipolar patients does, however, allow for the investigation 
of processes associated with the vulnerability to future relapses, particularly as a theme of 
this thesis is the potential role of memory specificity and other cognitive processes in the 
vulnerability to bipolar disorders. Although participants in the control group of Study Eight 
completed the screening questions of the SCID interview, the controls were not screened 
for past family histories of mental health disorders. Individuals with family members with 
diagnosed mental health conditions may themselves be vulnerable to bipolar disorder and 
other conditions. Future research should consider screening the family histories of 
volunteers when recruiting for control groups.  
Due to the cross-sectional nature of a number of studies in the current thesis, it 
remains somewhat unclear as to how the specificity of autobiographical memory recall, 
problem-solving as measured by the UMEPS task, and goal-related memory processes are 
associated with the vulnerability to hypomania and other symptoms of bipolar disorders 
over the longer-term. There is a clear need for future research to investigate how these 
processes may contribute to the development of mood disorders in vulnerable individuals 
and to relapse in individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorders, particularly in relation to the 
proportion of variance in prospective symptoms or risk of bipolar disorder that these 
cognitive processes can explain independent of baseline mood symptoms. 
 One concern regarding the investigation into autobiographical memory specificity 
in bipolar disorder is the extent to which memory specificity may be explained by the 
psychological mechanisms outlined in Williams‟ (2006) CaRFAX model. The CaRFAX 
model proposed that a combination of executive processing resources, capture and 
ruminative processes, and functional avoidance relating to emotion regulation are 
implicated in the recall of overgeneral memories (Williams, 2006). Although the current 
thesis has not been able to substantially further the understanding of the role of the 
CaRFAX processes in overgeneral memory in bipolar disorder, research presented in this 
thesis does suggest directions for further studies into the mechanisms underlying 
overgenerality.  
It is noteworthy that the majority of autobiographical memory studies do not 
consider the combined influence of the CaRFAX process upon memory. Although, a recent 
study has suggested that only capture and rumination, and executive processes, make 
independent contributions to the severity of overgeneral memory in a healthy student 
 273 
sample, and these processes did not appear to interact in relation to memory specificity 
contrary to the predictions of CaRFAX (Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2011). However, 
deficits in these processes should be more pronounced in clinical samples, so interactions 
between the CaRFAX processes may very well be observed in individuals with diagnosed 
affective disorders. Although there remains little supporting evidence and little 
development of the CaRFAX overgeneral memory model, the research presented in thesis 
has addressed several important methodological issues in the assessment of 
autobiographical memory in previous studies, allowing for the refinement of further 
research into the processes underlying memory specificity in bipolar samples. 
In relation to the CaRFAX overgeneral memory processes, executive processes are 
postulated to moderate the recall process within the memory system (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000; Williams, 2006), with reduced specificities of autobiographical memory 
associated with reduced executive processing capacities (Dalgleish et al, 2007). Neither the 
current thesis nor previous studies have fully considered how executive processing 
capacities may be implicated in reduced memory specificity in bipolar disorder.  However, 
care is required when assessing executive processing in relation to memory specificity, as 
the completion of cognitively demanding tasks may only serve to reduce processing 
capacities (e.g., Neshat-Doost et al., 2008). 
 Another unexplored aspect of the CaRFAX model is that of the affect regulatory 
properties of overgeneral memory. Given that bipolar disorder is a condition characterised 
by poor emotion regulation (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990; Hyman, 2000), understanding the 
affective regulatory properties of autobiographical memory specificity may assist in 
promoting effective therapeutic techniques in the management of mood swings. Whilst one 
study reported that the experience of childhood traumas were not associated with the 
severity of overgenerality in adults diagnosed with bipolar disorder (Mowlds et al., 2010), 
Tzemou and Birchwood (2007) noted currently hospitalised bipolar individuals who did 
not experience intrusive memories of past traumas were more overgeneral in their memory 
recall compared to those who experienced intrusions. The key difference between these 
two studies is that Mowlds and colleagues (2010) did not assess the prevalence of intrusive 
memories of past traumas, so the lack of associations between overgeneral memory and 
past traumas may actually be explained by the intrusion of distressing memories. 
Overgenerality may develop as a general means of coping with past negative experiences, 
but when bipolar individuals experience distressing intrusions of past events, 
overgenerality is unable to suppress the retrieval of these memories and their associated 
emotions. Whether the quick recall of some specific negative memories in Study Eight was 
due to the direct recall of intrusive or distressing memories was not clear. Future 
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investigations will need to consider the modes of memory retrieval, as well as the 
potentially intrusive nature of negative memories when evaluating the specificity of 
memory recall in individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 
Taking the results of Study Eight into consideration, there appears to be increasing 
support for the hypothesis that whilst overgenerality may assist in avoiding unpleasant 
emotions, which may not be a harmful means of emotion regulation in the short-term 
(Hermans et al., 2005; Raes et al., 2006c), long-term overgenerality may be dysfunctional 
(Williams, 2006). The availability of generally detailed self-propositional memories has 
also been associated with ruminative thought processes (Raes et al., 2006d), which are 
associated with the maintenance of depressive states (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), 
with both rumination and overgeneral memory associated with impairments in the ability 
to effectively generate solutions to psychosocial problems (Goddard et al., 1996; Watkins 
et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2006), which appear to form a triumvirate of inter-related 
cognitive vulnerability processes associated with the mood disorders (Raes et al., 2005a; 
2006d). The common observation that individuals with bipolar disorders report ongoing 
subsyndromal depressive symptoms even during remission from mood episodes (Post et 
al., 2003b) may be due to this availability of generalised negative memories and 
ruminative processes during euthymia. Indeed, previous research has noted that although 
individuals with bipolar disorder are more overgeneral in their recall of negative memories, 
they report the increased rehearsal of these memories on a daily basis (Mansell & Lam, 
2004).  
In addition, Section 5 was not able to present data collected as part of two event-
appraisal diary studies which were conducted alongside the AMT studies described in 
Studies Seven and Eight. These diaries were designed as pilot investigations into whether 
biases in the appraisal of recently experienced events, and the experience of bipolar mood 
symptoms over a seven day period, were associated with the degree of overgeneral 
memory recall in the respective AMT studies. Data analysis failed to find significant 
associations between performance on the AMT and the diary measures, due to a lack of 
statistical power. Future investigations may consider using Experience Sampling 
Methodologies (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Myin-Germeys et al., 2001) to further 
explore whether cognitive biases associated with memory specificity are associated with 
tendencies to over, or perhaps under, emotionally and cognitively respond to the 
experience of recent daily events in individuals with bipolar disorder. 
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6.9 Directions for Future Research  
As previously discussed across the experimental chapters, there are a number of future 
research directions given the somewhat preliminary and developing research literature 
investigating autobiographical memory specificity in bipolar disorder. One particular 
question which so far remains unanswered is whether the overgenerality for negative 
memories in bipolar individuals is a result of past experiences of severe depressive 
episodes (Nandrino et al., 2002), which are associated with the cognitive processes 
underlying a reduced specificity of autobiographical memory (i.e., negative rumination, 
reduced executive processing capacities, and functional avoidance; Williams, 2006). If 
overgeneral memory primarily develops as a consequence of severe depressive episodes 
(Nandrino et al., 2002; Mansell & Lam, 2004), and the associated rumination and 
establishment of over-elaborated networks of generally detailed memories through 
mnemonic interlock, would overgenerality be evident in individuals who have exclusively 
experienced hypomanic or manic states but not depression, for example, individuals with 
hyperthymic temperaments? Or would such individuals report a more positive form of 
overgenerality, featuring an established network of generic memory representations which 
may exclusively feature positive autobiographical memories? 
 Further research is also required to assess the prospective associations between 
memory specificity and the course of bipolar disorder. Previous research conducted within 
major depression has reported that an overgeneral memory bias is associated with greater 
probabilities of remaining clinically depressed at a four week follow-up (Hermans et al., 
2008), with the more specific recall of negative memories associated with reduced 
depression severities at three and seven month follow-ups in depressed patient samples 
(Peeters et al., 2002; Raes et al., 2006a). However, it is currently unclear as to whether the 
severity of overgeneral memory is associated with similarly poorer outcomes in bipolar 
disorder at long-term follow-up. 
On a different note, an interesting and underdeveloped area of research has 
investigated the potential overlap between self-schemas and autobiographical memory. 
Both self-schematic models and autobiographical memory are considered to form 
representations of the self in relation to past experiences, which assist in the interpretation 
of recent experiences, anticipation of future events, and direction of thought patterns and 
behaviours (Williams et al., 2007). There is some intriguing evidence to suggest that the 
activation of latent self-schematic models can be associated with the reduced specificity of 
autobiographical memory, particularly where there is a substantial conceptual overlap 
between memory cues and self-schematic content (Dalgleish et al., 2003). Indeed, one 
study noted that both depressed patients and patients with borderline personality disorder 
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recalled fewer specific autobiographical memories in response to cues that closely matched 
dysfunctional attitudes endorsed on the DAS scale (Spinhoven et al., 2007). A separate 
study reported that the priming of self-referent content by cue words on the AMT relating 
to perceptions of current, past and future selves, is associated with the recall of fewer 
specific autobiographical memories in formerly depressed patients but not in never-
depressed controls (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007). As negative self-schemas are 
considered to be formed and consolidated as a consequence of the experience of severe 
depressive episodes and negative life events (e.g., Beck, 1976), such schemas and 
overgeneral memory specificities should not be prevalent in never-depressed individuals. 
However, the nature of self-schematic models in individuals diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder is currently poorly defined and under-researched, with some disagreements 
between theories as to the exact nature of schemas in bipolar disorder (as discussed in 
Section 1.2). There is also no evidence-based theory of autobiographical memory which is 
specifically relevant to the experience of bipolar disorder. Whilst there have been some 
developments in psychological theories of bipolar disorder, at present none of these 
theories really consider the influence of memory specificity recall upon the course of the 
disorder and the development of symptoms. There is also a lack of an adequate 
psychological theory that considers how various psychological processes implicated in the 
affective disorder interact, including rumination, appraisals, memory recall and the 
availability of self-schematic models. Indeed, one difficulty at the outset of the work 
presented within the current thesis was the unavailability of a theoretical framework that 
clearly described how autobiographical memory recall may be affected by a diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder. In relation to this, one particular issue with the current theoretical 
literature in bipolar disorder is that theories have been developed which test only one 
cognitive process, usually self-appraisals (e.g., Jones, 2001; Mansell et al., 2007), which 
are heavily reliant upon the use of self-report questionnaire measures to validate the 
theory‟s assumptions.  
However, a recent promising study has used a variety of direct and indirect 
cognitive tasks to devise potential representations of suicide schemas in individuals with 
psychotic disorders (Pratt et al., 2010). These methods used by Pratt and colleagues (2010) 
could feasibly be applied to bipolar samples to understand the structure of self-schematic 
models in individuals across phases of bipolar disorder, and assist in devising a more 
integrative cognitive model than the theoretical frameworks that currently exist.  
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6.10 Clinical Implications 
Although the investigation of autobiographical memory recall in individuals diagnosed 
with bipolar disorder may have the potential to make substantial contributions to the 
refinement of psychotherapy, there remain few published studies which have investigated 
autobiographical memory in bipolar samples. There is evidence in major depressive 
disorder that overgenerality is a cognitive phenomenon (Dalgleish et al., 2001), is 
predictive of poorer responses to antidepressant medication and electro-convulsive therapy 
(Brittlebank et al., 1993; Raes et al., 2008a), but appears to be modifiable via cognitive-
behavioural therapies (Williams et al., 2000; McBride et al., 2007; Raes, Williams & 
Hermans, 2009), which may suggest promise for the development of memory-focused 
therapies for bipolar disorder. However, any potential clinical implications for bipolar 
disorder should be tempered due the largely preliminary nature of the current research 
literature. Indeed, a key argument from this thesis is that a substantial amount of further 
research is required into the role of autobiographical memory recall in relation to symptom 
development in bipolar disorder. It would be unwise to suggest substantial clinical 
approaches based upon the current state of the research literature. 
However, there are number of interesting research questions arising from this thesis 
which may further assist in developing specific clinical interventions for improving 
memory specificity in bipolar disorder. One interesting parallel between the 
autobiographical memory literature and more clinically focused research is that previous 
research has reported that individuals with bipolar disorder have particular difficulties in 
identifying the prodromal symptoms, or early warning signs, of depression (Lam & Wong, 
1997; Lam, Wong & Sham, 2001; Lam & Wong, 2005). It is interesting to note that 
previous research (e.g., Mansell & Lam, 2004), and Study Eight, suggest that individuals 
with bipolar disorder have tendencies to generate generalised descriptions of their past 
negative experiences during memory recall, which may be low in sensory-perceptual 
information and vividness. Whilst Study Eight indicated that some specific negative 
memories are ready available for recall by bipolar individuals, it is not fully clear as to 
what sort of negative events are retrieved via direct retrieval processes, and whether these 
memories may relate to prodromal symptoms. However, improving the recall specificity 
for negative autobiographical memories through cognitive-behavioural techniques, such as 
mindfulness (Williams et al., 2000), may assist in improving the specificity of a client with 
bipolar disorder‟s memories for past experiences which may overlap with depressive 
prodromes. The improved memory specificity for past negative experiences may assist in 
identifying the subtle changes associated with subsyndromal depressive symptoms, and 
may help in developing effective behavioural techniques for the client to apply when 
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prodromal symptoms emerge. Interestingly, a prospective study by Lam and colleagues 
(2001) reported that those individuals who reported the use of behavioural coping 
strategies for prodromal symptoms also had fewer depressive relapses over an 18-month 
follow-up (Lam et al., 2001). One future study could investigate depressive prodrome 
recognition and autobiographical memory specificity within a remitted bipolar sample. 
A longer term aim for the autobiographical memory in bipolar disorder literature 
would be to develop an evidence-based form of Memory Specificity Training (MeST: Raes 
et al., 2009) for use with individuals diagnosed with bipolar disorders. MeST has 
previously shown promise in improving memory specificity, decreasing negative 
ruminative thought processes, and in improving solution generation during problem-
solving in a pilot study with a small sample of inpatients with major depressive disorder 
(Raes et al., 2009). Although a number of CBT-focused interventions have been developed 
and tested within bipolar samples (see Section 1.2), many of these interventions have 
received only small-scale preliminary validation, and many lack a clear theoretical basis 
(Jones, 2004). A potential MeST for bipolar disorder would need to be deliverable as a 
solo intervention and adaptable for use alongside other techniques, such as social rhythm 
therapy (IPSRT; Frank et al., 2005) which have shown promise for bipolar disorder. 
 
6.11 Conclusions 
The research presented in this thesis attempted to further the understanding of the nature of 
the specificity of autobiographical memory recall within individuals diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder and those considered at-risk for hypomania and future bipolar disorder. A 
number of findings have been reported across the studies reported in this thesis.  
The vulnerability to hypomania and to future bipolar disorders was found to be 
associated with tendencies to engage in both positive and negative forms of ruminative 
thought processes, and increases in hypomania vulnerability over six months was 
associated with the experience of negative life events in at-risk individuals. Subclinical 
manic symptoms at a six month follow-up were primarily associated with negative but not 
positive forms of rumination contrary to their predicted associations, although a lack of 
positive rumination was associated with prospective increases in depressive symptoms. 
Whilst high-risk individuals reported poor problem-solving capabilities than low-risk 
individuals, these differences did not appear to be independent of current mood symptoms, 
suggesting that means-end problem-solving is due more to state-based factors, in this case 
mood symptoms, than a trait-based vulnerability to hypomania. High-risk individuals also 
reported more extreme overgeneral autobiographical memory across two different 
assessments, in contrast to previous research (Delduca et al., 2010); with one study 
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indicating that the higher risk for hypomania was associated with increased overgenerality 
for negative memories consistent with previous studies conducted within bipolar samples. 
Individuals in remission from bipolar disorder also reported more extreme overgenerality 
in autobiographical memory than matched health controls, but demonstrated the fast recall 
of some specific negative memories. 
In sum, these results suggest that there exists a continuum of increasing severity of 
overgeneral autobiographical memory, inclusive of individuals at higher risk for future 
bipolar disorders through to individuals with formal diagnoses of bipolar disorder. The 
vulnerability to bipolar disorder appeared to be associated with tendencies to engage in 
ruminative responses to both positive and negative experiences, and with the overgeneral 
recall of autobiographical memories, but not with deficits in problem-solving. Both 
vulnerable individuals and people with formal bipolar diagnoses demonstrated more 
marked overgeneral memory, with two studies suggesting that there is a particular bias for 
the overgeneral recall of negative autobiographical memories, similar to the overgenerality 
noted in major depressive disorder. 
Although the study of the psychology of autobiographical memory has great 
potential for informing the development of effective evidence-based memory-focused 
therapies for bipolar disorder, substantial further research is required into the effect of 
memory specificity upon illness outcomes and into the basic psychological processes 
which underlie the overgeneral memory bias noted in bipolar spectrum individuals. This 
thesis has represented an attempt to overcome methodological problems in the somewhat 
small and limited research literature of autobiographical memory in bipolar disorder. 
However, there remains a wider issue relating to the lack of psychological models which 
adequately explain the cognitive profile of bipolar affective illness. Without further 
research into the nature of the basic cognitive processes in bipolar disorder, and the 
development of adequate psychological theoretical frameworks, there is the risk that 
improvements in health outcomes for individuals diagnosed with bipolar illnesses via 
evidence-based psychotherapies may not be achieved. 
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Appendix 
 
Behavioural Inhibition & Activation Scale (BIS/BAS) 
 
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or disagree with. 
For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the item says. Choose only one 
response to each statement. Please be as accurate and honest as you can be. Respond to each item 
as if it were the only item. That is, don't worry about being “consistent” in your responses. Choose 
from the following four response options:  
 
4 = very true for me  
3 = somewhat true for me  
2 = somewhat false for me  
1 = very false for me  
 
 
1. A person's family is the most important thing in life ___  
 
2. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness. ___  
 
3. I go out of my way to get things I want. ___  
 
4. When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it. ___  
 
5. I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun. ___  
 
6. There are times in which I get immediately excited when I see an opportunity for something, 
while in other periods of time this is not the case at all ___  
 
7. How I dress is important to me. ___  
 
8. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energised. ___  
 
9. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit. ___  
 
10. When I want something I usually go all-out to get it. ___  
 
11. There are periods in which I try especially hard to get what I want, and in other periods of time  
I do nothing at all to get what I want ___  
 
12. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. ___  
 
13. It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut. ___  
 
14. If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right away. ___  
 
15. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know someone is angry at me. ___  
 
16. When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away. ___  
 
17. I often act on the spur of the moment. ___  
 
18. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty “worked up.” ___  
 
19. I often wonder why people act the way they do. ___  
 
20. Sometimes when I want to achieve something I seriously pursue a goal while I don't do this at 
all at other times ___  
 
21. When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly. ___  
 
22. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important. ___  
 
23. I crave excitement and new sensations. ___  
 
24. When I go after something I use a “no holds barred” approach. ___  
 
25. It differs a lot: There are episodes in which I give it a try immediately if I see a chance to get 
something I want while in other episodes I do not go after it at all ___  
 
26. I have very few fears compared to my friends. ___  
 
27. It would excite me to win a contest. ___  
 
28. I worry about making mistakes. ___  
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The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 
 
Below is a list of ways that you might have felt or behaved. Please indicate how often you have felt 
this way during the past week. Please tick one of four options: 
 
Rarely or none of the time (less than one day) 
Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days) 
Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
 
 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
4. I felt that I was just as good as other people. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
6. I felt depressed. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
8. I felt hopeful about the future. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
9. I thought my life had been a failure. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
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10. I felt fearful. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
11. My sleep was restless. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
12. I was happy 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
13. I talked less than usual. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
14. I felt lonely. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
15. People were unfriendly. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
16. I enjoyed life. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
17. I had crying spells. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
18. I felt sad. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
19. I felt that people dislike me. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
    
 
20. I could not get going. 
Rarely 
(less than a day) 
Sometimes 
(1-2 days) 
Occasionally 
(3-4 days) 
Most of the time 
(5-7 days) 
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Defeat scale 
 
Please read each of the following statements carefully and indicate how often you have felt like this 
in the previous seven days by circling a number on the scale. 
 
 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Mostly 
Always/ All 
the time 
1. I feel that I have not made it in 
life 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I feel that I am a successful 
person 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I feel defeated by life 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I feel that I am basically a winner 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I feel that I have lost my standing 
in the world 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I feel that life has treated me like 
a punch bag 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I feel powerless 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I feel that my confidence has 
been knocked out of me 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I feel able to deal with whatever 
life throws at me 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I feel that I have sunk to the 
bottom of the ladder 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I feel completely knocked out of 
action 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I feel that I am one of life's 
losers 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I feel that I have given up 1 2 3 4 5 
14. I feel down and out 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I feel I have lost important 
battles in life 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I feel that there is no fight left in 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Entrapment scale 
 
Please read each of the following statements carefully and indicate how much you feel like this by 
circling a number on the scale. 
 
 Not at all 
like me 
A little 
like me 
Moderately 
like me 
Quite a bit 
like me 
Extremely 
like me 
I want to get away from 
myself  
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel powerless to change 
myself  
1 2 3 4 5 
I would like to escape from 
my thoughts and feelings  
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel trapped inside myself  
1 2 3 4 5 
I would like to get away from 
who I am and start again  
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel I'm in a deep hole I 
can't get out of 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am in a situation I feel 
trapped in  
1 2 3 4 5 
I have a strong desire to 
escape from things in my life  
1 2 3 4 5 
I am in a relationship I can't 
get out of  
1 2 3 4 5 
I often have the feeling that I 
would just like to run away  
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel powerless to change 
things  
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel trapped by my 
obligations  
1 2 3 4 5 
I can see no way out of my 
current situation  
1 2 3 4 5 
I would like to get away from 
other more powerful people 
in my life 
1 2 3 4 5 
I have a strong desire to get 
away and stay away from 
where I am now  
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel trapped by other people 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Event-rating scale (ERS: Study Two) 
 
This questionnaire asks some questions relating to the experience of positive and negative 
events that have happened over the past six months, and how optimistic you feel for the 
upcoming six months. For each of the questions below please provide a rating of between 0 
and 100 and type that answer into the textbox. 
 
 
1. How many positive life events have you experienced over the past 6 months? 
(e.g., weddings, graduation, job promotions, achievements) 
 
Very Few                                                                            Many/A Lot 
 0                                                                                                                  100 
|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
 
 
2. How many negative life events have you experienced over the past 6 months?  
(e.g., bereavements, unemployment, losses) 
 
Very Few                                                                            Many/A Lot 
0                                                                                                                  100 
|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
 
 
3. Overall, how happy/positive were the events of the last six months?  
 
Not very happy/positive                                                      Very happy/positive 
0                                                                                                                  100 
|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
 
 
4. Overall, how sad/negative were the events of the last six months?  
 
Not very sad/negative                                            Very sad/negative  
0                                                                                                                  100 
|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
 
 
5. How do you feel when you think about the past six months of your life? 
 
Very negative/sad                                Very positive/happy  
0                                                                                                                  100 
|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
 
 
6. Looking forward, how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel about the next six 
months of your life?  
 
Very           Neither optimistic       Very 
pessimistic    or pessimistic      optimistic 
0                                                         50                                                     100 
|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
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Hypomania Interpretations Questionnaire (HIQ-10) 
 
Listed below are situations that you may or may not have ever experienced. For each situation, please 
circle the letter next to each reason that corresponds to how much that might explain the situation for 
you. Please check every item for each question. Also, answer whether you have experienced the 
situation in the last 3 months by circling A (yes) or B (no). Please answer all questions. 
 
                 A                                         B                  C                  D 
          Not at all          Somewhat          Quite a bit         A great deal  
 
1. If I thought my thoughts were going too fast I would probably think it was because: 
I am intelligent and full of good ideas.                                                          A     B    C   D 
There are too many competing tasks for me at present.                                A B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes B-no 
 
2. If I was on the go so much that other people couldn’t keep up with me, I would probably  
think it was because: 
I am overdoing it and will soon need a rest.                                                      A     B    C   D 
I have more stamina than other people.                                                             A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
3. If my thoughts were coming so thick and fast that other people couldn’t keep up, I would 
probably think it was because: 
I am full of good ideas and others are too slow.    A     B    C   D 
There are too many demands on my time.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
4. If I was feeling ‘sped up’ inside, I would probably think it was because: 
I am under pressure from work or social demands.    A     B    C   D 
I am in good spirits and can take on challenges.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes B-no 
 
5. If I felt physically restless and kept moving from one activity to the next, I would probably 
think it was because: 
I am full of energy and raring to go.    A     B    C   D 
There is too much pressure and I need a break.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
6. If I felt impulsive, I would probably think it was because: 
I could make rapid decisions and good choices.    A     B    C   D 
There are lots of external demands.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
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7. If I felt in high spirits and full of energy, I would probably think it was because: 
I am a talented person with lots to offer.    A     B    C   D 
Things happen to be going well for me at present.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes B-no 
 
8. If I woke up earlier than normal and felt full of energy, I would probably think it was  
   because: 
I am a happy, positive and energetic person.    A     B      C      D 
Something has disrupted my routine.    A     B      C      D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes B-no 
 
9. If I found my thinking was very quick and clear, I would probably think it was because: 
There are few distractions at present.                                                             A  B  C  D 
I am clever and talented.     A    B  C  D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
10. If I found that tastes, smells or things I touched seemed more vivid, I would probably 
   think it was because:  
It is just a phase and will pass.       A        B        C       D 
I am more sensitive and „tuned in‟ than other people.       A        B        C       D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes B-no 
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Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS) 
 
Please answer each item true or false.  Some items may sound like others, but all of them are 
slightly different.  Answer each item individually, and don't worry about how you answered a 
somewhat similar previous item. 
 
Circle either: 
 
True False The beauty of sunsets is greatly overrated. (EXAMPLE) 
 
 
True     False      1. I consider myself to be pretty much an average kind of person. 
 
True     False      2. It would make me nervous to play the clown in front of other people. 
 
True     False      3. I am frequently so “hyper” that my friends kiddingly ask me what drug I‟m  
taking.       
 
True     False     4. I think I would make a good nightclub comedian. 
 
True     False     5. Sometimes ideas and insights come to me so fast that I cannot express them all. 
 
True     False     6. When with groups of people, I usually prefer to let someone else be the center of 
attention. 
 
True     False     7. In unfamiliar surroundings, I am often so assertive and sociable that I surprise 
myself.                                   
 
True     False     8. There are often times when I am so restless that it is impossible for me to sit 
still. 
 
True     False     9. Many people consider me to be amusing but kind of eccentric. 
 
True     False     10. When I feel an emotion, I usually feel it with extreme intensity. 
 
True     False     11. I am frequently in such high spirits that I can‟t concentrate on any one thing for 
too long. 
 
True     False     12. I sometimes have felt that nothing can happen to me until I do what I am meant 
to do in life. 
 
True     False     13. People often come to me when they need a clever idea. 
 
True     False     14. I am no more self-aware than the majority of people. 
 
True     False     15. I often feel excited and happy for no apparent reason. 
 
True     False     16. I can‟t imagine that anyone would ever write a book about my life. 
 
True     False     17. I am usually in an average sort of mood, not too high and not too low. 
 
True     False     18. I often have moods where I feel so energetic and optimistic that I feel I could 
outperform almost anyone at anything.  
 
True     False     19. I have such a wide range of interests that I often don‟t know what to do 
        next. 
 
True     False      20. There have often been times when I had such an excess of energy that I felt 
little need to sleep at night.  
 
True     False      21. My moods do not seem to fluctuate any more than most people‟s do.  
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True     False      22. I very frequently get into moods where I wish I could be everywhere and do 
everything at once. 
 
True     False      23. I expect that someday I will succeed in several different professions. 
 
True     False      24. When I feel very excited and happy, I almost always know the reason why. 
 
True     False      25. When I go to a gathering where I don‟t know anyone, it usually takes me a 
while to feel comfortable. 
 
True     False      26. I think I would make a good actor, because I can play many roles 
convincingly. 
 
True     False      27. I like to have others think of me as a normal kind of person. 
 
True     False      28. I frequently write down the thoughts and insights that come to me when I am 
thinking especially creatively. 
 
True     False      29. I have often persuaded groups of friends to do something really adventurous or 
crazy. 
 
True     False      30. I would really enjoy being a politician and hitting the campaign trail. 
 
True     False      31. I can usually slow myself down when I want to. 
 
True     False      32. I am considered to be kind of a “hyper” person. 
 
True     False      33. I often get so happy and energetic that I am almost giddy. 
 
True     False      34. There are so many fields I could succeed in that it seems a shame to have to 
pick one. 
 
True     False     35. I often get into moods where I feel like many of the rules of life don‟t apply to 
me. 
 
True     False     36. I find it easy to get others to become sexually interested in me. 
 
True     False     37. I seem to be a person whose mood goes up and down easily. 
 
True     False     38. I frequently find that my thoughts are racing. 
 
True     False     39. I am so good at controlling others that it sometimes scares me. 
 
True     False     40. At social gatherings, I am usually the “life of the party”. 
 
True     False     41. I do most of my best work during brief periods of intense inspiration. 
 
True     False     42. I seem to have an uncommon ability to persuade and inspire others. 
 
True     False     43. I have often been so excited about an involving project that I didn‟t care about 
eating or sleeping. 
 
True     False     44. I frequently get into moods where I feel very speeded-up and irritable. 
 
True     False     45. I have often felt happy and irritable at the same time. 
 
True     False     46. I often get into excited moods where it‟s almost impossible for me to stop 
talking. 
 
True     False     47. I would rather be an ordinary success in life than a spectacular failure. 
 
True     False     48. A hundred years after I‟m dead, my achievements will probably have been 
forgotten. 
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The Internal States Scale (ISS) 
 
For each of the following statements, please mark an “X” at the point on the line that best describes 
the way you have felt over the past 24 hours.  While there may have been some change during that 
time, try to give a single summary rating for each item. 
 
  Not at all/                                                                Very much so/ 
           Rarely                                                                 Much of the time 
   
Today my mood is 
changeable 
0                                                                                                                  100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel irritable 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel like a capable 
person 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel like people are 
out to get me 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I actually feel great 
inside 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel impulsive 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel depressed 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today my thoughts are 
going fast 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today it seems like nothing 
will ever work out for me 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel overactive 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel as if the world 
is against me 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel “sped up” 
inside 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel restless 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel argumentative 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
Today I feel energised 
0                                                                                                                   100 
 |….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….| 
 
Today I feel:        Depressed/Down                  Normal                    Manic/High 
                  
-50                                              0                                          +50    
|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι….|….ι…| 
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Interpretations of Depression Questionnaire (IDQ) 
 
Listed below are situations that you may or may not have experienced. For each situation, please 
circle the letter next to each reason that corresponds to how much that might explain the situation 
for you. Please check every item for each question. Also, answer whether you have experienced the 
situation in the last 3 months by circling A (yes) or B (no). Please answer all questions. 
                 A                                         B                  C                  D 
          Not at all          Somewhat          Quite a bit         A great deal  
 
1. If I felt I couldn’t enjoy life as easily as other people, I would probably think it was 
because: 
Current pressures are distracting me from my interests    A     B    C   D 
I don‟t get pleasure from anything anymore    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes B-no 
 
2. If I experience guilty feelings even though I may not have done anything particularly 
wrong I would probably think it was because: 
I am being hard on myself because I under strain at the moment    A     B    C   D 
I am a bad person and deserve to be punished    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
3. If I have exploded at others and afterwards felt bad about myself I would probably think it 
was because:  
I am a nasty person.    A     B    C   D 
I am under a lot of pressure at the moment.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
4. If I felt cut off from other people I would probably think it was because: 
I am an insensitive person.    A     B    C   D 
Things are difficult at the moment and I have little energy  
for other things. 
   A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
5. If I had upsetting or bad thoughts going through my mind I would probably think it was 
because: 
I am rather low at present but when things improve the 
thoughts will go. 
   A     B    C   D 
I am a worthless person to have these types of thoughts.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes B-no 
 
6. If I felt down on myself I would probably think it was because: 
I am a bad person, even towards myself.    A     B    C   D 
Current problems are leading me to be rather hard on myself.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
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7. If I felt that the future was bleak and things were unlikely to improve I would probably think it 
was because: 
Situations look bleak, but will change as things improve.    A     B    C   D 
I am a negative pessimistic person    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
8. If there were times when I struggled to control an urge to cry or found myself crying 
without really understanding why I would probably think it was because: 
I am a weak, pathetic, person.    A     B    C   D 
My difficulties have affected me just at the moment.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
9. If I have periods of time when I felt a persistent sense of gloom I would probably think it 
was because: 
I am a failure and a burden to others.    A     B    C   D 
Things are going wrong for me just at present.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
 
10. If I felt that nothing was working out for me I would probably think it was because: 
Too many obstacles are being put in my way at present.    A     B    C   D 
I struggle to get anything right in my life.    A     B    C   D 
Have you experienced this situation in the last 3 months?                      A-yes  B-no 
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 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)  
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent 
you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.  
 
Please write the appropriate number in the space next to each word. Use the following scale to 
record your answers 
 
         1      2         3         4       5 
 very slightly  a little  moderately quite a bit extremely 
 or not at all 
 
  1      ___ interested   2      ___ irritable 
 
  3      ___ distressed   4      ___ alert 
 
  5      ___ excited   6      ___ ashamed 
 
  7      ___ upset    8      ___ inspired 
 
  9      ___ strong   10    ___ nervous 
 
  11    ___ guilty   12    ___ determined 
 
  13    ___ scared   14    ___ attentive 
 
  15    ___ hostile   16    ___ jittery 
 
  17    ___ enthusiastic   18    ___ active 
 
  19    ___ proud   20    ___ afraid 
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The Problem Solving Scale (PSS) 
 
Please indicate how characteristic or descriptive each of the following statements is of you by using 
the code given below. 
 
+3 very characteristic of me, extremely descriptive. 
+2 rather characteristic of me, quite descriptive 
+1 somewhat characteristic of me, slightly descriptive. 
-1 somewhat uncharacteristic of me, slightly undescriptive 
-2 rather uncharacteristic of me, quite undescriptive 
-3 very uncharacteristic of me, extremely nondescriptive 
 
When I do a boring job, I think about the less boring parts of the job and 
the reward that I will receive once I am finished. 
 
When I have to do something that is anxiety arousing for me, I try to 
visualize how I will overcome my anxieties while doing it. 
 
When I am faced with a difficult problem, I try to approach its solution 
in a systematic way. 
 
When I find that I have difficulties in concentrating on my reading, I 
look for ways to increase my concentration. 
 
When I plan to work, I remove all the things that are not relevant to my 
work. 
 
When I try to get rid of a bad habit I first try to find out all the factors 
that maintain this habit. 
 
When I find it difficult to settle down and do a certain job, I look for 
ways to help me settle down. 
 
First of all I prefer to finish a job that I have to do and then start doing 
the things I really like. 
 
When I feel that I am too impulsive, I tell myself „„stop and think before 
you do anything‟‟ 
 
Even when I am terribly angry at somebody, I consider my actions very 
carefully. 
 
Facing the need to make a decision I usually find out all the possible 
alternatives instead of deciding quickly and spontaneously. 
 
When I realise that I cannot help myself but be late for an important 
meeting, I tell myself to keep calm. 
 
I usually plan my work when faced with a number of things to do.  
When I am short of money, I decide to record all my expenses in order 
to plan more carefully for the future. 
 
If I find it difficult to concentrate on a certain job, I divide the job into 
smaller segments. 
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Responses to Positive Affect scale (RPA) 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel happy. Please read each of the following 
items and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or always think or do each one when you 
feel happy, excited, or enthused. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you 
should do.  
 
1 2 3 4 
Almost never Sometimes Often Almost always 
 
 
When you are feeling happy, how often do you…  
 
1) …notice how you feel full of energy 1        2         3         4   
2) …savour this moment 1        2         3         4   
3) …think "I am getting everything done" 1        2         3         4   
4) …think about how you feel up for doing everything 1        2         3         4   
5) …think "I am living up to my potential" 1        2         3         4   
6) …think "It is too good to be true" 1        2         3         4   
7) …think about how happy you feel 1        2         3         4   
8) …think about how strong you feel 1        2         3         4   
9) …think about things that could go wrong 1        2         3         4   
10)  …remind yourself that these feelings won't last 1        2         3         4   
11)  …think "People will think I am bragging“  1        2         3         4   
12)  …think about how hard it is to concentrate 1        2         3         4   
13)  …think "I am achieving everything" 1        2         3         4   
14)  …think "I don't deserve this" 1        2         3         4   
15)  …think "My streak of luck is going to end soon" 1        2         3         4   
16)  …think about how proud you are of yourself 1        2         3         4   
17) …think about the things that have not gone well for you. 1        2         3         4   
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Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) 
 
You will find below a list of things which people might do or think when they feel sad, low or in a 
depressed mood. Please indicate if you never, sometimes, often or always react in these ways when 
you feel sad or depressed mood, by placing a tick in the appropriate column. Please indicate what 
you generally do, not what you think you ought to do. 
 
      Never Sometimes Often Always 
1. Think about how alone you feel   
    
2. Think “I won‟t be able to do my job if I don‟t snap 
out of this” 
    
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness 
    
4. Think about how hard it is to concentrate 
    
5. Think “what am I doing to deserve this?” 
    
6. Think about how passive and unmotivated you 
feel 
    
7. Analyse recent events to try to understand why 
you are depressed 
    
8. Think about how you don‟t seem to feel anything 
anymore 
    
9. Think “why can‟t I get going?” 
    
10. Think “why do I always react this way?” 
    
11. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel 
this way 
    
12. Write down what you are thinking and anlayse it 
    
13. Think about a recent situation wishing it had gone 
better 
    
14. Think “I won‟t be able to concentrate if I keep 
feeling this way” 
    
15. Think “why do I have problems other people don‟t 
have?” 
    
16. Think “why can‟t I handle things better?” 
    
17. Think about how sad you feel 
    
18. Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults 
and mistakes 
    
19. Think about how you don‟t feel up to doing 
anything 
    
20. Analyse your personality to try to understand your 
feelings 
    
21. Go somewhere alone to think about your feelings 
    
22. Think about how angry you are with yourself 
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Items from the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT)  
& Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Test (SCEFT) 
 
SCEPT Instructions 
 
Below you will find eleven sentences. Actually these are only parts of sentences, because 
only the beginning of each of the sentences is provided. The purpose of the task is for you 
to complete each of the sentences by thinking about and recalling a specific 
autobiographical memory by typing your answer in the textbox provided.  An 
“autobiographical memory” refers to your memory for a specific event that you have 
previously experienced, which may have occurred at any time from when you were small 
up until now.  You can complete the sentences any way you want, just as long as what you 
write corresponds to the provided stem.  Also, make sure that each of the sentences refers 
to a different topic or event.   
 
Original SCEPT Items 
1. I still remember well how . . . 
2. I still recall how/that I . . . 
3. Last year . . . 
4. In the past . . . 
5. Last week I . . . 
6. I can still picture how . . .  
7. When I think back to/of . . . 
8. I will never forget . . . 
9. The most important thing that I have ever… 
10. Last year I . . . 
11. At the time when I … 
SCEPT-Win/Loss Items 
1. The word "winner" reminds me of 
when I... 
2. When I failed... 
3. The time I felt particularly 
successful... 
4. It was disappointing when… 
5. My greatest achievement was... 
6. "Loss" makes me think of when... 
7. I had achieved... 
8. I was let down when... 
 
Items from the Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Test (SCEFT) 
(Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009, same instructions as the SCEPT) 
1. In the future I can see well how . . . 
2. In the future I imagine how/that I . . . 
3. Next year . . . 
4. In the future . . . 
5. Next week I . . . 
6. In the future I can picture how . . . 
7. When I look forward to . . . 
8. In the future I will . . . 
9. The most important thing that I will ever . . . 
10. Next year I . . . 
11. At some time I will . . . 
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The University Means-End Problem Solving Task (UMEPS) 
 
Instructions: During our day-to-day lives we are faced with a variety of problems which we must 
solve in order to cope successfully with our environment.  In this study we are interested in how 
people respond to a problem and how they would attempt to overcome that problem.   
 
Below are a series of situations.  Please read each situation and think about how you would solve 
that situation.  As you read each problem, try to imagine yourself in the situation and think about 
what you would do to bring the story to a resolution. Be sure to state what steps you might take to 
achieve the stated outcome.  Once you have decided how you would overcome the problem in 
question, please write/type your answer in the box.  Please also provide a rating for how effective 
you think that solution would be for that situation. 
 
 
Break up with boyfriend/girlfriend 
You have been in a relationship with your boyfriend/girlfriend for the past two years.  You are very 
happy and feel positive about the future of the relationship.  However, your boyfriend/girlfriend has 
decided to end your relationship.  Although you wish to still be with him/her, you know that the 
relationship is over.  You are unsure how to pursue a friendship with your former 
boyfriend/girlfriend.  We end the story with your relationship improving with your former 
boy/girlfriend. 
 
Want to have a relationship 
Compared to your friends, you have little luck in meeting potential boyfriends/girlfriends.  As you 
have got older, many of your friends are now in stable long-term relationships.  You are starting to 
feel somewhat lonely because your friends spend more time with their boyfriends/girlfriends.  Even 
though you are shy, you want to meet a new romantic partner.  We end the story with you feeling 
less lonely. 
 
Trouble with job supervisor 
You have kept working at your part-time weekend job whilst you study at university.  Although 
you have worked in the same job for many years, you still enjoy working there.  Even though you 
work harder than your colleagues, your supervisor seems to dislike you and is overly critical of 
your work.  You have started to hate your job and your supervisor, but you cannot afford to not to 
have a part-time job.  The story ends with you ceasing to hate your job. 
 
Gambling 
You and your friends have recently started to visit the local casino.  You enjoy the banter and thrill 
of gambling, particularly when your friends lose their money.  As you have started to visit the 
casino more frequently, one of your friends has expressed concern over how much money you are 
losing when gambling.  You check your bank statements and realise that your friend may be right.  
We end the story with your gambling debts being reduced. 
 
Problems with course-mates 
As part of your degree, you have to design and run an experiment with a group of your course 
mates.  The lecturer has appointed you as chair of the group, with responsibility for managing the 
group and the experiment.  You are finding that some of your course mates aren‟t turning up to 
meetings or doing their share of the work.  Because this project forms a big part of your grade for 
the year, you need to get a good grade from running the group and a successful experiment.  We 
end the story with your group running a successful experiment and being awarded a good 
coursework grade. 
 
Lost essay materials 
You have been working hard on researching the topic of your new essay question.  You have been 
spending a fair amount of time in the library searching through academic journals and books as you 
plan out your essay.  When you come to write the essay a couple of days later, you realise that you 
have lost your notes and essay plan you had carefully researched at the library.   There isn‟t much 
time for you to write and hand-in the essay.  We end the story with you completing the essay in 
time for the deadline. 
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Friend is avoiding you 
You have started to get the impression that one of your friends is ignoring you.  You have tried 
sending emails, text messages, making phone calls and also tried contacting them through online 
social-networking websites without any luck. You wonder whether you have done something 
wrong. You are generally concerned about your friend, particularly as you haven‟t seen them or 
heard from them in a long time. We end the story with you eventually contacting your friend. 
 
Stranded after a night out 
You are on a night out with your university friends and housemates in a nearby city to where you 
study. You have to leave early to travel back, after saying goodbye to your friends and leaving the 
nightclub you become lost.  Eventually you find your way to the train station. Unfortunately the 
last train has gone, with your friends onboard, and you are stranded with little money. The story 
ends with you returning to the house which you share with your friends. 
 
Poor relationship with parents 
Although you spend most of your time away at university, you still have a poor relationship with 
your parents.  Whilst you spend little time back at home, you still seem to get into heated 
arguments with your parents on a regular basis.  When you are at university you keep thinking 
about your parents.  You wish that you could have a better relationship with them.  We end the 
story with your feeling closer to your parents. 
 
Depressed feelings 
Although you are generally a positive and upbeat person, you find yourself getting upset at the 
slightest little thing.  You are also scared that you‟ll just start crying for no reason, but you cannot 
think of a specific reason for these feelings.  You‟ve lost all motivation for doing your course-work 
and you don‟t want to socialise anymore.  You want to overcome these feelings.  We end the story 
with you overcoming these feelings. 
 
Worry about how to pay back student loan 
Like many students you took out a student loan to help pay your tuition fees, rent and living costs.  
You have just checked your bank and student loan statements and realise that your overall debt is 
much larger than what you anticipated.  You are also concerned that you don‟t have a job lined up 
for when you graduate.  As you look at your statements you wonder how you will repay your debts. 
We end the story with you overcoming your worries regarding the repayment of your debt. 
 
Worry about finances 
You are concerned about whether you have enough money to afford going on nights out with 
friends, on top of paying your bills. You have started to notice that you have less money at the end 
of each month. You want to have an active social life, but you don‟t want to run up large amounts 
of debt. You still have another year of university to complete, so you wonder how you can manage 
your money better until then.  The story ends with you feeling less worried about your finances. 
 
Alcohol abuse 
Like many undergraduate students, you enjoy going out binge drinking in pubs and nightclubs with 
your friends. However, you are now finding it harder to concentrate during your lectures and 
seminars the day after a drinking session.  Sometimes your hangover is so awful that you cannot 
get out of bed to go to university. You think that your drinking may be jeopardising your university 
work and degree. The story ends with you finding it easier to concentrate. 
 
Social Isolation 
You have moved into your university halls of residence at the start of your first year of your degree 
course. You have moved to a new city many hundreds of miles away from your family and friends 
back home. You do not know anyone at your new university or in your new city. You are currently 
sat alone in your flat, and you feel afraid to go out. We end the story with your feelings of 
loneliness going away. 
 
Stress 
There are number of upcoming deadlines for pieces of coursework for your degree.  You have 
started to feel stressed about how much coursework you have, and the decreasing amount of time in 
which you have to complete it.  Your other course mates seem to be managing their time more 
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effectively compared to you.  You wonder how you will be able to manage your time and complete 
your coursework on time.  We end the story with you handing in your finished coursework on time. 
 
Exam revision 
It is the end of the semester and your lectures have now finished.  You have just realised that your 
examinations are due to start in three weeks time.  You have only completed a small amount of the 
assigned reading for your courses and you have not kept your lecture notes up to date.  You need to 
get good grades in these exams to improve your overall grade average.  We end the story with you 
feeling prepared for your exams. 
 
Start of new university year 
You have decided that you want to make the most of this upcoming academic year.  During 
fresher‟s week you signed up to a number of interesting societies and have volunteered to be a 
student representative for your course and volunteer for a local charity.  A couple of weeks into the 
semester you feel increasingly excited about all the things you are doing.  However, you also feel 
that you can‟t slow down or relax.  The story ends with your feelings of excitement being reduced. 
 
Argument with housemates 
You are sharing a house with two of your friends from university.  Although you get along with 
your housemates, you have found yourself in the middle of a number of arguments between your 
two housemates.  You try your best to stay out of these arguments as you don‟t want to take sides, 
but the situation isn‟t improving.  As you still get along with everyone you feel that you should do 
something to resolve this situation.  We end the story with the tension between yourself and your 
housemates being reduced. 
 
Worry over job hunting 
You are only a few months away from graduating from university.  Like many final year students, 
you are thinking about your future job prospects and graduate career options.  You have recently 
read in a newspaper that there will be fewer graduate jobs available, meaning there will be more 
applicants per available job.  You are sure that you want to get a job, but you are worried that there 
is too much competition from other graduates for the best graduate training scheme job.  The story 
ends with the reduction of your worries about your future career. 
 
Sleeping too much 
When you first came to university you were able to stay out late and then attend lectures, play 
sports with friends and generally have a good time, whilst keeping up with your work.  But it is 
now your final year and you find that you spend your nights tossing and turning.  You also find that 
your sleep is troubled by nightmares.  The story ends with your quality of sleep improving. 
 
Abdominal pain 
You are normally in good health, but you have recently begun to experience stomach cramps.  
You‟ve also been feeling stressed out with lab classes where you are not on top of your work and 
which you dread. You have noticed that you feel agitated and nervous throughout the day.  In the 
past you have ignored the early signs of illness and have recovered without having to seek help.  
We end the story with your symptoms disappearing. 
 
Losing self-confidence 
Now you are in your third year you feel that you want to do as well as you can and you are aiming 
for a first. You have to write a short dissertation half way through the first semester. To your 
surprise, your tutor makes a number of negative comments on your first draft of your dissertation. 
You also have to give a talk critically analysing a journal article. During your talk people look 
bored. You are starting to lose confidence in yourself.  The story ends with you managing to 
improve your own self-confidence. 
 
Problems with course-mates 
As part of your degree, you have to design and run an experiment with a group of your course 
mates.  The lecturer has appointed you as chair of the group, with responsibility for managing the 
group and the experiment.  You are finding that some of your course mates aren‟t turning up to 
meetings or doing their share of the work.  You need to get a good grade because this project forms 
a big part of your overall grade for the year.  We end the story with your group running a 
successful experiment and being awarded a good grade. 
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The Willingly Approached Set of Statistically Unlikely Pursuits scale (WASSUP) 
 
(Modified by R. Dempsey for use with British samples, * = amended items) 
 
For each item on this page, choose the answer (from the choices just below) that best 
reflects how likely you are to set that as a goal for yourself. Code that answer onto your 
answer sheet. 
 
    1 = NO CHANCE I will set this goal for myself 
    2 = Slight chance I will set this goal for myself 
    3 = Moderate chance I will set this goal for myself 
    4 = Very good chance I will set this goal for myself 
    5 = Definitely WILL set this goal for myself 
 
1.    celebrities will want to be your friends.  
2.    each day of your work will be fulfilling.  
3.    everyone you know will love you.  
4.    someone will write a book about your life.  
5.    whenever you have a problem, your friends will drop what they are doing to 
support you. 
 
6.    you will appear regularly on TV.  
7.    you will be famous.  
8.    you will be important in political circles.  
9.    you will be on a magazine list of the sexiest people alive.  
10.   you will be president/leader of your country.*  
11.   you will create a great work of art, music, or poetry.  
12.   you will create world peace.  
13.   you will develop a TV show or a movie.  
14.   you will do only things you really like to do, and nothing else.  
15.   you will enjoy every day to the max.  
16.   you will have 10 close friends.  
17.   you will have 100 friends  
18.   you will have 20 million pounds or more.*  
19.   you will have 40 close friends.  
20.   you will have a major role in a movie.  
21.   you will have a million pounds or more. *  
22.   you will have more than 50 lovers in your lifetime.  
23.   you will have the closest family relationships imaginable.  
24.   you will run a FTSE 100 company.*  
25.   you will self-actualize or reach Nirvana.  
26.   you will stop world hunger.  
27.   you will write a popular book.  
28.   your children will see you as the perfect parent.  
29.   your relationship with your partner will be sheer bliss for years.  
30.   your relationship will be more romantic than Romeo and Juliet  
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Autobiographical Memory Test Instructions 
 
I am interested in your memory for events that have happened in your life.  I am going to 
read to you some words.  For each word I want you to think of an event that happened to 
you which the word reminds you of.  The event could have happened at any point in your 
life from when you were small to last week, but please do not include memories from last 
week.  It might be an important event, or trivial event. 
 
The memory you recall should be a specific event – that is: an event that lasted less than a 
day and occurred at a particular time and place.  So if I said the word “good” – it would not 
be OK to say, “I always enjoy a good party”, because that does not mention a specific 
event.  But it would be OK to say “I had a good time at Jane‟s party” because that is a 
specific event.   It is important to try and retrieve a different memory or event for each cue 
word.  
 
Let us try some words for practice: Bread, Library & Holiday 
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Coding Manual for AMT Study (R. Dempsey 2010) 
 
Responses on the AMT will be coded for: 
 
1. Specificity of Memory – referring to the level of detail described in the memory. 
2. Response Latency – the time taken for the participant to recall the memory, 
referring to the time between the end of the cue word presentation to the start of the 
participant‟s memory recall. 
 
Specificity of Memory Coding 
 
Responses on the AMT task will be coded as either a specific memory, a 
general/overgeneral memory or an omission: 
 
Memory Specificity 
Specific  
- Refers to an event that took place at a particular time and a place 
- Event also has a duration of less than a day  
- Participants may explicitly refer to a time or place, OR it may be 
inferred from the memory description that the event took place at 
particular time/location (e.g. “when I had my job interview at 
x…”). 
G
en
er
al
 
Extended  
- An event that took a longer period of time than a day 
- Could refer to a relatively specific time – but lasted more than a 
day, e.g. going on a holiday, spending a weekend with a 
friend/boyfriend/girlfriend/partner/spouse, etc. 
- Event could also have taken longer than a week, e.g. referring to 
weeks – going on a summer camp 
Categoric 
- Refers to either a category of events or to a repeating series of 
events (e.g. “when I went shopping…”) 
- No reference to a specific occasion – not able to determine that the 
participant is referring to a specific occasion 
Semantic 
Associate 
- Participant doesn‟t make reference to any sort of event, but makes a 
connection to themselves or to something else in relation to the cue 
word. 
- E.g. self reference such as a trait or a skill/ability – e.g. “I am a poor 
cook”, “I‟m always pessimistic” 
- Alternatively, the participant may just make some form of general 
trait(ish) statement, such as “me and my brother have never got 
along that well” 
Omission 
- No response to cue word (participant may fail to recall a memory 
within the time limit) or an unintelligible response. 
- If a participant recalls a memory outside of the 60 second limit, this 
is coded as an omission. 
 
Response Latency Timing 
- The time between the experimenter‟s presentation of the cue word (e.g. “Happy”, 
“Sad”, “Pessimistic”), to the first utterance of the recalled memory (this is highlighted 
in the transcript). 
- Utterances/fillers such as “erm”, “ah”, or utterances that do not refer to the recalled 
memory are not counted.  
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The University Means-End Problem Solving Task Scoring Manual 
 
Overview of UMEPS coding 
Number of relevant means A count of the number of effective solution steps (or “means”) 
Number of irrelevant means 
A count of the number of ineffective solution steps (or 
“means”) 
Effectiveness of the solution(s)  
Observer and participant made ratings of the effectiveness of 
the described solution(s). 
Specificity of solution 
An observer-made rating of the specificity of the described 
solution, in terms of the amount of detail described in the 
solution. 
 
Number of relevant means 
This is a simple count of the number of steps described in the solution.  The number of 
relevant means should be a count of each potentially effective step to achieve the outcome.  
A relevant mean should refer to an action or behaviour that attempts to reduce the problem, 
rather than restating the desired outcome.  For example, for a situation describing an 
individual who is losing too money gambling, stating that “I would stop gambling” doesn‟t 
refer to a step that would be taken to overcome the problem (stopping gambling is too 
generic and doesn‟t refer to a specific strategy or step).  However, stating: “stop going to 
the casino”, “take less money with me when I do go to the casino”, or “visit the casino less 
frequently” would all count as relevant means as each refer to specific behavioural 
strategies that would assist in reducing money lost when gambling.  During coding, raters 
may encounter occasions where participants state very similar means in the same solution 
description.  Each solution mean should refer to a separate mean, and not be a restatement 
of a previously mentioned mean.  For example, if a participant states that they would talk 
to or seek advice from two different individuals, this should be treated as two separate 
solution means (if effective) (e.g. “I would talk to my course leader/lecturer, and also talk 
to my friends from the lecture about problem x”). 
 
Number of irrelevant means 
This is a count of the number of ineffective or irrelevant steps described in a solution.  
Irrelevant solution means could include attempts to resolve the problem in an ineffective 
manner or that would exacerbate the current problem (e.g., “I would panic”), and may also 
include descriptions of behaviours, actions, or solution steps that are simply not relevant to 
the problematic situation at hand. 
 
Effectiveness of solution(s) 
For our studies, a point 5 likert scale was selected for the observer ratings of solution 
efficacy to match the 5 point scale ratings made by the participants for the likelihood of 
their solutions solving the problem (see next page for further guidelines on scoring solution 
effectiveness). 
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Guidelines for the observer-ratings of solution efficacy 
Score Efficacy of solution Scoring guidelines 
1 Very ineffective 
-   Solution doesn‟t attempt to resolve the problem 
-   Very unclear how solution would resolve problem 
-   Stated solution has a high likelihood of exacerbating the 
problem or has a high likelihood of creating further problems 
-   Solution(s) may be of a highly risky nature 
2 Ineffective 
-   Solution(s) demonstrate a weak attempt to resolve problem 
-   Low chances of solution(s) resolving the problem 
-   Some chance of the solution exacerbating the problem, or 
creating new  problems 
-   Solution(s) may be of a risky nature (but not highly risky – see 
above) 
3 Neutral 
-   Solution(s) are neither effective nor ineffective 
-   Solution(s) may have equal chances of resolving & failing to 
    resolve the problem (50/50 chances). 
4 Effective 
- Solution demonstrates a good attempt to resolve problem 
-   Solution(s) have a good chance of resolving problem (but not 
guaranteed/not a definitive solution) 
-   Some chance that solution will not work (but low chance) 
5 Very effective 
-   A very clear focus upon resolving the problem at hand 
-   Solution features a number of different means to resolve the 
problem. 
-   Participant may describe solution means in a detailed 
sequence 
-   The solution(s) have a very good chance of resolving the 
problem. 
-   Solution(s) may be particularly novel or resourceful (but 
realistic to apply in nature). 
 
Specificity of solution means 
The solution means generated on the UMEPS can also be subjected to an observer rating of 
“specificity”, referring to the amount of detail described by the participant in their solution 
to the stated problem.   
 
Score Specificity of solution Scoring guidelines 
1 Very unspecific 
- Solution is described in minimal detail (e.g. one to two 
words). 
- Solution is vague and contains no detailed or additional 
information 
2 Unspecific 
- One to two sentences. 
- Solution is still generally vague, and lacking in additional 
information. 
3 Specific 
- Solution contains at least 2 sentences. 
- Some additional information is included. 
4 Moderate Specificity 
- Four sentences or more. 
- Contains a fair amount of additional information. 
- Extra detail is provided on at least one aspect of the solution. 
5 Very specific 
- Very detailed solution/story. 
- Clear information (no vague or ambiguous information). 
- Numerous suggestions made. 
- Extra detail provided on three or more aspects of the solution. 
 
